GRIFFITH v. CIOX HEALTH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAD GRIFFITH,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23-20513 (GC) (JTQ)

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CIOX HEALTH,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Ciox Health’s unopposed1

Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Chad Griffith’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 13.) The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’

submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b) and Local Civil

Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, Defendant’s Motion

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1 The deadline for Plaintiff to oppose Defendant’s Motion has elapsed and Plaintiff has failed

to file any opposition. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and therefore is not “an experienced

litigator,” the Court is required to address Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on the merits even when

unopposed by Plaintiff. Jones v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 381 F. App’x 187, 189 (3d

Cir. 2010).

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Chad Griffith is a former employee of Defendant Ciox Health. (ECF 1 at 8.)3

Plaintiff states that he is disabled, having been diagnosed with ADHD and PTSD. (Id.) Ciox hired

Plaintiff as a client service representative in June 2015. (Id.) Daniel Schaaf, a senior manager at

Ciox, was Plaintiff’s manager and, in February 2021, Schaaf promoted Plaintiff to intake

supervisor. (Id.) Soon after, on March 31, 2021, Schaaf resigned from Ciox. (Id.)

Another Ciox employee, Megan Shaw, assumed Schaaf’s duties including managing

Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he met with Shaw on April 14, 2021 to disclose that he suffered

from ADHD and anxiety and sought various accommodations, including “transparency and

open/honest communication.” (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff states that Shaw was supportive and asked

him to trust her. (Id. at 16.)

On April 19, 2021, Shaw asked Plaintiff why he had not followed up with her regarding a

client issue. (Id.) Plaintiff “took offense” to Shaw’s question because he and Shaw “discussed

everything regarding this [client issue] the previous week.” (Id.) Plaintiff believed that he was

being “held liable” for not following up with Shaw despite “[doing] everything [he] was asked to

do” and, at around 4:00 PM—the time Plaintiff usually stops working—Plaintiff told Shaw he was

signing off for the evening. (Id.) The following day, Shaw and a human resources representative,

Juliette Maddox, scheduled a meeting with Plaintiff in which they alleged that he left work early,

2 The factual allegations recited here are based on Plaintiff’s Complaint and exhibits,

particularly Exhibit A, Plaintiff’s January 18, 2022 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) Charge of Discrimination. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

accept all facts as true, but courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and

quotations omitted).

3 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the

Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.

which Plaintiff denied. (Id. at 17.) During that meeting, Plaintiff states that he had an “anxiety

attack” and became “withdrawn and defensive.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “Ms. Shaw’s behavior

made [him] unable . . . to trust her.” (Id.) Plaintiff requested to be removed from Shaw’s team as

he “believed that [he] was at risk of future abuse.” (Id.)

On April 23, 2021, Plaintiff again met with Shaw and Maddox, who detailed a variety of

alleged infractions that Plaintiff had committed. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff stated that Shaw “incorrectly

represented the claims” and that Shaw was not honest about their interactions. (Id.) Plaintiff

subsequently refused to sign a “Corrective Action” plan document because, Plaintiff alleges, it was

an example of Shaw “using her position to abuse [him].” (Id. at 19.) The same day, Plaintiff filed

a “claim of abuse” against Shaw with human resources. (Id.) The claim detailed “specifically

how and why [Plaintiff] believe[d] Ms. Shaw was using her position and machinations to facilitate

[his] abuse.” (Id.) During a follow-up meeting, Maddox and another human resources

representative, Crystal Thudium, told Plaintiff that there was no evidence to support his abuse

claim. (Id. at 20.)

On April 27, Plaintiff asked Maddox for reasonable accommodations for his Seasonal

Affective Disorder. (Id.) Maddox said that she would discuss his request with management and

get back to him. (Id.) Plaintiff scheduled another meeting with Shaw, Maddox, and Thudium on

May 3, 2021 to “review [his] conduct in response to the Corrective Action against [him].” (Id. at

21.) During that meeting, Plaintiff requested that the group discuss “how [he could] be better.”

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Shaw “conveyed conflicting information and stances,” and that Thudium

became frustrated with Plaintiff’s questions. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently asked human resources

to give their “official position on [his] claim for abuse in writing” so that he could present it for

his disability claim. (Id.)

On May 6, 2021, Ciox’s human resources department informed Plaintiff that Shaw would

no longer be his immediate supervisor. (Id. at 21-22.) At this point, Plaintiff “began to believe

things would get better.” (Id. at 21.) He states that he “continued to check in with . . . Shaw for

the remainder of the week” and was not “given any indication that [his] job performance was

lacking.” (Id. at 22.) On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that Maddox and Shaw terminated him

because, in their words, “it wasn’t working out.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was fired so that

Ciox could avoid having “to complete the abuse report or facilitate [Plaintiff’s] reasonable

accommodations in a perceived unsafe work environment.” (Id. at 9.)

On January 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff claims that he

received a Notice of Right to Sue Letter on June 21, 2023. (Id. at 6.) On September 19, 2023,

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in forma pauperis asserting a retaliation claim under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and discrimination and retaliation claims under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 13.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim4

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts “accept the factual allegations in

the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and assess whether

the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting

Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Scranton, 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2020)). “A claim

4 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Clark v. Coupe, 55

F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d

Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, courts “disregard legal

conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported only by mere

conclusory statements.” Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d

892, 903 (3d Cir. 2021)). The defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion bears the burden of

“showing that a complaint fails to state a claim.” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab.

Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349

(3d Cir. 2016)).

B. Leniency

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and “[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s

pleadings is well-established.” Higgs v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d.Cir

2011) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

21 (1972)). “‘Courts are to construe complaints so ‘as to do substantial justice,’ Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(f), keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally.” Alston v.

Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). “Liberal construction does not, however, require the

Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984

F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906

(3d Cir. 1997)). “[P]ro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support

a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff brings a Title VII retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment

practices based on an individual’s race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Additionally, Title VII provides that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) see also Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 343

(3d Cir. 2006) (“Opposition to discrimination can take the form of informal protests of

discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management.”) (internal

citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must

plead (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).

With respect to “protected activity,” the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII “protects

those who participate in certain Title VII proceedings (the “participation clause”) and those who

oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII (the “opposition clause”).” Moore, 461 F.3d at

341. Further, the “employee must hold an objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the

activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.” Id. (citing Clark County v. Breeden, 532 U.S.

268 (2001) (rejecting retaliation claim where “[n]o reasonable person could have believed that”

the underlying incident complained about “violated Title VII’s standard” for unlawful

discrimination.). Moreover, “the employee’s opposition to unlawful discrimination must not be

equivocal.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that he engaged in any activity in which he opposed unlawful

conduct under Title VII. In the standard form “Complaint for Employment Discrimination,”

Plaintiff checks the boxes for race, color, and gender/sex discrimination. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

However, Plaintiff does not allege that he ever complained of discrimination related to any of these

categories.5 Based on the allegations in the Complaint and the attached EEOC Charge of

Discrimination, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim appears to be premised on his filing of the abuse report

against Shaw and his request for certain disability accommodations. (See ECF No. 1 at 9.)

However, nothing in the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff filed the abuse report in response to

racial or gender/sex discrimination. See Davis v. City of Newark, 417 F. App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir.

2011) (“Not every complaint or report entitles its author to protection from retaliation under Title

VII. . . . Rather, only complaints about discrimination . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin . . . constitute ‘protected activity.’”). Furthermore, as Defendant correctly argues,

disability is not a protected class under Title VII. See Patterson v. AFSCME #2456, 320 F. App’x

143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Title VII claim because Plaintiff

“did not claim she suffered discrimination based on the basis of a characteristic protected by Title

VII. Rather, she argued that she suffered discrimination on account of her cognitive disabilities.”)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is dismissed.

B. ADA Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff also brings a discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., which prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified

employees due to their disabilities. The Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting an ADA

5 In fact, beyond Plaintiff checking these boxes for race, color, and gender/sex discrimination

in the standard form “Complaint for Employment Discrimination,” (ECF No. 1 at 5), the

Complaint otherwise contains no references to Plaintiff’s race, color, or gender/sex.

discrimination claim based on Defendant’s failure to provide him with reasonable

accommodations.6 (ECF No. 1 at 23.)

An employer violates the ADA by “not making reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless such

covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate under the

ADA, Plaintiff must allege that (1) he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA and his

employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not make

a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably accommodated.” Capps v.

Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017)

1. Pleading a Disability under the ADA

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he is “disabled” under the ADA. A disability within

the meaning of the ADA is: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (emphasis added). “[M]ajor life

activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,

reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

6 Although Plaintiff’s Court-generated Complaint solely asserts a retaliation claim, the

attachments to the Complaint refer to a potential failure to accommodate claim. (see, e.g., ECF

No. 1 at 23) (“I believe [I] was denied reasonable accommodation . . . in violation of the Americans

with Disability Act”); see also Alston, 363 F.3d at 234 (“‘Courts are to construe complaints so ‘as

to do substantial justice,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular

should be construed liberally.”).

The Court assesses whether a person is “substantially limited” in a major life activity on a

case-by-case basis. Matthews v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2015); see also

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (requiring “individualized assessment”). The standard is not a

demanding one, and “should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2), (j)(i),

(j)(iii). The regulations emphasize that the term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly.

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) (the term “major” “shall not be interpreted strictly to create a

demanding standard for disability”); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be

construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage .... ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a

demanding standard.”).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that he is a “disabled person” under

the ADA. (ECF 13-1 at 17.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s allegations “that he has ADHD,

PTSD, and anxiety are–without more–insufficient to plead that he has a disability under the

ADA.” (Id.) It is true that conclusory allegations of suffering from a medical disability are not

enough to qualify as disabled under the ADA. See Sproul v. Sunpro Solar, Civ. No. 22-1439, 2023

WL 3548976 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2023) (dismissing ADA claim because while Plaintiff states that

he suffers from IBS, anxiety, and depression, he fails to provide details on how these impairments

substantially limits one or more major life activities). But Plaintiff does more than claim diagnoses

of certain medical conditions; he also alleges that these medical conditions affected his work—a

“major life activity” under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (““[M]ajor life activities

include…working”). Specifically, Plaintiff states that, during an April 14, 2021 meeting, he

advised Shaw that he has ADHD and that his “anxiety was incredible” because he was

overwhelmed and faced “[d]ifficulties” when “trying to get things moving” with respect to his job

responsibilities. (Id.)

Plaintiff also attaches a SSA letter confirming his entitlement to disability benefits.7 (See

ECF No. 1 at 31.) While Plaintiff will later be required to “prove, not merely allege, that he was

substantially limited in a major life activity,” Honauer v. N. Jersey Truck Ctr., Civ. No. 19-894,

2020 WL 5422824, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2020), the Court finds his allegations sufficient to state

a claim under the ADA for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that Plaintiff is not required to “go into the particulars about

the life activity affected by [his] alleged disability or detail the nature of [his] substantial

limitations” at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Matthews, 613 F. App’x at 168 (“A certain

lack of specificity in Matthews's complaint makes some of his claims difficult to evaluate. . . .

Nonetheless, on a motion to dismiss, we are bound take all factual allegations as true and make all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”); Honauer, 2020 WL 5422824, at *3 (finding that

while “the complaint is silent as to the impact of [the plaintiff’s] injury on how his impairments

affected his life or how long he was affected by them,” the plaintiff is not required to go into

particulars at the pleading stage); Willitts v. Engie N. Am. Inc., Civ. No. 20-11255, 2021 WL

2322833, at *8 (D. Mass. June 7, 2021) (stating that “[a]lthough it is difficult to ascertain from the

complaint what disability [the pro se plaintiff] is referring to (i.e. depression, anxiety, stress, and/or

ADHD),” the Court found the allegations “sufficient to state a plausible ADA claim particularly in

light of the additional deference that is afforded to pro se litigants”).

7 As previously noted, the attached letter includes many redactions, including the disability

that forms the basis for Plaintiff’s SSA benefits. However, drawing all reasonable inferences in

Plaintiff’s favor at this preliminary stage on a motion to dismiss, the Court will construe the

attached SSA letter as further evidence of Plaintiff having alleged a qualified disability under the

ADA for purposes of this motion to dismiss. Defendants can certainly renew their argument on

summary judgment once they have the benefit of discovery.

2. Failure to Accommodate

The Court also finds that, at this preliminary stage, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant

failed to accommodate him. During the April 14, 2021 meeting with Shaw, Plaintiff states that he

disclosed his medical conditions and requested that Shaw’s “supervisory methods be altered as a

form of reasonable accommodation.” (ECF No. 1 at 15-16.) Specifically, Plaintiff sought

“transparency and open/honest communication” and to be provided with certain supplies “in

support of [his] disabilities.” (Id. at 16.) At a later date, Plaintiff asked for “coaching” (which was

denied) and information regarding the availability of reasonable accommodations for his seasonal

affective disorder, such as changes to his “time schedule.” (Id. at 19-20.) As Plaintiff’s

relationship with Shaw became increasingly mired in conflict, he requested a new manager.

While the Court will not address the reasonableness of each of these requests on this

motion, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants failed to engage in the interactive process

once a request was made by Plaintiff. The ADA requires that an employer make a good faith effort

to “engage the employee in the interactive process of finding accommodations” that work for both

parties. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319 (3d Cir. 1999). If an employer does

not understand the exact nature of a requested accommodation, the “burden is on the employer to

request additional information that the employer believes it needs.” Id. at 315, 319 (also stating

that “the interactive process would have little meaning if it was interpreted to allow employers, in

the face of a request for accommodation, simply to sit back passively, offer nothing, and then, in

post-termination litigation, try to knock down every specific accommodation as too

burdensome.”). To determine if an employer acted in “good faith,” the Court looks to whether the

employer “obstructs or delays the interactive process.” Id. at 312 (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort

Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.1996). Furthermore, “a party that fails

to communicate, by way of initiation or response, may also be acting in bad faith.” Id.

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant did not engage in the interactive process

once Plaintiff made a request for an accommodation. While Shaw initially “validated” Plaintiff’s

request for accommodation and assured her support, there are no allegations regarding any follow-

up by Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at 16-23). Instead, according to the Complaint, Shaw “made

[Plaintiff’s] job more difficult, and simply sat back and continued to document [his] failures.”

Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319. Even after Plaintiff was put on a corrective action plan, he states that he

requested a meeting with Shaw and Thudium to review his conduct to “understand[ ] where I went

wrong.” (ECF No. 1 at 21.) During that meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Shaw refused to provide

any specific instances of Plaintiff’s misconduct and became defensive. (Id.) Thudium

subsequently cut the meeting short and stated that Plaintiff “must not be a good fit.” (Id.) Taking

Plaintiff’s allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim for failure to accommodate.

C. ADA Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff also brings a claim under the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203,

alleging that his termination was motivated by (1) Plaintiff’s filing of the abuse report; and (2)

Plaintiff’s request for accommodations. (ECF No.1 at 9.) The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision,

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), states that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because

such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such

individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA].” Id. Retaliation and discrimination claims are

distinct, as the former does “not require a plaintiff to prove that he or she has an actual disability;

rather, a plaintiff need only show that he or she [engaged in protected conduct] in good faith.”

Barber v. Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 329 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Shellenberger v. Summit

Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP,

856 F.3d 119, Civ. No. 15-2232, 2017 WL 1593474, at *9 (1st Cir. May 2, 2017) (“It is well settled

that an ADA plaintiff may assert a claim for retaliation even if she fails to succeed on a disability

discrimination claim.” (alterations omitted)).

A prima facie claim for retaliation under the ADA is analyzed under the same framework

utilized in Title VII retaliation cases. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)

(citing cases). A plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in protected conduct (i.e. made a

complaint against an employer for a perceived violation of the ADA); (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action by the defendant; and (3) there is a causal relationship between them. See

Abramson, 260 F.3d at 286; Bauer v. Ctr. for Animal Health & Welfare, Civ. No. 24-4744, 2024

WL 4137321, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2024).

1. Abuse Report

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to identify a protected activity, and therefore the

retaliation claim fails on the first prong. (ECF No. 13-1 at 19.) The Court agrees with respect to

a claim premised on Plaintiff’s filing of the abuse report against Shaw. For a plaintiff to show they

engaged in protected conduct, they must allege that they complained specifically about unlawful

discrimination. Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995). A party can do so

via formal charges of discrimination, “as well as informal protests of discriminatory employment

practices, including making complaints to management.” Abramson, 260 F.3d at 288 (quoting

Barber, 68 F.3d at 287). Regardless of form, “[a] general complaint about unfair treatment does

not constitute protected activity.” Bauer, 2024 WL 137321, at *2.

While Plaintiff states that he submitted a report detailing Shaw’s abusive behavior, he does

not expressly allege that his disability was the reason for that abuse. See Barber, 68 F. 3d at 702

(holding that a letter sent to human resources did not constitute protected activity as it “d[id] not

explicitly or implicitly allege that age was the reason for the alleged unfairness. A general

complaint of unfair treatment does not translate into a charge of illegal [ ] discrimination.”).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged that he engaged in protected conduct, his retaliation claim

pertaining to the abuse report must be dismissed.

2. Accommodations Request

Plaintiff additionally claims that his termination was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s request

for accommodations. (See ECF No. 1 at 9.) Here, Plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs of the

prima facie retaliation framework. Accommodation requests are a protected employee activity

under the ADA. See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 188 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“Prohibited discrimination under the ADA includes retaliation against an employee for requesting

an accommodation”). And, termination is an established adverse employment action.8 Holmes-

Mergucz v. Cellco P’ship, Civ. No. 18-11816, 2021 WL 3163985, at *5 (D.N.J. July 27, 2021),

aff’d, Civ. No. 21-2617, 2022 WL 16545589 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2022). Therefore, Plaintiff has

adequately alleged that he engaged in protected conduct under the ADA and suffered an adverse

employment action.

With respect to prong three, establishing a causal connection between a plaintiff’s protected

act and an employer’s adverse action, the Third Circuit focuses on two factors: (1) timing; and (2)

evidence of ongoing antagonism. Abramson, 260 F.3d at 288. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff

was terminated twenty-six days after requesting an accommodation. (See generally ECF No. 1.)

While there is no bright line rule, the Third Circuit has found that anything within a three-month

range can be “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.” Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 477

8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to articulate how he was denied a “reasonable

accommodation.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 19.) The denial of a reasonable accommodation, however, is

not the retaliation that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. Rather, Plaintiff claims that he was

terminated in retaliation for his request for accommodations. (See ECF No. 1 at 9.) (“[Ciox]

terminated [Plaintiff] in a manner that removed the need to . . . facilitate [Plaintiff’s] reasonable

accommodations.”).

(3d Cir. 2024); see also Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (“An

inference of ‘unduly suggestive’ temporal proximity begins to dissipate where there is a gap of

three months or more between the protected activity and the adverse action.”) (citing LeBoon v.

Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Furthermore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a period of ongoing antagonism. While

courts consider a “broad array of evidence,” it is important for Plaintiff to demonstrate “that the

antagonistic behavior began after [the protected activity occurred].” Incorvati v. Best Buy Co.,

Civ. No. 10-1939, 2013 WL 3283956, at *5 (D.N.J. June 27, 2013) (emphasis added); see also

Abramson, 260 F.3d at 289 (crediting plaintiff’s evidence of ongoing antagonism in light of

evidence of plaintiff’s superior’s “change in demeanor after [plaintiff engaged in protected

activity]”). There is no indication that Plaintiff was subject to disciplinary measures prior to the

April 14, 2021 meeting with Shaw in which he disclosed his medical conditions and requested

certain accommodations. (See ECF No. 1 at 15-16.) Plaintiff alleges that he previously had a

“rapport of honesty and mentorship” with his prior supervisor, Daniel Schaaf. (Id. at 15.)

Beginning on April 19, however, and continuing through his termination, Plaintiff alleges that he

was subjected to a series of disciplinary meetings in which Shaw “needlessly escalated situations”

and “gave [ ] false reports on [his] performance.” (Id. at 22.) See Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp.

Auth., Red Arrow Div., 982 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1993) (deeming trial court’s finding of a causal

link to not be clearly erroneous when evidence was presented that the plaintiff was subjected to a

“constant barrage of written and verbal warnings . . . , inaccurate point totalings, and disciplinary

action, all of which occurred soon after plaintiff’s initial complaints and continued until his

discharge.”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

temporal proximity and a sufficient period of ongoing antagonism to state a claim for retaliation

under the ADA.

Ti. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 13) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim

is DISMISSED without prejudice in its entirety. Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim is DISMISSED

without prejudice with respect to the abuse report. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects,

and the remaining counts in the Complaint shall proceed. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: April 10, 2025 / 1) . af fe Udypte.

GEORGEYTE CASTNER

bien TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16