The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY GARVIN, Civil No. 3:25-cv-199
Petitioner □ (Judge Mariani)
v .
WARDEN JESSICA SAGE, .
Respondent .
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Anthony Garvin (“Garvin”) initiated the above-captioned action by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Garvin alleges
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) withheld application of his First Step Act (“FSA”)
credits and Second Chance Act (“SCA”) credits, in violation of his constitutional rights. (/d.).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice
based on Garvin's failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies.
Background
Garvin is serving a 24-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey for his conviction of conspiracy to commit bank
fraud and bank fraud. (Doc. 10-3). His current projected release date is August 30, 2025,
via FSA release. (/d.; see also Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Online Inmate Locator,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/).
The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP
custody, Garvin filed a total of nineteen administrative remedies. (Doc. 10-4). Seven of
those administrative remedies—numbers 1203945-F1, 1203945-F2, 1203945-F3, 1203945-
R1, 1203945-A1, 1225601-F1, and 1226607-F1—concern FSA credits. (/d.).
On June 27, 2024, Garvin filed administrative remedy number 1203945-F1 at the
institution level requesting that FSA credits be applied to his Residential Reentry Center
(“RRC”) date. (Id. at p. 4). The remedy was rejected because Garvin did not attempt to first
resolve the issue informally or submit proof of his attempt to informally resolve the issue.
(Id.). On August 2, 2024, Garvin filed administrative remedy number 1203945-F2 at the
institution level again requesting that FSA credits be applied to his RRC date. (/d. at p. 7).
The remedy was similarly rejected for lack of informal resolution or proof of his attempt to
informally resolve the issue first. (/d.). Garvin was advised that he must submit the entire
BP-8 and he was instructed to re-submit the administrative remedy within five days. (Id).
Garvin then submitted administrative remedy number 1203945-F3 on August 9, 2024,
requesting that FSA credits be applied to his RRC date. (/d. at p. 8). The remedy was
denied, and Garvin was again instructed that he must provide the entire BP-8 and re-submit
the remedy. (/d.). Garvin then filed administrative remedy number 1203945-R1 with the
Regional Office, which received it on September 9, 2024. (/d. at p. 9). The Regional Office
denied the remedy the same day and advised Garvin that his appeal was due on
September 3, 2024, and that he needed to submit the appeal with a staff memo explaining
why the appeal was late. (/d.). On October 4, 2024, Garvin submitted administrative
remedy number 1203945-A1 to the Central Office, which rejected it for the reasons stated
by the Regional Office. (/d. at p. 11).
On January 16, 2025, Garvin submitted administrative remedy number 1225601-F 1
to the institution. (/d. at p. 11). The institution rejected the remedy because Garvin was
improperly appealing multiple claims with one form. (/d.). Garvin was advised that each
claim must be separate, and he must provide specific information for each claim. (/d.).
Additionally, Garvin did not provide his unit information on the remedy. (/d.) He was
notified that he had five days to appeal. (/d.).
On January 27, 2025, Garvin submitted administrative remedy number 1226607-F 1
to the institution, which was denied and closed on February 3, 2025. (/d. at p. 12).
Garvin never received a final denial from the Central Office for any of these
administrative remedies. (See Doc. 10-4; see also Doc. 10-2, Declaration of Hugh Rich,
BOP Case Manager (“Rich Decl.”), p. 3 ¥ 5).
In his § 2241 petition, Garvin alleges that the BOP violated his rights withholding his
FSA credits and SCA credits. (Doc. 1). For relief, he seeks immediate release from
custody. (/d. at p. 9). Respondent filed a resiponse, asserting that the Court should dismiss
the petition because Garvin did not exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding
to federal court and, alternatively, because the petition is without merit. (Doc. 10). The
record clearly establishes that Garvin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies;
therefore, the Court does not reach Respondent's alternative arguments.
ll. Discussion
While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions
brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[flederal prisoners
are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98
F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d
Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop
a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to
grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d
at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).
However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these
underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See Coleman v. U.S. Parole
Comrn’n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). “For example, exhaustion
may be excused where it ‘would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and
unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional tighits, or if the administrative procedure is
clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.” Brown v. Warden Canaan
USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Lyons v. U.S. Marshals,
840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988)). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a
party must ‘provide a clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson
v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d
287, 293 (3d Cir. 2002)).
In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the
procedural requirements of the BOP’s administrative remedy process, which are set forth in
the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. Under these
regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if
the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written
request on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13-542.14. If
the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response, the inmate shall then submit an
appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a). And,
finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response, then the inmate
shall submit an appeal to the Office of the General Counsel, located in the BOP Central
Office, using the appropriate form. See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id.
(explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal”).
Here, the record reflects that, although Garvin filed seven administrative remedies
concerning FSA credits—numbers 1203945-F1, 1203945-F2, 1203945-F3, 1203945-R1,
1203945-A1, 1225601-F1, and 1226607-F1—he undisputably failed to properly exhaust
those remedies. (See Doc. 10-4). Garvin's Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval
report demonstrates that he never received final denial from the Central Office for any of
these remedies—the necessary step to fully exhaust his administrative remedies. (/d.; see
also Doc. 10-2, Rich Decl., p. 3] 5). On more than one occasion, Garvin was advised of
the proper steps to submit his administrative remedies. (Doc. 10-4). Rather than comply
with the directives, Garvin bypassed the statutorily mandated procedures and, instead, filed
the instant habeas petition in federal court.
Garvin concedes his failure to exhaust but argues that exhaustion should be
excused as futile because “it is the [p]attern and [practice of this administration to routinely
deny early release remedy, and the remedy process can toll beyo[]nd 6 months.” (Doc. 1,
p. 8). In other words, Garvin argues that he should not have to exhaust his administrative
remedies because the administrative remedy process could months to complete, and he
should be released before the process is completed. The Court, however, is unpersuaded
by Garvin’s argument, as it does not provide a basis to excuse exhaustion. See, e.9.,
Greene v. Spaulding, No. 22-cv-01726, 2023 WL 3372375, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023)
(concluding that the Section 2241 petitioner had failed to show irreparable harm as a basis
for excusing administrative exhaustion, where he argued that the denial of his claim at the
administrative level would result in him being relzassed later than the: date he would be
entitled to release if he were granted habeas relief—i.e., granted credits under the First Step
Act); Rodriguez v. Sage, No. 22-cv-02053, 2023 WL 2309781, at *2 (M.D P’a. Mar. 1, 2023)
(explaining that “district courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the
argument that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply because
his projected release date is approaching, and he may not complete his administrative
appeal before the release date” (collecting cases)); Ramirez v. Sage, No, 22-cv-00638,
2022 WL 2318693, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2022) (rejecting the Section 2241 petitioner's
argument that requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies “would subject him to
irreparable harm because the delay would result in him being incarcerated beyond the date
he should be released” (citation omitted)). Additionally, the Court is unaware of any
decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a federal prisoner may be
excused from the exhaustion requirement on that ground.
Garvin further argues, without any support, that “he attempted to resolve [the]
grievanceJs], but to no avail. Petitioner claims other attempts to resolve|] [the] grievance[s]
[were] ‘blocked’ by either not answering the grievance or not submitting [his] grievance to
the appropriate authority.” (Doc. 1, p. 8). The record reflects that Garvin has filed nineteen
remedies, seven of which relate to the FSA, but he has never received a final denial from
the Central Office on the merits of his claims. (Doc. 10-4). Thus, the record undercuts
Garvin's contention that he is being blocked by BOP staff from seeking administrative relief.
Put differently, Garvin’s unsupported claim that his attempts at administrative exhaustion
have been “blocked” by staff—in light of his numerous successful administrative filings—is
insufficient to circumvent the prudential exhaustion requirement for Section 2241 petitions.
Despite being well aware of the BOP’s exhaustion requirements, Garvin failed to
“avail [] himself of every process at every turn (which would require all appeals to be timely
pursued, etc.).” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). Garvin fails to identify
BOP actions that would clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights,
and he has not set forth any facts or advanced an argument that would permit this Court to
find that exhaustion of his administrative remedies would subject him to irreparable injury.’
Garvin's dispute regarding the calculation of FSA credits and SCA credits is the
exact type of claim that needs to first be raised with the BOP so that the alleged error could
be corrected or a record for habeas review could be developed. Because Garvin did not
fully exhaust his administrative remedies before petitioning this Court, and because no
exception to the exhaustion requirement applies here, his Section 2241 petition must be
dismissed.
‘Garvin also argues in his reply that “Chevron Jeferenice was over turiedl! by the Supreme Court
[in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)] and thus stripped! away this administration's
long standing practice of interpreting Law to deny citizens their Rights.” (Doc. 13, at 1). Under Loiper,
federal courts “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within
its statutory authority, as the [Administrative Procedure Act] requires...” and “may not defer to an agency
interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” Loper, 603 U.S. at 412-13. This Court
finds that Loper is inapplicable to Garvin's case because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Because Garvin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, there is no final BOP determination of his
eligibility or ineligibility to earn FSA time credits and SCA credits. Stated another way, there is no “agency
interpretation of the law” in Garvin's case for the district court to review under the directive of Loper. Loper,
603 US. at 413.
Ill. = Conciusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.
{.S—
[X LitaAy)
Robert
United States District Judge
Dated: April , 2025