The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES E. BANKS, III, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 356
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
)
DARRELL SMITH, et al., )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants. ) AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Charles E. Banks, III, filed this civil rights action against three purported
managers of Fazoli’s Italian Restaurant: Darrell Smith, Shannon Jane Doe, and John John Doe.
(Doc. No. 1). In the very brief complaint, Plaintiff alleges “discrimination of civil rights.” (Id. at
4). He then states “contacted job for a scheduled job interview[.] I’m a registered sex offender[.]
No background check[.] Genetic information spread in job field[.] Violation of Civil Rights
Act.” (Id.). Plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The application
is granted.
II. Standard of Review
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.
594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma
pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,
109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);
Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis
in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to
raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed
factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the defendant
unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.
1998).
-2-
III. Law and Analysis
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not
“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material elements
of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Although specific facts are not
required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l
Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of
Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and
Iqbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim
showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is composed entirely of
barely legible conclusory allegations and sentence fragments. The complaint fails to include any
discernible factual allegations or coherent claims. And the Court is not required to construct
claims from sentence fragments on behalf of a pro se litigant. See Beaudette v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s statement that he “contacted job for a scheduled
job interview ... genetic information spread in job field ... violation of Civil Rights Act” is
nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal,
-3-
556 U.S. at 678. The complaint therefore does not satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of
Rule 8.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
No. 2) and dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further, the Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision may not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[tf Denable C2. Magen
DONALD C. NUGEN
United States District Judge
DATED: April 2, 2025
-4-