(PS) Vigil v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 THEODORE J. VIGIL, No. 2:25-cv-0629 DAD AC PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

14 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

15 Defendant.

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17 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to the undersigned

18 by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

19 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See

20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted.

21 I. Screening

22 A. Legal Standard

23 A determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma pauperis status does not

24 complete the inquiry required by the statute. The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to

25 dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which

26 relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

27 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff must assist the court in determining whether the complaint is

28 frivolous, by drafting the complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1 (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a

2 “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed

3 in this court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is

4 entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the

5 relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and

6 directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the

9 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they

10 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the

11 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von

12 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

13 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

14 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint

15 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court

16 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must

17 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a

18 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

19 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

21 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice

22 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

23 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must

24 allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

25 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

26 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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1 A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

2 opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

3 Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as

4 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc).

5 B. The Complaint

6 Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 2024, he endorsed a contract for a vehicle loan with

7 the following language “WITHOUT RECOURSE, Pay to the order of THEODORE JOSEPH

8 VIGIL By: Theodore-Joseph:Vigil/Agent.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff cites to his attached Exhibit

9 A, which he identifies as the “Endorsed Auto Contract.” This exhibit contains a photo of one

10 page of paper with the title “Retail Installment Sale Contract – Simple Finance Charge (With

11 Arbitration Provision),” identifying a 2022 used Ford Explorer as the subject of the loan

12 agreement. ECF No. Id. at 13. On October 16, 2024, plaintiff sent defendants a “Notice of

13 Acceptance” along with “negotiable instruments and remittance coupons for the full balance of

14 the loan, pursuant to UCC § 3-603.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff refers to attached Exhibit B, the “Notice of

15 Acceptance & Debt Validation Request.” Id. The referenced document, titled “Notice of

16 Acceptance” and addressed to the CEO of JP Morgan Chase & Co., states in part, “I, Theodore-

17 Joseph: Vigil, Accept for Value all related endorsements of this matter and resubmit coupon as

18 Tender of Payment pursuant to 3-419 HJR 192,31 CFR § 328.6 and the Emergency Banking Act

19 of 1933, Public Law 73-10.” Id. at 15. It goes on to state, “If you do not accept this coupon, you

20 will be in Dishonor and the amount is automatically discharged pursuant to UCC 3-603.” Id.

21 Plaintiff alleges that Chase’s executive office, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection

22 Practices Act and the Truth in Lending Act, refused to process the negotiable instrument as

23 required under the UCC and federal law. Id. Defendant “wrongfully refused to process

24 Plaintiff’s lawful payment and improperly returned submitted documents” in violation of UCC §

25 3-505. Id. at 4. The referenced letter reads: “We are returning the enclosed correspondence that

26 you recently sent us, for the following reason: We only accept U.S. currency in the form of

27 checks, cashier checks, and money orders, without restrictive endorsements, drawn on U.S. banks

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1 and payable in the United States. The form of payment you provided is not legal tender and you

2 remain liable under the loan/lease agreement.” Id. at 30.

3 Plaintiff then requested an original copy of the contract containing his “wet ink signature”

4 which defendant did not provide. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff later sent defendant Power of Attorney

5 documents to “reinforce Plaintiff’s authority over the account,” which he attached as Exhibit F.

6 Id. at 5. Defendant refused to honor the power of attorney document and on January 15, 2025,

7 issued a Default Notice, threatening repossession, despite the ongoing failure to validate the

8 alleged debt. Id. at 6.

9 C. Analysis

10 As previously noted, under § 1915, the court must dismiss the case if the action is

11 frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

12 over frivolous cases. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)

13 (holding federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that are “so

14 insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or otherwise completely

15 devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537

16 (1974) (court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “essentially fictitious,”

17 “obviously frivolous” or “obviously without merit”). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

18 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

19 Accordingly, courts must dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably

20 meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are “clearly baseless,” a category

21 encompassing allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and “delusional”). Id. at 327; see also

22 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “[T]he frivolousness

23 determination is a discretionary one” for the court. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.

24 Here, the underlying premise of the complaint is that plaintiff’s note to defendant

25 constituted legal tender that discharged the debt on his car loan, and that defendant violated the

26 law by not accepting the note and discharging the loan. Although plaintiff does not explicitly

27 identify himself as such, the complaint is replete with the “legal-sounding but meaningless”

28 language “commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign-citizen movement.” Sealey v.

1 Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 2:17-cv-785-MHT-SMD, 2019 WL 1434065, at *2, 2019 U.S.

2 Dist. LEXIS 28585 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2019). For example, plaintiff appears to subscribe to the

3 “strawman” theory that a person’s name, when spelled in all capital letters, creates a separate

4 legal entity (e.g., ECF No. 1 at 3), frequently cites to the Uniform Commercial Code, and argues

5 that an “endorsement” or other non-standard, self-generated document is a form of legal tender, a

6 meritless assertion that courts “have easily rejected.” Bendeck v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn, No. 17-

7 00180 JMS-RLP, 2017 WL 2726692, at *4, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97404 (D. Haw. June 23,

8 2017). Plaintiff’s legal claims are frivolous and similar claims have been “rejected by countless

9 federal courts.” Caetano v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:22-CV-00837-JLT-SAB, 2023 WL

10 3319158, at *4, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81020 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2023) (collecting cases), report

11 and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-00837-JLT-SAB, 2023 WL 4087634 (E.D. Cal. June

12 20, 2023).

13 The complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal claim against any

14 defendant because it is clear from the complaint that plaintiff provided non-legal tender to

15 defendant in an attempt to pay a loan, and defendant was not required to accept the non-legal

16 tender. Because the complaint is frivolous, the court recommends it be dismissed without leave

17 to amend.

18 II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

19 Plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order asking the court to prevent

20 repossession of his vehicle. ECF No. 3. This motion was referred to the undersigned by the

21 district judge for findings and recommendations. ECF No. 4. Underlying this motion is

22 plaintiff’s contention that he satisfied the loan in full by sending a “Notice of Acceptance with

23 remittance coupons and negotiable instruments for the full balance of the loan, pursuant to UCC

24 § 3-603” which defendant improperly rejected as non-legal tender. ECF No. 3 at 9. Because this

25 theory is meritless, as discussed above, the undersigned recommends the motion for a temporary

26 restraining order be denied.

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1 Ill. Pro Se Plaintiff?s Summary

2 Your motions to proceed without paying the filing fees are being granted, and you do not

3 || have to pay the filing fee. However, the Magistrate Judge has determined that your complaint

4 || cannot be served because it does not state any legal claim that the court can help with. The

5 || Magistrate Judge is recommending that your case be dismissed. You have 21 days to file an

6 || objection to this recommendation. The district judge will make the final decision.

7 IV. Conclusion

8 Tn accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s application to

9 || proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

10 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that that the motion for a temporary

11 || restraining order (ECF No. 3) be DENIED, that all claims against all defendants be DISMISSED,

12 || and that this case be CLOSED.

13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).. Within twenty-one days

15 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

16 || with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

17 || and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified

18 || time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153

19 | (9th Cir. 1991).

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21 | DATED: April 1, 2025

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23 Htttenr— Lhor—e_

ALLISON CLAIRE

24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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