The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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8 D. L.,1
Case No. 24-cv-06590-PHK
9 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND
10 v. DENYING-IN-PART PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST TO REVERSE AND
11 Leland Dudek, et al.,2 REMAND; ORDER OF REMAND
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
12 Re: Dkts. 12 and 18
Defendants.
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This case is an appeal from the denial of Social Security benefits. Now before the Court is
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Plaintiff D. L.’s brief requesting that the Court “reverse the decision of the Commissioner, and
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remand with instructions to award benefits pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” [Dkt.
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12]. Alternatively, Plaintiff D. L. requests that “the Court [] remand for further administrative
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proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” Id. Defendant Leland Dudek, Acting
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Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), moves for an order remanding this action for
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further administrative proceedings pursuant to the Social Security Act § 205(g), as amended, 42
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U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four. [Dkt. 18 at 2]. After carefully considering the briefing and all
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relevant documents, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument.
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Civil L. R. 7-1(b). As discussed herein, the Court DENIES-IN-PART and GRANTS-IN-PART
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1 In actions involving requested review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, the Court generally uses the first name and initial of last name (or just both initials)
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of the Plaintiff in the Court’s public Orders out of an abundance of caution and regard for the
Plaintiff’s potential privacy concerns.
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2 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 16, 2025.
1 Plaintiff D. L.’s requested relief.
2 RELEVANT BACKGROUND
3 On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff D. L. applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and
4 Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, alleging he became disabled on
5 January 10, 2013. AR 15. On June 12, 2015, the Commissioner of Social Security denied the
6 application initially and on reconsideration. Id. On February 27, 2018, an Administrative Law
7 Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision finding Plaintiff D. L. was not disabled. AR 15–28. On December
8 16, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff D. L.’s request for review. AR 1954. Plaintiff D. L.
9 sought review of the denial, and on June 29, 2020, the United States District Court for the Northern
10 District of California remanded for further proceedings. AR 2313. On remand, an ALJ held another
11 hearing and received testimony from Plaintiff D. L. and a vocational expert. AR 3484. On January
12 26, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff D. L. not disabled. AR 3463–84. Plaintiff D.
13 L. filed an appeal of this second adverse decision in the Northern District of California, and on
14 September 14, 2022, the parties to that case stipulated to a remand for further administrative
15 proceedings. AR 3498-3500. On May 28, 2024, the ALJ held a third hearing and issued a decision
16 denying benefits. AR 3395–3427.
17 On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff D. L. filed a Complaint for judicial review of the denial of
18 benefits. [Dkt. 1]. Before the briefing on the ultimate merits of the complaint was filed, “Counsel
19 for the respective parties engaged in good faith settlement discussions but could not come to an
20 agreement on the terms of a voluntary remand[.]” [Dkt. 18 at 2].
21 On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff D. L. filed the instant brief requesting that the Court “reverse
22 the decision of the Commissioner, and remand with instruction[s] to award benefits pursuant to
23 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” [Dkt. 12]. Alternatively, Plaintiff D. L. requests that “the
24 Court [] remand for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
25 405(g).” Id.
26 On March 14, 2025, the Commissioner filed its response, after being granted leave to extend
27 the time to file its response, in which the Commissioner responded to Plaintiff’s request for an order
1 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four. [Dkt. 18 at 2]. On March 28, 2025, D. L. filed a
2 reply to the Commissioner’s opposition. [Dkt. 19].
3 LEGAL STANDARD
4 In Social Security disability cases, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether: (1)
5 substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision; and (2) the Commissioner’s decision
6 comports with relevant legal standards. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999); see
7 generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
8 administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s factual
9 determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks
10 omitted). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it
11 is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
12 conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal
13 quotation marks omitted).
14 A reviewing court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
15 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
16 Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If “the evidence is susceptible to more
17 than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by
18 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996,
19 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
20 Further, “a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the ALJ did
21 not apply proper legal standards.” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir.
22 2014) (citing Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009)).
23 DISCUSSION
24 This appeal from the denial of Social Security benefits is procedurally unusual. The Parties
25 do not dispute that the Commissioner’s final decision here is not supported by substantial evidence
26 and the Parties do not dispute otherwise. [Dkt. 12; Dkt. 18 at 3]. The gravamen of the dispute
27 centers around whether this case is one of those “rare circumstances” justifying the Court in finding
1 remand with instructions to award benefits pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt.
2 12 at 18–19; Dkt. 18 at 3–4.
3 “An automatic award of benefits in a disability benefits case is a rare and prophylactic
4 exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044
5 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir.
6 2014)). “Before ordering that extreme remedy, we must first satisfy ourselves that three
7 requirements have been met.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015). “First,
8 we must conclude that ‘the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting
9 evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion.’” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759
10 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Second, we must conclude that ‘the record has been fully
11 developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.’” Id. “Third, we
12 must conclude that ‘if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be
13 required to find the claimant disabled on remand.’” Id. (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021).
14 “Finally, even if all three requirements are met, we retain ‘flexibility’ in determining the appropriate
15 remedy.” Id. “We may remand on an open record for further proceedings ‘when the record as a
16 whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of
17 the Social Security Act.’” Id.
18 Here, both Parties agree the second requirement for an automatic award of benefits without
19 remand (whether the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would
20 serve no useful purpose) is not satisfied. The second requirement “will not be satisfied if ‘the record
21 raises crucial questions as to the extent of [a claimant’s] impairment given inconsistencies between
22 his testimony and the medical evidence in the record,’ because ‘[t]hese are exactly the sort of issues
23 that should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings.’” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495
24 (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105) (alterations in original). “Importantly, we are ‘to assess
25 whether there are outstanding issues requiring resolution before considering whether to hold that
26 the claimant’s testimony is credible as a matter of law.’” Id. “This is because ‘a reviewing court is
27 not required to credit claimants’ allegations regarding the extent of their impairments as true merely
1 F.3d at 1106). “The touchstone for an award of benefits is the existence of a disability, not the
2 agency’s legal error.” Id. “To condition an award of benefits only on the existence of legal error
3 by the ALJ would in many cases make ‘disability benefits . . . available for the asking, a result
4 plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1106).
5 The Commissioner admits, and argues for remand on the grounds, that the record has not
6 been fully developed because it is unclear whether the ALJ took into account the testimony of a
7 nurse practitioner witness. See Dkt. 18 at 6–7 (The Commissioner argues: “Here, the record has not
8 been fully developed because it is unclear from the ALJ’s decision whether Plaintiff’s residual
9 functional capacity finding had to account for the limitations related to the need to elevate feet as
10 described in [Nurse Practitioner] deBree’s opinion.”). Similarly, Plaintiff D. L. argues that the ALJ
11 failed to take into account the medical opinion of that very same nurse practitioner witness. See
12 Dkt. 12 at 16 (Plaintiff D. L. argues “In this case, the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical opinion of
13 Olivia deBree, [Nurse Practitioner], from the Lifelong Clinic. [citation omitted] It appears the ALJ
14 did not even consider Ms. deBree’s opinion because the ALJ wrote that Dr. Chow’s opinion
15 regarding a leg elevation limitation was ‘not noted by any other provider[.]’”).
16 Because both Parties agree that the ALJ failed to take into account the medical testimony of
17 the same witness, there can be no serious dispute that the record has not been fully developed.
18 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the second requirement for awarding benefits now is
19 satisfied. This case is not a “rare circumstance” justifying that this Court reverse and order payment
20 of benefits on remand. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105; Leon, 880 F.3d
21 at 1044. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff D. L.’s request for reversal and remand for
22 payment of benefits without further findings by the ALJ.
23 For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that this case is not a “rare circumstance”
24 justifying remand and an order by this Court to award benefits, and accordingly, DENIES Plaintiff
25 D. L.’s request for such a finding and order.
26 Indeed, because both Parties agree that this case should be remanded for further
27 administrative proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court GRANTS such request and
1 CONCLUSION
2 IT IS ORDERED that this action is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for
3 further proceedings pursuant to the fourth sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
4 |} US.C. § 405(g).
5 The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and against
6 Defendant, reversing the final decision of the Commissioner.
7 Upon proper presentation, Plaintiff will be entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access
8 to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, et seq.
9 This RESOLVES Dkts. 12 and 18.
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11 IT IS SO ORDERED.
12 Dated: April 4, 2025
CA Ke
14 United Stator Magistrate Judge
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