Valencia Estates Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Hazan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-cv-24879-ALTMAN

VALENCIA ESTATES

HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELIZABETH HAZAN, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________________/

ORDER

One of our Defendants, Sean Meehan, has asked us to reconsider our decision to remand this

case to state court. See Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 31]. After careful review,

we DENY the Motion.

Our Plaintiff, Valencia Estates Homeowners’ Association, Inc., filed a complaint in state court

against Meehan and two other Defendants (Elizabeth Hazan and 6913 Valencia, LLC), asserting one

claim for foreclosure of a lien and a second for breach of a declaration. See State-Court Complaint (the

“Complaint”) [ECF No. 9] ¶¶ 18–39.1 On December 13, 2024, Meehan removed this action to federal

court, arguing that we have “diversity” jurisdiction over the case and that the proceeding “is related

to” a separate action under Title 11. See Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] at 4–5 (cleaned up). On

December 16, 2024, Valencia Estates timely moved to remand the case back to state court. See Motion

to Remand [ECF No. 7].

1 Valencia Estates also named as Defendants “JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, as unknown tenants or

occupants (‘TENANTS’).” Complaint at 1. But we dismissed them from the case, see Paperless Order

[ECF No. 16], because “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court,” Richardson v. Johnson,

598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010).

On December 23, 2024, Meehan amended his notice of removal to: (1) allege that the removal

was proper under “28 U.S. Code 1452” because of the (supposedly) related “bankruptcy case,” and

(2) justify the removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) because of an alleged “deprivation of constitutional

rights” by “the presiding judge of the state court action[.]” Amended Notice of Removal [ECF No.

10] ¶¶ 1–6. On January 16, 2025, Valencia Estates responded with two more motions to remand. See

Renewed Motion to Remand (“Renewed Motion”) [ECF No. 23]; Motion to Remand for Failure to

Comply with Court Orders [ECF No. 24]. In the Renewed Motion, Valencia Estates advanced five

arguments. First, it said that we couldn’t reconsider Judge Darrin Gayles’s decision to remand this

complaint back to state court. See Renewed Motion at 10 (“Defendants are effectively asking this Court

to reconsider the [Judge Gayles] Remand Order, which this Court cannot do.”).2 Second, Valencia

Estates contended that the new notice was untimely. Id. at 11. Third, Valencia Estates argued that we

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because “the parties are not diverse.” Ibid. (cleaned

up). Fourth, Valencia Estates maintained that “the original proceeding is not related to the bankruptcy

action[.]” Id. at 14. Fifth, Valencia Estates insisted that this “is not a civil rights case under 28 U.S.C. §

1443(1)[.]” Id. at 17. In the Motion to Remand for Failure to Comply with Court Orders, Valencia

Estates noted that Meehan had repeatedly failed to comply with our orders—specifically, with our

“Order Requiring Removal Status Report And Joint Scheduling Report” and our “Show Cause

Order.” Motion to Remand for Failure to Comply with Court Orders ¶¶ 5, 7, 10–11, 13 (requesting

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)).

We ultimately struck both remand motions and ordered Valencia Estates to file “one single

motion to remand combining its arguments.” Paperless Order [ECF No. 25]. Valencia Estates

2 Judge Gayles (of our Court) already remanded the Complaint because “there is no complete

diversity” and because “this action is unrelated to the Bankruptcy Action.” Remand Order in First

Removal Action, Valencia Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Hazan et al., 1:23-cv-24780-DPG (Mar.

5, 2024), ECF No. 30 at 5–6.

complied with this instruction on January 21, 2025. See Operative Motion to Remand [ECF No. 26].

In this latest remand motion, Valencia Estates re-raised all the arguments it had advanced in the earlier

motions. Under our Rules, the Defendants had 14 days—or until February 4, 2025—to respond to

this motion. S.D. FLA. L. R. 7.1(c)(1) (“For all motions, except motions served with the summons and

complaint, each party opposing a motion shall file and serve an opposing memorandum of law no

later than fourteen [ ] days after service of the motion.”). When that day came and went without a

response from the Defendants, we granted the Operative Remand Motion by default (on February 6,

2025). See Order Granting Remand [ECF No. 27] (“Since fourteen days have passed and no defendant

has responded, we now grant the Motion by default.” (citing S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (“For all motions,

except motions served with the summons and complaint, each party opposing a motion shall file and

serve an opposing memorandum of law no later than fourteen [ ] days after service of the motion.

Failure to do so may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion by default.”))).

The next day, February 7, 2025, Meehan filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which we

resolve here. In that Motion, Meehan (rightly notes) that he had “3 extra days” to file his response

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) because he “was served by mail”—thus extending his

response deadline to “February 7, 2025.” Motion at 1–2. He therefore asks us to vacate our Order

Granting Remand “and rule again with the benefit of his response in opposition to remand.” Id. at 2.

Later that same day, Meehan filed what he called his “Response in Opposition to Remand[.]” Response

in Opposition (“Response”) [ECF No. 32] at 1. But that Response, if you can call it that, includes no

argument, factual development, or citation to any legal authority at all. See Response at 1 (advancing

no argument at all beyond “request[ing] the court deny the motion to remand and allow the case to

proceed in this court”). Our Local Rules are clear that “[e]very motion [or response or reply] when

filed and served shall incorporate a memorandum of law citing supporting authorities.” S.D. FLA. L.R.

7.1(a)(1); see also S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (“[E]ach party opposing a motion shall file and serve an

opposing memorandum of law[.]”); cf. Belony v. Amtrust Bank, 2011 WL 2297669, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June

8, 2011) (Marra, J.) (“The Defendant’s failure to cite any authority for this principle makes it difficult

for the Court to rule in its favor.”); ibid. (noting that the “Defendant’s deficient memorandum of law

is itself a basis to deny its motion”); Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir.

2009) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal

authority are waived.”). And our Circuit has been clear that these rules apply with equal force to pro se

litigants. See, e.g., In re Ellingsworth Residential Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 125 F.4th 1365, 1377–78 (11th Cir. 2025)

(“By making her arguments in a perfunctory manner without authority or support, [pro se appellant]

Guan has waived the right to have the Court consider her arguments.”); Jamison v. United States Marshals

Serv., 2024 WL 4524681, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2024) (“By failing to provide supporting arguments

and authority in his brief to challenge the denial of his deliberate indifference claim on the merits, [pro

se appellant] Jamison abandoned the issue.”). Since Meehan’s Response isn’t really a response, in short,

we would have granted the Operative Motion to Remand even if we had waited for his submission.

Accordingly, we DENY the Motion for Reconsideration because Meehan’s Response hasn’t added

anything to our analysis of this dispute.

***

But there are other valid reasons to remand this case. First, the law is clear that all defendants

must consent to removal. See Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1049 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he law is well settled that in cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to

the removal of a case to federal court. . . . Like all rules governing removal, this unanimity requirement

must be strictly interpreted and enforced because of the significant federalism concerns arising in the

context of federal removal jurisdiction.”); id. at 1050 (“Beginning with the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900), federal courts have universally

required unanimity of consent in removal cases involving multiple defendants.” (cleaned up)). In our

case, neither of the other Defendants—Hazan and 6913 Valencia—signed either the Notice of Removal

or the Amended Notice of Removal. See generally Notice of Removal; Amended Notice of Removal.3

That’s sufficient for us to remand this case back to state court. See Russell Corp., 264 F.3d at 1041, 1050

(“[T]he district court properly remanded the case to the state court for failure to comply with the

unanimity requirement.”); Hernandez v. Seminole Cnty., Fla., 334 F.3d 1233, 1237 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“Section 1446 . . . has been interpreted to require that all defendants join in the removal petition.”).4

Second, Meehan hasn’t shown that we can exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

We have a duty to remand to state court any case that has been improperly removed for “a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Hernandez, 334 F.3d at 1236–37 (quoting Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d

1249, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 1999)). There are two bases for federal courts to exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction over a case: “diversity jurisdiction” and “federal question jurisdiction[.]” Blankenship v.

Claus, 149 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2005). We can exercise diversity jurisdiction in civil actions

where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the action is between “citizens of different

States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).

But diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity: Every plaintiff must be diverse from every

3 Hazan’s and 6913 Valencia’s subsequent statements further indicate their lack of consent. See generally

Joint Scheduling Report and Proposed Scheduling Order (“JSR”) [ECF No. 22]. Hazan, for instance,

“takes no position” on whether this “matter must be remanded for a second time to the state court,”

and 6913 Valencia “will defer to Meehan and Hazan.” Id. at 2–3. Moreover, in response to our request

for “proposals for the formulation and simplification of issues, including the elimination of frivolous

claims or defenses, and the number and timing of motions for summary judgment or partial summary

judgment,” Hazan and 6913 Valencia “take[ ] no position as [they] . . . did not seek removal of the

action.” Id. at 3. That doesn’t sound like consent to us. If Hazan and 6913 Valencia wanted to consent

to removal, they’ve had ample time to say so unambiguously.

4 Section 1443 may provide an exception to the unanimity requirement. As Judge Jordan (sitting on

the district court) has explained, there’s a “dearth of case law on whether unanimity is required for

removal under § 1443(2) (or § 1443 generally), and the few courts or commentators to have addressed

the issue have not been in complete agreement.” Brown v. Florida, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1349 (S.D.

Fla. 2002) (Jordan, J.) (collecting cases). We needn’t reach this issue here, though, because (as we’ll

soon explain) Meehan hasn’t come close to properly removing this case under § 1443.

defendant. See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Tapscott v.

MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 1996)). We can exercise federal-question

jurisdiction “only if it is federal law that creates the cause of action.” Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502,

1505 (11th Cir. 1996).

We plainly lack diversity jurisdiction over this case because Meehan hasn’t properly alleged

either his own or 6913 Valencia’s citizenship. Meehan says that he’s “a resident of New York,”

Amended Notice of Removal ¶ 9, but “[r]esidence alone is not enough” to determine one’s citizenship,

Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013). Moreover, to “sufficiently allege the

citizenships of [a limited liability company like 6913 Valencia], a party must list the citizenships of all

the members[.]” Ibid. Meehan only tells us that 6913 Valencia’s “principals are Canadian,” Amended

Notice of Removal ¶ 8 (emphasis added), but he tells us nothing about “the citizenship of each of [its]

members,” Incitatus Real Estate, LLC v. Lancelot Miami River, LLC, 2024 WL 4106441, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

Feb. 6, 2024) (Altman, J.) (cleaned up & emphasis added).

And we plainly lack federal-question jurisdiction because Meehan hasn’t identified a single

federal cause of action Valencia Estates has asserted against him (or any of the other Defendants). See

generally Amended Notice of Removal. The law is clear that, for removal to be proper, the federal

question must be asserted by the plaintiff in its underlying complaint against the defendants—not by the

defendant in response to that complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“[A]

case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense[.]”); Kondaur Capital v. Soler,

2023 WL 356018, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2023) (“That [the defendant’s] notice of removal asserted a

defense to foreclosure based on federal law does not authorize removal to federal court.”).

Meehan (it’s true) did initially remove this action (in part) under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) because

of an alleged “deprivation of constitutional rights” by “the presiding judge of the state court action”

who “espoused off hand comments that tend to show a bias towards Meehan.” Amended Notice of

Removal ¶¶ 2–6. And that statute does create a narrow exception to the “well-pleaded complaint”

rule, which requires that the complaint “establish[ ] either that federal law creates the cause of action

or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of

federal law.” MedSoftSys, Inc. v. CoolMoon Corp., 553 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (Altman,

J.) (quoting Newton v. Capital Assurance Co., 245 F.3d 1306, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2001)). Under § 1443(1),

the defendant in a state-court action may remove the case to federal court when the defendant “is

denied or cannot enforce” in state court “a right under any law providing for . . . equal civil rights.”

28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). But the removing defendant must meet two elements. “First, the defendant must

show that the removal is predicated upon a federal law ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in

terms of racial equality.’” Alabama v. Thomason, 687 F. App’x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Georgia

v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966)). “Second, the removing defendant must establish that he has been

denied or is unable to enforce that civil right in the state court.” Ibid. (citing Rachel, 384 U.S. at 794)).

In his Response, however, as Valencia Estates points outs, Meehan “abandons this assertion,”

Reply ¶ 6, claiming only that he “removed the case pursuant to Title 28, United States Code §§§§§

1331, 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1452”—and nowhere mentioning 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), see Response at 1

(errors in original). He’s thus forfeited any argument he might have had under § 1443(1). See Michaels

v. Sasser’s Glass Works Inc., 662 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2023), aff’d, 2025 WL 588648 (11th

Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (Altman, J.) (first citing Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319

(11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he failure to make arguments and cite authorities in support of an issue waives

it.”); and then citing In re Egidi, 571 F.3d 1156, 1163 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Arguments not properly

presented . . . are deemed waived.”)).

In any event, Meehan doesn’t come close to showing that there’s a “basis from which the

federal court” can make a “firm prediction” that the defendant will be “denied or cannot enforce his

civil rights in state court.” Thomason, 687 F. App’x at 878 (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 804 (cleaned up)).

So far as we can tell, he isn’t suggesting that his troubles in state court have anything to do with any

“specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Id. at 877. He, for instance, has done nothing

to show that, even if there had been some issue in state court implicating his civil rights “in terms of

racial equality,” he’s “unable to enforce that civil right in the state court.” Ibid. And, in either event,

the law is clear that “[t]he allegedly corrupt or otherwise improper motives of an individual state court

judge”—precisely what Meehan complains about here—are “insufficient to support removal under §

1443(1).” Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001); see also id. at 1297 (“[A]llegations of

corruption or unfairness . . . during a particular court proceeding do not support removal under §

1443(1)[.]”).

Finally, we reject Meehan’s frivolous claim that we “have jurisdiction over the original

proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)” and that “[t]his [current] proceeding is related to a

bankruptcy before Judge Paul Hyman.” Amended Notice of Removal ¶¶ 12–13; see also id. ¶ 1

(“Removal Under 28 U.S. Code § 1452[:] There is currently pending litigation involving the same

property and the bankruptcy case before Judge Hyman, Meehan believes that removal of this action

to United States District Court is appropriate.” (errors in original)). Section 1334(b) confers “original

but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to

cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Section 1452, in turn, provides that “[a] party may remove

any claim or cause of action in a civil action . . . to the district court for the district where such civil

action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section

1334[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). That section goes on to say that a court may “remand such claim or cause

of action on any equitable ground.” Id. § 1452(b).5 “An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome

5 In our District, bankruptcy matters are automatically transferred to the Bankruptcy Court. See

Administrative Order 2012-25 (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), any and all cases under title 11 and any

and all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 are referred to

the bankruptcy judges of this district.” (emphases added)).

could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively)

and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.” In re Big

Daddy Guns, Inc., 651 B.R. 817, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2023) (Specie, C.J.) (citing Matter of Lemco Gypsum,

Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990)).

But our case cannot be related to the bankruptcy case before Judge Hyman because that

bankruptcy concluded (and was closed) years ago. See Reply ¶ 5 (“Judge Gayles . . . previously ruled

on this exact issue and the parties had [ ] entered into the Stipulation of Settlement – which was

executed by Plaintiff and Hazan and approved by the Bankruptcy Court on November 17, 2016[.]”);

Operative Motion to Remand at 15 (“The Stipulation, Plan, and Confirmation Order [entered in the

bankruptcy] plainly and unequivocally permitted Plaintiff to seek, collect, and enforce the Declaration

after the Bankruptcy Action, including all assessments and charge.”); see also Remand Order in First

Removal Action at 5 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Action has been closed since July of 2023[.]”); id. at 5–6

(“[B]ecause the Bankruptcy Action has been closed since July of 2023, Plaintiff contends that this

action cannot possibly affect the Bankruptcy Action. . . . As Defendants have not challenged these

assertions, the Court accepts them as true.”). And, in any event, Judge Gayles (of our Court) has

already remanded the case back to state court after noting that “[t]his action began in state court based

on a typical breach of contract claim, which is squarely within the realm of state law.” Remand Order

in First Removal Action at 6. Moreover, we agree with Judge Gayles that, “even if this action is

generally related to the Bankruptcy Action, any subsequent determinations in this action will not

impact the closed Bankruptcy Action,” so “they are unrelated for purposes of conferring jurisdiction.”

Ibid. (collecting cases).

Meehan—who never asked Judge Gayles to reconsider this decision—cannot in effect appeal

Judge Gayles’s decision to us. See Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 951 F.2d 325, 329–30

(11th Cir. 1992) (“[28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)] not only forecloses appellate review, but also bars

reconsideration . . . by the district court of its own remand order.” (cleaned up)). “[T]he district court

has one shot, right or wrong.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 34050426, at *4

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2001) (Seitz, J.) (cleaned up); see also In re Loudermilch, 158 F.3d 1143, 1147 (11th Cir.

1998) (“Because the district court’s order to remand was based on the lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the court exceeded its power by reconsidering the second remand and vacating that

order.”). “There are very limited circumstances when a Party may remove a case a second time. . . .

[T]he basis for the second removal must differ from the first. That is, a pleading must establish that

the Court’s consideration of the second removal is more than reconsideration of the ‘same grounds’

upon which the case was first removed.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. v. Jenkins, 2008 WL 4926968, at *1

(S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (Zloch, J.).6 Meehan thus cannot try to “circumvent section 1447(d)’s

prohibition on reconsideration” by filing a second notice of removal “based on the same facts and

allegations[.]” Ibid. But that’s exactly what Meehan has done here. After Judge Gayles remanded his

case to state court because it was not related to the closed bankruptcy, Meehan simply removed the

case a second time—this time trying to convince us that the case is related to the closed bankruptcy

action. He obviously cannot do that.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Defendant’s Motion for

Reconsideration [ECF No. 31] is DENIED. Valencia Estates’s request for attorney’s fees and costs,

see Operative Motion to Remand at 19–20, is DENIED without prejudice because Valencia Estates

has not submitted any evidence of its fees and costs. We also DENY the sanctions request Valencia

6 It’s true that “[s]ection 1447(d) . . . expressly exempts from its coverage certain civil rights cases

removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443.” Provident Funding Assocs., LP v. Obande, 414 F. App’x 236, 237 (11th

Cir. 2011) (permitting appellate review of “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it

was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d))). As we’ve said,

however, Meehan hasn’t actually removed this case under § 1443.

Estates included in its Response in Opposition to Meehan’s Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No.

DONE AND ORDERED tn the Southern District of Florida on March 11, 2025.

ROY K. ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

Sean Neil Meehan, pro se

Ehzabeth Hazan, pro se

’ Valencia Estates’s Response to Meehan’s Motion for Reconsideration includes a request for

sanctions. See zd. at 3 (“Meehan should be sanctioned for his lack of candor to the Court.”). That’s

improper. A party cannot seek affirmative relief in a response memorandum; instead, to obtain relief,

the party must file a otion asking for that relief. See S.D. PLA. L. R. 7.1(a)(2) (referring to “relief sought

in the motion,” not in a response memorandum (emphasis added)).

11