The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
| MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELLIOT STEED, :
Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-565
V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
| LUZERNE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., :
| Defendants □
| MEMORANDUM
| This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
| For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice, and plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Elliot Steed, brings the instant case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging that defendants, various individuals employed by Luzerne
County Correctional Facility, the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas,
Luzerne County, the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office, the
| Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Wilkes-Barre Police Department, and
the Pennsylvania State Police are violating his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1).
| According to the allegations in the complaint, Steed was arrested on
| December 19, 2023, by defendant Raul Ortiz, an officer with the Wilkes-
Barre Police Department on an arrest warrant for domestic violence. (/d. at
6). He was detained in the Luzerne County Correctional Facility (“LCCF”),
where unnamed officers “never allowed” him to go to a court hearing. (/d.)
The criminal charges were subsequently dismissed, but the jail allegedly
refused to release him because defendant Thomas F. Malloy, Sr., a
magisterial district judge, kept “allowing new charges [to be] filed” against
him while he was in custody. (/d.) The complaint states that as of the time of
writing, Steed was detained in LCCF on charges that he was a fugitive from
justice and was arrested prior to requisition. (/d.)
The complaint alleges that, beginning on January 4, 2024, and
continuing to the present date, unnamed officers in LCCF have “poisoned
[Steed’s] food, water, juice, etc.” (/d. at 6). Steed also allegedly has been
assaulted by “the Luzerne County Jail Correctional Officers” and “tased,
maced, and beat[en] up on several occasion{s].” (/d.) The complaint states
that Steed has been denied medical treatment while in custody and that the
alleged poisoning has caused him “severe heart and liver failure.” (/d.) The
complaint alleges that Steed will die unless he is given medical treatment.
(Id. at 7). Steed alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and requests monetary relief and injunctive
relief requiring the defendants to provide him medical care and transfer him
out of LCCF. (/d. at 7).
ll. □ DISCUSSION
This court must review a complaint when “a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”
28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must dismiss the complaint. /d. §1915A(b)(1). The
court has a similar screening obligation regarding actions filed by prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis. Id. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that. . . the action or
appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”).
In screening legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B),
the court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Coward v.
City of Philadelphia, 546 F. Supp. 3d 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Smith v.
Delaware, 236 F. Supp.3d 882, 886 (D. Del. 2017).
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out
“sufficient factual matter” to show that his claim is facially plausible. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more
than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
$
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not
‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.” /d. at 679.
When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as
true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. /d.
However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a
district court’s screening under Section 1915A and 1915(e)(2). Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.
Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983
authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights and provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory .. .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by
a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). By its terms,
Section 1983 does not create a substantive right, but merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights conferred by the United States
Constitution and the federal statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
A defendant cannot be liable for a violation of a plaintiff's civil rights
unless the defendant was personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v.
Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant's
personal involvement cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat
superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather,
for a supervisor to be liable for the actions of a subordinate, there must be
allegations of personal direction or actual Knowledge and acquiescence. /d.
Section 1983 allows claims only against a “person” who violates the
plaintiff's constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.
| §1983. County jails are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Northampton County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2016);
Beaver v. Union County Pennsylvania, 619 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2015);
Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 F. App’x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2013).
Steed’s complaint plainly fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted because it fails to allege the personal involvement of any
defendant in the alleged civil rights violations. The complaint alleges
numerous wrongs during Steed’s detention in LCCF, including poisoning,
assault, tasing, macing, and denial of medical care, but does not allege that
| any defendants were personally involved in these actions except LCCF,
which is not a proper defendant to a Section 1983 claim. See Edwards, 663
F. App’x at 136; Beaver, 619 F. App’x at 83; Lenhart, 528 F. App’x at 114.
: The only defendants against whom Steed makes specific allegations
are defendant Ortiz, who allegedly arrested Steed, and defendant Malloy,
who allegedly allowed criminal charges against Steed to proceed. Based on
the allegations in the complaint, however, it appears that these actions were
simply job duties that Ortiz and Malloy were required to perform in their
professional roles as a police officer for the Wilkes-Barre Police Department
| and a magisterial district judge,’ respectively. There are no allegations in the
| complaint as to how Ortiz and Malloy committed any civil rights violations in
performing these duties.? Accordingly, because the complaint fails to allege
the personal involvement of any individual defendants other than Ortiz and
Malloy and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
those defendants, the court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
Before dismissing a civil rights claim for failure to state a claim, a district
| court must permit a curative amendment unless the amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d
Cir. 2008). With the exception of the claims against LCCF,* the court will
| grant Steed leave to file an amended complaint because it cannot say as a
' It appears that Malloy may be entitled to judicial immunity because the
claims against him are based on actions he took in his role as a magisterial
district judge. See, e.g., Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006);
Brown v. Friel, 842 F. App’x 792, 794 (3d Cir. 2021). Given the sparse factual
allegations against Malloy, however, the court will dismiss the claims against
him solely for failure to state a claim at this stage of litigation because the
court cannot properly analyze the question of judicial immunity on such
limited allegations.
2 Although the complaint states that the arrest warrant that authorized Ortiz
| to arrest Steed was “false” he does not make any factual allegations in
support of this statement. Steed’s conclusory statement that the warrant was
“false” is not entitled to the assumption of truth and is not by itself sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Ortiz.
3 As noted above, LCCF is not a proper defendant. The claims against LCCF
will accordingly be dismissed with prejudice.
| matter of law at this stage of litigation that amendment would be inequitable
| or futile.
Ill. © CONCLUSION
| □□□ aie
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss Steed’s complaint
without prejudice and grant him leave to file an amended complaint. An
appropriate order shall issue.
| E. Mannion
| United States District Judge
Dated: yf 1/28
25-565-01
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