Opinion

State v. Savage

  • 2025 Ohio 1206
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Apr 4, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Huffman
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.7%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Savage, 2025-Ohio-1206.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :

:

Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-12

:

v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 104

:

TOBY WAYNE SAVAGE : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas

: Court)

Appellant :

:

...........

OPINION

Rendered on April 4, 2025

...........

ERIC J. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellant

KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee

.............

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Toby Wayne Savage appeals from his convictions of several drug offenses,

two counts of endangering children, and one count of furnishing a firearm to a minor.

He asserts that his convictions on the drug offenses were against the manifest weight of

the evidence, that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence that he sought to

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admit, and that the trial court erred in failing to consider his ability to pay fines and court

costs. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On June 5, 2023, Savage was indicted on several drug offenses: two counts

each of possession and trafficking of hashish and one count each of possession and

trafficking of marijuana. He was also indicted on three counts of endangering children

and one count of improperly furnishing firearms to a minor. The drug and firearm offenses

each had an attendant firearm specification.

{¶ 3} Savage was tried by a jury in March 2024 and was found guilty of all the

offenses and firearm specifications. The court merged the possession offenses into the

respective trafficking offenses and merged two of the endangering children offenses.

The court proceeded to sentencing on three counts of trafficking, two counts of

endangering children, one count of furnishing firearms to a minor, and the firearm

specifications. The court sentenced Savage to indefinite terms of three to 4.5 on the

three trafficking offenses, to 150 days and 180 days respectively on the endangering

children offenses, and to ten months for furnishing firearms to a minor. These sentences

were ordered to be served concurrently. The court imposed one-year prison terms on two

firearm specifications, to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the

concurrent terms. Thus, the aggregate sentence was five to 6.5 years. The court also

imposed fines totaling $19,500.

{¶ 4} Savage appeals, raising four assignments of error.

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Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Savage asserts that the jury’s findings of guilt

on the six drug offenses charged in the indictment (Counts 1-6) were against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Specifically, Savage asserts that he demonstrated the hashish

and marijuana at issue in these counts had been legally purchased from a legitimate

Tennessee business through his limited liability corporation, for which he had obtained

an identification number for tax purposes. According to Savage, he likely would not have

been prosecuted if his inventory had been “in a brick-and-mortar store.” He also argues

that the State did not present any evidence as to the source of the material, only its

potency, and that it was “entirely possible that it was hemp, perfectly legal at the time of

sale,” but that it subsequently “decarboxylated” (i.e., underwent a change in its chemical

composition), which increased its potency and led to the heightened potency testified to

by the State’s expert. Finally, Savage asserts that his “lack of clients or connections

made in the drug trade” and the absence of notes, ledgers, and confidential informants

who could attest to Savage’s sale of drugs indicated that he did not possess the drugs

“for sale or a trafficking operation.”

{¶ 6} A weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the

evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more

believable or persuasive. State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing State v.

Hufnagel, 1996 WL 501470, *3 (Sept. 6, 1996). The proper test to apply to a manifest

weight of the evidence inquiry is set forth in State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175

(1983), which states:

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. . . [T]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. . . .

“In order to find that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred, an appellate court must

conclude that a guilty verdict is ‘against,’ that is, contrary to, the manifest weight of the

evidence presented.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 14.

{¶ 7} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony

are primarily matters for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. DeHass, 10

Ohio St.2d 230 (1967).

Because the factfinder . . . has the opportunity to see and hear the

witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of

appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the

evidence requires that substantial deference be extended to the factfinder's

determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to

credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar

competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.

State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997).

{¶ 8} Additionally, the trier of fact is in the best position to consider inconsistencies,

along with the witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses’

testimony is credible. State v. Petty, 2012-Ohio-2989, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.), citing State v.

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Williams, 2002-Ohio-4503, ¶ 58 (10th Dist.). “To that end, the fact finder is free to believe

all, part or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” Id., citing State v.

Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). “Mere disagreement over the credibility of

witnesses is not sufficient reason to reverse a judgment.” Id., citing State v. Wilson,

2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24. Moreover, “[i]t is well-established that when conflicting evidence

is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply

because the trier of fact believed the prosecution testimony.” In re M.J.C., 2015-Ohio-

820, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). Thus, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of

fact on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact

lost its way in arriving at its verdict. See Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, at ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Bradley, 1997 WL 691510, *4 (2d Dist. Oct. 24, 1997).

{¶ 9} With these standards in mind, we will review the evidence presented at trial.

Savage directs our attention particularly to the testimonies of Sgt. Curnette, forensic

scientist Woolford, and Ageny Guryko, as well as his own testimony.

{¶ 10} We note that the events giving rise to this matter began with the death of

Savage’s 12-year old son and a subsequent search of Savage’s property pursuant to a

search warrant. The coroner who performed the autopsy on the child determined that

his manner of death was suicide by means of a gunshot wound to the head.

{¶ 11} Sergeant Scott Curnette of the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office testified

that on October 25, 2022, he responded to a call that a 12-year old child had fallen down

the stairs at Savage’s home. Curnette subsequently learned that the child had a gunshot

wound to the head, and the injury was not accidental. Curnette advised Sergeant Ryan

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Black to respond to Savage’s address and “freeze it” until a search warrant could be

obtained. Curnette assisted in the execution of the search warrant and located a Ruger

.22 revolver in the child’s bedroom, with five rounds in the cylinder as well as a spent

cartridge in the sixth chamber, directly under the hammer.

{¶ 12} Curnette had 33 years of law enforcement experience and testified that,

when he arrived at the residence, the “unusual smell that stood out to [him] was the strong

odor of marijuana.” He stated that after the execution of the search warrant, he

discovered and weighed over 47 pounds of marijuana at the address.

{¶ 13} Eric Holmes, the Chief Deputy for the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office,

responded to the Savage residence to assist in executing the search warrant. He

testified that there were firearms in “virtually every room” in the residence and that there

was ammunition throughout the residence as well. Several of the firearms were loaded,

and a few had rounds in their chambers such that Holmes “had to render them safe.”

{¶ 14} Detective Anthony Sells of the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office testified

that he met Savage and his wife at the hospital after their son was taken there by

CareFlight. Sells then proceeded to the Savage residence. After a search warrant was

obtained, he assisted in documenting the items that were located at the scene. He

identified a Ruger revolver, which the parties stipulated had been found in the deceased

son’s bedroom and was operable. The parties further stipulated that a spent .22 casing

found at the scene had been discharged from that weapon.

{¶ 15} Sells identified numerous items that were seized as a result of the search

warrant and admitted into evidence. These included: a very large number of bags, jars,

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and vacuum-sealed packages of marijuana, dozens of packages of edibles, storage

containers and boxes containing bags of marijuana, and 60 packs of “Glo Extracts THC”

in boxes. They also included the following items, which were specifically relevant to

expert testimony that will be discussed below:

15. Box containing bags of marijuana

15 A-R. 17 vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana

...

18. 1 large mason jar containing brown powdery substance

19. 1 large Rubbermaid container with red lid containing brownish powder

20. 41 plastic containers with wax-like substance in box; 1 clear round container

with green lid with crystal-like substance; 1 plastic container of wax-like substance

21. Three individual boxes of “Gold Coast Clear Winter Edition (THC vape

cartridges), with one cartridge removed

Sells further identified nine envelopes containing cash in amounts ranging from $18.48 to

$24,365, and 21 weapons, including pistols, revolvers, shotguns, and rifles.

{¶ 16} During Sells’s testimony, defense counsel objected to his characterization

of the green vegetative substances located in the home as marijuana. Sells stated that

he had 22 years of law enforcement experience on road patrol and in the detective

division, and he had often sent “green vegetative substances” for testing that were proven

to be marijuana. Sells also stated that the odor of unburnt marijuana is “very distinct,”

and he noted that odor in the Savage residence.

{¶ 17} Sells stated that some of the firearms found in the home had been loaded,

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and none of them had been secured in a manner that restricted access to them. Sells

also retrieved weapons from the pole barn at the Savage property that were not secured,

and the parties stipulated to the number of firearms found there. According to Sells,

Savage told him at the hospital that his children did not have access to the firearms in his

home.

{¶ 18} The court designated Elizabeth Woolford an expert in drug analysis; she

was a forensic scientist in the Drug Chemistry Section at the Bureau of Criminal

Investigation, with experience in analyzing plant material to determine the presence of

marijuana. Woolford testified that she had analyzed vegetation, oil, and wax substances

retrieved from the Savage address and had prepared a report.

{¶ 19} Woolford described drug analyses she performed and her conclusions. She

stated that State’s Exhibits 21 and 22 contained hashish in liquid form and that they were

commercially manufactured products containing 834 cartridges. According to Woolford,

Gold Coast Clear (Exhibit 21) is “a brand that we see quite often in the laboratory.”

State’s Exhibits 19 and 20 were found to contain hashish in solid form. With respect to

Exhibit 15, vacuum sealed bags of suspected marijuana, Woolford stated that she had

weighed all 17 bags and found a total weight to be 7,120.2 grams. She had randomly

selected and tested 13 of the 17 bags using hypergeometric sampling, which was “a

statistically valid sampling plan” that allowed an inference to be drawn about the content

of the total items from testing a percentage of individual homogenous samples. Woolford

testified that hemp, which is legal, is defined in the 2018 Farm Bill as “a cannabis plant

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with .3 percent THC or less.”1 However, all of the bags she tested were above .3 percent.

Woolford testified that, if any of the samples had “come out different or negative,” she

would have abandoned the “sampling plan” and tested “every single bag.” Woolford

testified that all of her findings were made to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.

{¶ 20} On cross-examination, Woolford further testified that hemp and marijuana

are both cannabis, and that the vegetation she tested was marijuana, not hemp. She

explained: “THC-A is an acid form of THC, which is the psychoactive substance in

marijuana.” “Decarboxylation happens when [the vegetation is] dried or when it’s heated

and the acid portion, that molecule falls off and it goes from THC-A to THC. That

happens when a plant is dried or when it’s heated, as in it’s smoked.” Woolford stated

that “[i]t’s the development of the amount of THC that determines whether it is a hemp or

a marijuana plant.”

{¶ 21} Defense counsel questioned Woolford as follows:

Q. I’ll show you what’s been marked as Defense Exhibit D, which is a

report of the THC analysis of some hemp from Tennessee.

A. Okay.

Q. Could that hemp, which is legal, be the same hemp as that?

A. I can’t speak to that at all.

Q. Okay. So you don’t know?

A. I tested that marijuana, and that’s all I can speak to.

...

1

Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the psychoactive substance in marijuana.

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Q. So you cannot confirm or deny that any of these things started as

hemp?

A. I do not speak to where the plant came from. I can tell you what the

THC content is right now - -

Q. Okay.

A. - - in that bag.

Q. So you can’t confirm it was hemp?

A. There’s no point where a hemp plant will develop that amount of THC,

except when it’s a small seedling. But my job is to test the amount of THC

at that point and, at that point, it is marijuana.

{¶ 22} On redirect, Woolford testified that harvested hemp will not turn into

marijuana. She stated that she tests for THC and THC-A, and those numbers are

combined for the total THC value; “if it was .3 or less, that would be THC-A and THC, and

those would never increase.” Woolford testified that none of her testing had produced

any scientific evidence or basis for concluding that the items tested “were hemp at any

point in time.”

{¶ 23} On recross-examination, Woolford testified that THC, as defined in the Ohio

Revised Code, is the combination of THC and THC-A. Accordingly, in examining the

vegetative substance, “we test delta-9 THC, we get a percentage. We also test THC-A,

get that percentage.” Then, because “THC-A is a larger molecule because it has a

bigger part to it because of the acid, we multiply that by 0.877. That is a scientifically

proven number, the ratio between THC size and THC-A size.” Those numbers are

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combined to arrive at the total THC, which is defined in the Ohio Revised Code.

{¶ 24} George Gyurko, a Special Agent Supervisor for the Ohio Attorney General’s

Office, Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Narcotics Section, and the Marijuana

Coordinator for the Ohio Cannabis Suppression Unit, was designated an expert witness

in the field of narcotics trafficking. Guryko testified that he had reviewed the evidence

collected by the sheriff’s office in this case, which consisted of a large amount of

marijuana, but “it was broken down in 102 compartments or bags.” According to Guryko,

this packaging was consistent with resale and not personal use. He stated that

approximately $63,000 in cash was recovered “really nearby” the marijuana, which was

“a lot of money that’s kept at hand.” Moreover, the cash had been also separated into

piles and, in Guryko’s experience, “people try to hide assets and try to limit their exposure

so you spread your money out so you don’t all your eggs in one basket.”

{¶ 25} Noting the large number of firearms found at the Savage property, Guryko

further testified that, in his experience, people who sell drugs also keep guns for multiple

reasons, including their own protection. Drug dealers also invest in firearms because

they typically hold their value or appreciate, in order to “diversify large amounts of cash.”

Guryko stated a large amount of jewelry was also found at the Savage property, but he

did not know its value. According to Guryko, firearms and jewelry are often bartered for

drugs.

{¶ 26} Guryko further noted that rubber bands were found at the scene, and those

are often used in the drug trade to bundle cash in increments of $100 or $1,000. Guryko

had also reviewed three years of Savage’s bank records, and he testified that the large

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amount of money coming in in “round numbers” was indicative to him of cash deposits.

Specifically, Guryko noted deposits of $15,000, $4,000, and $3,000, and he stated that

approximately $128,000, in round numbers, was deposited into that account; there had

also been a large “investment” of about $50,000 through a crypto currency.

{¶ 27} Guryko identified a document he classified as a “ledger”; it contained the

words “carts,” which he believed to be an abbreviation for vape cartridges, and “flower,”

which he interpreted to mean the bud of a marijuana plant. Guryko testified that the

street value of hemp is up to $50 a pound, while the street value of marijuana is $1,500

to $4,000, “depending on the THC level” and the area of the county where it is sold.

Guryko testified that the ledger did not contain the names of any individuals. He also

testified that someone making large sums of money from selling marijuana could launder

it by claiming that deposits were actually profits from selling hemp.

{¶ 28} Finally, Savage testified on his own behalf. He testified that he had served

in the Army, where he had received firearms training, and that he had been deployed to

Iraq and Afghanistan. He had also worked as a contractor for the Department of

Defense. In 2005, he obtained a peace officer certification, and he had worked for the

Village of St. Paris in Champaign County and the Village of Tremont in Clark County.

{¶ 29} Savage stated that he had sustained multiple injuries in the course of his

military career and was put on a “cocktail” of medications at the VA. He discovered

hemp-derived THC while researching alternative treatments for his father, who had

terminal cancer. After experimenting with different types of hemp-derived THC, Savage

was able to reduce his daily medication intake from 40 pills a day to one pill a day.

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{¶ 30} According to Savage, based upon his own results, he began to help others

find THC by directing them to websites, research, and companies from which to buy. He

testified that he had helped veterans, first responders, lawyers, doctors, judges, and

anyone else that asked; those individuals suggested to Savage that he start a local

business. As a result, he started “Kameleon Farms,” a “multi-purpose farm” “to do hemp,

organic soils.” Savage identified a 2021 certificate from the Ohio Secretary of State for

his business and a document reflecting a federal identification number for tax purposes

for Kameleon Farms. To build inventory, Savage contacted Kindred Ranch in

Tennessee, which he described as a business with a license to sell hemp products.

{¶ 31} In anticipation of documentary evidence that Savage sought to admit about

what he had purchased in Tennessee, the following exchange occurred at sidebar:

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Defense is about to present - - I believe this is

testimony with regards to drug tests and drug testing that was done on

products this Defendant might purchase. There is no authentication of the

test. We don’t have a person here who did the test and a person here to

talk about how the tests were performed, whether the tests were

scientifically reliable. We don’t have any of that information.

So I don’t know how he’s going to be able to introduce a document that

purports to say that this product - - that exhibits the State has presented are

hemp without bringing an expert in, the person who performed the test.

THE COURT: Counsel for defense.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We discussed the knowingly element. This was

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provided to him as part of the invoice in the other package from the farm in

Tennessee. This shows he’s buying legal hemp. It goes directly to one of

the elements of the offense.

THE COURT: Even if that’s what it says, how the - - the hemp that they

received in 2019, how do you know that what they have in 2022 is the hemp

they would have received in 2019?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How do I know that? [Savage will] testify to that.

THE COURT: Well, then, what purpose does this document have?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That shows the THC content; that he was

knowingly buying hemp-derived THC, not hemp marijuana.

THE COURT: The court finds that, under the Evidence Rule 801(C), the

document is hearsay because it’s being offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted.

To the extent that there is a hearsay exception, the Court looked at records

of regularly conducted activity under 803.67 [sic], and as the Weissenberger

Ohio Evidence Courtroom Manual 2023 edition sets forth, [t]he business

records exception contains its own distinct authentication requirement.

Every piece of documentary evidence must be properly authenticated; that

is, some evidence must be introduced to establish that the document is, in

fact, what it purports to be.

So you don’t have an authentication witness. And I don’t believe that

document can be self-authenticating under 902. This document is not to

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be used.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would ask that it be proffered.

THE COURT: Yes, that’s fine. It will be marked as it is marked,

Defendant’s Exhibit D.

{¶ 32} Savage then identified a purchase order from Kindred Ranch Hemp

Company for hemp-derived items purchased in bulk for Kameleon Farms. He also

identified a Tennessee Hemp Movement Permit to allow the hemp to be transported.

{¶ 33} According to Savage, he did not open a “brick and mortar” store because of

the COVID-19 pandemic. He stated, “we thought that would be the best time to get our

bulk amount. And when we found Kindred Ranch, they were actually selling out. They

were going out of business and that’s why we ended up getting several purchases.” With

respect to the “green vegetative material,” the edibles, and the vapes, Savage testified

that he did not believe he had purchased any marijuana products. In addition to Kindred

Ranch, he stated that he had purchased materials from C.B. Distillery in Colorado, Hemp

Wholesalers in New York, and many other companies, and that each purchase order had

a “lab test that goes with it to verify what it is.”

{¶ 34} Savage explained the amount of cash in his home by stating that he had

never trusted banks and that, during COVID, “different countries were locking down bank

accounts.” Due to his military experience, Savage stated he had been privy to

information about “government manipulation,” and so he did not “trust a lot of the

government functions for the people, as in banking, electronics of that nature.” Savage

also testified that he divided his money into envelopes designated for different things,

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such as his children and savings. Savage stated that he had one bank account with four

or five “subaccounts” for his wife and children. He denied that the cash in his home was

from illegal drug sales.

{¶ 35} According to Savage, he received Social Security Income, military disability

income, money for each dependent from the VA, and “dependent money” for each

dependent from Social Security. These checks were deposited automatically, and

Savage withdrew the amounts in cash. He also refinanced his home every couple of

years “for investments” and to “draw all of [his] equity out.” He stated that, in these

transactions, “[t]hey would give [him] a check for $20,000, $30,000, $40,000,” which he

would deposit into his bank, use to pay expenses, and then withdraw the rest. He used

money from his house “to make money for [his] family.”

{¶ 36} Savage stated that the items of jewelry at his home were “family heirlooms.”

He testified that the ledger about which Guryko had testified represented his notes,

“estimate projections of expenses,” and attempt “to try to get the proper numbers to buy

and sell . . . everything.”

{¶ 37} Savage testified that he enjoyed owning the number of weapons on his

property because he was “Military and law enforcement,” but he did not use all of the

weapons, and they were “all legal guns.” He stated that some were purchased to pass

down to his children or were gifts from his brothers.

{¶ 38} In response to Woolford’s testimony about the THC levels in the substances

found on his property, Savage stated that a product originally tested and sold as legal

hemp could develop a higher THC content if exposed to heat, but in that circumstance, it

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was “still a legal product under the 2018 Farm Bill.” He reiterated that, when his products

were purchased, they had all been “legally hemp-derived products from the company I

purchased them from with the paperwork that they provided to me.”

{¶ 39} On cross-examination, Savage stated that he had been declared

permanently disabled in 2012 and received around $3,400 per month in disability

payments. He supported his family with his disability income and investment income.

His wife received around $1,200 from the VA to care for him. Savage testified that his

annual income was between $74,000 and $82,000.

{¶ 40} Savage acknowledged that he had transported products from Kindred

Ranch to his home around April 5, 2021. He testified that he had not sold a single

product from that purchase.

{¶ 41} The following documents were admitted as defense exhibits: the Kameleon

Farms, LLC Secretary of State Filing; the Department of Treasury Employer Identification

Number document; the Hemp License for Kindred Farm Ranch, Inc.; and an April 5, 2021

Tennessee Hemp Movement Permit.

{¶ 42} The drug offenses of which Savage was convicted were as follows: Count

1, possession of hashish; Count 2; trafficking in hashish; Count 3, possession of hashish;

Count 4, trafficking in hashish; Count 5, possession of marijuana; and Count 6, trafficking

in marijuana (all with firearm specifications).

{¶ 43} R.C. 2925.11 addresses drug possession offenses. It specifies that anyone

who knowingly obtains, possesses, or uses a controlled substance is guilty of possession

of controlled substances. R.C. 2925.03 governs drug trafficking offenses and states that

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anyone who knowingly sells or offers to sell a controlled substance, or prepares for

shipment, ships, transports, delivers, prepares for distribution, or distributes a controlled

substance, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the substance is intended

for sale, is guilty of drug trafficking.

{¶ 44} Based on its findings that Savage was guilty of the drug offenses, the jury

clearly credited the testimony of Sgt. Curnett, Woolford, and Agent Guryko over that of

Savage, and we defer to the jury’s assessment of credibility. Moreover, Savage

mischaracterizes the record as to Woolford’s testimony. She testified that legal hemp is

defined as a cannabis plant with .3 percent THC, and that a scientifically-proven number,

namely the ratio between THC size and THC-A size, was combined to determine total

THC as defined in the Ohio Revised Code. She testified, to a reasonable degree of

scientific certainty, that none of the vegetation she tested from Savage’s property was

legal hemp and that legal hemp cannot become marijuana by means of decarboxylation.

In its judgment entry of conviction, the trial court noted: “While there is certainly evidence

that the Defendant intended to establish a ‘hemp business’ and purchased hemp-level

product at some point, there is no evidence that the felony drugs discovered at the

Defendant’s residence were the hemp products purchased in Tennessee.” We agree.

{¶ 45} The jury could have reasonably concluded that the presence at Savage’s

home of large amounts of packaged illegal drugs, multiple unsecured and loaded

firearms, and substantial amounts of cash in separate envelopes did not support a

conclusion that Savage merely intended to sell legal hemp. Moreover, there was expert

testimony from Guryko that jewelry and firearms, which were found in large amounts on

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the premises, are commonly bartered for drugs, that the banking transactions were

suspect, and that the scene at Savage’s residence had features common to a drug

trafficking operation. Moreover, Sgt. Curnette and Det. Sells recognized a strong odor

of marijuana at Savage’s residence, which undercut Savage’s argument that it was hemp.

While Savage testified that he had intended to open a business selling hemp and organic

soils, there was no testimony about the presence of those porducts for sale at his

residence.

{¶ 46} We conclude that Savage’s convictions on counts one through six were not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury did not lose its way and create a

manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Savage’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

Exclusion of Evidence

{¶ 47} We will consider Savage’s second and third assignments of error together.

In these assignments, Savage argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding

“documentary evidence of the source of the vegetative material seized” at his property

and violated his due process rights by preventing him from presenting a defense by

excluding that documentary evidence. These arguments were based on the exclusion

of Defense Exhibit D, which was purportedly “a lab result showing that the vegetative

product was . . . hemp-derived THC.” Savage acknowledges that the documents in the

exhibit were “not self-authenticating” and could be considered hearsay, but he argues

that “the test of the vegetative material . . . was wholly exculpatory” and would have led

to his acquittal by the jury. According to Savage, the “only reason the [S]tate objected

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to this document . . . [was] its explosive effect on the jury.” He also argues that the

exhibit, along with other documents he offered at trial, showed that he “went to great

lengths to run a legal store for the sale of hemp-derived THC.” The State responds that

the court properly determined that the exhibit constituted inadmissible hearsay.

{¶ 48} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence is within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion.” State

v. Santana, 2022-Ohio-4118, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jali, 2020-Ohio-208, ¶ 39 (2d

Dist.). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citation omitted). AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place

Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157 (1990). It is well-settled

that most abuses of discretion “will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather

than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. “A decision is unreasonable if

there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id.

{¶ 49} “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence

unless a substantial right of the party is affected; and . . . the substance of the evidence

was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which

questions were asked.” Evid.R. 103(A)(2). “The requirement of authentication or

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient

to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Evid.R.

901(A). Authenticity is normally demonstrated by extrinsic evidence unless the evidence

is self-authenticating as provided in Evid.R. 902, which states that “[e]xtrinsic evidence

as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required” for certain listed documents, such

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as documents under seal, certified copies of public records, and newspapers.

{¶ 50} Hearsay is a statement made by someone other than the declarant while

testifying, “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C).

As a general rule, hearsay is not admissible into evidence. Evid. R. 802. Evid.R.

803(6), which the trial court considered, provides an exception to the hearsay rule for

records of regularly conducted activity as follows:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,

events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information

transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly

conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that

business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data

compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified

witness or as provided by Rule 901(B)(10), unless the source of information

or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of

trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes

business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of

every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

{¶ 51} Savage proffered Defense Exhibit D to establish that the marijuana found

in his home was purchased as legal hemp. However, as defense counsel

acknowledged, Savage lacked any independent witnesses to authenticate the contents

of the document, such as the testing procedures used, the results obtained, their

reliability, and whether the exhibit had been produced in the course of regular business

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activity. There was also no independent witness to testify about whether the precise

“hemp” represented in the exhibit was the same as that admitted into evidence, and the

charges against Savage arose from the marijuana in his possession. The court

reasonably found that the exhibit was hearsay not subject to an exception and was not

self-authenticating. As such, no abuse of discretion is demonstrated in the exclusion of

the evidence, and Savage’s right to due process was not violated. Savage’s second and

third assignments of error are overruled.

Fines and Court Costs

{¶ 52} Savage’s fourth assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to

consider his ability to pay the fine and court costs imposed, which were substantial.

According to Savage, the court “concerned itself” with the amount of money found in his

home, approximately $62,000, notwithstanding his testimony that he had saved that

money, did not trust banks, and that there “were purposes for each of the amounts of

money.” The State responds that the fines the court imposed were within the statutory

range pursuant to R.C. 2929.18 and R.C. 2929.28. The State also notes that Savage

did not object at sentencing to the fines imposed and that the record shows that the trial

court properly considered Savage’s ability to pay the fines and costs.

{¶ 53} “Ordinarily, a failure to bring an error to the attention of the trial court at a

time when the court could correct that error constitutes a waiver of all but plain error.”

State v. Johnson, 2005-Ohio-6826, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d

114 (1990). “Plain error does not exist unless it can be said that but for the error, the

outcome of the trial would clearly have been different.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing State v. Long,

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53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1987) and Wickline. See also Crim.R. 52(B).

{¶ 54} Before imposing the fines at the sentencing hearing, the court noted:

In imposing the financial sanction, the Court has considered the

Defendant’s present and future ability to pay the financial obligation before

the financial obligation was imposed. The Court notes the availability of

the funds that are currently State exhibits. The Court is not going to ask the

Defense, at this point, whether it wishes those moneys to be used to pay off

any fines. If you do, you can file a motion with the Court to do that. But

at this point the Court is going to impose a financial sanction and then leave

it up to you guys how you want it paid.

{¶ 55} The judgment entry stated:

Regarding the Defendant’s future ability to pay the amount of the

financial obligations set forth herein, and in addition to the information

provided by the pre-sentence investigation report and statements of the

Prosecutor, Defense Counsel and Defendant at sentencing, the Court also

considered that as an inmate, the Defendant would have the possibility of

employment in inmate work programs established pursuant to R.C.

§5145.16 and OAC §5120-3-01 through §5120-3-09.

{¶ 56} Savage does not contest the amounts of the fines imposed, and they were

within the statutory range. R.C. 2929.18 governs financial sanctions. R.C. 2929.18(A)

states that a sentencing court may impose a financial sanction or combination of financial

sanctions set forth in that statute.

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{¶ 57} Count 10, furnishing a firearm to a minor, was a fifth-degree felony; R.C.

2929.18(3)(e) authorizes a fine of $2,500 for a felony of the fifth degree, which the court

imposed for that offense.

{¶ 58} The three drug trafficking offenses of which Savage was convicted were

second-degree felonies; R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) states for a second-degree felony violation

of any provision of R.C. Chapter 2925, the sentencing court shall impose upon the

offender a mandatory fine. R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(b) authorizes a maximum fine in the

amount of $15,000 for a felony of the second degree. The court imposed “concurrent”

mandatory fines of $15,000 on the trafficking offenses, Counts 2, 4, and 6.

{¶ 59} Finally, Savage’s convictions for endangering children, Counts 7 and 8,

were first-degree misdemeanors. R.C. 2929.28 governs financial sanctions for

misdemeanors and authorizes a fine of not more than $1,000 for a misdemeanor of the

first degree. The court imposed fines in that amount on Counts 7 and 8.

{¶ 60} The court imposed fines within the statutory ranges and considered

Savage’s present and future ability to pay financial sanctions. No error is demonstrated.

Savage’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 61} Having overruled all assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

.............

EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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