noting that orders “to unseal a document cannot be undone” because “once confidential information is released, there is no going back” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- noting that orders “to unseal a document cannot be undone” because “once confidential information is released, there is no going back” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-60309 Document: 95-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-60309 April 10, 2025
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
State of Mississippi; United States of America
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
JXN Water,
Defendant—Appellee,
______________________________
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
versus
City of Jackson, Mississippi,
Defendant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC Nos. 3:12-CV-790, 3:22-CV-686
______________________________
Before Smith, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
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This appeal involves various failures of Jackson, Mississippi’s water-
related utilities. In two consolidated enforcement actions, the district court
ruled that a court-appointed federal receiver operated a “[f]ederal assistance
program” under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (“FNA”) by setting
municipal utility rates and, therefore, was entitled to access data governing
recipients of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”).
We now consider for the first time the definition of a “[f]ederal assistance
program” under the FNA. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the
district court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
I
A
The FNA establishes SNAP, a federal benefit program assisting low-
income households to afford nutritious food. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036d.
Typically, a household is SNAP-eligible when its financial resources “are
determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a
more nutritious diet.” Id. § 2014(a). States voluntarily participate in and
administer the SNAP program, id. §§ 2013(a), 2020(d), but must meet
federal requirements and be approved by the Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”). Id. § 2020(d). When a state participates in SNAP, it becomes
responsible for accepting and approving applications and keeping records,
while the USDA monitors compliance. Id. § 2020. If a state fails to comply,
the USDA may withhold funds from the state as appropriate. Id. § 2020(g).
In Mississippi, the Mississippi Department of Human Services
(“MDHS”) administers SNAP and maintains records of its recipients. 18-
14 Miss. Code R. § 1.2. Pursuant to federal rules protecting the data
security of SNAP recipients, Mississippi has enacted various laws
prohibiting disclosure of information received from SNAP applicant
2
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No. 24-60309
households, unless the disclosure is otherwise permitted by federal law.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-1-19(1). Further, the State has enacted various
regulations prohibiting disclosure of “[n]ames and addresses or lists of
[SNAP] applicants and recipients”; rather, an adult household member
must provide written consent. 18-14 Miss. Code R. §§ 1.11(B)(1), (C).
B
1
In 2012, the United States and State of Mississippi brought an
enforcement action under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) against the City
of Jackson (the “City”), alleging that the City violated both the CWA and
the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law by allowing raw sewage
to be discharged into state and federal waterways. On the day the action was
filed, the parties proposed a consent decree, which the district court
ultimately adopted and entered in 2013. Under the consent decree, which
remains active today, the City is to take remedial actions to bring the sewage
system into compliance with both the CWA and the Mississippi anti-
pollution law. The decree will remain active until the United States
determines that the City is fully compliant, and that it has completed all other
terms and conditions of the decree.
Meanwhile, Jackson’s water supply system faced challenges. “The
City of Jackson stands out among large water systems across the nation as
having an unusually high number of water outages, line breaks[,] and
treatment violations.” Indeed, between 2017 and 2021, Jackson suffered line
breaks at an average annual rate of 55 breaks per 100 miles of line—nearly
four times the industry benchmark.
In 2020, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued an
Emergency Administrative Order to the City, identifying that there was a
substantial risk that its drinking water contained disease-causing organisms,
3
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No. 24-60309
including Cryptosporidium, Giardia, Legionella, and E. coli. The parties in the
CWA enforcement action informed the court of the EPA’s participation in
bringing the City’s public water system into compliance under the Safe
Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”). The Emergency Order was resolved by a
Consent Order, which established a repair plan to address the water system’s
deficiencies. However, the City consistently failed to comply with this
Consent Order and remained non-compliant with federal law.
In August 2022, excessive rainfall overwhelmed Jackson’s water
system. The Pearl River flooded surrounding areas, causing debris to block
multiple plants’ water intake systems and the City’s distribution system to
experience a pressure loss. The system consequently failed to provide an
adequate quantity or quality of water, with most residents losing the ability
to use or drink water safely. Several emergency announcements followed:
the mayor issued an emergency proclamation, the governor a state of
emergency, the Mississippi State Department of Health a public health
emergency, and the President of the United States a federal emergency,
alongside various other emergency proclamations. It took the City
approximately one week to restore water pressure and service.
Subsequently, on November 29, 2022, the United States brought an
enforcement action under the SDWA. The complaint explained that
contaminants entered the drinking water, endangering the health of Jackson
residents. It also detailed the City’s failure to comply with the EPA’s
previous administrative orders. On the day the United States filed the
SDWA action, the court entered an interim stipulated order appointing
Edward Henefen as interim third-party manager (“ITPM”) over the City’s
water system and its billing and collections arm.
Henefin’s duties include operating and managing the water system.
He established JXN Water, Inc., through which he operates the water
4
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No. 24-60309
system; the order appointing Henefin was subsequently amended to include
JXN Water. 1 The SDWA suit was stayed, with the interim stipulated order
remaining in effect until final judgment. Soon thereafter, the court
consolidated the 2012 and 2022 suits and entered a stipulated order in the
CWA suit, appointing Henefin (and in turn JXN Water) as the ITPM over
the sewer system.
In accordance with the court’s orders, Henefin developed new rates
for the water and sewage systems as he deemed necessary. These rates
incorporated a seventy-five percent discount of monthly meter-availability
charge for residents receiving SNAP benefits. 2
2
For JXN Water to implement the tiered rate plan, it required SNAP
recipient data. Accordingly, in February 2024, the ITPM filed a motion
requesting that the district court order the disclosure of the names, phone
numbers, and email addresses of SNAP recipients in thirty-two ZIP codes
in the Jackson area. In the ITPM’s view, this would “efficiently and rapidly
provide access to safe drinking water” for all ratepayers, since cross-
comparison between SNAP recipients and JXN Water’s ratepayers was
“[t]he only practical way to timely implement that rate classification.” The
United States and Mississippi, while agreeing with the policy, disagreed with
the means of implementation, arguing that disclosure would substantively
violate the FNA’s protections of SNAP recipients’ privacy.
After filing the motion, the ITPM worked with both the United States
and Mississippi to consider alternative proposals for implementing the
_____________________
1
We refer to Henefin, the ITPM, and JXN Water interchangeably.
2
SNAP recipients would pay $10 per month, while other residential customers
would pay a minimum of $40 per month.
5
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discounted rate without exposing SNAP recipients’ privacy. The MDHS,
while not a named party itself, 3 also sent a letter to the court, expressing its
opposition on the ground that disclosure of SNAP recipients’ information
could result in the loss of federal funding. Following oral argument and
receipt of the MDHS’s letter, the ITPM withdrew its motion and refiled a
motion one week later requesting the quarterly disclosure of the names and
addresses of SNAP recipients in thirty-two ZIP codes. The district court
granted the motion over the United States’s opposition, finding the prompt
implementation of the rate schedule “critical.” It also found that the
disclosure did not violate the law because the adopted rates fell within an
exception of the FNA: disclosure is permitted “to persons directly
connected with the administration or enforcement of the provisions of [the
FNA], regulations issued pursuant to [the FNA], [f]ederal assistance
programs, or federally-assisted [s]tate programs.” 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(e)(8)(A)(i). It concluded that the ITPM’s proposed rate setting was
“the equivalent of a federal assistance program,” and disclosure therefore
did not violate the law.
The United States and the State of Mississippi filed notices of appeal. 4
The United States moved to stay the order pending appeal, which the district
court granted during the pendency of these proceedings. We must first
assure ourselves that we have appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory
appeal before considering the merits.
_____________________
3
MDHS is not a named party to either enforcement action. The State of
Mississippi is a named plaintiff in only the CWA enforcement action.
4
The State first filed a notice of appearance in the SDWA action.
6
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II
We always have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction. Brown
v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2006). Cases presumptively
fall outside of this court’s limited jurisdiction, thus placing the burden on the
parties to establish its existence. Ashley v. Clay County, 125 F.4th 654, 659
(5th Cir. 2025).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides courts of appeals with “jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts,” thus typically
requiring a decision “by which a district court disassociates itself from a
case.” In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). Some doctrines,
however, create narrow openings for non-final judgments to be appealed.
Among these is the collateral order doctrine, which “is ‘best
understood not as an exception’ to this finality rule, ‘but as a practical
construction of it.’” Id. (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)).
In essence, it provides jurisdiction over a “‘small class’ of pre-judgment
orders that ‘finally determine claims of right separable form, and collateral
to, rights asserted in the action [and that are] too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’” Id. at 483–
84 (alteration in original) (quoting Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495,
498 (1989)). Therefore, we have jurisdiction where the appealed order
(1) conclusively determines a disputed question; (2) resolves an important
issue separate from the merits of the matter; and (3) is functionally
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 484.
These conditions are “stringent.” Id. (quoting Digit. Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)). Because expansion of the
doctrine could result in the rule being swallowed, it is treated gingerly and
7
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No. 24-60309
rarely invoked. See id. at 484, 491. Some orders traditionally fall within this
doctrine, such as those rejecting absolute or qualified immunity, the denial of
a state’s claim to the Eleventh Amendment’s protections, and a ruling
against a criminal defendant’s double jeopardy defense. Id. at 484–85. These
orders “implicate weighty public interest concerns,” with each one
containing “some particular value of a high order.” Id. at 485 (quoting Will,
546 U.S. at 352). Other orders, however, are traditionally unappealable
under this doctrine, including denials of motions to enforce forum selection
clauses, discovery orders, and attorney disqualification decisions. Id. This
order falls neatly into none of these clear-cut appealable or non-appealable
categories. 5
First, the appealed order conclusively determines a disputed question:
whether the ITPM’s SNAP rate schedule is a federal assistance program
under 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(A)(i). The district court’s order found that the
schedule “is the equivalent of a federal assistance program” and noted that
the relief would assist the ITPM in efficiently identifying water and sewer
rates for citizens of limited means. This, in turn, would “further[] the
purposes of the SNAP federal assistance program.” It concluded by stating:
“For good cause shown, the Court finds that, for the purpose of this Order
and to implement the Stipulated Orders in this matter, the ITPM’s adopted
rates are a ‘federal assistance program’ and the motion should be
GRANTED on that ground.” This is a conclusive determination of a
disputed question of law.
Second, the issue is important and separate from the merits of the
matter. The underlying case consists of two consolidated enforcement
_____________________
5
While JXN Water contends that this was a discovery order, the record shows that
discovery was stayed.
8
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actions, the objectives of which are to bring the City into compliance with
environmental laws including the CWA and the SDWA. Indeed, the ITPM
position itself was created as a means to bring the City into compliance. But
never was it the duty of the ITPM to assist in administering SNAP or to
“further[] the purposes of the SNAP federal assistance program.” 6 Instead,
in carrying out his duties as the ITPM, Henefin realized that more
individuals would pay their utility bills if certain changes were made to the
rates. It was through this lens that SNAP came into view. Surely, there is a
relation to the stipulated orders and the ITPM’s duties thereunder. But the
legal issue itself is unrelated to those underlying the orders and consent
decree.
The issue also satisfies the “importance” requirement. See In re
Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d at 484 & n.4 (noting that “‘[i]mportance’ has
sometimes been characterized as a discrete fourth requirement and other
times been wrapped up in an analysis of both the second and third
requirements,” and ultimately identifying it as “a significant component in
the jurisdictional analysis under this doctrine”). Each recipient’s privacy
over their financial status and eligibility for SNAP is at stake. Congress itself
recognized this importance, protecting against the non-consensual disclosure
of recipients’ personal information with few exceptions. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(e)(8). Here, the district court found a third party, unrelated to the
administration of SNAP (or any identified federal assistance program),
issued federal assistance in part because the ITPM is designated as an officer
of the court and furthers the goals of SNAP. The propriety of that finding is
_____________________
6
Even if JXN Water argued that the federal assistance program at issue was not
SNAP itself but general federal assistance through the enforcement actions, it has failed to
show that the court’s order could qualify as a federal assistance program that is intertwined
with the underlying merits of the case.
9
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an issue for the merits; at this point, it need only be an “important” issue of
statutory construction. This ruling has significant impacts on recipients
throughout the Jackson area, and it could have lasting implications over
recipients’ privacy in later litigation.
Finally, the issue must be functionally unreviewable on appeal at final
judgment. This requirement is satisfied. First, the CWA consent decree
operates as its own judgment, so no final judgment will follow. Second, and
more importantly, once the confidential information of the SNAP recipients
is released, no relief can make the information confidential again. After all,
the toothpaste cannot be put back into the tube. See Vantage Health Plan, Inc.
v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 913 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that
orders “to unseal a document cannot be undone” because “once confidential
information is released, there is no going back” (emphasis added)). The data
will have been exposed to a third party—one unrelated to the administration
of a federal assistance program—but there will be no way of undoing the harm
suffered by these individuals. Accordingly, this issue is of the type that is
functionally unreviewable on appeal.
All three elements place this order squarely within the narrow
collateral order doctrine. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction and
proceed to the merits.
III
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Carder v.
Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2011). 7 The district court
_____________________
7
Because the parties discuss appellate jurisdiction in the context of injunctive
relief, their briefing focuses on the abuse of discretion standard that governs such suits. See
Thomas v. Hughes, 27 F.4th 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2022). But it does not matter whether we
adopt the more deferential “abuse of discretion” standard here, because “a trial court’s
failure to properly analyze the law or apply it to the facts is an abuse of discretion.” Id.
10
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ordered that the United States and Mississippi provide SNAP recipient data
to JXN Water, reasoning that JXN Water, as ITPM of the public utilities,
operated a federal assistance program. Both the United States and
Mississippi challenge this premise, providing arguments regarding (1) plain
text; (2) statutory history; and (3) the impacts of the federal government’s
role in the consent decrees. Because the statute and its history suggest that
JXN Water does not implement, administer, or otherwise participate in a
federal assistance program through its rate setting, we reverse.
A
First, the parties contest the plain text of the statute governing
disclosure of SNAP recipients’ data. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8) reads as follows:
“The [s]tate plan of operation required under subsection (d) of this section
shall provide, among such other provisions as may be required by
regulation[,] safeguards which prohibit the use or disclosure of information
obtained from applicant households . . . .” However, disclosure is permitted
without consent of the household in specific circumstances: “the disclosure
of such information to persons directly connected with the administration or
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, regulations issued pursuant to
this chapter, [f]ederal assistance programs, or federally-assisted [s]tate
programs.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(A)(i).
The United States and Mississippi argue that this text prohibits
disclosure of the information described in the order. After all, the statute
requires that each state safeguard against disclosure of recipient households’
information. True enough. However, since the statute permits disclosure to
_____________________
(quoting Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2002)). Since the only question before
us is one of statutory interpretation, the standard of review would revert to de novo.
11
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administrators of a “[f]ederal assistance program,” we must determine
whether JXN Water’s utility rate setting falls within that definition.
The statute leaves the term “[f]ederal assistance program”
undefined. Therefore, we interpret it pursuant to its “ordinary and natural
meaning and the overall policies and objectives of the statute.” Cheapside
Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 94 F.4th 492, 499 (5th Cir.
2024) (quoting NPR Invs., L.L.C. ex rel. Roach v. United States, 740 F.3d 998,
1007 (5th Cir. 2014)). The United States argues that federal assistance
programs are those “administered by the federal government and [that]
operate under laws passed by Congress, in contrast with those administered
by state, county, or municipal governments.” 8 It provides a list of federal
assistance programs as defined by the General Services Administration
(“GSA”) in 2 C.F.R. § 200.203(a)(i) to demonstrate that this was not a
federal assistance program.
JXN Water counters by claiming that the term is without
qualification. Thus, it argues, the statutory objectives permit a far broader
interpretation of the term—one that would include the ITPM’s activity. In
support of its position, JXN Water relies on the fact that the City suffered a
weather event that triggered a federal public health emergency, after which
the federal government invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court to enforce
a federal statute. Accordingly, because the government spent hundreds of
_____________________
8
Mississippi, for its part, states that “a responsible agency, plus congressional or
executive-branch authorization [] define[s] and distinguishe[s] ‘federal assistance
programs’ from other public or private programs.” It relies on the General Services
Administration and Office of Management and Budget shared catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance from 2008 to show that, at the time the statute was passed, the programs in the
catalog—which was the official “government-wide compendium of [f]ederal programs,
projects, services, and activities” and “basic reference source of [f]ederal programs”—
contained these features. Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Off. of Mgmt. and Budget
& U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., at I (2008) (accessible at https://bit.ly/4canrii).
12
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millions of dollars to assist the City, and because rate setting directly related
to its role in the enforcement actions, JXN Water asserts that its actions must
qualify as providing federal assistance.
JXN Water’s arguments are unavailing. A “[f]ederal assistance
program” under 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(A)(i) clearly implies administration
by an arm of the federal government. As an initial matter, and as the United
States points out, the FNA confirms that Congress contemplated the
difference between levels of government. In the very same subsection as that
at issue here, the statute excludes “federally-assisted [s]tate programs.” 7
U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). This alone suggests that where
the statute uses the term “[f]ederal,” it does so to explicitly exclude state
programs, and likely those beneath that level. But we need not hang our hat
on this ambiguity: the Act also permits disclosure to “local, [s]tate, or
[f]ederal law enforcement officials for the purpose of investigating an alleged
violation of this chapter.” Id. § 2020(e)(8)(C) (emphasis added). 9 The
inclusion of the term “local” within the same subsection demonstrates
Congress’s intent to only include federal activity for federal assistance plans,
which, of course, comports with the plain text. See Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
_____________________
9
JXN Water cites this exception, among others, to show a series of “narrowly-
tailored exceptions suggest[ing] that Congress’s broader and unqualified use of the term
‘[f]ederal assistance programs’ was intentional and meant to encompass much more than
[the United States and Mississippi] assert, including programs like the ITPM’s adopted
rate schedule.” But, despite some exceptions that specifically list “agencies of the Federal
Government,” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(D), the fact remains that Congress intentionally
excluded the terms “local” and “state.” That “[f]ederal assistance program” appears to
cast a broader net than do other uses of “federal” does not make its definition boundless.
13
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No. 24-60309
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983))).
Further, the district court vested JXN Water with the power to set
municipal water and sewer rates. The municipal code provides for the annual
review and revision of the water service charge system to ensure proper rates.
Jackson, Miss., Code of Ordinances § 122-273. The court itself
defined “rate” as “rates and amounts required to be paid for water services
per month by customers of the City waterworks as prescribed in Section 122-
268 and Section 122-269 of the Code of Ordinances, City of Jackson,
Mississippi.” It further described the ITPM’s duties to include “meet[ing]
with the City to discuss the need to adjust the Rate structure, the Rates under
the existing or a modified Rate structure, and any fees that the City charges
customers for water utilities.” It ultimately required the mayor to propose
an amendment consistent with the ITPM’s recommended rates under the
Code of Ordinances of Jackson, Mississippi. The ITPM clearly derives its
rate-setting authority from a non-federal source.
None of this considers other agency interpretations of the term
“[f]ederal assistance plan.” As described above, the GSA has promulgated
a rule requiring public notice of federal financial assistance programs on its
website, which includes SNAP and Supplemental Security Income, among
other federally run programs. 2 C.F.R. § 200.203(a)(1); Assistance Listings,
https://sam.gov/data-services/Assistance%20Listings/datagov/2025/01-
Jan?privacy=Public (last visited March 6, 2025). It is true that
“interpretation of a statute or regulation from one agency does not bind
another’s interpretation of that material.” Tex. Truck Parts & Tire, Inc. v.
United States, 118 F.4th 687, 693 n.4 (5th Cir. 2024). Nor does it
automatically bind this court’s. But that does not mean that one agency’s
interpretation cannot inform others’ interpretations; rather, the applicability
of a definition across agencies is dictated by context and common sense. In
14
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this setting, the programs in the GSA’s listing clearly comport with the plain-
text interpretation of the statute at issue. The GSA’s interpretation is
therefore informative.
Finally, JXN Water’s argument that the statute is ambiguous—and
should therefore be read broadly—fails. In support, it cites United States v.
Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1996), in which a criminal defendant
challenged his bribery conviction. The defendant, the Sheriff of Hidalgo
County, had entered agreements “to establish and govern relations between
the U.S. Marshals Service and Hidalgo County,” including federal
participation in jail construction predicated upon a need for additional space
for federal prisoners. Id. The statute under which Marmolejo was convicted
restricted its applicability to agencies that received benefits “under a
[f]ederal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee,
insurance or other form of [f]ederal assistance.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(b)). And, since the statute’s plain text was ambiguous, we turned to
legislative history, which supported a broad interpretation. Id. Both
agreements heavily governed the interactions between federal entities, so the
court found that the funds stemmed from “[f]ederal assistance.” Id.
This is inapposite. First, Marmolejo focused on a criminal statute
relating to bribery—a far cry from the FNA. Second, the bribes in Marmolejo
came from agencies operating such federal assistance programs. Id. Contrast
that with the case here, which prevents disclosure of data, unless the
individual is directly connected with the administration or enforcement of the
provisions of SNAP or some other federal assistance program. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(e)(8)(A)(i). The ITPM was not appointed to participate in,
administer, enforce, or otherwise operate SNAP. Indeed, the term
“SNAP” never shows up as part of the ITPM’s duties, obligations,
authorities, or otherwise in the interim stipulated order. And the ITPM’s
duties involve carrying out the direct orders of a district court—not to
15
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No. 24-60309
administer a program set forth by law. Third, as explained below, the
statutory history supports a finding here that “[f]ederal assistance
programs,” when initially written, identified federally funded or
administered programs.
Accordingly, to the extent that the district court ordered the release
of this information because the “rates are the functional and legal equivalent
of a federal assistance program,” it erred. See Tex. Truck Parts, 118 F.4th at
692 (declining to accept “an illogically broad definition” of a statutory term).
The rate-setting authority stems directly from the municipal code, and all
rate setting must ultimately be authorized by the mayor in accordance with
that code. This alone is sufficient to support reversal. Nevertheless,
statutory history lends additional support.
B
The United States, through a lengthy discussion of the statutory
history of the FNA, asserts that the statutory amendments, made most
recently in 1985, demonstrate a focus upon federally administered programs.
The FNA’s predecessor, the Food Stamp Program, permitted
disclosure of recipients’ data only to “persons directly connected with the
administration and enforcement of” the law and any regulations promulgated
pursuant to the law. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e)(3) (1976). Soon thereafter, however,
Congress amended the statute, permitting the sharing of data between the
Food Stamp Program and other federal programs. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(i) (Supp.
II 1978). Following this amendment, the USDA promulgated a regulation
dictating that “[u]se or disclosure of information obtained from applicant
households . . . shall be restricted to persons directly connected with the
administration or enforcement . . . of the Food Stamp Act, or with other
[f]ederal or federally aided, means-tested assistance programs such as Title
IV-A (AFDC), XIX (Medicaid), or XVI (SSI).” 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(c)(1)
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(1979). Finally, in 1982, Congress enacted the Food Stamp Amendments, in
which it authorized the disclosure of food stamp data to those connected with
the administration or enforcement of “[f]ederal assistance programs, or
federally-assisted [s]tate programs,” the language that remains today. 96
Stat. 779, § 169. Accordingly, the USDA issued a regulation noting that its
proposed rule, issued in 1983, “deleted from the regulation the reference to
specific programs and inserted broader statutory language.” Food Stamp
Program; Disclosure of Information and Noncompliance with Other Programs, 49
Fed. Reg. 48,677, 48,678–79 (1984).
The deleted language indicates the sorts of programs included in the
initial directive: “Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and General Assistance
(GA) programs subject to the joint processing requirements.” Id. at 48,678.
While these specific examples were removed and replaced with broader
language, they shed light on the original understanding of a federal assistance
program. The mere fact that the language ultimately broadened does not
create a boundless definition of “federal.” Indeed, the language enshrined
in the final statute very much mirrors the language from previous versions in
which those examples were incorporated.
Instead, JXN Water argues that the statutory history demonstrates
“an ever-widening exception that the USDA’s implementing regulations
sought to narrow.” It argues that because the disclosure was gradually
broadened, and because the USDA sought to impose non-statutory
limitations that JXN Water asserts are improper, the term should be read
more broadly. It finds further support in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), which permits the
federal government to provide assistance to state and local governments by
“providing [f]ederal assistance programs for both public and private losses
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sustained in disasters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(6). JXN Water claims that this
definition clashes with those provided by the United States and Mississippi.
These arguments fail. The “ever-widening” nature of the FNA’s
disclosure requirements supports our reading. After all, despite the statute’s
continued widening of an exception to the rule, never has it taken the step of
incorporating all activities funded by the federal government, nor has it
incorporated those local or state actions that support or otherwise further the
ideals set forth in federal programs. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(A). As
described above, the use of the terms “local” and “[s]tate” in the statute—
but not in the relevant provision—suggests Congress’s intent to exclusively
refer to those programs administered by the federal government. That the
exception has continually widened and still has not incorporated that
language cuts against JXN Water’s argument.
JXN Water’s citation to the Stafford Act is equally as confusing. That
statute permits the federal government to assist state and local governments
in times of natural disasters and emergencies by providing funds, including
through federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(6). This does not support a
finding that the implementation of a municipal rate-setting schedule becomes
a federal assistance program, especially for the purpose of the FNA. As the
United States aptly points out, “[e]ven if federal programs that dispense
federal disaster relief funds were considered ‘federal assistance programs,’
the ITPM is not dispensing federal disaster relief funds through his
municipal rate schedule.” There is no answer to this: the ITPM’s activities,
while related to a federal disaster, do not involve the disbursement of any
emergency funds—at least not for the purpose for which the SNAP data is
sought. Accordingly, the statutory history supports a finding that the
programs to which the FNA refers are administered and enforced by the
federal government.
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C
Finally, it bears considering whether the sheer volume of federal
involvement could transform JXN Water’s activity into the provision of a
federal assistance program. It cannot.
JXN Water argues that the City suffered a federal public health
emergency, at which point the federal government invoked the jurisdiction
of a federal court to enforce the SDWA, a federal statute. It further argues
that since the ITPM is a federal trustee and an officer of the federal court,
and because hundreds of millions in federal aid have been provided, the
ITPM must be carrying out a federal assistance plan under the statute. The
United States and Mississippi, on the other hand, claim that federal
receivership carries no weight in the determination of whether a program is
a federal assistance program. Instead, they emphasize that a federal receiver
carries out the state laws to which they are bound.
Once again, JXN Water’s arguments are unconvincing. A receiver
“appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States . . . shall
manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver
or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in
which such property is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (emphasis added); see
also SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)). A common example for such a receivership is
“when public health issues are implicated, such as mismanagement of a
public water system.” Jonathan P. Friedland, Strategic
Alternatives for and Against Distressed Businesses
§ 14.4 (2025).
The mere appointment of a federal receiver—even if the individual or
entity is considered an officer of the court—does not grant federal power to
the receiver. Instead, the receiver’s powers, while stemming from both a
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statutory grant and “the court’s equitable power to fashion appropriate
remedies as ‘ancillary relief’ measures,” Stanford Int’l Bank, 927 F.3d at 840
(quoting SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980)), fall in line with
laws of the state, see id. (noting that the receiver’s obligations stemmed from
the laws of Texas). In other words, while JXN Water became an officer of
the court and a federal receiver, its compliance with state and local law did
not become a matter of federal law or administration of federal assistance.
This is unchanged by the fact that approximately $778 million of
federal funding has been provided “to address the System’s infrastructure
and other needs.” 10 These funds were provided by the federal government
to assist Jackson’s ailing sewage and water services. See supra note 10. But
while these funds were issued to improve the systems, and while the ITPM’s
duties include “implementation of projects on the Priority Project List in
accordance with the Implementation Schedule,” the divulgence of SNAP
recipient data does not advance the disbursement of federal funds or
provision of federal assistance. That is, to the extent that the ITPM does act
as an agent of a federal assistance program by contributing to the
improvement of Jackson’s water systems with federal funds stemming from
grants, 11 the particular action for which it requests SNAP data—rate
_____________________
10
This funding includes: (1) $150 million for grants under the SDWA; $450
million to remain available for capitalization grants under the SDWA; (3) $2.8 million
through an EPA grant; (4) $4 million through an additional EPA grant; (5) $125 million
through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and (6) $46 million under the American
Rescue Plan Act.
11
For instance, it contributes by paying bills related to the system from the Capital
Improvements Account. We make no determination today regarding the ITPM’s
purported role in administering or enforcing a federal assistance program through such
contributions.
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setting—is unequivocally non-federal. All true legal authority stems from the
city ordinances.
This reading comports with Stanford International Bank’s statement
that a receiver is typically bound by the laws of the state. 927 F.3d at 840.
Even assuming arguendo that some of a federal receiver’s duties involve the
administration of a federal assistance program, that does not create a broad
grant that all activities associated therewith, stemming from a single consent
decree, are federal assistance programs. After all, “the federal government
cannot control, regulate, or otherwise administer the ITPM’s rate
schedule.”
D
For the reasons described above, the ITPM does not enforce or
administer a federal assistance program under the statute’s general terms.
Because the district court improperly found that disclosure was appropriate
under the statute, we do not address the State’s arguments relating to
sovereign immunity or personal jurisdiction.
IV
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order and
REMAND for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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