Saunders Jr v. The Legal Aid Society

UEANSITTEEDR NS TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORF INCETW C OYUORRTK

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LOUIS SAUNDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-8732 (LDH) (TAM)

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, CAROL SILVER,

JESS RAO,

Defendants.

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LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Louis Saunders, Jr., appearing pro se, filed this complaint on November 17,

2023, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). As set forth below, the complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from Plaintiff’s proceedings in Queens County Family Court. Plaintiff

brings claims against the Legal Aid Society, Supervising Counsel Carol Silver, and Juvenile

Rights Practice Attorney Jess Rao. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that based on

“testimony & false statements” made by Defendant Rao, the attorney for his children, the Family

Court Judge granted custody of the children to their mother. (Id. at 4-5.) He seeks unspecified

damages and that Defendant be disbarred from practicing law. (Id. at 6.) Despite listing them as

defendants in the complaint, Plaintiff makes no allegation against the Legal Aid Society or

Defendant Silver.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged

facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant’s liability for the alleged

misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility”

of a defendant’s liability, id., “[i]t is not the [c]ourt’s function to weigh the evidence that might

be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss. Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp.

2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the [c]ourt must merely determine whether the

complaint itself is legally sufficient, and in doing so, it is well settled that the [c]ourt must accept

the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, their pleadings “must

be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes

v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v. KeyCorp,

521 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam)). This is “particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [their] civil rights have

been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still,

“even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil right claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless

their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a ‘right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Jackson v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

Nonetheless, a district court may dismiss a pro se action sua sponte, even if the plaintiff

has paid the Court’s filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous or that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d

362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of frivolous pro se complaint where

pro se plaintiff had paid the required filing fee). An action is frivolous when “either (1) ‘the

factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or

fantasy;’ or (2) ‘the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d

605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). A finding of frivolousness is appropriate “when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are

judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33

(1992).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides, in

pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ..

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to maintain a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

(a) acted under color of state law (b) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the

Constitution or federal law. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Pitchell v.

Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1984)). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983

excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). It is well established that attorneys do not act under color of state law when they

perform traditional functions of counsel. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A]

public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Sash v. Rosahn, 450 F. App’x

42, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A] court appointed criminal defense attorney does not act under color of

state law when representing a client” (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.

1997)); Garcia v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-5655, 2013 WL 153756, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

14, 2013) (dismissing § 1983 claim against attorney from the Legal Aid Society). Because

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rao relate to his function as counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant

Rao did not act under the color of state law. Therefore, the complaint is dismissed for failure to

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Furthermore, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to state any facts against the Legal Aid

Society or Carol Silver. A § 1983 complaint that does not allege the personal involvement of a

defendant fails as a matter of law. Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); see also

Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order); Blackson v. City of

New York, No. 14-CV-452, 2014 WL 6772256, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014) (dismissing claims

where plaintiff made “no specific allegations” about defendants’ conduct apart from naming

them as defendants). However, even if Plaintiff had alleged facts against the Legal Aid Society

or Carol Silver, it is apparent that they are not state actors. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83,

87 (2d Cir. 2000); Caroselli v. Curci, 371 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order)

(noting that the Legal Aid Society was not a state actor amenable to suit under § 1983).

Therefore, the complaint is dismissed against the Legal Aid Society and Carol Silver for failure

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). Despite Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court declines to grant leave to amend as it

finds that amendment would be futile. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2011)

(affirming district court decision to dismiss pro se complaint without leave to amend where

amendment would be futile).

In light of Plaintiff’s litigation history,1 Plaintiff is cautioned that this Court will not

tolerate abuse of its judicial resources and that he may be subject to a filing injunction barring

Plaintiff from filing new actions seeking in forma pauperis status without prior leave of this

Court. Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000).

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken

in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed enter judgment, close the case, and mail a copy of this

Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

__/s/LDH_________________________

LaShann DeArcy Hall

United States District Judge

Dated: April 11, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

1 Plaintiff also filed three other actions at the same time. See Saunders v. Sofola, No. 23-cv-8731 (LDH) (TAM);

Saunders v. New York State Supreme Court, No. 23-cv-8733 (LDH) (TAM) and Saunders v. District Attorney, No.

23-cv-8734 (LDH) (TAM). Each of these actions have been determined to be without merit and will be dismissed

by the Court by orders dated April 11, 2025. In addition, Plaintiff has four other actions pending: Saunders v.

McFarlane, No. 23-cv-7097 (LDH) (TAM) (filed Sept. 14, 2023); Saunders v. Bua, No. 23-cv-7098 (LDH) (TAM)

(same): Saunders v. Queens Family Courthouse, No. 23-cv-7099 (LDH) (TAM) (same); Saunders v. Center for

Family Representation, No. 23-cv-8921 (LDH) (TAM) (filed Nov. 29, 2023). These cases have also been

determined to be without merit and have been dismissed by the Court.