The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Kendris Richard Brown, ) Case No.: 4:24-cv-05457-JD-KDW
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) ORDER AND OPINION
Michael Robinson; Judge Michael )
Nettles; Prosecutor Clemons; and )
Cathy Elmore, )
)
Defendants. )
)
This matter is before the Court with the Report and Recommendation
(“Report”) of United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West (DE 27), made in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) of the District of
South Carolina concerning the Magistrate Judge’s initial review of Plaintiff Kendris
Richard Brown’s (“Plaintiff” or “Brown”) pleadings.1
A. Background
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which the Court
incorporates without a complete recitation. In any event, the Court provides this
summary as a brief background.
Brown, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Defendants Michael
Robinson (“Robinson”); Judge Michael Nettles (“Judge Nettles”); Prosecutor Clemons
1 The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a
final determination remains with the United States District Court. See Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of
those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the
magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
(“Clemons”); and Cathy Elmore (“Elmore”), alleging they violated his constitutional
rights. Brown contends that Robinson, a Florence Police investigator, coerced a
murder confession when he was 15 years old by failing to Mirandize him and
threatening to shoot him under the table during the interview and that he was later
refused an attorney after requesting one. (DE 1.) Brown also claims that Robinson
illegally seized and collected fabricated evidence, which was then forwarded to
Prosecutor Clemons. (DE 1-2.) Further, Brown alleges that Clemons fabricated
evidence, spread false information, and failed to present the facts of the case, which
led to misinformation circulating among the court, its officials, and the media. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that after his case was transferred from Family Court to
General Sessions Court, Judge Nettles had an opportunity to investigate and
examine his case. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that Judge Nettles allowed the
prosecution to fabricate evidence, abuse process, and violate due process, which
resulted in his conviction for a crime he did not commit. (Id. at 4.) Brown further
alleges that Governor McMaster granted him an executive pardon at the beginning
of 2024, which proves Plaintiff is innocent and was subjected to fabricated evidence
and coercion. (Id.)
B. Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge reviewed Plaintiff’s pro se complaint under the
procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and under a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, on January 23, 2025, the
Magistrate Judge issued the Report based on an initial review of the pleadings. The
Report recommends dismissing Plaintiff's complaint without issuance and service of
process because Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in the complaint, and an
amendment would, therefore, be futile. (DE 27 at 6.) Specifically, the Report states:
e The Stump Court made clear that “whether an act by a judgeisa
‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, 1.e., whether
it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity.” 485 U.S. at 362. The allegations in
Plaintiff's Complaint address decisions or actions made by Judge
Nettles in relation to Plaintiff's criminal case. Therefore, Judge
Nettles is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
e Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected
with judicial proceedings, such as a criminal trial, bond hearings,
bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial hearings. See
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-
Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The allegations in
Plaintiff's Complaint concern Prosecutor Clemons’ actions during
Plaintiffs judicial proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims are
barred by prosecutorial immunity and the undersigned
recommends Clemons be summarily dismissed from this case.
e Plaintiff has failed to allege any factual allegations in his
Complaint to state a plausible claim against Defendant Cathy
Elmore (“Elmore”). Additionally, as Plaintiffs juvenile attorney,
Elmore did not act under the color of federal law, which is a
jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under §
1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 nn. 8-9,
12-14 (1981).
e Plaintiffs Complaint [seeking monetary damages... ] is barred
by the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck,
the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover
damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the
imprisonment must first be successfully challenged|.|
(DE 27.) On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff objected to the Report. (DE 32.)
C. Legal Standard
To be actionable, objections to the Report and Recommendation must be
specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party’s right to
further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted
by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir.
1984). “The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the validity of such a waiver rule,
explaining that ‘the filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district
judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of
the parties’ dispute.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(2005) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (emphasis added)). In the
absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate
judge, this Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
D. Plaintiff’s Objections
Brown raises five objections, which the Court will address in turn. First, Brown
objects generally to the Report based on his allegation that there is “evidence that
proves that [his] pardon occurred, Mr. Brown never had the opportunity to subpoena
his witnesses and evidence.” (DE 32 at 1.) Further, he contends that he “should have
a chance to proceed to trial and a chance to obtain an investigator and an attorney.
(Id. at 2.) However, this argument does not address the shortcomings of his pleadings,
subjecting his case to summary dismissal. Therefore, it is overruled.
Next, Brown objects to the dismissal of Elmore, stating he tried to sue her in a
separate lawsuit but did not have the resources to obtain her address. (DE 32 at 2.)
Again, this argument does not address the merits of Elmore’s dismissal in this case,
and the objection is overruled. Third, Brown objects to the Report’s reliance on Heck
for the proposition that Brown must prove his conviction was reversed on direct
appeal. (Id.) The Report properly addressed this point stating, “when Plaintiff was
instructed to provide additional information about his pardon, Plaintiff indicated he
contacted individuals about his pardon in October 2024, and he was told his pardon
file could not be located, and that the clerk of court did not have any evidence of the
government hearing.” (DE 27 at 6; see also DE 21.) Therefore, the Court overrules
this objection.
Fourth, Brown contends he should be given a new trial “to prove to the Court
his innocence” and “to establish his defense and to seek discovery to build his case.”
(DE 32 at 3.) Brown provides no applicable basis or authority for the Court to order a
new trial for him to build a defense; therefore, this objection is overruled. Lastly,
Brown disagrees that an amendment to his complaint would be futile because he has
“witnesses to call forward with assistance from an investigator and an attorney” to
“prove his grounds have merits.” (Id.) However, because Brown’s Complaint fails to
state a valid legal basis for the lawsuit, his objection is overruled.
E. Conclusion
Accordingly, after a thorough review of the Report and Recommendation and
the record in this case, the Court adopts the Report (DE 27) and incorporates it here
by reference.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that Plaintiffs complaint (DE 1) is dismissed
without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED. C) baston
Joseph Dawson, II
United States District Judge
Florence, South Carolina
April 7, 2025
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
The parties are hereby notified of the right to appeal this order within thirty
(30) days from this date under Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.