Com. v. Williams, W.

J-S43023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

WALTER D. WILLIAMS, JR. :

:

Appellant : No. 952 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 14, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0002151-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2025

Appellant seeks review of the judgment of sentence entered by the

Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court). Following a jury trial,

Appellant was found guilty of numerous drug-related offenses, and he was

sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 15 to 30 years. On appeal, he raises

several claims: the search warrant executed by police was invalid; he was

deprived of his constitutional right to be tried by a jury of peers; the sentence

was manifestly excessive; the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing

factors; and the evidence of guilt was legally insufficient. We affirm.

Before examining the issues raised on appeal, we note at the outset that

our review is hindered by the lack of a complete record. As mentioned by the

trial court, Appellant requested copies of the notes of testimony from the

relevant proceedings, but he “failed to make payment” to the court

stenographer “even after numerous requests[.]” Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion,

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8/16/2024, at 11 n.8. Appellant did not timely seek to qualify to proceed in

forma pauperis, and the notes of testimony were not made part of the record.

Nevertheless, to the extent that the limited record allows, we will endeavor to

glean enough facts to consider the merit of Appellant’s claims. 1

This case arose from a series of “controlled buys” arranged by the

Pennsylvania State Police and Chester County detectives assigned to the Drug

and Organized Crime Unit. In March 2022, Chester County detectives

identified a person known as “Mills,” or “J” (later identified as Appellant), as a

potential narcotics dealer operating out of West Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The detectives believed that this individual had been regularly delivering

controlled substances to customers in Chester County, and surrounding

counties.

Through their investigations, the detectives linked the phone number of

their suspect to Appellant, and they used the number to set up three

monitored purchases of controlled substances between April 2022 and May

2022. The detectives also linked Appellant to the vehicle used by the

individual selling the narcotics (a black Infiniti QX30).

The controlled buys took place in East Bradford Township, West Chester,

in Chester County, Pennsylvania. On each occasion, Appellant arrived at the

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1 The Commonwealth has argued that this appeal should be dismissed, or

quashed, for lack of a complete record. See Appellee’s Brief, at 7. Rather

than do so, we will address the issues raised to the extent possible, while

noting, as needed, where the lack of an adequate record has resulted in waiver

of a claim.

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designated place while either driving or being driven in a black Infiniti QX30,

which was registered in Appellant’s name. Appellant delivered several bundles

of “heroine/fentanyl,” which were purchased by undercover police agents.

The arresting officers detailed the facts leading to Appellant’s arrest in their

affidavit of probable cause, which was included in the police criminal complaint

filed on June 24, 2022. Neither of the parties in this appeal has disputed that

the arresting officers swore to the following facts in their affidavit:

On May 19, 2022, the target of this investigation, [Appellant] was

contacted via cellular phone number 267-684-8297 and

arrangements were made to purchase twenty (20) bundles of

suspected HEROIN/FENTANYL from [Appellant] in exchange for

US Currency. [Appellant] agreed to meet in Coatesville, Chester

County Pennsylvania to complete the sale. [Appellant] later

changed his mind about the delivery location and wanted to

complete the sale at the Hillside Motel, located at 458 Baltimore

Pike, Glen Mills, PA 19342. No sale was completed on this date.

On May 23, 2022, [Appellant’s] was contacted via [his] cellular

phone number . . . [and he] agreed to sell ten (10) grams of bulk

HEROIN/FENTANYL to another person in exchange for $950.00.

A delivery time for this sale was never finalized due to [Appellant]

wanting the delivery to take place in Philadelphia. Later in [the]

day on May 23, 2022, your affiant requested assistance from the

Pennsylvania State Police Troop K VICE to set up surveillance on

the Hillside Motel, room #124, located at 458 Baltimore Pike, Glen

Mills, Delaware County, PA 19342. [Appellant] and a black male

with a slender build were observed leaving the hotel out of room

#124 and getting into the same black Nissan Altima that [an

undercover officer] drove to buy. [Appellant] was stopped and

arrested.

The slender build black male passenger in the Nissan was found

to be a juvenile who was identified as the driver of [Appellant’s]

lnfiniti that drove [Appellant] to the third controlled buy of this

investigation. . . . Surveillance units maintained visual surveillance

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on [Appellant’s] motel room until a search warrant could be

obtained for it and the Nissan.

On the evening of May 23, 2022, a search warrant was [issued by

District Judge (MDJ) Robert M. D’Agostino, Esquire, Magisterial

District Court 32-1-24 in Broomall, Pennsylvania] and executed

on the aforementioned vehicle and motel room. The search of the

motel room resulted in seizing the following:

- Over approximately 125 grams of suspected raw FENTANYL,

- approximately 30 grams of suspected CRACK COCAINE

- 90 individual baggies of suspected FENTANYL

- Four (4) unknown pills

- over 1,000 New and unused baggies

- Cutting agents

- Narcotic packaging materials including scales and electric

mixers.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/24/2022, at II-IV (some indentations added).

Detective Thomas P. Hyland, Jr., a member of the Phoenixville Borough

Police Department, and Trooper Ryan Smith, a member of the Pennsylvania

State Police, were the applicants (co-affiants) for the search warrant of the

motel room and Appellant’s vehicle.

A few days after his arrest, Appellant was charged with possession with

intent to deliver (PWID), criminal conspiracy, and other related crimes. On

October 20, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking (1) the

suppression of physical evidence seized as a result of the searches of

Appellant's person and his vehicle; (2) the suppression of Appellant's

statements subsequent to his arrest; (3) the suppression of a lineup

identification; and (4) discovery pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573.

At an evidentiary hearing held on March 3, 2023, Appellant also

challenged the validity of the search warrant issued on May 23, 2022, by MDJ

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D'Agostino, arguing that the evidence obtained as a result of the search was

inadmissible and had to be suppressed. The trial court denied the suppression

motion on April 14, 2023. See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/14/2023, at

1-2 n.1.

Appellant’s trial began on October 3, 2023, and it concluded two days

later. He was found guilty of five counts of PWID; three counts of conspiracy;

and one count of criminal use of a communication facility. After evaluating a

pre-sentence investigation report, and the Commonwealth's sentencing

memorandum, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 15 to 30 years on Count

4 (PWID); two to four years on Count 5 (PWID), concurrent to Count 4; five

to 10 years on Count 1(PWID), concurrent to Count 4; and 7.5 to 15 years on

Count 9 (conspiracy), concurrent to Count 4. As to the remaining PWID and

conspiracy counts, no further penalty was imposed. The aggregate term

totaled 15 to 30 years in state prison.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on March 14, 2024, seeking

reconsideration of the sentence in light of his history of addiction and recent

attempts at sobriety. The motion was denied, and Appellant timely appealed.

Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.

1925. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 8/16/2024, at 2-3. In his brief,

Appellant now raises several claims for our consideration:

1. Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion in denying

[Appellant’s] Motion to Suppress by Order of April 14, 2023 since

the search warrant was void ab initio, and the search was illegal?

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A. District [Judge] Robert M. D’Agostino, Esquire, of

Magisterial District Court 32-1-24 in Broomall, Pennsylvania,

was without jurisdiction to issue the search warrant-in-

question.

B. Detective Thomas P. Hyland, Jr. and Trooper Ryan Smith

did not secure the search warrant from a district magistrate

of their primary jurisdiction, in violation of the Municipal

Police Jurisdiction Act ("MPJA"), and service of the search

warrant was not done with the consent of the chief law

enforcement officer of Glen Mills, where the search warrant

was served.

C. The Commonwealth failed to establish a nexus between

the [m]otel room where the drugs were found and the

Defendant or that he participated in the drug activity.

2. Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion in denying the

[Appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion because his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury of his peers was violated since he is an African

American who was subject to an all-white jury panel?

3. Was the sentence imposed on [Appellant] harsh and excessive

and an abuse of discretion since the lower court failed to properly

consider all of the sentencing factors of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) or

any mitigating evidence when it imposed the sentence in question?

4. Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion in that it

sentenced [Appellant’s] in the upper end of the sentencing

guidelines without considering mitigating factors and only

considered the seriousness of the offense when it imposed

sentence?

5. Was the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences

drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, insufficient to enable the

fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of

the elements of the second conviction (relating to the second

alleged controlled substance sale to the undercover officer when

[Appellant] was not present) for Manufacture, Delivery, or

Possession With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver, in violation of 35

§ 780-113 §§ A30, beyond a reasonable doubt?

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6. Was the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences

drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, insufficient to enable the

fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of

the elements of the fourth conviction (relating to the controlled

substances recovered from motel room when [Appellant] was not

present) for Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession With Intent to

Manufacture or Deliver, in violation of 35 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 780-113 §§

A30, beyond a reasonable doubt?

7. Was the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences

drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, insufficient to enable the

fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of

the elements for Conspiracy - Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession

With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver, in violation of 18 [Pa.C.S.A.]

§ 903, beyond a reasonable doubt?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-9 (some claims reordered).

Appellant’s first claim, concerning the validity of the subject search

warrant, has three sub-parts, the first of which is that the issuing authority,

MDJ D’Agostino, lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant. Appellant contends

that MDJ D’Agostino only had authority to issue warrants within the

magisterial district located in Broomall, Pennsylvania, which fell outside of the

magisterial district where the search took place, in Glen Mills, Pennsylvania.

An issue concerning a court’s jurisdiction is a pure question of law,

subject to a de novo standard of review on appeal. See Commonwealth v.

McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 65 (Pa. Super. 2017). “A search warrant may be

issued by any issuing authority within the judicial district wherein is located

either the person or place to be searched.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 200. Our Supreme

Court has clarified that the jurisdiction of a magisterial district judge to issue

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warrants is “county-wide.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 400 A.2d 1264, 1266

(Pa. 1979) (“We thus believe a district [judge] has at least county-wide

jurisdiction.”).

The Comment to Rule 200 has adopted the holding of Ryan, citing it for

the proposition that “the authority of a magisterial district judge to issue a

search warrant outside of the magisterial district but within the judicial district

is recognized [in that case].” Pa.R.Crim.P. 200, cmt. More recently, our

Supreme Court has explained that Rule 200 “restricts the territorial jurisdiction

in which an issuing authority may issue a search warrant to the judicial district

in which the issuing authority sits, the parameters of which are generally

the county.” In re Lackawanna County, 212 A.3d 1, 21 (Pa. 2019) (citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a)).

Here, the search warrant was issued by MDJ D'Agostino, whose judicial

district was located in Delaware County at the relevant times. The motel

room to be searched pursuant to that warrant was also located in Delaware

County. Accordingly, the warrant was validly issued by the proper issuing

authority, and Appellant’s first claim has no merit. See id.

The second part of Appellant’s first claim is that the search warrant was

defective because the officers who applied for it violated section 8953(a)(1)

of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA), which, under some

circumstances, requires the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality

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where the warrant is to be served to consent to the warrant’s service. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19. The MPJA provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) General rule.-Any duly employed municipal police officer who

is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of

his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to

enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the

functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing

those functions within the territorial limits of his primary

jurisdiction in the following cases:

(1) Where the officer is acting pursuant to an order issued by a

court of record or an order issued by a district magistrate whose

magisterial district is located within the judicial district wherein

the officer's primary jurisdiction is situated, or where the officer

is otherwise acting pursuant to the requirements of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the service

of an arrest or search warrant shall require the consent of the

chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to

give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which

regularly provides primary police services in the municipality

wherein the warrant is to be served.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953 (emphasis added).

In the present case, the warrant was served in Glen Mills, PA, which is

an unincorporated community of Concord Township, in Delaware County,

Pennsylvania. The issuing authority for the warrant, as discussed above, sits

in Delaware County. Concord Township does not have its own police

department; it is instead serviced by the Pennsylvania State Police, Troop K.

The two officers who applied for a warrant in this case were Trooper Ryan

Smith and Detective Thomas Hyland. Trooper Smith was a member of the

Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Pennsylvania State Police, assigned to Troop K.

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On these facts, the record does not establish that the officers violated

the MPJA. As a preliminary matter, the MPJA applies to municipal police

officers. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8951 (defining a “municipal police officer” in the

MPJA as “[a]ny natural person who is properly employed by a municipality,

including a home rule municipality, as a regular full-time or part-time police

officer.”). Trooper Smith is indisputably a member of the state police, and not

employed by a municipality, so he would not be subject to subsection 8953(a),

and that statute would not limit his authority to execute the search warrant

issued in Delaware County, by a magistrate district judge sitting in Delaware

County.

Further, it is not at all clear from the record that the officers were acting

beyond the territorial limits of their primary jurisdiction, since Trooper Smith’s

unit was assigned to work in the township within the same county as the

issuing authority for the warrant. And even assuming that Trooper Smith and

Detective Hyland were acting beyond the territorial limits of their primary

jurisdiction under section 8953(a), they still would have had authority under

that provision to serve the warrant in Glen Mills because that community is

located in Delaware County, where the issuing authority sat. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 8953(a) (permitting an officer to execute a warrant “[w]here the officer is

acting pursuant to an order issued by a court of record or an order issued by

a district magistrate whose magisterial district is located within the judicial

district wherein the officer's primary jurisdiction is situated.”). Thus, the

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warrant was not served or executed in violation of subsection 8953(a)(1) of

the MPJA, and the second part of Appellant’s first claim has no merit. 2

The third part of Appellant’s first claim is that the search warrant was

invalid because the Commonwealth did not establish a sufficient “nexus”

between Appellant and the motel room where the search warrant was

executed. As to this sub-issue, the trial court found (and we agree) that the

ground for relief has been waived, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Appellant’s second claim is that his Sixth Amendment right to be tried

by a jury of his peers was violated because he is African American, and the

jury was composed of an “all-white jury panel.” Appellant’s Brief, at 22.

This claim is waived for several reasons. “Issues not raised in the trial

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P.

302(a). This waiver rule applies even with respect to asserted violations of

constitutional rights. See Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (“[I]ssues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived

if not raised in the trial court.”). To preserve a challenge to the racial

composition of the jury, a defendant must lodge a contemporaneous objection

on that ground and make an adequate record documenting the relevant

portions of voir dire. See generally Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d

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2 To the extent that Appellant intended to raise any additional arguments or

constructions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953 that would establish the invalidity of the

search warrant, or the service of the search warrant, such claims are waived

due to the lack of development of the record.

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1176, 1182-83 (Pa. 1993) (specifying the steps needed to make an adequate

record to challenge the racial composition of a jury); see also Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor’s challenge to

potential jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

United States Constitution).

Here, Appellant’s brief contains no citations to the parts of the record

which support the claim or show that the issue was preserved by a

contemporaneous objection to the jury’s composition. The argument is also

undeveloped, as it does not establish the legal basis on which Appellant is

entitled to relief. While Appellant has alluded to the Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial by a defendant’s peers, he does not discuss what happened

during voir dire, or cite any applicable caselaw. See Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 281 n.21 (Pa. 20110 (without a “developed, reasoned,

supported, or even intelligible argument, [t]he matter is waived for lack of

development.”).

Further, Appellant cites no authority for the proposed blanket rule that

a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury composed of any particular

race. And in fact, there is no such constitutional right. See Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“[A] defendant is not constitutionally

entitled to a jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his or her own

race[.]”). Thus, this unpreserved claim is unavailing to Appellant, and even if

it were not waived, there is no merit to its underlying premise that an all-

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White jury is per se unconstitutional where the defendant is a member of

another race or ethnicity. See id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. 79.

Appellant’s third and fourth claims concern the validity of his sentence,

and each of these claims will be addressed in turn. In the third claim,

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an

excessive sentence, and the trial court failed to consider all relevant

sentencing factors, such as mitigating evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 23-

25. This claim is waived. Appellant has not identified where in the record he

preserved this sentencing issue; he has not cited to relevant portions of the

record demonstrating the merit of the issue; and he has not developed the

argument on this point, instead baldly stating that the sentence was both

excessive and based on incomplete consideration of relevant sentencing facts.

There also is no transcript of the sentencing proceedings, further hindering

our review. Thus, the issue is not preserved, and this Court cannot reach the

merits of Appellant’s third claim.3

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3 The Commonwealth also correctly points out that Appellant has attempted

to seek relief from an abuse of the trial court’s discretion at the sentencing.

See Appellee’s Brief, at 19-21. A challenge to a discretionary aspect of

sentencing must be asserted in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which,

among other things, requires the party seeking relief to include in the briefing

a separate concise statement showing that the sentencing issues demonstrate

a “substantial question” as to the propriety of the sentence under the

Sentencing Code. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Failing to comply with these

procedures may result in the waiver of the sentencing claim if the

Commonwealth objects to the deficiency. See Commonwealth v. McNear,

852 A.2d 401, 408 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, Appellant’s brief does not

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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For the same reasons, Appellant’s fourth claim likewise is waived. He

argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence

without considering mitigating factors and only considering the seriousness of

the offense. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25-26. However, Appellant has not

demonstrated that the issue was preserved before the trial court, and, in any

event, the lack of a record again precludes meaningful appellate review.

Appellant’s final three claims concern the sufficiency of the evidence.

He argues that several of his convictions cannot be sustained because the

Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of those offenses beyond a

reasonable doubt, as Appellant was not physically present at the location

where these offenses allegedly occurred. See Appellant’s Brief, at 26-29.

That is, Appellant contends that the “Commonwealth failed to establish a

nexus between the [m]otel room where the drugs were found and [Appellant]

or that he participated in the drug activity.” Appellant’s Brief, at 28-29.

Once more, we must find that Appellant has waived his claims. He has

not cited to relevant portions of the record demonstrating the issue’s merit;

and he has not developed the argument in his brief. The lack of transcripts of

the trial proceedings further hinders our ability to consider the merit of the

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comport with the rule, and the Commonwealth has objected, so the sentencing

issues are clearly waived for this additional reason. See Appellee’s Brief, at

20.

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claims. Thus, no relief is due on Appellant’s sufficiency issue, and the

judgment of sentence must be upheld.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/10/2025

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