Cassidy v. Citrus County Mosquito Control District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

JAMES TYLER CASSIDY as

Trustee of Maximus James Trust,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-CV-00043-WFJ-PRL

CITRUS COUNTY MOSQUITO

CONTROL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff James Tyler Cassidy, as trustee for the Maximus James Trust,

proceeding pro se, raises twelve claims against Defendant Citrus County Mosquito

Control District (“CCMCD”). Dkt. 1 at 2–16. Plaintiff alleges that CCMCD, by

spraying pesticides via helicopter fly-over onto the trust property and its residents,

is liable to the trust for various torts and civil rights violations. Id. CCMCD now

moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. 16. Plaintiff responds in opposition.

Dkt. 21. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that CCMCD has flown its helicopters over property owned

by the Maximus James Trust, for which he acts as a trustee, on numerous occasions,

dispersing chemicals on the trust property, him, his mother, and his animals. See

generally Dkt. 1. The allegations in the complaint relate to two separate incidents

occurring on January 15, 2025, and November 18, 2024. Id. Count 1 relates to the

January 15 fly-over and alleges the following:

Claim #1A . . . intentional TORT of Personal Injury via 320 Assault,

Libel, & Slander. . . .

Claim #1B . . . intentional Real Property Torts to land by illegally

trespassing on Land after notice, being a nuisance, and contaminating

the grounds and air with chemicals . . .

Claim #1C . . . deprivation of Civil Rights and Violation of said rights.

It is my God given right as well as my private contractual right to enjoy

the above mentioned property without interference from outside

agencies. . . .

Claim #1D . . . violation of The Federal Trade Commission Act . . .

[because] targeting human beings and living spaces [rather than] areas

for mosquito treatment [is] evidence of unfair and deceptive acts and

practices. . . .

Claim #1E . . . [violation of the] NOTICE OF TRESPASSING

CHARGE section of the [Cease and Desist & Official NOTICE of

TRESPASSING CHARGES] Affidavit that was serviced upon

CCMCD . . . Additionally I believe the above mentioned actions show

evidence of a Trespassing Crime[.] CCMCD actions show evidence of

CCMCD violating Florida Statute 810.08. . . .

Claim #1F . . . [violation of the] NOTICE NOT TO DUMP section of

the CDONTC Affidavit that was serviced upon CCMCD[.]

Id. at 2–11. Counts 2A–F repeat the same causes of action except as they relate to

the November 18, 2024, fly-over by Defendant. Id. at 11–16.

The “Cease and Desist & Official NOTICE of TRESPASSING CHARGES

Affidavit” (“CDONTC Affidavit”) referenced above appears to have been created

by Plaintiff and sent to Defendant in August 2024. Id. at 22–24. To the Court’s

understanding, the CDONTC Affidavit demanded that Defendant stop flying over

and dispersing on the trust property or face monetary penalties imposed by Plaintiff.

See id. at 9–11, 14–16, 22–24.

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. 16 at 1. In response, Plaintiff

filed a notice that reasons through why, in Plaintiff’s view, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss should be denied. Dkt. 21 at 1–2. The Court treats this notice as a response

in opposition. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint for the following reasons.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought under

12(b)(1) may attack jurisdiction facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 232

F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–

29 (11th Cir. 1990)). Facial attacks challenge jurisdiction based solely on the face of

the complaint. Id. Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge jurisdiction based on

the facts outside of the complaint. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,

572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, Defendant does not assert additional

facts and relies solely on the complaint to challenge jurisdiction. Dkt. 16 at 9–14.

Thus, the Court accepts all allegations on the face of the complaint as true in deciding

on Defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529.

II. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which

Relief Can Be Granted

A complaint withstands dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts state

a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quotations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). In reviewing the complaint, all facts, and not legal conclusions, are accepted

as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)); see also

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (stating that legal conclusions

“couched” as facts need not be accepted as true); Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326

F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that “legal conclusions masquerading as

facts” will not prevent dismissal).

III. Pro Se Litigants

“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted

by attorneys” and arguments therein will therefore “be liberally construed.”

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998); Russell v.

Flixbus, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-796-MHC, 2023 WL 11959351, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 18,

2023). This liberal reading, however, does not exempt pro se plaintiffs from the

pleading standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Middle

District of Florida Local Rules. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F.

App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ro se complaints must also comply with

procedural rules that govern pleadings.”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837

(11th Cir. 1989); Caton v. Louis, No. 2:07-CV-32-FtM-99SPC, 2007 WL 9718731,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007).

Moreover, a district court may not serve as a pro se plaintiff’s “de facto

counsel” or “rewrite [a] . . . deficient pleading . . . .” Powers v. Avondale Baptist

Church, 393 F. App’x 656, 657 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted) (citations

omitted); see GJR Invs. v. City of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).

But where more specific allegations would remedy the pleading problems in a pro

se plaintiff’s complaint, the district court must dismiss with leave to amend. See

Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988); Woldeab v. Dekalb

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2018).

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal district courts can exercise federal

question jurisdiction, which is original jurisdiction over civil lawsuits that arise

under “the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

District courts may also exercise diversity jurisdiction, which exists when the matter

in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. § 1332.

When a district court has original jurisdiction over an action, it may exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that form part of the same case or

controversy. § 1367(a).

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet indicates that diversity jurisdiction is the basis of

jurisdiction for this lawsuit. Dkt. 1-1. He identifies CCMCD as incorporated in or

having a principal place of business in Florida, and identifies himself as a foreign

nation. Id. The allegations in the complaint explain that Plaintiff brings the action as

trustee of the Maximus James Trust, which owns the land on which Plaintiff

apparently lives and over which CCMCD allegedly dusted pesticide. Dkt. 1 at 2–3.

“A ‘traditional trust’ holds the citizenship of its trustee[.]” Alliant Tax Credit

31, Inc v. Murphy, 924 F.3d 1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2019) (first citing Americold Realty

Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 383 (2016); and then citing Raymond

Loubier Irrevocable Tr. v. Loubier, 858 F.3d 719, 730 (2d Cir. 2017)). “A ‘traditional

trust . . . generally describes a fiduciary relationship regarding property where the

trust cannot sue and be sued as an entity under state law.’” Id. (quoting Wang ex rel.

Wong v. New Mighty U.S. Tr., 843 F.3d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Under Florida

law, a trust is not a “distinct juridical entity,” but rather makes and defends claims

via its trustee. Id. (citing Loubier, 858 F.3d at 730–31); see Fla. Stat. § 736.0811 (“A

trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims

against the trust.”); see also Dkt. 1 at 5 (“As Trustee of the above mentioned property

I have a contractual duty, privilege, and right to preserve the property and my health

so I can fully carry out my duties as Trustee for the Maximus James Trust.”).

As alleged, the complaint does not establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff

appears to reside on this land in Citrus County, Florida. See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 8

(referring to one area within the tract as “living spaces”). Thus, for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction, he is a citizen of Florida. McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d

1254, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2002) (citizenship of natural person determined by their

domicile). And because Plaintiff is trustee of the Maximus James Trust, it too would

be a citizen of Florida. Murphy, 924 F.3d at 1143. Citrus County Mosquito Control

District represents that its “principal place of operation is also Florida” such that

there is no diversity of citizenship between it and the trust. Dkt. 16 at 10.

Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction does not exist on these facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

1332.

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Plaintiff sets forth two grounds that could, in theory, support federal question

jurisdiction: (1) “violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,” and (2)

“deprivation and violation of Civil Rights.” E.g., Dkt. 1 at 8, 13. The Court addresses

each in turn.

First, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq., does not

provide for a private right of action. Tershakovec v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 79 F.4th

1299, 1318 (11th Cir. 2023) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Plaintiff

cannot proceed under this claim.

Next, however, courts have interpreted pro se plaintiffs’ allegations of “civil

rights violations” as traveling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when the statute is not

specifically asserted. See Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 849 (11th Cir.

2015) (“[I]nsofar as she is alleging a violation of her civil rights, she would be

proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”); Hallett v. Ohio, 711 F. App’x 949, 950–

51 (11th Cir. 2017); Rossin v. Clinch, No. 3:21-CV-342-TJC-LLL, 2022 WL

22234576, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:21-CV-342-TJC-LLL, 2022 WL 22234580 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2022) (noting that

“[a]lthough not explicitly invoked, it appears plaintiffs are attempting to state a claim

under § 1983,” and then evaluating that potential claim).

So, Plaintiff’s allegations of “civil rights violations” by CCMCD survive the

inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction as they can be construed as section 1983

claims. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a section 1983 claim, as will be

discussed below.

II. Failure to State a Section 1983 Claim

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but

merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred ... [t]he

first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly

infringed.’” Moody v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 19-24638-CV, 2020 WL 13614261, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2020) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)).

In this case, Plaintiff has not identified the specific constitutional right that

CCMCD has allegedly violated. In claims 1C and 2C he states that it is his “God

given right as well as [his] private contractual right to enjoy the above mentioned

property without interference from outside agencies.” Dkt. 1 at 7; accord id. at 13.

Regarding Plaintiff’s assertion of a “contractual right,” the Court cannot

discern a cognizable section 1983 claim from the complaint. A handful of cases have

discussed the right to contract in the context of a section 1983 claim. See Young

Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, Fla., 529 F.3d 1027, 1039–40 (11th Cir. 2008);

Novak v. Cobb Cnty. Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 74 F.3d 1173, 1174, 1176 (11th Cir.

1996); Biasella v. City of Naples, Fla., No. 2:04-CV-320-FTM29DNF, 2005 WL

1925705, at *5–6, *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2005). But, as a threshold issue, the Court

is unaware of any contract that Maximus James Trust entered or attempted to enter

such that CCMCD unconstitutionally prevented it from doing so. If Plaintiff is

referring to the CDONTC Affidavit as a contract with CCMCD, Dkt. 21 at 4, this is

a legal conclusion the Court need not accept as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, beyond Plaintiff’s mention of a “contractual right” to enjoy the

property without interference, he does not “identify the specific constitutional right

allegedly infringed” as required to state a section 1983 claim. Moody, 2020 WL

13614261, at *2. Despite the leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the Court cannot

“serve as de facto counsel” to construct a claim for Plaintiff. GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at

1369. CCMCD is not on “fair notice of the claims asserted against [it] and the

grounds upon which they rest[.]” Moody, 2020 WL 13614261, at *2. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has failed to state a section 1983 claim, which is the only claim discernable

from the complaint that gives the Court subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit.

Unless and until Plaintiff states a section 1983 claim, or any other claim

presenting a federal question, the Court would decline to retain supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining Florida tort and “violation of affidavit”/breach of

contract claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); Silas v. Sheriff of

Broward Cnty., Fla., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Although the district court

has discretion, concerns of federalism—namely, of federal courts of limited

jurisdiction weighing in on state law—counsel in favor of dismissing state-law

claims after the federal claims are dismissed.”); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d

1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any

remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior

to trial.”). For now, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

III. Plaintiff May Not Represent the Trust

The Court briefly notes that Plaintiff, as a non-lawyer, may not represent the

Maximus James Trust in either federal or Florida courts. J.J. Rissell, Allentown, PA

Tr. v. Marchelos, 976 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] nonlawyer trustee has

no authority to represent a trust in court.”); EHQF Tr. v. S & A Cap. Partners, Inc.,

947 So. 2d 606, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“[A] trustee cannot appear pro se on

behalf of the trust, because the trustee represents the interests of others and would

therefore be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.”). If Plaintiff wishes to file

an amended complaint as trustee on behalf of the trust, he must obtain counsel.

Plaintiff responds that “[i]f it is not allowable to proceed as Trustee of

Maximus James Trust than I shall proceed as a natural person.” Dkt. 21 at 2. But the

Court’s inquiries are defined by the allegations in the complaint. See, e.g., Moody,

2020 WL 13614261, at *3. If Plaintiff seeks to represent himself pro se, any amended

complaint he files may establish that.

The Court advises Mr. Cassidy to seek legal counsel. Some legal services

offices may offer free advice.1

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 16, is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Should Plaintiff

choose to file an amended complaint, he must do so within 21 days. Defendant is

free to raise and re-raise any relevant arguments in a subsequent motion to dismiss.

If no amended complaint is on file within 21 days this case will be closed

permanently.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 8, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff, pro se

1 For example, Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida, (800) 405-1417;

legalaccessforall.org.