affirming 24 dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being 25 sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”
How later courts described this case
- affirming 24 dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being 25 sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”
- “Section 2 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of 3 a different state than each of the defendants.”
- liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MICHELLA CRISTINA ALFARO Case No. 2:24-cv-3465-TLN-CSK
BRITTANY,
12
Plaintiff,
13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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CHILD SUPPORT SERVICE/STATE
15 OF CALIFORNIA, (ECF Nos. 1, 2)
16 Defendant.
17
18 Plaintiff Michella Cristina Alfaro Brittany is representing herself in this action and
19 seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF
20 No. 2.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be
21 denied, and the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
22 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement,
24 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person
25 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security
26 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the
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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.
28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).
1 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient
2 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo,
3 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient
4 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of
5 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis
6 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some
7 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department
8 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not
9 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,650.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service
10 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines).
11 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application indicates Plaintiff receives a yearly gross income
12 of $91,604.00. ECF No. 2 at 1 ¶ 2. Plaintiff also affirmatively answers she receives
13 income from the following sources: “[b]usiness, profession, or other self-employment,”
14 “[r]ent payments, interest, or dividends,” “pension, annuity, or life insurance payments,”
15 “[d]isability, or worker’s compensation payments,” “[g]ifts, or inheritances,” and “[a]ny
16 other sources.” Id. at 1 ¶ 3. When asked to describe each source of money and amount
17 received, Plaintiff only indicates she receives “[d]isability[,] [a]nnuity[,] [l]ife insurance[,]
18 and [i]nheritance.” Id. Despite Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the amount received for each
19 of these sources, it is clear Plaintiff has failed to establish that she is entitled to
20 prosecute this case without paying the required fees. Plaintiff’s gross household income
21 is close to six times the 2025 poverty guideline.2 Given this, the Court cannot find
22
2 The Court also notes Plaintiff has recently filed multiple requests to proceed in forma
23 pauperis in other actions, which have pending findings and recommendations
recommending IFP status be denied and indicate additional sources of income not listed
24 in the IFP application in this action. Compare ECF No. 2 at 2 ¶ 4 (stating $5.00 in
checking or savings account), with Michella C. Alfaro Brittany v. Child Support Services,
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et al., No. 2:24-cv-3396-DC-JDP (PS) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (recommending IFP
26 request be denied and ordered to pay the filing fee and indicating Plaintiff has $139,000
in her bank account); Michella C. Alfaro Brittany v. Annalise Burney, No. 2:24-cv-3464-
27 DAD-JDP (PS) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (recommending IFP request be denied and
ordered to pay the filing fee); Michella C. Alfaro Brittany v. Yolo County Police
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1 Plaintiff unable to pay the filing fee. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. In addition, the
2 Court also finds Plaintiff’s IFP application should be denied because the action is facially
3 frivolous and meritless.
4 “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it
5 appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without
6 merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v.
7 First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of
8 Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not
9 abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears
10 from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without
11 merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District
12 Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine
13 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is
14 without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
15 pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is
16 also frivolous and is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court
17 recommends Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied for this reason as well.
18 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
19 Plaintiff’s Complaint warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s
20 required pre-answer screening. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen
21 every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is
22 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks
23 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
24 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is
25 legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v.
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27 Department, et al., No. 2:25-cv-0778-DAD-JDP (PS) (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2025)
(recommending IFP request be denied and ordered to pay the filing fee and indicating
28 Plaintiff has $65,000 in her checking account).
1 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the
2 court accepts as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are
3 clearly baseless or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to
4 the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
5 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).
6 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
7 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal).
8 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable
9 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d
10 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does
11 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
13 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough
14 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
15 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
16 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
18 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be
19 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80
20 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
21 III. THE COMPLAINT
22 The Complaint names “Child Support Service/State of California” as the sole
23 defendant in this action. Compl. at 2 (ECF No. 1). The entirety of the allegations in the
24 Complaint are as follows:
25 I took a DNA maternity test with Wellspace Health Roseville,
CA 95661 and they said Chana Alfaro and her 9 brothers and
26 sisters where my children and Lil Marco Alfaro myself and my
son Anthony R. Alfaro adopted him. He is a victim of
27 domestic violence and child abuse.
28 Compl. at 5. For relief, Plaintiff states she “would like it to be known on Court Documents
1 with 3351 Power Inn Rd. Sacramento, CA 95821 Family Court of California Child
2 Support Service/State of California that these 10 children are mine.” Id. at 6.
3 IV. DISCUSSION
4 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
5 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Federal courts are
6 courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases authorized by federal law.
7 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Jurisdiction is a threshold
8 inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary
9 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir.
10 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); see
11 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380
12 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the merits of a case
13 or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. A federal
14 court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions arising under federal
15 law or those between citizens of different states in which the alleged damages exceed
16 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or
17 forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” subject matter jurisdiction
18 even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
19 The Complaint does not establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See
20 Compl. The Complaint states no basis for federal court jurisdiction, and none is
21 apparent. Although the Complaint indicates the basis for subject matter jurisdiction is
22 federal question based on “civil rights – adoption, natural born children”, no federal
23 cause of action is clearly asserted, and no federal claims are suggested by the facts, to
24 the extent the facts are discernible. See Compl. at 3-4. The Complaint also fails to
25 establish diversity jurisdiction. First, Plaintiff does not satisfy the amount in controversy
26 requirement. See Compl. at 4 (stating amount in controversy is “$15,000 -? 2.5 million.”
27 Compl. at 5; see also ECF No. 1-1 (civil cover sheet indicating monetary demand is
28 $15,000.00). Second, Plaintiff also does not establish complete diversity of citizenship.
1 See Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section
2 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of
3 a different state than each of the defendants.”). On the face of the Complaint, all parties
4 appear to be citizens of California. Compl. at 4; see also ECF No. 1-1 (civil cover sheet
5 marking both Plaintiff and Defendant as citizens of California). Because there is no
6 diversity of citizenship established here, the Court finds that it also lacks subject matter
7 jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court recommends this action
8 be dismissed without leave to amend because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
9 over this action and amendment would be futile.
10 B. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
11 Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim
12 as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims
13 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of
14 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.
15 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the Complaint does not contain facts
16 supporting any cognizable legal claim against Defendant. The Complaint consists of
17 vague and conclusory allegations that fail to establish Plaintiff’s causes of action.
18 Because the Complaint is unintelligible, granting leave to amend in this case would not
19 be fruitful. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se
20 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and
21 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The
22 Complaint therefore fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and is subject to
23 dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming
24 dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being
25 sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”).
26 C. Leave to Amend
27 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court finds that the
28 Complaint is without merit and consists entirely of allegations with no basis in law. See
1 | generally Compl. The Complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal
2 | claim against Defendant. In light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
3 | Complaint’s deficiencies, granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should
4 | therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato
5 | v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995).
6 | V. CONCLUSION
7 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that:
8 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED;
9 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend;
10 and
11 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
13 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
14 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file
15 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should
16 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any
17 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14
18 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time
19 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,
20 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
21
22 || Dated: April 10, 2025 C i s
23 CHI SOO KIM
24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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26 || 4, britts4e5.24
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