Com. v. Flood, L.

J-S40007-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

LANDON TYLER FLOOD :

:

Appellant : No. 3056 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0002713-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

LANDON TYLER FLOOD :

:

Appellant : No. 3057 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0002715-2020

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2025

Appellant, Landon Tyler Flood, appeals from the judgments of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County on October 27, 2023.

Although these cases are consolidated, we will address each in turn as the

facts and legal issues are distinct. We affirm as to both.

On February 9, 2021, Appellant initially entered negotiated guilty pleas

on both dockets and was sentenced to an aggregate of seven months and

J-S40007-24

three days to three years of incarceration, followed by a consecutive

probationary term of two years. No direct appeal was taken. On February

23, 2021, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. A hearing was held

on March 3, 2021, wherein Appellant appeared pro se and alleged ineffective

assistance of trial counsel regarding his guilty pleas. Based on Appellant’s

assertion at the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and

appointed counsel. On April 26, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and a and petition for post-conviction relief pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.

Appellant and his counsel failed to appear at the May 27, 2021, hearing, and

the PCRA court dismissed his motion and PCRA petition.

On October 27, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition to withdraw

his guilty pleas. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to

withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

Super. 1988). On December 28, 2021, the PCRA court denied counsel’s

request to withdraw and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA

petition. On February 1, 2022, after a hearing, the PCRA court granted

Appellant’s petition and allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas because the

parties agreed that the sentences imposed were illegal. 1 See Order, 2/1/22.

____________________________________________

1 The sentence was deemed illegal because Appellant failed to get a drug and

alcohol evaluation prior to sentencing in accordance with 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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This is where the commonality between the cases ends. We now address each

case in turn.

3056 EDA 2023

The trial court aptly summarized the factual background of this case as

follows:

On January 15, 2020 at approximately 7:00 p.m., Jacob R.

Snyder, the owner of the residence at 2957 Old Post Road,

Slatington, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, was home when he

suddenly felt the corner of his house vibrating. He exited his home

and observed a minivan roughly two feet from the corner of his

house with the engine revving. The minivan had not come into

physical contact with Mr. Snyder’s residence. Mr. Snyder testified

that he saw [Appellant] in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.

****

After the police [were called], Trooper Ryan Fraunfelter of the

Pennsylvania State Police was dispatched to the scene of the

incident. Trooper Fraunfelter testified that upon his arrival, he

saw a vehicle which exited the right side of the roadway and

traveled through the two adjacent properties before stopping at

the second. Trooper Fraunfelter approached [Appellant]. He

testified [Appellant] appeared “disheveled,” and his pupils were

dilated. The trooper also detected an odor of marijuana

emanating from [Appellant].

Based on these observations, Trooper Fraunfelter suspected

[Appellant] was under the influence and conducted standardized

field sobriety tests, [wherein] Trooper Fraunfelter concluded

[Appellant] was under the influence of a controlled substance. He

based this determination on [Appellant’s] performance on the

tests, as well as his observation of [Appellant] having a green

tongue and rapid eyelid tremors during the modified Romberg

____________________________________________

3816(a) (“every person convicted of [DUI] . . . shall, prior to sentencing . . .

be evaluated . . . to determine the extent of the person’s involvement with

alcohol or controlled substances”).

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test. As a result, Trooper Fraunfelter concluded [Appellant] was

not capable of safe driving.

Trooper Fraunfelter spoke with [Appellant], who indicated he was

driving, noticed a rock in the roadway, and tried to make an

evasive maneuver, which led him to veer off the road and across

the two properties. Trooper Fraunfelter asked [Appellant] about

his marijuana usage and [Appellant] admitted he used marijuana

earlier in the day. [Appellant] was not free to leave during this

interaction.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 2-4 (citations to record omitted).

Appellant was charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”) –

general impairment, DUI – controlled substance, and various summary

violations. After the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition to withdraw his

guilty plea, he filed a motion to suppress. Specifically, in this case, Appellant

argued that Trooper Fraunfelter conducted an illegal, warrantless search of his

mouth. N.T. Suppression, 6/13/22, at 9. The trial court denied the motion,

finding that Appellant failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the color of one’s tongue. Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 14-

15.

The case proceeded to a non-jury trial on April 24, 2023, wherein

Appellant was found guilty of DUI – controlled substance and summary

careless driving. On October 27, 2023, Appellant was sentenced to 72 hours

to 6 months of incarceration on the DUI. This appeal followed. Both Appellant

and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises a sole

issue for our review:

Whether the [trial court] erred, under both the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the

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Pennsylvania Constitution, when it failed to suppress evidence

obtained during a warrantless search of [Appellant’s] mouth?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to the denial of a

suppression motion is

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual

findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard

of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the

defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal

citations omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the record created during

the suppression hearing. In re L.J., supra.

“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019). “If there

is sufficient evidence of record to support the suppression court’s ruling and

the court has not misapplied the law, we will not substitute our credibility

determinations for those of the suppression court judge.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014).

In this case, Appellant contends that Trooper Fraunfelter “performed a

search of [Appellant’s] mouth for the purpose of discovering evidence[, i.e., a

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green tongue2,] and did so without a warrant.” Appellant’s Brief, at 15. He

argues that the warrantless search was illegal because the Commonwealth

failed to prove an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 16. The trial

court found that Appellant failed to establish that he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the color of his tongue, and therefore the Fourth

Amendment and Article I, § 8 were not implicated.

Without deciding whether (1) an officer’s request for a defendant to stick

out their tongue constitutes a search, and (2) Appellant’s constitutional rights

were violated if this requested constituted a search, we conclude that even if

there was error, such error was harmless.3 “An error is harmless if it could

____________________________________________

2 When police officers attend training to become a Drug Recognition Expert

(“DRE”), they are taught that “some users of marijuana have displayed a

green coating on their tongue after recent use[,]” but that it does not occur

with all users. NHTSA Drug Recognition Expert Course (DRE) 7-day School,

Instructor Guide, R5/13 Edition, Session 21. The manual further directs

instructors to “[p]oint out that there are no known studies that confirm

marijuana [use] caus[es] a green coating on the tongue.” Id.

3 We can raise harmless error sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Hamlett,

234 A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. 2020) (“sua sponte invocation of the harmless error

doctrine is not inappropriate as it does nothing more than affirm a valid

judgment of sentence on an alternative basis”) (citation omitted);

Commonwealth v. Frein, 206 A.3d 1049, 1070-71 (Pa. 2019) (“In light of

the substantial physical evidence establishing [a]ppellant as the perpetrator

of these crimes, we conclude that the trial court’s error in denying

[a]ppellant’s motion to suppress the statements he made in his videotaped

interview was harmless”); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 327 A.3d 1236, 1247

(Pa. Super. 2024) (finding trial court erred when it denied suppression of the

defendant’s statements; even though Commonwealth did not argue harmless

error, it may be raised sua sponte and we concluded that the error was not

harmless).

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not have contributed to the verdict, or stated conversely, an error cannot be

harmless if there is a reasonable possibility the error might have contributed

to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 716 (Pa.

2015) (citation omitted). Harmless error occurs where:

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice

was de minimis; or

(2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely

cumulative of other untainted evidence which was

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted

evidence; or

(3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of

guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of

the error was so insignificant by comparison that the

error could not have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 493 (Pa. 2018).

The properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt in the

instant case was so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the alleged

error was so insignificant, that it could not have contributed to the verdict.

Trooper Fraunfelter responded to a single car accident where the vehicle left

the roadway and travelled through two properties before it stopped short of

striking Snyder’s property. N.T. Hearing, 6/13/22, at 17. While speaking with

Appellant, Trooper Fraunfelter noted that Appellant appeared disheveled and

had dilated pupils. Id. at 19. He further noticed an odor of burnt marijuana

emanating from Appellant’s person and/or vehicle, and Appellant admitted to

smoking marijuana earlier in the day. Id. at 20-22, 28 31.

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As a result, Trooper Fraunfelter believed Appellant was under the

influence of marijuana and conducted standardized field sobriety tests

(“SFST”) and an Advanced Roadside Impairment Driving Evaluation

(“ARIDE”). Id. at 20. Trooper Fraunfelter’s observations – the single car

accident, Appellant’s disheveled appearance and dilated pupils, and the odor

of marijuana – were sufficient to support the reasonable suspicion necessary

to request Appellant to perform field sobriety tests. See Commonwealth v.

Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 326-327 (Pa. Super. 2010) (officer had reasonable

suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests where the defendant had bloodshot

eyes and smelled of alcohol). The SFST included tests that were unrelated to

the officer’s request for Appellant to stick out his tongue, such as the

horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn test and the one leg stand

test. N.T., 6/13/22, at 20. Appellant’s performance on the SFST provided the

officers with probable cause to arrest Appellant and subject him to a blood

draw. See Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 997 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(finding probable cause to arrest under suspicion of DUI based on field sobriety

tests).

The results of the blood draw indicated the presence of THC in

Appellant’s system. See N.T. Hearing, 6/13/22, Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-

2. Thus, the uncontradicted and admitted evidence to support his DUI

conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i) was so overwhelming, any error

relative to the color of Appellant’s tongue could not have contributed to the

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verdict. See Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283, 1291 (Pa. Super.

2022) (pursuant to Section 3802(d)(1)(i), it is illegal to drive with any amount

of a Schedule 1 controlled substance in one’s blood). Thus, no relief is due on

this claim.

We now turn to Appellant’s second case.

3057 EDA 2023

The trial court aptly summarized the facts in this case as follows:

On April 28, 2020, at approximately 2:00 in the morning, Officer

Donald Stratton of the Catasauqua Police Department . . .

observed a vehicle traveling up Wood Street, a one-way road,

going the wrong way without any headlights. He followed the

vehicle and activated his overhead lights in order to initiate a

traffic stop. The vehicle stopped [and] Officer Stratton interacted

with the operator, whom he identified as [Appellant]. There was

a passenger . . . in the vehicle as well[.]

Officer Stratton testified that [Appellant] appeared confused when

asked why he went the wrong way down the road. [Appellant]

indicated he was on his way home after being at the Catty Mart.

During the course of this conversation, Officer Stratton smelled

the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. He observed that

[Appellant] appeared lethargic; he was tired and his responses

were slow. Officer Stratton and Officer [Richard] Reis asked both

individuals to step out of the vehicle and they searched the

vehicle. They found a clear plastic bag with marijuana in the glove

box, as well as two burnt marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray. The

officers also found “Game” wrappers, which are cigar wrappers in

which people wrap marijuana.

Officer Reis . . . echoed the testimony of Officer Stratton with

respect to his observations of [Appellant] and smelling marijuana

coming from [Appellant’s] vehicle. Officer Reis had [Appellant]

perform field sobriety tests at the scene.

****

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[After completing the field sobriety tests, Officer Reis concluded

that] Appellant was likely under the influence of marijuana and

incapable of safe driving. . . . [Appellant] was transported to

Lehigh County Central Booking Center where he consented to a

blood draw. The blood tests revealed the presence of THC in

[Appellant]’s system.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 7-10.

Appellant was charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”) –

controlled substance schedule I, DUI – controlled substance impaired ability,

use/possession of drug paraphernalia, small amount of marijuana, and various

summary violations. After the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition to

withdraw his guilty plea, he filed a motion to suppress. Specifically, in this

case, Appellant argued that Officers Stratton and Reis conducted an illegal,

warrantless search of his vehicle. Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 3/29/22, at 4.

The trial court granted the motion in part and suppressed the marijuana and

paraphernalia based upon the warrantless search of Appellant’s vehicle. Trial

Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 14.

On June 1, 2023, the day of jury selection in this case, Appellant filed a

motion in limine to preclude evidence of Appellant’s performance on the SFST

and the results of chemical testing “as fruit from the poisonous tree.” See

Motion in Limine, 6/1/23, ¶ 6. He argued that those results should be

suppressed because the illegal search occurred before the SFST and chemical

testing had taken place. Id. He further argued that his arrest was illegal

because the officers considered the now suppressed evidence when deciding

to arrest Appellant for DUI. Id.

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The trial court denied Appellant’s motion after a hearing immediately

preceding the commencement of jury selection. After a two-day trial, the jury

found Appellant guilty of both DUI offenses, and the trial court found Appellant

guilty of two summary offenses. On October 27, 2023, Appellant was

sentenced to a minimum term of 90 days, and a maximum term of one year

of incarceration. This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for our

consideration:

1. Whether the [trial court] erred, under both the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, when it refused to

suppress all physical evidence and statements obtained after

the illegal, warrantless search of [Appellant’s] vehicle?

2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s]

motion in limine seeking exclusion from trial of all physical

evidence and statements obtained after the illegal, warrantless

search of [Appellant’s] vehicle?

3. Whether the trial court erred when it recognized Melanie

Stauffer as an expert in toxicology over [Appellant’s] multiple,

timely objections?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.

Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to the denial of a

suppression motion is

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual

findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard

of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the

defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may

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consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal

citations omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the record created during

the suppression hearing. In re L.J., supra.

“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019). “If there

is sufficient evidence of record to support the suppression court’s ruling and

the court has not misapplied the law, we will not substitute our credibility

determinations for those of the suppression court judge.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014).

In the instant case, the trial court suppressed the physical evidence, i.e.

marijuana and drug paraphernalia, based upon an illegal search of Appellant’s

vehicle. Appellant contends, however, that all the evidence of his DUI offense

should have been suppressed as fruit of the illegality. Appellant’s Brief, at 16.

“Evidence constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree, and must be

suppressed, if it was obtained by ‘exploitation’ of the illegality . . . and so long

as the taint of that illegality has not been purposed.” Commonwealth v.

Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 290 (Pa. 2017). The general rule excludes all

evidence unlawfully seized, as well as the direct and indirect products of the

illegality. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 928 (Pa. 2019).

“[E]xcludable evidence includes proof that is tangible and physical materials,

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items observed, words overheard, confessions or statements made by the

accused, and eyewitness identification testimony.” Id. “The inquiry simply is

whether the evidence was obtained via exploitation of the initial illegality.”

Shabezz, 166 A.3d at 289.

Notwithstanding the illegal search, we conclude that Appellant’s

performance on the SFTS and blood draw results were not obtained as a result

of the illegal vehicle search. The initial traffic stop was valid. Appellant was

stopped because he was driving his vehicle the wrong way down a one-way

without headlights at 2:00 a.m. N.T. Hearing, 8/4/22, at 15. Upon speaking

with Appellant, the driver, Officer Stratton noted that (a) Appellant appeared

confused and lethargic, (b) had red glassy eyes, and (c) he could smell an

odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. Id. at 15-17. As a result

of these observations, Officer Stratton suspected Appellant was under the

influence of marijuana. N.T. Hearing, 8/4/22, at 17-18. Moreover, Officer

Reis specifically testified that his opinion that Appellant was under the

influence of marijuana was not informed by what was later found during the

illegal search of his vehicle. N.T. Hearing, 9/9/22, at 23.

Those observations – made prior to the illegal search – led the officers

to believe Appellant was driving under the influence and were sufficient to

support the reasonable suspicion necessary to request Appellant to perform

field sobriety tests. See Cauley, 10 A.3d at 326-327. Appellant’s

performance on the SFST, in turn, provided the officers with probable cause

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to arrest Appellant and subject him to a blood draw. See Salter, 121 A.3d at

997.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude, in this case, that the evidence of

Appellant’s performance on the SFST and the results of his blood draw were

obtained by exploiting the illegal search of his vehicle. Therefore, the trial

court did not err or abuse its discretion when it declined to suppress all

evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Appellant’s second issue is related. On the day of jury selection,

Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence as fruit of the

poisonous tree. See Motion in Limine, 6/1/23. It was denied after brief

argument. See N.T. Trial, 6/1/23, at 2-13.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for

an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639, 645 (Pa.

Super. 2000). “The admission of evidence is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court” and will not be overruled absent evidence of

“manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181

A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

For the same reasons as previously discussed, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion in limine. The officers’

observations of Appellant prior to the illegal search were sufficient to support

the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct field sobriety tests, which in

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turn, led to probable cause for arrest. See Cauley, Salter, supra. Thus, no

relief is due on this claim.

Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred when it recognized

Melanie Stauffer as an expert in toxicology. He argues that Ms. Stauffer was

not qualified because the analysis of the blood was done by a machine, and

not her personally. Appellant’s Brief, at 19-20; N.T. Trial, 6/1/23, at 108-09.

The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be overruled absent an abuse of that discretion.

Commonwealth v. Powell, 171 A.3d 294, 305 (Pa. Super. 2017). Expert

testimony is governed by Pa.R.E. 702, which reads:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average

layperson;

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the

relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702.

Appellant does not cite, nor can we find, authority that an individual

qualified as an expert in toxicology must personally analyze the blood rather

than rely on machinery for that task. We find Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79

A.3d 520 (Pa. 2013) to be instructive. There, the Commonwealth presented

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Dr. Lee Blum as an expert in toxicology. Id. at 553. He was an assistant

laboratory director and a toxicologist at National Medical Services (“NMS”)

labs. Id. Dr. Blum was responsible for the lab’s quality assurance program

and client service, as well as reviewing analytic testing, writing reports, and

testifying at trial. Id. He reviewed and verified the raw data received from

the gas chromatography machine. Id. at 523-24.

In Yohe, Dr. Blum did not personally analyze the blood samples,

observe the blood samples being placed in the gas chromatography machine,

or handle any of the defendant’s blood samples. Id. at 525. The defendant

did not object to Dr. Blum’s qualifications as an expert in toxicology. Id. at

524. Rather, he objected on the grounds that Dr. Blum’s testimony regarding

the toxicology report, as well as the admission of the report, violated his right

to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution because the specific lab technicians who performed the testing

were not called as witnesses. Id. Our Supreme Court held there was no

violation because “Dr. Blum’s expert opinion was contained in the toxicology

report and was the result of his independent verification of the chain of

custody and his independent analysis of the three test results produced by

two lab technicians[.]” Id. at 541.

Similar to the expert in Yohe, Ms. Stauffer is a technical specialist

employed by Health Network Laboratories (“HNL”) in its toxicology

department. N.T. Trial, 6/1/23, at 96. She is responsible for processing and

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reviewing data, method development, troubleshooting, and monitoring quality

control. Id. Ms. Stauffer has spent 30 of her 36 years working at HNL in the

toxicology department. Id. at 96-97. She has an associate’s degree in

medical laboratory technology and certified by the American Society of Clinical

Pathology. Id. at 97.

Ms. Stauffer explained that when blood is drawn for a patient, a courier

service delivers it to HNL and placed into secure storage. Id. at 101. The

sample goes through an extraction process and is placed in a liquid

chromatography-mass spectrometer for analysis. Id. at 104. Once the

analysis is complete, the machine prints the results. Id. at 106. The data is

then reviewed for accuracy by one individual and certified by a second

individual. Id. at 106-07.

Appellant’s only argument, without providing any authority, is that Ms.

Stauffer should not have been qualified as an expert because she merely

“pull[ed] numbers off of a machine[.]” Id. at 108-09. As explained by Ms.

Stauffer, the process for analyzing bodily fluid samples is automated. Id. at

101-07. The only human involvement is placing the sample into the machine,

removing it from the machine once the analysis is complete and reviewing and

certifying the data for accuracy. Id. Moreover, Rule 702 does not require a

witness to have hands-on experience in a given field in order to testify as an

expert. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 209 A.3d 444, 449 (Pa. Super.

2019) (an expert witness must only “possess more knowledge than is

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otherwise within the ordinary range of training, knowledge, intelligence or

experience” to testify). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Stauffer as an expert in toxicology.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/10/2025

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