Keegan v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMIE KEEGAN, ) CASE NO. 3:24-CV-1662

)

Plaintiff, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG

v. )

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

SECURITY, ) AND ORDER

)

Defendant. )

I. INTRODUCTION

The Commissioner of Social Security1 denied Plaintiff Jamie Keegan’s application for

Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Mr. Keegan seeks judicial review of that decision pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The parties have consented to a magistrate judge

exercising jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Rule 73 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule 73.1. (ECF No. 8.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision denying

Mr. Keegan’s application for benefits.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 22, 2022, Mr. Keegan filed an application to the agency, seeking DIB.

(Tr. 205.)2 He claimed that he became disabled on March 2, 2021. (Id.) He identified four disabling

1 Martin O’Malley resigned as Commissioner of Social Security in November 2024. Carolyn W. Colvin

served as Acting Commissioner of Social Security from November 2024 to January 2025. Michelle A. King

thereafter served as Acting Commissioner until February 2025. Leland C. Dudek is currently serving as

Acting Commissioner.

2 The administrative transcript appears at ECF No. 7. The Court will refer to pages within that transcript by

identifying the Bates number printed on the bottom right-hand corner of the page (e.g., “Tr. 43”). The Court

will refer to other documents in the record by their CM/ECF document numbers (e.g., “ECF No. 9”) and

page-identification numbers (e.g., “PageID# 587”).

conditions: (1) major depressive disorder – “[severe]/recurrent”; (2) anxiety; (3) attention-

deficit/hyperactivity disorder; and (4) bipolar disorder. (Tr. 235.)

Mr. Keegan’s application was denied at the initial administrative-review level (Tr. 91) and

again upon reconsideration (Tr. 100.)

Mr. Keegan then requested a hearing with an ALJ. (Tr. 112.)

The ALJ held a hearing on June 20, 2023. (Tr. 55–83.) Mr. Keegan testified and was

represented by counsel at the hearing. (See id.)

The ALJ issued a decision on July 14, 2023, finding that Mr. Keegan was not disabled.

(Tr. 27–43.) Mr. Keegan asked the SSA Appeals Council to review that decision. (Tr. 202–03.)

On June 10, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Keegan’s request to review the ALJ’s

decision. (Tr. 13–18.) The Appeals Council granted Mr. Keegan additional time to file a civil

action in this Court. (Tr. 1–2.)

Mr. Keegan filed his complaint seeking judicial review of that decision on September 27,

2024. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) He raises the following assignment of error:

The Commissioner erred as a matter of law by improperly evaluating the

medical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating provider, including by failing to

incorporate limitations from a medical opinion the ALJ found to be

persuasive.

(Pl.’s Merit Br., ECF No. 9, PageID# 587.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Personal, Educational, and Vocational Experience

Mr. Keegan was born in 1989 and was 32 years old on the date of his application. (Tr. 58.)

He graduated high school and completed some college courses. (Tr. 59.) He previously worked in

factories and warehouses, running machines and assembling parts. (Tr. 60–63.) He was also

employed at a paving company, where he worked with asphalt and assisted with sealcoating.

(Tr. 64.) He lives with his wife and two children (a seven-year-old and a three-year-old). (Tr. 58.)

He has a driver’s license and is able to drive. (Tr. 59.)

2. Function Reports

Mr. Keegan filled out a function report on April 5, 2022. (Tr. 267–75.) He wrote that his

depression and anxiety were “so high” that it was “hard to function or to think straight.” (Tr. 267.)

He “jitter[s] and twitch[es]” during the day. (Tr. 269.) He has difficulty staying asleep, as he wakes

up every two to three hours “in a panic.” (Id.) He does not go outside the house very often.

(Tr. 271.) He is able to drive a car, but if he goes out alone, his “anxiety kicks in” and he gets

“worked up.” (Id.)

With effort, he is able to take care of his children during the day while his wife works. (Tr.

269.) He has no problems seeing to his hygiene and personal care, except that he needs to be

reminded to shave and shower and, sometimes, to take medicine. (Tr. 269–70.) He feeds his

children during the day but does not prepare any meals; he “get[s] very impatient” preparing meals

“and [his] anxiety kicks in.” (Tr. 270.)

With encouragement, he is able to do laundry, clean dishes, and mop once a week for about

two hours. (Id.) He is able to pay bills and count change, but he gets “shaky” and antsy when

handling money. (Tr. 271.) He listens to music every day. (Tr. 272.) He sometimes speaks with

others on the phone or over text messages, but rarely and only to “talk about [his] problems.” (Id.)

He has problems getting along with people because “people take [him] the wrong way so [he]

get[s] upset.” (Id.) He gets “overwhelmed,” a state that he has found affects his memory, ability to

complete tasks, concentration, understanding, and ability to get along with others. (Tr. 273.) These

difficulties cause him to feel depressed because he feels he is “not normal.” (Id.)

Mr. Keegan estimated that he could pay attention for only two minutes at a time. (Id.) He

follows written instructions “okay,” but when given spoken instructions he forgets “what [he] was

asked to do.” (Id.) He gets along with authority figures “okay.” (Id.)

Mr. Keegan wrote that he does not handle stress or changes in his routine well. (Tr. 274.)

In August 2022, Mr. Keegan wrote that he has “had no interest in anything, even food or

eating.” (Tr. 289.) He said that he has had difficulties getting out of bed and “completing task[s]

from day to day.” (Id.)

3. Relevant Hearing Testimony

a. Mr. Keegan’s Testimony

Mr. Keegan testified that his anxiety and depression keep him from being able to work.

(Tr. 65.) He identified that the “biggest factor” is his ability to focus; he is not able to concentrate

and has “so many racing thoughts.” (Tr. 67.) He described doing his best to take care of his children

during the day but admitted that at certain points he “break[s] down” and cries on the couch.

(Tr. 65.) His anxiety then turns into depression, during which he has “major suicidal thoughts.”

(Id.) When he is depressed, it can be hard to want to even get up and do things around the house.

(Tr. 67.) He estimated that three days per week, his depression is bad enough that he does not want

to get out of bed. (Tr. 74.) He has been seeing a case manager, psychiatrist, and therapist for two

years. (Tr. 74–75.)

He is able to sit all day; in fact, when depressed, it can be “hard to even want to get up” do

things around the house. (Tr. 67.) He sleeps six to eight hours a night. (Id.) He does not need help

seeing to his hygiene, but he is not able to cook because he does not “know how.” (Tr. 67–68.) He

is able to help with dishes but cannot help with laundry because he “get[s] triggered . . . and the

depression sets in” after he starts the laundry. (Tr. 68.)

Mr. Keegan does not have any hobbies; he has never had hobbies. (Tr. 68.) He participates

in in-person group therapy three days a week. (Tr. 69.) He finds it difficult sometimes to talk in

these sessions because he gets “nervous.” (Id.)

Mr. Keegan does not manage his own medication; the group-therapy clinic fills a

medication planner with his medicine once a week. (Tr. 70.) There are days when Mr. Keegan

misses his afternoon dose of medicine because he is crying on the couch. (Id.) But, for the most

part, he is compliant with his medication. (Id.)

Mr. Keegan testified that he can drive for up to an hour, after which he becomes “antsy and

wanting to look around and getting distracted.” (Tr. 59.)

Mr. Keegan estimated that he could stand for up to an hour at a time and walk for a mile.

(Tr. 65.) No doctor has given him lifting restrictions, but he has limited himself to lifting items

weighing less than 15 pounds. (Tr. 66.) He candidly described that his physical limitations did not

result from his mental-health conditions, but rather stemmed from generally “being out of shape.”

(Tr. 67.)

In 2021, Mr. Keegan worked at a business for “[j]ust a day,” because his “anxiety had got

too bad” to continue. (Tr. 71.) He was able to sit through video training without a problem, but he

could not focus when he got out on the floor, which “sent [him] into a spiral of depression.”

(Tr. 72.) He also was only able to work at a gas station for a day and a half before his anxiety

caused him to leave. (Id.) He worked at a couple factories for a day each, too, but he was not able

to keep up with the expected production rate. (Id.)

b. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Robert Mosley testified as a vocational expert. (Tr. 75.) He classified Mr. Keegan’s past

work as that of a small parts assembler I (DOT 706.684-022), small products assembler II (DOT

739.087-030), warehouse worker (DOT 922.687-038), painter helper (DOT 741.687-014), and

construction worker II (DOT 869.687-026). (Tr. 76.)

The ALJ asked the expert to imagine a hypothetical person with Mr. Keegan’s age,

education, and work experience with the residual functional capacity for work at any exertional

level but who is further limited as follows: the individual can understand, remember, and carry out

simple instructions for work that does not require a specific production rate or hourly quota; the

individual is capable of using judgment to make simple, work-related decisions with occasional

changes in a routine work setting; and the individual is capable of occasional interaction with

supervisors and occasional, brief, and superficial interaction with the general public and

coworkers. (Tr. 77–78.) The ALJ explained that, by “superficial,” he meant that the individual

could be in proximity to others, exchange greetings, and engage in discussions that do not require

persuasion or involve tandem tasks that extend beyond a 30-day training period. (Id.)

The expert opined that such a person would not be able to perform any of Mr. Keegan’s

past relevant work, but that the person would be able to perform other jobs that exist in the national

economy, such as cleaner II (DOT 919.687-014), cleaner/housekeeping (DOT 323.687-014), and

laundry worker II (DOT 361.685-018). (Tr. 78.)

The ALJ next asked the expert to limit the hypothetical person from his first question to

only light work. (Id.) The expert opined that such a person could perform the work of a

cleaner/housekeeping, cafeteria attendant (DOT 311.677-010), or folder/clothing (DOT 369.687-

018). (Tr. 79.)

The ALJ next asked the expert to limit the hypothetical person to sedentary work. (Tr. 79.)

The expert opined that the person could perform the work of a surveillance system monitor (DOT

379.367-010), lens inserter (DOT 713.687-026), or final assembler (DOT 713.687-018). (Tr. 80.)

The ALJ next asked the ALJ to consider that the hypothetical person from the first

hypothetical would be off task for more than 15 percent of the work period. (Tr. 80.) The expert

opined that this limitation would be work-preclusive, as employers will not tolerate employees

who are off-task for 15 percent or more of the workday. (Id.) The expert testified that employers

will tolerate up to one absence per month. (Tr. 80–81.)

4. State Agency Medical Consultants

A disability examiner (Kurt Dickman) and a psychologist (Courtney Zeune, Psy.D.)

reviewed Mr. Keegan’s claim at the initial administrative level. (Tr. 84–91.) Dr. Zeune concluded

that Mr. Keegan has moderate limitations in the ability to interact with others and to concentrate,

persist, and maintain pace. (Tr. 86.) Dr. Zeune identified that Mr. Keegan has mild limitations in

the ability to adapt or manage himself and to understand, remember, and apply information. (Id.)

She found Mr. Keegan’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting

effects of his mental-health conditions to be only partially supported by the record. (Tr. 87.) She

stated that medical records showed that Mr. Keegan did display “fidgety behavior” and rapid

speech, but also showed that he has normal attention despite complaining of poor focus. (Id.)

Dr. Zeune concluded that Mr. Keegan had moderate functional limitations with respect to

his ability to: (1) maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (2) perform activities

within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; (3)

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based

symptoms and perform at a consistent pace; (4) interact appropriately with the general public, (5)

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (6) get along with

coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (Tr. 88.) She

concluded that he had no further significant functional limitations. (Id.) Dr. Zeune explained that

she found Mr. Keegan capable of interacting with others on a brief, superficial basis if those

interactions do not include conflict resolution or negotiation. (Id.)

Based on these opinions, the agency concluded that Mr. Keegan had the residual functional

capacity to perform unskilled work at any exertional level, such that he could perform the work

required of a “stuffer” (DOT 731.685-014), “garment sorter” (DOT 222.687-014), or “shaper and

presser” (DOT 583.685-102). (Tr. 89.)

Therefore, the consultants concluded that Mr. Keegan was not disabled. (Tr. 90.) In a letter

explaining this decision, the SSA wrote that the evidence shows that Mr. Keegan has some mental

problems but is “still able to think, communicate, and carry out routine tasks” such that he is

“capable of work that is simple and repetitive.” (Tr. 105.)

In seeking reconsideration of that decision, Mr. Keegan provided additional information.

Specifically, he informed the agency that he had been admitted to an inpatient psychiatric facility

on May 2, 2022, “due to suicidal ideations.” (Tr. 277.) He wrote that, after being discharged, he

has had days of “higher anxiety and depression” and other days where his symptoms have been

the same as before the hospitalization. (Id.) He wrote that he has lost interest in the things he used

to do and is unable to take care of his personal hygiene. (Tr. 279.) He said that he is able to “push”

himself to care for his children and meet their needs. (Id.) He described he felt he would not be

reliable or dependable at work and “[kept] getting let go because of it.” (Tr. 94.) He acknowledged

that he does not “want to feel like a failure trying” to work. (Id.)

At the reconsideration level, a disability examiner (Joseph Burrus) and a psychologist

(Karla Delcour, Ph.D.) affirmed the finding that Mr. Keegan is not disabled. (Tr. 92–100.) Dr.

Delcour concurred that Mr. Keegan retained the ability to carry out simple and multi-step tasks in

the absence of production or quota demands and to interact superficially with others. (Tr. 97.) She

concluded that the prior administrative findings were consistent with the medical evidence. (Id.)

Based on these findings, the agency consultants concluded that Mr. Keegan had the residual

functional capacity to perform the work of a “stuffer” (DOT 731.685-014), “garment sorter” (DOT

222.687-014), or “shaper and presser” (DOT 583.685-102) and was not disabled. (Tr. 98–99.)

In a letter explaining this decision, the SSA wrote that Mr. Keegan “may feel depressed

and anxious at times” but is “still able to think clearly, communicate with others as needed, and

act in your own interest” to the extent that he is “able to complete [his] normal daily activities

without supervision.” (Tr. 111.)

5. Relevant Medical Evidence

The record in this case spans from January 2022 to March 2023. (See, e.g., Tr. 316, 461.)

The medical records reflect that Mr. Keegan has sought routine medication and psychotherapy

treatment during that time period. (See generally Tr. 316–465.) While this appeal concerns one

specific medical opinion from December 2022, the Court notes that it has reviewed each of the

medical records in the file. They corroborate that Mr. Keegan has reported feeling “down” most

of the time, with varying energy levels and pronounced irritability and inability to concentrate, and

with a history of suicidal ideation. (See, e.g., Tr. 316, 318–20, 324, 340, 346, 352, 358, 376, 407,

412, 416, 430, 432, 435, 437, 456, 469, 471, 484, 502, 504, 509, 540.) He reported anxiety with

respect to various stressors, including interactions with family. (See, e.g., 376, 378, 390, 396, 398,

400, 402, 405, 416, 418, 422, 434, 439, 441 (describing alleged domestic violence), 443, 461, 489,

498, 520, 542.)

Mr. Keegan’s mental status examinations have largely been normal, except for a notably

depressed and anxious or irritable mood and racing thoughts, and occasional paranoia. (See 318,

321–22, 325–26, 329–30 (also “fidgety”), 333, 341, 347–48, 353–55, 359–61, 383–85, 392–93,

408–09, 423–424, 447–48, 477 & 514 & 535 (also “disheveled”), 485, 530–31.) Mr. Keegan has

endorsed feeling better with medication and expressed optimism with respect to his ability to

obtain and maintain employment (See, e.g., Tr. 318, 382, 398, 446, 525, 529.)

Mr. Keegan was admitted to a hospital in May 2022 for suicidal intent. (Tr. 332.) While in

the hospital, he socialized appropriately with others and his symptoms gradually improved. (Tr.

333.) He was discharged in stable condition. (Id.)

On December 15, 2022, Ms. Bernal completed a medical source statement. (Tr. 450–55.)

After identifying Mr. Keegan’s diagnosis (bipolar disorder) and symptoms—including, among

others, recurrent severe panic attacks and persistent disturbances of mood or affect—Ms. Bernal

was asked to identify whether Mr. Keegan’s mental and emotional capabilities were affected to

the extent that he could not “satisfactorily perform” a list of work activities “independently,

appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in a regular work setting.” (Tr. 450–53.) She

did not identify any work area in which Mr. Keegan would be unable to meet competitive work

standards. (Tr. 452–53.) However, Ms. Bernal identified that Mr. Keegan has a “serious” limitation

in a number of work areas.3 (Id.) Ms. Bernal was asked to explain these “serious” limitations and

detail the clinical findings that support those limitations; she did not provide any information in

response to that request. (Tr. 453.) She further did not identify “stress tolerance” as “an issue.”

3 Those were with respect to the ability to (1) remember “work-like procedures,” (2) maintain attention for

a two-hour segment, (3) work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted,

(4) make simple work-related decisions, (5) complete a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, (6) get along with coworkers or peers without unduly

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, (7) respond appropriately to changes in a routine work

setting, (8) deal with normal work stress, (9) understand and remember detailed instructions, (10) carry out

detailed instructions, (11) set realistic goals or make plans independently of others, (12) deal with stress of

semiskilled and skilled work, (13) interact appropriately with the general public, (14) maintain socially

appropriate behavior, (15) adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, and (16) travel in

unfamiliar places. (Tr. 452–53.)

(Tr. 454.) But she opined that Mr. Keegan could be anticipated to be absent around two days per

month on average because of his limitations (Id.)

IV. DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

The ALJ determined that Mr. Keegan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

March 2, 2021. (Tr. 33.)

The ALJ further determined that Mr. Keegan has the following severe impairments:

(1) anxiety; (2) attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); (3) major depressive disorder;

and (4) bipolar disorder. (Id.)

The ALJ next found that Mr. Keegan does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.)

The ALJ determined that Mr. Keegan had the residual functional capacity to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels, except that (1) he can understand, remember, and carry out

simple instructions for work not requiring a specific production rate or hourly quota (like assembly

line work); (2) he is capable of using judgment to make simple work-related decisions, with

occasional changes in a routine work setting; and (3) he is capable of occasional interaction with

supervisors and occasional, brief, and superficial interactions with coworkers and the general

public. (Tr. 35.) The ALJ clarified that “superficial interactions” means that Mr. Keegan is able to

“be in proximity of others,” “exchange greetings,” “engage in discussions that do not require

persuasion or involve tandem tasks that extend beyond a 30 day training period.” (Id.)

The ALJ next determined that Mr. Keegan was unable to perform his past relevant work as

a small parts assembler, small products assembler, warehouse worker, painter helper, or

construction worker, relying on the vocational expert’s testimony that an individual with Mr.

Keegan’s RFC could not perform the work required by that position. (Tr. 41–42.)

However, the ALJ determined that—considering Mr. Keegan’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity—there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy that he could perform, including work as a “cleaner II” (DOT 919.687-014),

“cleaner, housekeeping” (DOT 323.687-014), or “laundry worker” (DOT 361.685-018).4 (Tr. 42–

43.)

Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Mr. Keegan was not disabled. (Tr. 43.)

V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Whether reviewing a decision to deny SSI benefits (undertaking the review authorized by

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)) or a decision to deny disability insurance benefits (reviewing under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g)), the Court uses the same standard of review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (final

determinations under 42 U.S.C. § 1383 “shall be subject to judicial review as provided in [§]

405(g) . . . to the same extent as . . . final determinations under [§] 405 . . . .”).

“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council

becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott

v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)

(en banc). The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

4 These jobs refer to entries in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The DOL

no longer publishes the tool—see Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2014)—but the most

recent version, from 1991, is available online through the DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges Law

Library. Dictionary of Occupational Titles—Fourth Edition, Revised 1991, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR OFF.

OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/topics/libraries/LIBDOT.

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931,

937 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than

a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d

234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). If the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, “even if a

reviewing court would decide the matter differently[.]” Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286; Kinsella v.

Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983).

In addition to considering whether the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied proper legal standards.

Failure of the Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations

is grounds for reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009);

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by substantial

evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA failed to

follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the

claimant of a substantial right.”).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence

in the record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.

Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)

(alteration in original)).

B. Standard for Disability

The Social Security regulations outline a five-step sequential evaluation process that the

ALJ must use in determining whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is engaged

in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or

combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments,

meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether

the claimant can perform her past relevant work in light of her RFC; and (5) if not, whether, based

on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of

producing sufficient evidence to prove that she is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1512(a). Specifically, the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps One through Four.

Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the

Commissioner at Step Five to establish whether the claimant has the RFC to perform work in the

national economy. Id.

C. Analysis

Mr. Keegan contends that the ALJ erred at Step Five when crafting the RFC, arguing that

the ALJ failed to incorporate the functional limitations described by Ms. Bernal in her December

2022 medical source statement. (Pl.’s Merits Br., ECF No. 9, PageID# 589–90.) Mr. Keegan

points to Ms. Bernal’s finding that he had a “serious” limitation with respect to the ability to

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting and deal with normal work stress.

(Tr. 452.) He argues that the ALJ should have included a “low stress work” limitation in the RFC.

(Pl.’s Merits Br., ECF No. 9, PageID# 591.) He complains that the ALJ did not explain why such

a limitation was not included in the RFC. (Id. at PageID# 591–92.) He points out that the ALJ

concluded that Mr. Keegan had medically-supported “reduced stress tolerance.” (Tr. 34.)

Mr. Keegan argues that the ALJ similarly failed to incorporate or explain why the ALJ did

not adopt a “serious” limitation with respect to the ability to maintain attention for two-hour

segments. (See ECF No. 9, PageID# 593.)

Finally, Mr. Keegan contends that the ALJ should have included these limitations in the

hypotheticals proposed to the vocational expert, arguing that the additional limitations “could have

easily altered the vocational expert’s analysis o the type of work [he] could perform.” (ECF No.

9, PageID# 595.)

An individual’s residual functional capacity (i.e., the most an individual can still do despite

applicable limitations) is an administrative decision reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 1546(c).

The ALJ assesses an individual’s RFC based on all relevant evidence of record. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(1). It is well-established that an ALJ need not discuss each piece of evidence or

limitation considered. See, e.g., Conner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 248, 254 (6th Cir.

2016) (citing Thacker v. Comm’r of Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir. May 21, 2004)) (finding

an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record). But courts do not hesitate to remand

where an ALJ selectively considers only portions of the medical evidence that place that claimant

in a capable light and fails to acknowledge evidence that potentially supports a finding of disability.

See, e.g., Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 724 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing where the

ALJ “cherry-picked select portions of the record” rather than doing a proper analysis); see also

Ackles v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV00249, 2015 WL 1757474, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2015) (“The

ALJ did not mention this objective evidence and erred by selectively including only the portions

of the medical evidence that placed Plaintiff in a capable light.”); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 2:16-cv-172, 2016 WL 7208783, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2016) (“This Court has not

hesitated to remand cases where the ALJ engaged in a very selective review of the record and

significantly mischaracterized the treatment notes.”).

The Commissioner defends the ALJ’s decision, arguing that the ALJ fully accounted for

Ms. Bernal’s opinion in the RFC and “reasonably translat[ed] Ms. Bernal’s more general findings

of impairment into vocationally relevant terms.” (Def.’s Merits Br., ECF No. 11, PageID# 604.)

The Commissioner points out that Ms. Bernal did not identify any areas in which Mr. Keegan

would not be able to meet competitive work standards. (Id.)

After a careful review, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. In evaluating Ms. Bernal’s

medical-source statement, the ALJ accurately summarized as follows:

[Ms.] Bernal, CNP opined that the claimant had serious limitations, but was

not precluded from remembering work-like procedures, and making simple

work-related decisions. The claimant was similarly seriously limited but not

precluded from maintaining attention for two-hour segments. The claimant

was seriously limited from completing a normal workday and workweek

without interruptions from [symptoms.]”

(Tr. 39.)

After describing other limitations noted in Ms. Bernal’s statement, the ALJ found the

“balance of the opinion” to be persuasive, noting an exception with respect to Ms. Bernal’s opinion

that Mr. Keegan would be absent from work twice per month. (Id.) The ALJ further explained that

Ms. Bernal’s opinion—which is that Mr. Keegan had serious but not work-preclusive limitations

in a number of work areas—was consistent with that of the state agency physicians, who opined

that Mr. Keegan “could carry out simple and multistep tasks without production or quota

performance demands.” (Id.)

The ALJ credited Mr. Keegan’s testimony that interacting with others caused his anxiety

to worsen, noting accurately that treatment records supported that he was frequently agitated and

irritable during treatment sessions. (Tr. 39–40.) The ALJ specifically noted that, during the

hearing, Mr. Keegan “showed signs of heightened anxiety . . . including tearfulness.” (Tr. 40.) The

ALJ thus imposed greater limitations than the state agency consultants proposed, finding “the lack

of limitations regarding workplace decision making and workplace changes to be unpersuasive.”

(Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that Mr. Keegan has “reduced stress tolerance and self-management.”

(Id.)

After making the above observations, the ALJ then carefully explained why the RFC was

appropriate. The ALJ accurately explained that treatment notes “frequently noted that [Mr.

Keegan]’s attention was normal” and he “exhibited numerous periods during which his thought

process was logical.” (Tr. 40.) His social and emotional reciprocity was described as intact and he

engaged in activities that required functional adaptation and self-management, including—

significantly—his ability to care for his children during the day while his spouse worked. (See Tr.

40–41.)

In other words, the ALJ did not “cherry-pick” evidence to support a finding that Mr.

Keegan was not disabled. To the contrary, the ALJ carefully and accurately summarized the

medical records in evidence and correctly concluded that Mr. Keegan’s reported symptoms were

partially, but not fully, consistent with the record evidence. In doing so, the ALJ accurately and

comprehensively summarized Mr. Keegan’s testimony about his reported symptoms. The ALJ

credited his testimony and, based as well on the medical records, imposed greater limitations than

those recommended by the state agency consultants.

The ALJ then thoroughly explained why Mr. Keegan’s reported functional limitations were

only partially consistent with the medical evidence.

After engaging in this review, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Keegan retains the ability to

follow simple instructions and complete work tasks without the onus of a specific production rate

or hourly quota. (Tr. 41.)

While Mr. Keegan is correct that Ms. Bernal identified a number of “serious” limitations,

as described further above, her conclusion must be viewed in its appropriate context. Ms. Bernal

was asked whether Mr. Keegan’s limitations—while “serious”—were significant enough to

preclude him from working “independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in

a regular work setting.” (Tr. 450–53.) She did not opine that any of his limitations would be work-

preclusive. (See id.)

Therefore, the Commissioner is correct that the ALJ did not leave out—without

explanation—a functional limitation identified by a treating medical source. To the contrary, the

ALJ adopted functional limitations consistent with Ms. Bernal’s opinions, with the exception of

her opinion on absenteeism, and went even further than Ms. Bernal would have. While Ms. Bernal

did not identify “stress tolerance” as “an issue” (see Tr. 454), the ALJ specifically found that Mr.

Keegan had “reduced stress tolerance” and accommodated that limitation by limiting Mr. Keegan

to work requiring only simple work-related decisions, with occasional changes, and with only

occasional interaction with supervisors and occasional, brief, and superficial interactions with

coworkers and the general public.

In summary, the ALJ’s decision addresses Mr. Keegan’s subjective complaints and

explains why those complaints are not entirely consistent with the record. See Pifer v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., Case No. 1:21-CV-00314-CEH, 2022 WL 1521911 (N.D. Ohio May 13, 2022)

(affirming where the ALJ considered the claimant’s subjective allegations and gave a thorough

explanation as to why he found those allegations inconsistent with the medical evidence). The

Court is convinced that the ALJ considered all the relevant evidence and that a reasonable mind

might accept the record evidence as adequate to support the ALJ’s findings. The RFC is more

restrictive than the opinions of the state agency consultants.

To the extent Mr. Keegan believes the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently

and imposed greater limitations, it is not a reviewing court’s role to second guess the ALJ’s

determination. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 477. The Court is convinced that there is no compelling

reason for the Court to disturb the ALJ’s findings. See Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp.

2d 724, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2005).

The standard for “substantial evidence” is “not high.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. “The

substantial-evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the

decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.

1986)). “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a

preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long as substantial evidence

also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). A reviewing court may not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in

evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” O’Brien v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. App’x 409,

416 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Mr. Keegan acknowledges that an ALJ is not required to mirror a medical opinion

verbatim. (Reply Br., ECF No. 12, PageID# 611.) Here, the Court is convinced that the ALJ

adequately acknowledged Mr. Keegan’s reduced stress tolerance and concentration limitations

(going beyond even what Ms. Bernal supported), and that the ALJ’s RFC is reasonable and

supported by sufficient evidence.

Accordingly, Mr. Keegan’s assignment of error is overruled.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision denying Mr.

Keegan’s application for benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2025 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE