for First Amendment claim, belief “must be sincerely 10 || held” and “must be rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’ philosophical 11 || concerns” (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- for First Amendment claim, belief “must be sincerely 10 || held” and “must be rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’ philosophical 11 || concerns” (citations omitted)
- purpose of Rule 8(a) is to ensure that a 25 || complaint “fully sets forth who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, 26 || with enough detail to guide discovery’’
- magistrate judges can dismiss complaints with leave to amend; dismissal of complaint with leave to amend is 22 || non-dispositive matter
- “[W]e have repeatedly 19 || recognized that prison officials are constitutionally prohibited from being 20 || deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a 21 || substantial risk of serious harm.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
KEIRON M. ELIAS, Case No. 2:21-cv-06052-MWF-JC
11
Plaintiff,
12 ORDER DISMISSING THIRD
v. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
13 LEAVE TO AMEND AND DIRECTING
PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO ORDER
14 C/O ROSAS, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 I. INTRODUCTION
18 On July 27, 2021, Plaintiff Keiron M. Elias, who is in state custody, is
19 proceeding pro se, and has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of
20 filing fees (“IFP”), filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Original Complaint”) pursuant
21 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). On November 11, 2021, the Court screened
22 and dismissed the Original Complaint with leave to amend. (Docket No. 8).
23 Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint on April 26, 2022, and the Court
24 screened and dismissed it with leave to amend on October 31, 2022. (Docket Nos.
25 15, 16). A Second Amended Complaint then followed on March 23, 2023, and the
26 Court screened and dismissed it with leave to amend on July 3, 2023. (Docket
27 Nos. 20, 21, 23).
28
1 On September 29, 2023, the Court granted a motion to stay the case because
2 Plaintiff had been moved to the county jail in connection with a pending
3 resentencing proceeding and had no access to her1 case files and other materials
4 related to this case. (See Docket Nos. 24-25). Plaintiff proceeded to file periodic
5 status reports. (See Docket Nos. 26-28). On June 18, 2024, because Plaintiff had
6 been returned to state custody at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD)
7 and was again in possession of her files, and no further extension was warranted,
8 the Court lifted the stay and ordered Plaintiff to respond by filing either a Third
9 Amended Complaint, a voluntary notice of dismissal, or a notice of Plaintiff’s
10 intent to stand on the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 31).
11 On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (alternatively,
12 “TAC”)2 against the following employees at California State Prison, Los Angeles
13 County (“CSP-LAC”): Correctional Officer (“C/O”) Rosas, Lt. Martinez, and
14 Associate Warden Williams and/or Warden Hor[n].3 (Docket No. 33). Warden
15 Horn is sued in is his individual and official capacities (see TAC 17, 19), while the
16 other Defendants appear to be sued in their individual capacities only. Liberally
17 construed, the Third Amended Complaint asserts claims for violations of
18 Plaintiff’s religious rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
19 and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C.
20
21
1As Plaintiff’s recent filings employ female pronouns to refer to Plaintiff, the Court does
22 so here as well.
23 2Citations to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and supporting exhibits refer to the
24 page numbers from the Court’s official Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF)
system.
25
3Plaintiff’s reference to “Warden Hor” is construed to refer to Pat Horn, a former warden
26
of CSP-LAC. Associate Warden Williams is not named in the caption of the Third Amended
27 Complaint, but he is referenced in the claims and allegations. As discussed below, Plaintiff
sometimes indicates that Warden Horn has replaced Williams as a Defendant, but Plaintiff’s
28 intentions on that point remain unclear.
2
1 || § 2000cc et seq.,* and her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
2 || unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.”
3 | (TAC at 5, 8-21). Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages. (TAC at 24).
4 As the Third Amended Complaint is deficient in multiple respects,
5 | including those detailed below, it is dismissed with leave to amend.
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
7 The Third Amended Complaint, construed liberally, alleges the following:°
8 Plaintiffs religious beliefs are grounded in being “God in flesh as one.”
9 || (TAC at 6). On June 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint giving
10 || notice of her religious belief and “mental therapy.” (TAC at 6). On July 16, 2018,
11 || Plaintiff submitted an administrative request form seeking relief from prison
12 || staff's disruptions and burdens upon her religious exercise. (TAC at 6).
13 || Administrative officials granted Plaintiff's request for the right to live in peace
14 || and to use Plaintiff's religious sacraments to ensure her “mental stability and
15 || safety” after Plaintiff had suffered two prior suicide attempts, and they assertedly
16 || did not dispute the $5 million “civil liability” that Plaintiff has placed on “any
17 || hinderence [sic] or punishment for the exercise of free will, peace and love,” so
18 || long as Plaintiff did not harm anyone or disrupt the day-to-day operations of the
19 || prison. (TAC at 6). The prison psychologist understood that Plaintiffs
20
71 “Plaintiff also cites RFRA — i.e., the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107
Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. — but that Act is applicable only to the federal
22 || government, as it was held unconstitutional as applied to the states. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
3 U.S. 709, 714-16 (2005) (discussing these Acts). Plaintiff's references to RFRA are therefore
construed under RLUIPA.
24
"In addition, as addressed below, the Third Amended Complaint makes several references
25 || to Plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process and to be free from retaliation, though it is
unclear whether Plaintiff intends to assert claims on these grounds.
27 *Plaintiff’s account of the factual background of the case is largely copied from one of the
Court’s prior screening orders, but with some edits and additions. (Compare TAC at 6-8 with
28 || Docket No. 16 at 2-4).
1 perspective on death lends her a “strong likelihood” of committing suicide in
2 prison whenever the “evils of this world” make her depression unbearable. (TAC
3 at 6).
4 When Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-LAC, she immediately placed all
5 staff and institutional officials on notice of her severe depression, past suicide
6 attempts, and need “to be left alone in peace.” (TAC at 6). She also put them on
7 notice of the $5 million liability for violating her rights. (TAC at 6).
8 On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff was running “wind sprints” back and forth along
9 the fence with headphones on “a little too loud” when she “realized inmates were
10 getting down” and an alarm was sounding. (TAC at 6). At this realization,
11 Plaintiff stopped running and got down “in a squat[t]ing position.” (TAC at 6).
12 Defendant C/O Rosas had the guard tower announce that all inmates needed to get
13 down, but Plaintiff ignored this announcement because she was already down.
14 (TAC at 6). C/O Rosas then approached Plaintiff and ordered her to “cuff up.”
15 (TAC at 6). Plaintiff peacefully complied and was taken to the “make shift police
16 station in the gym” where she was forced to submit to an unclothed body
17 inspection and was told by Rosas that she needed to be “all the way down on the
18 ground” during alarms. (TAC at 6-7). Plaintiff was receptive to the counseling.
19 (TAC at 7). Nonetheless, Rosas cited Plaintiff for violating a prison rule – title 15,
20 section 3005, of the California Code of Regulations – by “willfully delaying a
21 peace officer in the performance of duty.” (TAC at 7).
22 On May 15, 2019, Defendant Lt. Martinez found Plaintiff guilty of the rule
23 violation and punished Plaintiff with the loss of both yard and dayroom privileges
24 for ninety days, depriving Plaintiff of outdoor physical activity for that period,
25 even though prison regulations assertedly prohibit depriving inmates of outdoor
26 exercise for longer than ten days “absent extreme circumstances.” (TAC at 7).
27 Defendant Williams, an Associate Warden, approved this decision. (TAC at 7).
28 ///
4
1 Plaintiff was not present at the disciplinary hearing. (TAC at 7). Although
2 Lt. Martinez claimed that another officer had informed him that Plaintiff refused to
3 be present, Martinez did not provide any written waiver from Plaintiff, nor did he
4 mention such officer in his report.” (TAC at 7). When Plaintiff questioned
5 Martinez about who this other officer was, Martinez became evasive. (TAC at 7).
6 Martinez also did not deny that Plaintiff did not receive twenty-four-hour notice to
7 prepare for the hearing. (TAC at 7).
8 Being confined to the cell for so long caused Plaintiff’s depression, anxiety,
9 and suicidal thoughts to “skyrocket,” making Plaintiff unable to practice her “daily
10 prayers and rituals” or obtain any relief from her sacraments. (TAC at 7). She had
11 difficulty sleeping and would not clean up for herself, which caused three fights
12 with her cellmate. (TAC at 7). Plaintiff asked Lt. Martinez for the restriction to
13 be removed from her door, but he refused, even when assertedly told that he would
14 be liable if he did not do so. (TAC at 7).
15 Although, as discussed below, it is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to
16 claim, based on the foregoing allegations, that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and
17 Williams and/or Horn violated her religious rights under the First Amendment (see
18 TAC at 5, 8-14); that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn
19 violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
20 punishment and deliberate indifference to her “serious medical need for peace and
21 tranquility in treatment of her vulnerability to suicide” (see TAC at 8, 14-19; and
22 that Defendant Williams and/or Horn violated her religious rights under RLUIPA
23 (see TAC at 5, 19-21).
24 III. PERTINENT LAW
25 A. The Screening Requirement
26 As Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against
27 governmental defendants, the Court must screen the Third Amended Complaint,
28 and is required to dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous
5
1 || or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
2 || monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
3] U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); Byrd v. Phoenix Police
4 || Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
5 When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is
6 || viable, the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion
7 || to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso,
8 | 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is
9 || read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
10 || Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, each
11 |) complaint filed in federal court must contain a “short and plain statement of the
12 | claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While
13 || Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint
14 || must allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular
15 || claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests.” Bell
16 || Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and
17 || quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
18 || (Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
19 | unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
20 To avoid dismissal on screening, a complaint must “contain sufficient
21 || factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
22 || face.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. City of
23 || Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (Twombly and Iqbal instruct that
24 || plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that [plaintiff's] claim has
25 || substantive plausibility”). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged in the
26 || complaint would support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to
27 || relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
28 || (citation omitted); see also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242 (9th Cir. 2018)
1 || CA] [Section 1983] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
2 || through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”’)
3 || (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676); Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071
4 || (N.D. Cal. 1988) (complaint “must allege the basis of [plaintiff's] claim against
5 || each defendant” to satisfy Rule 8 requirements (emphasis added)). Allegations
6 || that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, or reflect only “the mere
7 || possibility of misconduct” do not “show|] that the pleader is entitled to relief” (as
8 || required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), and thus are insufficient to state a claim that is
9 || “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and quotation marks
10 || omitted).
11 At this preliminary stage, “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint
12 || are assumed true, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action”
13 || and “legal conclusion|s] couched as a factual allegation” are not. Id. (citation and
14 || quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014)
15 || (‘mere legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth’” (quoting
16 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). In addition, the
17 || Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are
18 || contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” Steckman v. Hart
19 || Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and
20 || “need not [] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to
21 || judicial notice or by exhibit,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979,
22 || 988 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation
23 || omitted).
24 In general, civil rights complaints are interpreted liberally in order to give
25 || pro se plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations and
26 || internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must still follow
27 || the rules of procedure that govern all litigants in federal court, including the
28 | Rule 8 requirement that a complaint minimally state a short and plain statement of
1 || acclaim that is plausible on its face. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir.
2 || 1995) (per curiam) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro
3 || se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied,
4 | 516 US. 838 (1995); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d
5 || 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] liberal interpretation of a... civil rights
6 || complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially
7 || pled.” (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)) (quotation
8 | marks omitted; ellipses in original)).
9 If a pro se complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court must
10 | “freely” grant leave to amend. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d
11 | 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
12 | 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
13 || Nonetheless, courts have the discretion to deny leave to amend in cases of undue
14 || delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, “repeated failure to cure
15 || deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” and futility. See Foman v.
16 || Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted).
17 || Courts have “particularly broad” discretion where a plaintiff “has previously
18 || amended the complaint.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (citation and quotation marks
19 || omitted); see also Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999)
20 || (‘The trial court’s discretion . . . is particularly broad where . . . a plaintiff
21 || previously has been granted leave to amend.” (citations omitted)).
22 B. —_ Section 1983 Claims
23 To state a Section 1983 claim, a complaint must allege that a defendant,
24 || while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiffs federal
25 || rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations
26 || omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
27 || There is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 lawsuits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
28 || (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
1 || 658, 691 (1978)). Hence, a government official may not be held liable under
2 || Section 1983 unless the particular official’s own actions caused the alleged
3 || constitutional deprivation. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069
4 || (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 819 (2013).
5 | A Section 1983 plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate (i.e.,
6 || legal) causation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th
7 || Cir. 2008). Allegations regarding Section 1983 causation “must be individualized
8 | and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose
9 || acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v.
10 || Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “Sweeping
11 | conclusory allegations [regarding causation] will not suffice ....” Id. (citation
12 || omitted).
13 An individual “causes” a constitutional deprivation basically when he
14 | (1) “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to
15 || perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation”; or
16 || (2) “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or
17 || reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”
18 || Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting
19 | Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)) (quotation marks
20 || omitted).
21 Similarly, a government official acting in a supervisory capacity “causes” a
22 || deprivation to the extent he (1) personally participates in or directs a subordinate’s
23 || constitutional violation; or (2) was not “physically present when the [plaintiffs]
24 | injury occurred,” but the constitutional deprivation can, nonetheless, be “directly
25 || attributed” to the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
26 || 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 566 U.S. 982 (2012); see also OSU
27 || Student Alliance, 699 F.3d at 1069 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Under the
28 || latter theory, even absent “overt personal participation,” a supervisor may be liable
1 || under Section 1983 if he created, promulgated, implemented, advanced, or was
2 || otherwise responsible for the continued operation of a policy that “requires
3 || subordinates to commit constitutional violations,” and enforcement of the policy
4 || (either by the defendant-supervisor or his subordinates) proximately caused the
5 || Plaintiff's constitutional injury. OSU Student Alliance, 699 F.3d at 1076 (citing
6 || Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S.
7 || 960 (2011)); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013)
8 || (supervisory officials may be held liable “even without overt personal
9 || participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so
10 | deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the
11 || moving force of a constitutional violation’” (citation and internal quotation marks
12 || omitted)).
13 | IV. DISCUSSION
14 The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for
15 || violation of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, among other
16 || deficiencies addressed below.
17 A. The Third Amended Complaint Violates Rules 8 and 10 of the
18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
19 Rule 8(a), as noted above, requires a complaint to provide “fair notice” of
20 || who is being sued, for what particular conduct, and in what particular claim. See
21 || Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3 (Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to give “fair
22 || notice” of the particular claims being asserted against them and “the grounds upon
23 || which [the claims] rest[]’’) (citation and quotation marks omitted); McHenry v.
24 || Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (purpose of Rule 8(a) is to ensure that a
25 || complaint “fully sets forth who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory,
26 || with enough detail to guide discovery’’); see also Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (a
27 || complaint violates Rule 8 if a defendant would have difficulty understanding and
28 || responding to the complaint).
10
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 because it fails to give
2 || adequate notice as to who 1s being sued and on what grounds. First, as indicated
3 || above, it 1s unclear whether Plaintiff intends to sue Associate Warden Williams,
4 || Warden Horn, or both. For example, the caption of the Third Amended Complaint
5 || includes Horn and not Williams, but some later statements of Plaintiff's claims
6 || reference Williams but not Horn. (See TAC at 1, 5, 7-8). At multiple points,
7 || Plaintiff states that Williams has been “repla[c]ed” by Warden Horn, the
8 | “repla[ce]ment defendant.” (See TAC at 7,11). Yet, if that is indeed the case,
9 || then it is unclear why Williams is sometimes referenced as a Defendant in the
10 | claims. (See TAC at 5). Additionally, although Plaintiff appears to indicate that
11 | her only claims are for violation of her religious rights under the First Amendment
12 | and RLUIPA and her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force
13 || and deliberate indifference (see TAC at 5), the Third Amended Complaint also
14 || later alludes to Plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process (see TAC at 8) and
15 || to be free from retaliation (see TAC at 10-11, 15, 24), making it unclear whether
16 | Plaintiff intends to assert independent claims on these grounds.’ As a result of
17 || these discrepancies, among others, Defendants are unable to clearly discern which
18 || claims and allegations are being asserted against them.
19 The Third Amended Complaint also appears to violate Rule 10(a) of the
20 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that “all the parties” be named in
21 || the caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“Every pleading must have a caption
22 | with...atitle.... The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]’’). As
23 || noted above, the caption on the first page of the Third Amended Complaint omits
24 || Associate Warden Williams, despite that Williams is later referenced (albeit
25 || inconsistently) as a Defendant in Plaintiff's claims. (See TAC at 1, 5).
26
27 ’As discussed below, Plaintiff's allegations fail at least to support a viable retaliation
28 claim.
11
1 Accordingly, dismissal with leave to amend is warranted for violation of
2 || Rules 8 and 10. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2013)
3 || (violations of Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirements “warrant
4 || dismissal”), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 815 (2014); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178;
5 || Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.), as amended (May 22, 1992)
6 || (affirming dismissal of action based on failure to comply with court order that
7 || complaint be amended to name all defendants in caption as required by Rule
8 | 10(a)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). The Court will nevertheless highlight
9 || some other deficiencies in the Third Amended Complaint.*
10 B. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim for
11 Violation of Plaintiff's Religious Rights under the First
12 Amendment or RLUIPA
13 Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment” including
14 || the right to “the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
15 || 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds,
16 || 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. However, as a consequence of incarceration, a
17 || prisoner’s First Amendment rights are necessarily “more limited in scope than the
18 || constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532
19 | U.S. 223, 229 (2001). An inmate retains only “those First Amendment rights that
20 || are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
21 || objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
22 To state a First Amendment free exercise claim, an inmate must allege that a
23 || prison official’s actions (1) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate’s exercise of a
24 || sincerely held religious belief; and (2) did so in an unreasonable manner — i.e., the
25 | official’s actions were not “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.”
26
7 *While the Third Amended Complaint as a whole warrants dismissal with leave to amend
for violation of Rules 8 and 10, dismissal at this juncture is not predicated on a failure to state an
28 || Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Martinez and Williams and/or Horn.
12
1 || See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50; Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033
2 || (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th
3 || Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “[G]overnment action places a substantial burden
4 || on an individual’s right to free exercise of religion when it tends to coerce the
5 || individual to forego [his or] her sincerely held religious beliefs or to engage in
6 || conduct that violates those beliefs.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d at 1031-33
7 || (citations omitted).
8 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn
9 || violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights by punishing her for disobeying
10 || Rosas’s order for all inmates to “get down on the ground,” as Plaintiff's religious
11 || beliefs assertedly forbid obedience to anyone other than herself, who is “God in
12 || flesh.” (See TAC at 5, 8-12). She asserts, moreover, that “getting down in the dirt
13 || at the command of someone else equates to being dethroned,” and she allegedly
14 || cannot “allow [her]self to sit in the dirt at the command of another man, and be
15 || dethroned.” (TAC at 8 (brackets omitted)). Plaintiff alleges that she had given all
16 || Defendants sufficient notice of these rights. (See TAC at 6, 8-11). She further
17 || contends that because she was in a squatting positing at the time, there was no
18 || legitimate penological interest in requiring her to go further down on the ground
19 || or for punishing her refusal to do so. (See TAC at 10).
20 Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any First Amendment violation here.
21 || Correctional officers obviously have a strong and legitimate penological interest in
22 || requiring inmates to obey their orders and in punishing inmates’ failure to do so.
23 | In particular, there is certainly nothing unreasonable about an order to get down on
24 || the ground when an alarm is triggered to preserve order and safety during an
25 || inmate fight, no matter how unnecessary Plaintiff may believe this was.
26 || Moreover, even if having to obey any officers’ rules and commands conflicts in
27 || general with Plaintiff's religious belief in her personal sovereignty as “God” on
28 | ///
13
1 || her “throne,” Plaintiff cannot plausibly show that the command at issue imposed a
2 || substantial burden on her religious exercise.
3 Plaintiff further claims that her First Amendment religious rights were
4 || violated when Defendant Rosas subjected her to a strip search. (TAC at 13-14).
5 || However, Plaintiff's vague, conclusory assertion that her “belief forbid[]s [her]
6 || getting naked in front of or by Men” (TAC at 13) does not plausibly show that the
7 || search actually conflicted with — and substantially burdened — a belief that was
8 | “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” See Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d
9 || 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (for First Amendment claim, belief “must be sincerely
10 || held” and “must be rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’ philosophical
11 || concerns” (citations omitted)); see also White v. Davenport, 2024 WL 5237438, at
12 | *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2024) (“While courts will not second-guess the
13 || reasonableness of a plaintiff's assertion that a requirement conflicts with her
14 || religious beliefs, a plaintiff still must allege what the conflict is.” (citing
15 || Bolden-Hardge v. Office of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir.
16 || 2023))), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 268850 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
17 || 2025).
18 Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a First
19 | Amendment free exercise claim. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50. Plaintiff also
20 || fails to state a claim under RLUIPA, which similarly requires pleading a
21 || substantial burden on her religious exercise.” See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418
22 || F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (under RLUIPA, plaintiff bears initial burden to
23 || demonstrate that defendant’s actions substantially burden the exercise of his
24 || religious beliefs (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). In sum, Plaintiff's allegations
25 || do not establish a substantial burden, or a “significantly great restriction or onus
26 | ——__
27 *Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim is predicated solely on the
28 disciplinary matter (and resulting sanctions) regarding Plaintiff's failure to obey Rosas’s order to
get on the ground, not the strip search. (See TAC at 5, 19-20).
14
1 || upon [religious] exercise,” to support a violation of her religious rights under
2 || RLUIPA or the First Amendment. New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of
3 || Salinas, 29 F.4th 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567 (2023).
4 C. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State a First Amendment
5 Retaliation Claim
6 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison
7 || officials ....” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation
8 | omitted). Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right
9 || to seek redress/access the court is an independent constitutional violation.
10 || Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). To prevail on a First
11 | Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must prove that (1) the plaintiff/inmate
12 || engaged in conduct that is protected under the First Amendment; (2) a prison
13 || official took “adverse action” against the inmate; (3) the inmate’s protected
14 || conduct was the “substantial or motivating factor” behind the prison official’s
15 || action; (4) the official’s retaliatory action “would chill or silence a person of
16 || ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities”; and (5) the action “did
17 || not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution” because it was either
18 || “arbitrary and capricious” or “unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the
19 || institution.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15 (citations and internal quotation marks
20 || omitted). A complaint that does not allege a “chilling effect” may still state a
21 || viable retaliation claim if it alleges that the plaintiff “suffered some other harm...
22 || that is more than minimal... .” Id. at 1114 (citations and internal quotation marks
23 || omitted).
24 To satisfy the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, an
25 || inmate/plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a specific causal link between the
26 || defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct and the inmate’s exercise of a
27 || constitutional right. See generally Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)
28 || (citations omitted); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1995). A
15
1 || plaintiff may do so either with direct evidence of a defendant’s retaliatory motive,
2 || or with circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the protected
3 || conduct at issue plus some other evidence probative of retaliatory intent, such as
4 || “(1) proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation;
5 || (2) [that] the [defendant] expressed opposition to the speech; [or] (3) other
6 || evidence that the reasons proffered by the [defendant] for the adverse .. . action
7 || were false and pretextual.” McCollum v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d
8 | 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted; alterations in
9 || original); see generally Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (direct evidence of retaliatory
10 || intent “rarely” available).
11 Here, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to assert a First Amendment
12 || retaliation claim, such claim fails at least because Plaintiff's allegations do not
13 || establish causation. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rosas, by issuing the RVR,
14 || acted “in retaliation for grievances and civil complaints filed against several
15 || officers just 60 days previously.” (TAC at 10). However, absent any facts to
16 || suggest that Defendant actually knew about Plaintiff's protected conduct, the
17 || alleged sixty-day proximity is insufficient to raise a plausible inference that the
18 || protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” behind any Defendant’s
19 || actions against her.
20 D. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State an Eighth
21 Amendment Claim Against at Least Defendant Rosas
22 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
23 || protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v.
24 | Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
25 || U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison officials therefore have a “duty to ensure that
26 || prisoners are provided with adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical
27 || care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000),
28 || cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
16
Nevertheless, “a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
2 || two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
3 || ‘sufficiently serious,’” in that the official’s act or omission resulted “in the denial
4 || of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities[.]’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
5 || (citations omitted); Norbert v. City & County of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 927
6 | (9th Cir. 2021). “This requires the inmate to demonstrate ‘conditions posing a
7 || substantial risk of serious harm’ that present an ‘excessive risk to [his] health or
8 || safety.’” Norbert, 10 F.4th at 928 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837). The
9 || second requirement is subjective — a prison official is not liable for denying an
10 || inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official acted with a
11 || deliberately indifferent state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Norbert,
12 | 10 F.4th at 928 (“The subjective requirement, relating to the defendant’s state of
13 || mind, requires deliberate indifference.” (citation omitted)).
14 Deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment exists when a
15 || prison official knows an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm to his
16 || health and fails to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
17 || 847; Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); see
18 || also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly
19 || recognized that prison officials are constitutionally prohibited from being
20 || deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a
21 || substantial risk of serious harm.”). “Under this standard, the prison official must
22 || not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
23 || substantial risk of harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”
24 | Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); Castro v. County of
25 || Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 580
26 || U.S. 1099 (2017). “Ifa [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but
27 || was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how
28 | ///
17
1 severe the risk.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (citation omitted); Peralta v. Dillard,
2 744 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1073 (2015).
3 Plaintiff claims her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants
4 Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn when Plaintiff was deprived of any
5 outdoor exercise for ninety days as punishment for disobeying C/O Rosas’s order
6 to get on the ground during the alarm. (See TAC at 5, 14-19). This claim fails to
7 meet the subjective requirement, at least with respect to Defendant C/O Rosas,
8 because Rosas had no apparent role in deciding (or approving) the punishment that
9 resulted from the RVR she issued. Plaintiff acknowledges this, but insists that
10 Rosas still should be held liable because he opted to issue a “serious” RVR,
11 allegedly while knowing this would result in a “far more severe punishment” than
12 would an RVR based on a lesser offense that might instead have been warranted
13 by the circumstances. (TAC at 15). Plaintiff asserts that this “set into motion the
14 ability of [D]efendant Martinez to issue the harsher punishment . . . .” (TAC at
15 15). That is not enough, however, as there is nothing here to show that Rosas
16 actually knew the RVR would subject Plaintiff to a serious risk of harm.
17 Accordingly, the Third Amended Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment
18 claim against at least Defendant Rosas.
19 E. Plaintiff’s Challenges to Disciplinary Proceedings Appear to Be
20 Barred by Heck
21 Under the “favorable termination doctrine” set forth in Heck v. Humphrey,
22 the district court must dismiss a state prisoner’s Section 1983 claim for damages if
23 “judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
24 conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction
25 or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
26 486-87 (1994). This doctrine has been extended to apply in the prison disciplinary
27 context where the “defect complained of by [Plaintiff] would, if established,
28 necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits[,]”
18
1 || Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872,
2 || 875 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004), and if the restoration of
3 || those credits “necessarily” would “affect the duration of time to be served.”
4 || Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004) (per curiam); see also Nettles v.
5 || Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 929 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Heck applies only to
6 || administrative determinations that ‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of
7 || time to be served[,]’” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1063 (2017).
8 Here, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks a speedier release from custody, or a
9 || favorable determination on Plaintiffs claim(s) would necessarily accomplish this,
10 || such claims are barred, and a petition for habeas corpus is Plaintiff's exclusive
11 || remedy. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929 n.4.
12] V. ORDERS’
13 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Third
14 || Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend."'
15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty-one (21) days of the date of
16 || this Order, Plaintiff must do one of the following:
17 ///
18 ///
19
20 '°The Magistrate Judge’s orders herein constitute non-dispositive rulings on pretrial
21 || matters. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1991) (magistrate judges can
dismiss complaints with leave to amend; dismissal of complaint with leave to amend is
22 || non-dispositive matter). To the extent a party disagrees with such non-dispositive rulings, such
party may file a motion for review by the assigned District Judge within fourteen (14) days. See
Local Rule 72-2.1. To the extent a party believes the rulings to be dispositive, rather than non-
24 || dispositive, such party has the right to object to this Court’s determination that the rulings are
non-dispositive within fourteen (14) days. A party will be foreclosed from challenging the
25 rulings herein if such party does not seek review thereof, or object thereto.
26
'' As indicated above, the Third Amended Complaint as a whole is dismissed with leave
27 || to amend against all Defendants because it violates Rules 8 and 10, but the Court does not deem
28 it appropriate, at this juncture, to predicate such dismissal on the failure to state an Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendants Martinez and Williams and/or Horn.
19
1 1. File a Fourth Amended Complaint which cures the pleading defects
2 set forth herein;12 or
3 2. Sign and file the attached Notice of Dismissal which will result in
4 the voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice; or
5 3. File a Notice of Intent to Stand on Third Amended Complaint,
6 indicating Plaintiff’s intent to stand on the Third Amended Complaint despite the
7 pleading defects set forth herein, which may result in the dismissal of this action in
8 its entirety based upon such defects.
9 Plaintiff is cautioned that Plaintiff’s failure timely to file a Third
10 Amended Complaint, a Notice of Dismissal, or a Notice of Intent to Stand on
11 Third Amended Complaint may be deemed Plaintiff’s admission that
12 amendment is futile, and may result in the dismissal of this action with or
13 without prejudice on the grounds set forth above, on the ground that
14 ///
15 ///
16 ///
17 ///
18
19
12The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a Central District of California Civil
20 Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to facilitate Plaintiff’s filing of a Fourth Amended Complaint if
21 Plaintiff elects to proceed in that fashion. Any Fourth Amended Complaint must: (a) be labeled
“Fourth Amended Complaint”; (b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to the
22 prior complaints – i.e., it must include all claims on which Plaintiff seeks to proceed (Local Rule
15-2); (c) contain a “short and plain” statement of each of the claim(s) for relief (Fed. R. Civ. P.
23
8(a)); (d) make each allegation “simple, concise and direct” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)); (e) set forth
24 clearly the sequence of events giving rise to the claim(s) for relief in sequentially “numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances” (Fed. R. Civ. P.
25 10(b)); (f) allege specifically what the Defendant did and how that individual’s conduct
26 specifically violated Plaintiff’s civil rights; (g) state the names of all Defendants in the caption
and not include in the body of the Fourth Amended Complaint any Defendants who are not also
27 named in the caption (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)); (h) be signed by Plaintiff who is proceeding pro se
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Local Rule 11-1); and (i) not add Defendants or claims that are not
28
reasonably related to the claim asserted in the previous complaints.
20
1 amendment is futile, for failure diligently to prosecute and/or for failure to
2 comply with this Order.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
5 DATED: April 7, 2025
6 ________________/s/______________________
7 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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