Shuford v. Dudek (CONSENT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BRANDON DENARD SHUFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-268-CWB

)

LELAND DUDEK, )

Acting Commissioner of )

Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction and Administrative Proceedings

Brandon Denard Shuford (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act and an application for Supplemental Security Income

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on April 13, 2021—alleging disability onset as of

March 17, 2020 due to bullet in spine, bad nerve in left leg that gives out, damaged left lung,

difficulty breathing, heart problems, back pain, and difficulty staying awake. (Tr. 10, 54-56, 64,

72-74, 82).2 The claim was denied at the initial level on September 1, 2021 and again after

reconsideration on July 8, 2022. (Tr. 10, 106, 111, 126, 129). Plaintiff then requested de novo

review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 10, 135-36). The ALJ subsequently heard

the case on March 16, 2023 (Tr. 10, 46-52), at which time testimony was given by a vocational

expert (Tr. 49-51). Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing but was represented by his attorney.

1 Leland Dudek became Acting Commissioner for the Social Security Administration on or about

February 19, 2025 and is automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 References to pages in the transcript are denoted by the abbreviation “Tr.”

(Tr. 48). The ALJ issued a Notice to Show Cause to determine if Plaintiff had a good reason for

not being present at the hearing, took the matter under advisement, and issued a written decision

on July 6, 2023 that found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 10-25, 52, 195-200).

The ALJ’s written decision contained the following enumerated findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through March 31, 2022.

2. The claimant has not engaged in SGA since March 17, 2020, the alleged onset

date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: status post gunshot

wounds, degenerative disc disease (DDD), obesity, and depression (20 CFR

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in

20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range

of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). He can lift

and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and up to 10 pounds frequently; can sit,

stand, or walk for six hours each out of an eight-hour day; can occasionally

climb ramps and stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; can frequently balance;

can occasionally stoop; can occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl; is able to

understand simple and routine tasks, and is able to make simple work-related

decisions involving the use of judgment.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a hinge assembler.

This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded

by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from March 17, 2020, through the date of this decision (20 CFR

404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

(Tr. 13, 14, 18, 23, 24). On February 27, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review (Tr. 1-5), thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

See, e.g., Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff now asks the court to reverse the final decision and remand the case for a new

hearing and further consideration. (Doc. 6 at p. 7). As contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and

Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge (Docs. 8 & 9), and the court finds the case ripe

for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & 1383(c)(3) in that the court construes Plaintiff’s

supporting brief (Doc. 6) as a motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s opposition

brief (Doc. 7) as a competing motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties’

submissions, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment is due to be denied, that the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment

is due to be granted, and that the final decision is due to be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review and Regulatory Framework

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. Assuming the proper

legal standards were applied by the ALJ, the court is required to treat the ALJ’s findings of fact as

conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v.

Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla,”

but less than a preponderance, “and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings,

[a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”)

(citations omitted). The court thus may reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is convinced that the

decision was not supported by substantial evidence or that the proper legal standards were not

applied. See Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). Reversal is not warranted

simply because the court itself would have reached a contrary result. See Edwards v. Sullivan,

937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). Despite the deferential nature of its review, however,

the court must look beyond those parts of the record that support the decision, must view the record

in its entirety, and must take account of evidence that detracts from the evidence relied on in the

decision. See Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Walker v. Bowen,

826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

To qualify for disability benefits and establish entitlement for a period of disability, a

person must be unable to:

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).3 To make such a determination, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential

evaluation process:

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments set

forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of Impairments]?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer

to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 &

3 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

416.920.4

The burden of proof rests on the claimant through step four. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).

A claimant establishes a prima facie case of a qualifying disability once he or she has carried

the burden of proof from step one through step four. Id. At step five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner, who must then show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. Id.

In order to assess the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39. The RFC is what the

claimant is still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-

43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience

to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

Id. at 1239. To do so, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”),

see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2, or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. The

grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or light work,

inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each factor can

independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual, and combinations

of these factors yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. at 1240.

4 Because the same sequence applies in both, cases arising under Title XVI are appropriately cited

as authority in Title II cases, and vice versa. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412

(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 876 n.* (11th Cir. 2012) (“The

definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has a disability is the same

for claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income.”).

III. Issue on Appeal

Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal: whether the ALJ erred in failing to find good cause

for Plaintiff’s failure to appear at the hearing. (Doc. 6 at p. 2).

IV. Discussion

Social Security regulations provide that “[a]ny party to a hearing has a right to appear

before the administrative law judge ... to present evidence and to state his or her position” and

that “[a] party may also make his or her appearance by means of a designated representative ... .”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(a), 416.1450(a). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted). However, “[t]here must be a showing of prejudice

before [a court] will determine that a social security claimant’s due process rights have been

violated to such a degree that the case must be remanded to the Commissioner for development of

the record.” McCabe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 661 F. App’x 596, 599 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing

Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995)). “This at least requires a showing that the

ALJ did not have all of the relevant evidence before him in the record (which would include

relevant testimony from claimant), or that the ALJ did not consider all of the evidence in the record

in reaching his decision.” Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985). “A claimant

cannot show prejudice by speculating that she would have benefitted from a more comprehensive

hearing.” McCabe, 661 F. App’x at 599.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not finding that he showed good cause under the

Hearing, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”) I-2-4-25(C) for his failure to appear

at the March 16, 2023 hearing. (Doc. 6 at pp. 5-6). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not

provide an adequate explanation for finding that the stated reason for not appearing was not an

unforeseeable event. (Id. at p. 6).5 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly followed

the procedures laid out in HALLEX § I-2-4-25(D)(2) to find that Plaintiff constructively waived

his right to appear and issued a decision based on the evidence of the record. (Doc. 7 at p. 5).

“HALLEX is an agency handbook for the SSA.” Carroll v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r,

453 F. App’x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 2011). “As a general rule, where the rights of individuals are

affected, an agency must follow its own procedure, even where the internal procedures are more

rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Hall v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1981).6

While the Eleventh Circuit has not affirmatively stated whether HALLEX creates judicially

enforceable rights, the court has held that, to the extent it does, “an agency’s violation of its own

governing rules must result in prejudice before we will remand to the agency for compliance.”

Carroll, 453 F. App’x at 892 (citing Hall, 660 F.2d at 119); see also McCabe, 661 F. App’x at 599

(“This Court has not decided whether HALLEX carries the force of law. ... Even assuming

(without deciding) that HALLEX carries the force of law and the agency failed to comply

with it, [the plaintiff] has not shown that she was prejudiced by this failure.”); Newton v. Apfel,

209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000) (“While HALLEX does not carry the authority of law, this court

has held that ‘where the rights of individuals are affected, an agency must follow its own

5 Plaintiff’s sole contention of error is that the ALJ erred in not finding good cause for his

failure to appear at the March 16, 2023 hearing. Plaintiff therefore has waived all other issues

related to the ALJ’s disability determination, including the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC,

subjective symptom allegations, and vocational evidence. See Chait v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 2:17-cv-222, 2018 WL 2715459, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2018) (“Any issue not raised by

Plaintiff on appeal is deemed to be waived.”) (citing Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,

385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] legal claim or argument that has not been briefed

before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”)).

6 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981 are

binding in the Eleventh Circuit).

procedures, even where the internal procedures are more rigorous than otherwise would be

required.’ If prejudice results from a violation, the result cannot stand.”) (quoting Hall, 660 F.2d

at 119); Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-669, 2024 WL 1270486, at *5 (M.D. Fla.

Mar. 26, 2024) (“‘[T]he Eleventh Circuit has indicated in several unpublished decisions that

HALLEX does not create judicially enforceable rights, particularly where a plaintiff fails to

establish prejudice.’”) (citation omitted).

HALLEX § I-2-4-25(D)(2), 1993 WL 643012 sets forth the procedures for when a claimant

fails to appear at a hearing but the appointed representative appears and continues to represent

the claimant. In such instances, “the ALJ may determine that the claimant has constructively

waived the right to appear at the hearing if: The representative is unable to locate the claimant;

The Notice of Hearing was mailed to the claimant’s last known address; and The agency has

followed the contact procedures required by 20 CFR 404.938(c) and 416.1438(c).” Id.7 If the ALJ

finds that the claimant constructively waived his or her right to appear at the hearing, the ALJ need

not proceed with the hearing and may choose to issue a decision on the record, but the ALJ will

advise the appointed representative, either on the record during the hearing or in writing thereafter,

that the ALJ will not send a request to show cause for failure to appear to the claimant

because the claimant constructively waived his or her the right to appear at the hearing.

See HALLEX § I-2-4-25(D)(2)(a), 1993 WL 643012.

7 Title 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.938(c) and 416.1438(c) provide the following: “The notice of hearing will

ask you to return a form to let us know that you received the notice. If you or your representative

do not acknowledge receipt of the notice of hearing, we will attempt to contact you for an

explanation. If you tell us that you did not receive the notice of hearing, an amended notice will

be sent to you by certified mail.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege that there was any deficiency as to

the notice of hearing sent to him by the Commissioner or that he did not receive it.

If the ALJ finds that the claimant did not constructively waive his or her right to appear at

the hearing, the ALJ may choose to proceed with the hearing, accepting the testimony of the

witness(es) and allowing the appointed representative to question the witness(es) and make

arguments on the claimant’s behalf. See HALLEX § I-2-4-25(D)(2)(b), 1993 WL 643012.

The ALJ will then advise the appointed representative that the ALJ will send a request to

show cause for failure to appear to the claimant to ask why he or she did not appear at the hearing

and whether a supplemental hearing should be held. Id. The ALJ will subsequently determine

that the claimant constructively waived his or her right to appear at the hearing if the claimant fails

to respond or show good cause for the failure and will issue a decision based on the evidence of

record. Id. On the other hand, the ALJ will offer the claimant a supplemental hearing to provide

testimony if the claimant establishes good cause for failing to appear at the hearing as scheduled.

Id.

In defining “Good Cause for Failure to Appear,” HALLEX § I-2-4-25(B), 1993 WL

643012, explains that the “term ‘good cause’ refers to a reasonable explanation for failing

to comply with a requirement” and states that when determining whether good cause exists

for failure to appear, the ALJ must base a decision on the circumstances of each case and that

in doing so, the ALJ must consider any physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations that

may have prevented the claimant from appearing at the scheduled time and place of the hearing.

HALLEX § I-2-4-25(C)(1), 1993 WL 643012, instructs that although “[t]here are no set criteria

for determining what constitutes good cause for failure to appear ... good cause generally exists”

when (1) the claimant did not receive proper notification of the hearing, (2) “an unforeseeable

event occurred” where neither the claimant nor the appointed representative could timely request

a postponement of the hearing, or (3) the appointed representative withdrew shortly before the

hearing without the claimant’s knowledge. Further, the regulations cited within HALLEX § I-2-

4-25(B), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911 and 416.1411, provide the following added guidance regarding

examples of “good cause”:

(a) In determining whether you have shown that you had good cause for missing a

deadline to request review we consider—

(1) What circumstances kept you from making the request on time;

(2) Whether our action misled you;

(3) Whether you did not understand the requirements of the Act

resulting from amendments to the Act, other legislation, or court

decisions; and

(4) Whether you had any physical, mental, educational, or linguistic

limitations (including any lack of facility with the English

language) which prevented you from filing a timely request or

from [complying with the notice of hearing].

(b) Examples of circumstances where good cause may exist include, but are not

limited to, the following situations:

(1) You were seriously ill and were prevented from contacting us in

person, in writing, or through a friend, relative, or other person.

(2) There was a death or serious illness in your immediate family.

...

(6) We gave you incorrect or incomplete information ... .

(7) You did not receive notice of the determination or decision.

(8) You sent the request to another Government agency in good faith

within the time limit and the request did not reach us until after

the time period had expired.

(9) Unusual or unavoidable circumstances exist, including the

circumstances described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section,

which show that you could not have known of the need to file

timely, or which prevented you from filing timely.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911(a), (b) and 416.1411(a), (b).

The ALJ noted that on December 8, 2022 a Notice of Hearing was mailed to Plaintiff’s

address on file, notifying him that a telephone hearing was scheduled to be held in his case at

9:00 a.m. on March 16, 2023 and that a copy of the Notice of Hearing was also mailed to Plaintiff’s

representative. (Tr. 10, 176, 187). On February 24, 2023, a Notice of Hearing-Important Reminder

was mailed to Plaintiff’s address on file, reminding him of the scheduled telephone hearing,

as well as a copy of the Notice to Plaintiff’s representative. (Tr. 10, 190-93). On March 16, 2023,

the ALJ conducted a hearing by telephone due to the extraordinary circumstances presented by

the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic. (Tr. 10, 46-53). The ALJ noted that “[a]ll

participants attended the hearing by telephone” and that “[a]lthough the claimant did not appear at

the hearing as scheduled, his representative did appear at the hearing, represented the claimant at

the hearing, and had no objection to the telephonic nature of the hearing.” (Tr. 10, 46-53). At the

close of the hearing, the ALJ informed Plaintiff’s representative of the following:

All right, Counsel, we’re going to issue a Notice to Show Cause to see if we can

locate the Claimant and see if he has good reason for not being in here today and

then we will determine whether we need to reschedule this. If not, there’s a

possibility that I could declare him a non-essential party and go ahead and release

a decision if we can’t ever hear back from him.

(Tr. 52).

On April 6, 2023, the ALJ sent a Request to Show Cause for Failure to Appear to the

address on file for Plaintiff, directing him to provide a written explanation within 10 days as to

why he did not attend his scheduled hearing and whether he still wanted the ALJ to hold a hearing

on his claim. (Tr. 11, 195-200). On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff responded to the Request to Show

Cause for Failure to Appear, explaining that he “had just got[ten] out of the hospital a couple of

days before the hearing” and did not attend the hearing due to oversleeping after taking some pain

medications. (Tr. 11, 201). The ALJ then determined as follows:

The undersigned has considered the claimant’s response to the Request to Show

Cause for Failure to Appear and finds that good cause for the claimant’s failure to

appear has not been shown. Although good cause may be shown by the occurrence

of an unforeseeable event that prevents the claimant from notifying the

Administrative Law Judge and requesting a postponement in enough time before

the scheduled hearing, (HALLEX I-2-4-25(C)(1)(b)), oversleeping, even after

taking pain medication, does not constitute an unforeseeable event that supports

a good cause finding.

Because the claimant has not shown good cause for his failure to appear at the

scheduled hearing, the undersigned determines that the claimant has constructively

waived his right to appear for a hearing, and this decision is being issued based on

the evidence of record, including the vocational expert’s testimony taken during the

hearing held on March 16, 2023 (HALLEX I-2-4-25(D)(2)(b).

(Tr. 11).

Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ’s conclusion is, in essence, that Shuford could foresee that

taking pain medication the night before his hearing could cause him to oversleep” and that the ALJ

“suggests that Shuford would either be expected to forego pain medication to insure that

he does not oversleep due to pain medication, or, if he is going to take pain medication the night

before the hearing, that he should take such other measures that will still insure that he does not

oversleep, despite taking pain medication.” (Doc. 6 at pp. 6-7). The Commissioner argues that

Plaintiff’s argument ignores reasonable mitigation efforts that Plaintiff could have taken to prevent

himself from oversleeping. (Doc. 7 at p. 6).

The record reflects that Plaintiff received proper notice of the hearing. The record further

reflects that the ALJ did not initially find that Plaintiff constructively waived his right to appear at

the hearing, as the ALJ heard evidence and informed Plaintiff’s representative that a request to

show cause for failure to appear would be sent to Plaintiff asking him why he did not appear at

the hearing and whether the hearing should be rescheduled. Based upon the guidance provided in

Hallex § I-2-4-25(B), C)(1) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911(a), (b) and 416.1411(a), (b), the court finds

that the ALJ did not err in determining that Plaintiff failed to provide good cause for his failure

to appear. Plaintiff fails to provide any reason why he was unable to foresee that taking pain

medication might make him sleepy or why he could not direct steps at mitigating the effects of his

medication. Moreover, although Plaintiff stated that he had gotten out of the hospital “a couple of

days before the hearing” (Tr. 201), the medical record does not show any hospitalizations in

March 2023. In fact, the record shows that Plaintiff was discharged from his most recent

hospitalization on February 13, 2023, which should have afforded enough time to allow Plaintiff

to be aware of any side effects from his medication. (Tr. 26-29, 835). Under the totality of the

circumstances presented, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing good cause. See

Parrish v. Colvin, No. CV414-108, 2015 WL 5095310, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2015).

Further, even if the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to show good cause for not

appearing at the hearing, Plaintiff has failed to show prejudice. Plaintiff merely speculates that his

“testimony could have changed the outcome of the decision” (Doc. 6 at p. 7), without providing

any support as to how. Plaintiff’s representative participated at the hearing and was able to present

Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff does not articulate how his testimony would have brought forth

any additional evidence beneficial to his claim. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no allegations that the

record was incomplete or inadequate, and Plaintiff did not submit any further evidence to the ALJ

or the Appeals Council for consideration. In short, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how his

presence at the hearing would have altered the ALJ’s decision or how his absence from the hearing

otherwise resulted in prejudice.

V. Conclusion

After carefully and independently reviewing the record, and for the reasons stated above,

the court concludes that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff failed

to establish good cause for not appearing at the hearing. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

e that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 6) is DENIED;

e that the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 7) is GRANTED;

and

e that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment will issue.

DONE this the 2nd day of April 2025.

CHAD'W. BRYAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14