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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1432-23
D.M.,1 on behalf of minor
child, C.M.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE TOWNSHIP OF HAMILTON,
MERCER COUNTY,
Respondent-Appellant.
______________________________
Argued March 18, 2025 – Decided April 9, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of
Education, Docket No. 73-4/22.
Patrick F. Carrigg argued the cause for appellant
(Lenox Law Firm, attorneys; Patrick F. Carrigg and
Costadinos J. Georgiou, on the briefs).
Amna T. Toor, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent Commissioner of Education
1
We use initials to protect the identities of the parties.
(Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Donna
Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Amna
T. Toor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
County (Board) appeals from the November 30, 2023 final agency
decision of respondent, the New Jersey Commissioner of Education
(Commissioner),2 affirming the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) initial
decision vacating the Board's determination that C.M. violated the District Code
of Conduct for eating a Rice Krispies treat edible3 on school premises and
distributing the rest to other students. The Commissioner determined that the
Board's determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Based on
our review of the record and applicable principles, we affirm.
2
At the time of this decision, the Commissioner was Dr. Angelica Allen -
McMillan, Ed.D.
3
An edible is defined as "any of various food items containing
[tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)]" or "something that is suitable or safe to eat[;] a
food item." Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/edible (last visited Apr. 2, 2025).
A-1432-23
2
I.
In January 2022, C.M. was an eighth-grade student attending Emily C.
Reynolds Memorial Middle School (Reynolds Middle School). On January 18,
2022, C.M., along with another student L.P., purchased a Rice Krispies treat4
from an unidentified man behind a Dollar Tree Store at the Hamilton Square
Shopping Center. The man was never apprehended. The following day, C.M.
and L.P. went to school and reported to the gym bleachers—where eighth
graders sit for their morning program. C.M. ate a piece of the Rice Krispies
treat while sitting in the bleachers and reported that she felt "weird" after eating
it. C.M. claimed that L.P. forced her to eat the treat and distribute it to other
students. However, L.P. claimed that it was C.M. who brought the treat to
school and ate it willingly.
Video footage of the students showed C.M. and L.P. sitting side by side
at lunch without any signs of discomfort or coercion between them. The video
footage also revealed that there was something on C.M.'s lap, but it was difficult
to identify. C.M. consumed more of the treat at lunch. After lunch, C.M.
became ill and vomited. C.M. went to the nurse's office and texted her father,
4
The treat is also referred to as an "edible" in the record. We use "treat" and
"edible" interchangeably in our opinion.
A-1432-23
3
D.M, to pick her up from school, and was absent from school the next day. Other
students told L.P. that C.M. blamed L.P. for putting something in the Rice
Krispies treat that made her sick. C.M. texted L.P. that she got her in trouble
because something was "laced" in the treat.
On January 21, 2022, L.P. went to C.M.'s locker and started a fight with
her because of the rumors that C.M. spread about her regarding the treat. C.M.
was "submissive." L.P. punched C.M. in the head and pulled her hair. The fight
ended when school administrators intervened and broke it up. Administrators
spoke with students, including C.M. and L.P., learned about C.M.'s and L.P.'s
purchase of the treat, and called their parents. L.P. was suspended for five days
for fighting, while C.M. was suspended indefinitely pending a Board hearing for
possession and distribution of an illegal substance on January 19, 2022.
On February 2, 2022, Reynolds Middle School Principal Patricia
Landolfi-Collins sent correspondence to D.M., notifying him that C.M. was
suspended indefinitely and charged with "possession and distribution of an
illegal substance," in violation of the District Code of Conduct.5 The school
5
Section C of the Hamilton Township School District Policy and Regulation
(District Policy) 5600 (C)(10), states that "[c]onduct which shall constitute good
cause for suspension . . . shall include, but not be limited to, any of the following:
. . . [k]nowing possession or knowing consumption . . . of . . . controlled
A-1432-23
4
administrators were unable to perform laboratory testing on the treat because it
had been consumed by C.M., and the rest of it had been distributed. C.M. could
not remember which students she gave pieces of the treat to. In a letter to the
Board, Landolfi-Collins stated that C.M.'s suspension stemmed from her
"admission" that she consumed a "Rice Krispie[s] [t]reat edible with THC" and
distributed it to other students.
On February 15, 2022, the Board conducted C.M.'s disciplinary hearing.
Landolfi-Collins and Vice Principal Christine Hart testified at the Board
hearing. Landolfi-Collins did not mention THC during her testimony but stated
she knew there was an illegal substance in the treat based on her interview with
C.M., who advised her that she and L.P. "bought an edible" and that L.P.
probably "laced whatever she gave her." Hart testified that C.M. did not know
what was in the treat.
C.M.'s counsel submitted evidence of a negative drug test administered by
C.M.'s pediatrician conducted four days after the incident. C.M. underwent the
drug test voluntarily. The Board found that C.M. violated the District Code of
substances on school premises, or being under the influence of . . . controlled
substances while on school premises . . . .
A-1432-23
5
Conduct by bringing the edible on school grounds. On March 1, 2022, the Board
issued a written decision setting forth its findings and legal conclusions.
The Board found that C.M. "believed she was in possession of what she
thought to be a dangerous substance" and distributed it to other students. The
Board noted C.M.'s "admissions" to Landolfi-Collins "were unrebutted and
support the finding." The Board determined that the "circumstances" as to how
C.M. acquired the edible "are highly concerning" because she purchased it "from
an unidentified man behind a store" rather than inside of a store if C.M.
"believed this to be a regular [R]ice [K]rispies treat."
The Board explained that C.M. "admitted to distributing the edible to other
students" and "to feeling sick" after ingesting it, "causing her to vomit." The
Board noted that no lab test confirmed whether the edible "was actually laced
with a dangerous substance," but that does not "excuse" C.M.'s conduct on
school grounds. The Board highlighted the "importance of deterring other
students from similar conduct" as well as the "need to punish" C.M. for conduct
that could have had a "more dire result for her and other students."
The Board noted C.M.'s attendance and good grades and allowed her to
return to school with a suspension noted in her discipline record. C.M. was
A-1432-23
6
assessed with the maximum discipline permitted by the District Code of Conduct
for possession and distribution.
D.M., on behalf of C.M., filed an appeal to the New Jersey State
Department of Education, Bureau of Controversies and Disputes, which
transferred the case to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL). The parties
cross-moved for summary decision. On October 24, 2023, the ALJ found the
Board was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in its findings and vacated its
determination that C.M. violated the District Code of Conduct. The ALJ
determined:
[C.M.] has demonstrated that the Board acted in
disregard of the circumstances before it, and that its
decision was not supported by credible evidence.
While it is reasonable to infer that C.M. did not believe
she purchased an ordinary Rice Krispies treat from the
man behind the Dollar Tree Store, [the Board] concedes
that neither the school nor the Board was able to
determine what dangerous substance, if any, the Rice
Krispies treat contained. [The Board] likewise
acknowledges that C.M. did not know what was in the
Rice Krispies treat. Contrary to [the Board]'s assertion
that [C.M.]'s mere belief that she possessed contraband
is sufficient to justify the suspension, the District Code
of Conduct specifically penalizes "[k]nowing
possession or knowing consumption without legal
authority of . . . a controlled dangerous substance
[(CDS)] on school premises" and "being under the
influence of . . . [CDS] while on school premises."
There was no knowledge here or proof that a [CDS] was
involved, and the Board offered scant details about the
A-1432-23
7
alleged distribution. The absence of substantial,
credible evidence in this case renders the Board's
decision unreasonable. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE
that [the Board] acted in a manner that is arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable and the charge of
possession and distribution of T[HC] is unfounded.
The Board filed a written exception with the Commissioner pursuant to N.J.A.C.
1:1-18.4(a).
On November 30, 2023, the Commissioner adopted the ALJ's initial
decision. The Commissioner found the Board's decision was arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable and "lacked a rational basis." The Commissioner
highlighted that the record "does not contain any credible evidence to establish
that the treat contained THC or any other [CDS]." In addition, the
Commissioner found the record failed to establish C.M. "knowingly possessed
or knowingly consumed a [CDS] on school premises in violation of N.J.S.A.
18A:37-2(j), and District Policy 5600(C)(10).
The Commissioner noted that the principal's testimony elicited at the
Board meeting was based on an assumption that the treat contained THC because
C.M. referred to it as an "edible" purchased from an unknown person. However,
the Commissioner emphasized the record showed C.M. maintained she did not
know what was contained in the treat, neither she nor anyone else ever stated
that the treat contained THC, and the treat was never evaluated to determine
A-1432-23
8
whether it contained THC or another substance. The Commissioner noted the
dictionary definition of "edible" fails to support the conclusion that the treat at
issue contained THC or a CDS, and C.M.'s "belief" that L.P. might have put
something in the treat does not support that conclusion either.
II.
On appeal, the Board contends the Commissioner's final decision should
be overturned as arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Board further
argues the Commissioner incorrectly construed the Board's policy and charge
by arbitrarily and inappropriately adding a scienter requirement and overlooked
undisputed evidence in the record. It also contends the Commissioner's final
decision violates public policy by encouraging the consumption of edibles and
other drugs on school grounds before a Board can test the substance. The
Commissioner seeks affirmance. 6
Our role in reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency is
limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). When a contested case is
submitted to the OAL for a hearing, the agency head must review the record
submitted by the ALJ and give attentive consideration to the ALJ's initial
6
D.M. did not file a brief but relies on the brief filed on behalf of the
Commissioner.
A-1432-23
9
decision. N.J. Dep't of Pub. Advoc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 189 N.J. Super.
491, 506 (App. Div. 1983). The agency head nevertheless remains the primary
factfinder and maintains the ultimate authority to reject or modify findings of
fact, conclusions of law, or interpretations of agency policy. Id. at 507 (citing
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c)).
Established principles of law direct us not to upset an agency
determination absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable; that it lacked fair support in the evidence; or that it violated
legislative policies. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014); Campbell v.
Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). The "final determination of an
administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference." In re Eastwick
Coll. LPN-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016). "A reviewing court
'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, even though the court
might have reached a different result.'" In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194
(2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)).
To determine whether an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, a reviewing court must examine:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law;
A-1432-23
10
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant factors.
[Ibid. (quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83).]
"The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative
action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006). We review
summary decision motions under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 "substantially the same as
that governing a motion under Rule 4:46-2 for summary judgment in civil
litigation." L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192, 203 (2015).
"[T]he Commissioner . . . has primary jurisdiction to hear and determine
all controversies arising under the school laws." Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of City
of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2023) citing Bower v. Bd. of
Educ. of E. Orange, 149 N.J. 416, 420 (1997) (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9). As a
result, their "statutory interpretation is entitled to considerable weight, where
not inconsistent with the statute and in harmony with the statutory purpose."
Kletzkin v. Bd. of Educ. of Spotswood, 261 N.J. Super. 549, 553 (App. Div.
1993). We will ordinarily uphold the Commissioner's determination "unless it
A-1432-23
11
is 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or is not supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Ramapo Indian Hills Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J. Super. 246, 259-60 (App.
Div. 2012) (quoting Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cnty. Reg'l High Sch.
Dist. #1, 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993)).
A.
We first address the Board's argument that the Commissioner erred by not
applying the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard to the "plain
language" of the Board's policy by adding the word "knowing" to the charge of
possession and distribution of a controlled substance. By adding the word
"knowing" to the Board's policy, the Board maintains the Commissioner created
a "dangerous precedent" by "demanding" that the Board prove C.M.'s knowledge
of the exact contents of the substance she claimed made her ill. The Board
contends this misinterpretation "complicated the matter" and was contrary to
substantial credible evidence in the record warranting reversal. The Board
asserts that interjecting the scienter requirement restricts its ability to prevent
the consumption and distribution of edibles and drugs on school premises.
The Board's arguments are unavailing. The Commissioner agreed with
the ALJ's assessment there was no credible evidence presented that established
A-1432-23
12
the treat contained THC or any other CDS in contravention of District Policy
5600. Moreover, the Commissioner found that C.M. maintained that she did not
know what the treat contained; neither she nor anyone else ever represented the
treat contained THC; and saliently, the treat was never tested to ascertain what,
if anything, it contained. Importantly, the Commissioner determined C.M.'s
belief, without more, that L.P. might have laced the treat does not lead to the
conclusion that the treat actually contained THC or a CDS. The record supports
that determination.
B.
The Board next argues that the Commissioner overlooked the "undisputed
evidence" in the record. According to the Board, the circumstances under which
C.M. and L.P. purchased the edible from "the nefarious man" behind the Dollar
Tree Store, consumed at school, and distributed by C.M. to other students was
not considered by the Commissioner. The Board contends C.M. and L.P. "could
have simply entered the Dollar Tree Store" to make a purchase, indicating the
purchase of the treat was "illegal."
The Board asserts the treat caused "foggy memory" because C.M. claimed
she had difficulty remembering which students she gave the treat to, and her
ingestion of the treat made her feel "weird" and later ill. The Board claims it is
A-1432-23
13
"undisputed" that C.M. possessed and distributed an illegal substance. We
disagree.
The record is devoid of evidence or testimony that the treat contained a
dangerous substance. Notwithstanding C.M. stating it was an "edible," the
Commissioner determined that C.M. maintained she did not know what
substance—if any—was in the treat. Moreover, the testimony presented at the
Board disciplinary hearing confirmed that C.M. did not know what was in the
treat and no independent testing or evidence was presented to establish what the
purported "illegal substance" was. Specifically, we note THC was not
mentioned at the hearing by the witnesses who testified. The Commissioner
found that C.M.'s belief that L.P. may have put something in the treat failed to
support a finding that the treat contained THC or a dangerous substance.
Given these findings, we are convinced the evidence in the record amply
supports the Commissioner's decision. We find no merit in the Board's
argument. We conclude the Commissioner's decision is not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. See Hermann, 192 N.J. at 27-28.
C.
Finally, the Board argues the Commissioner's final agency decision is
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and violates public policy by
A-1432-23
14
encouraging the consumption of edibles and other illicit drugs on school
grounds. In the Board's view, the Commissioner's decision sets a dangerous
precedent by advising school boards to reject student confessions and require
drug testing even when the substance has already been consumed. The Board
contends the Commissioner's decision essentially promotes the consumption of
edibles on school grounds and imposes an unrealistic burden on school boards
by requiring proof that a student "knowingly" ingested or distributed an edible
containing THC, and fosters an environment where students will exhibit the
same behavior as C.M.
The Board's arguments are belied by the record. The Commissioner
rejected
the Board's assertion that the [i]nitial [d]ecision
"creates a dangerous precedent" and ignores the Board's
obligation to maintain the safe and orderly operation of
the schools and protect students. While the
Commissioner does not condone [C.M.]'s actions, the
ALJ correctly found and concluded under the
applicable legal standard that the Board's disciplinary
charges against C.M. were unsupported by credible
evidence. The holding in this case is limited to the
unique facts described herein and in no way ignores a
Board's obligation to maintain the safe and orderly
operation of schools and to keep students from harm,
nor does it prevent [school] [b]oards from disciplining
students in accordance with applicable law and
regulations.
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Contrary to the Board's assertions, the record does not reflect the
Commissioner inferred facts or drew conclusions that are contrary to public
policy. In rendering her decision, the Commissioner emphasized it was limited
to C.M.'s case and the unique facts presented. Accordingly, we conclude the
Commissioner's decision does not violate public policy.
Because the Commissioner's final decision is supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record, we discern no basis to disturb it. To the extent
we have not addressed any of the Board's remaining arguments, we find they
lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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