“[T]he proposed class must 25 satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he proposed class must 25 satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 United States District Court
9 Central District of California
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11 KEITH HUCKABY, Case № 2:21-cv-07766-ODW (PDx)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR
13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT [108][109];
AND DENYING MOTION FOR
14 CRST EXPEDITED, INC. et al., DECERTIFICATION [115]
15
Defendants.
16
17 I. INTRODUCTION
18 Plaintiff Keith Huckaby is a former long-haul truck driver for Defendants
19 CRST Expedited, Inc. and CRST International, Inc. (together, “CRST”). (First Am.
20 Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 6, 11–12, ECF No. 44.) Huckaby contends that CRST’s
21 compensation model does not comply with California law and he thus brings this class
22 action asserting wage and hour violations. (See id. ¶¶ 39–122.) The Court certified a
23 class of California CRST drivers for three of Huckaby’s causes of action. (Order re
24 Certification, ECF No. 60.) Now, both sides move for summary judgment, and CRST
25 seeks to decertify the class. (ECF Nos. 108, 109, 115.) For the reasons below, the
26 Court DENIES all three motions.1
27
28 1 Having considered the papers filed in connection with the pending motions, the Court deemed the
matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.
1 II. BACKGROUND
2 CRST is an Iowa-based interstate motor carrier that provides long-haul
3 expedited freight delivery services to customers across the forty-eight contiguous
4 United States. (Defs. Statement Uncontroverted Fact (“DSUF”) 1, ECF No. 109-22;
5 Pl. Additional Material Fact (“PAMF”) 36–37, ECF No. 119-1.3) CRST uses a team
6 driver model, which means when one driver is on duty driving, the other driver is
7 typically off duty inside or outside the truck’s sleeper berth. (DSUF 3–4.) Huckaby
8 was a CRST employee driver from approximately April 2019 to August 2020.
9 (DSUF 2.)
10 The parties hotly dispute the basis of CRST’s compensation model. (See, e.g.,
11 DSUF 20; PSGI 20.4) CRST asserts that it primarily compensates its drivers through
12 load pay—a flat rate for delivering the load and performing all driving and nondriving
13 tasks necessary for safe delivery. (DSUF 20.) According to CRST, the team driver’s
14 load pay is calculated from a basic formula: multiplying (i) a split of the number of
15 computer-estimated miles associated with a load; and (ii) the per-mile compensation
16 rate that a driver is assigned based on experience. (DSUF 25.) In contrast, Huckaby
17 asserts that CRST promised to compensate its drivers based on actual miles, not by
18 load or computer-estimated miles. (PSGI 20, 25; PAMF 3.)
19
20 2 Although the Court primarily cites the statements and evidence from papers filed in connection
with CRST’s motion for summary judgment, it has also considered all statements and evidence from
21
papers filed in connection with Huckaby’s motion for summary judgment. As the statements and
22 evidence substantially overlap, the Court primarily cites only one set for economy. The same is true
for arguments raised in both sets of summary judgment briefing.
23 3 In contravention of the Court’s Case Management Order, Huckaby restarts the numbering of his
PAMF at “1.” (See Scheduling & Case Management Order (“Case Order”) 7, ECF No. 27 (requiring
24
additional facts to continue sequentially from the moving party’s).) Consequently, for clarity, the
25 Court cites Huckaby’s Statement of Genuine Issues (“PSGI”) and PAMF separately, although they
appear in the same document. (See PAMF; PSGI, ECF No. 119 1.)
26 4 Both parties repeatedly violate the Court’s Case Management Order by including extensive
argument in the statements of fact and dispute. (Case Order 7 (“No argument should be set forth in
27
this document.”).) The parties’ violations result in statements that are immensely overlong,
28 burdensome, and time-consuming to navigate. Strict compliance with Court procedures will be
required going forward.
1 Based on this and related disputes, on March 9, 2022, Huckaby brought this
2 putative class action raising nine causes of action under California and federal law.
3 (See generally FAC.) On March 14, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the
4 Court dismissed without prejudice Huckaby’s sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of
5 action. (See Order Stip. Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 46.) Accordingly, six of
6 Huckaby’s causes of action remain: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to
7 pay statutory/contractual wages; (3) failure to reimburse business expenses; (4) failure
8 to provide itemized wage statements; (5) failure to timely pay wages; and (9) violation
9 of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). (See FAC ¶¶ 39–78; 114–22.)
10 On October 3, 2022, the Court granted in part Huckaby’s motion for class
11 certification and certified a class as to (1) minimum wages, (2) statutory/contractual
12 wages, and (9) UCL violations. (Order re Certification 13 n.7, 18.) Subsequently, on
13 April 10, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part CRST’s motion for
14 reconsideration. (Order Recons. Certification, ECF No. 86.) The Court denied
15 CRTS’s motion to the extent CRST sought to undo class certification, but the Court
16 agreed to amend the end date of the class period. (Id. at 8.) The Court consequently
17 defined the certified “Amended Piece-Rate Class” or “Class” as:
18 All current and former employees that had a residential address in
California and performed work as a truck driver for CRST (“CA
19
Truck Driver”) who were compensated by a piece-rate from
20 August 9, 2017, through the date of the Court’s April 10, 2023 order
amending this class definition, excluding the participants in the
21
settlement in Montoya v. CRST Expedited, Inc., Case No. 16-cv-
22 10095-PBS (D. Mass.).
23 (Id.) Those who qualify for this class are “Class Members.”
24 Huckaby now moves for partial summary judgment. (Pl. Mot. Summ. J.
25 (“PMSJ”), ECF No. 108.) CRST also moves for summary judgment, or in the
26 alternative, partial summary judgment. (Defs. Mot. Summ. J. (“DMSJ”), ECF
27 No. 109.) Additionally, CRST moves to decertify the Amended Piece-Rate Class.
28 (Defs. Mot. Decertify (“Mot. Decert.”), ECF No. 115.)
1 III. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
2 Huckaby seeks partial summary judgment on the issues underlying the three
3 Class claims: minimum wage; contractual/statutory wage; and UCL. (PMSJ 1–2.) He
4 argues the undisputed facts establish that CRST did not compensate Class Members
5 for (1) conducting pre- and post-trip vehicle inspections; (2) completing required
6 paperwork and data entry; (3) stopping and scaling the vehicles at weigh stations;
7 (4) participating in Department of Transportation (“DOT”) inspections; and (5) fueling
8 the truck. (Id. at 1.) Huckaby contends that CRST’s failure to compensate for these
9 nondriving tasks violated California Labor Code sections 221, 223, and 226.2 and that
10 CRST thus owes Class Members compensation for work done on these tasks. (Id.
11 at 1–2, 9–16.)
12 CRST seeks summary judgment as to all claims, Class and individual.
13 (DMSJ 1–2.) On the Class claims, CRST argues the undisputed facts establish that it
14 compensated Class Members under a load-based piece-rate pay structure that
15 encompasses all tasks necessary to safely deliver a load, and this load-based pay
16 structure fully complies with California law. (DMSJ 1–2.) On Huckaby’s individual
17 claims, CRST contends the derivative wage statement and waiting time claims fail for
18 the same reason as the Class claims and Huckaby’s claim for unreimbursed cell phone
19 expenses fails as a matter of law. (Id. at 2.)
20 A. Evidentiary Objections
21 Huckaby and CRST each object to the other’s evidence. (Defs. Obj. ISO Opp’n
22 PMSJ, ECF No. 121-2; Pl. Obj. ISO Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 119-4; Defs. Obj. ISO
23 Reply DMSJ, ECF No. 126-4.) Preliminarily, the parties do not comply with the
24 Court’s Case Management Order, which requires evidentiary objections to track the
25 separate statements’ paragraph numbers. (Case Order 8.) Nevertheless, to the extent
26 feasible, the Court has cross-referenced the various objections with identifiable
27 evidence and considered the parties’ relevant objections.
28
1 Where the objected evidence is unnecessary to the resolution of the summary
2 judgment motions or supports facts not in dispute, the Court declines to resolve those
3 objections here. The remaining relevant evidentiary objections are premised on
4 foundation, hearsay, and extrinsic evidence. First, foundation-based objections are
5 moot in the context of summary judgment. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.
6 Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Further, while a court may not grant a
7 summary judgment motion on the basis of hearsay evidence, it may deny a summary
8 judgment motion on the basis of hearsay evidence, “as long as a court finds that [the]
9 hearsay evidence could be presented in an admissible form at trial.” Cherewick v.
10 State Farm Fire & Cas., 578 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2022); accord Fraser
11 v Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, to the extent the Court
12 relies on objected to evidence in this order without further discussion, including
13 extrinsic evidence, those objections have been thoroughly considered and are hereby
14 overruled. See Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (proceeding with only necessary
15 rulings on evidentiary objections).
16 B. Legal Standard
17 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
18 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
19 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A disputed fact is “material” where it might
20 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is “genuine”
21 where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
22 nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
23 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the
24 moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
25 Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot
26 simply rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt”
27 about a material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See id. at 324; Matsushita
28 Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party
1 must show that there are “genuine factual issues that . . . may reasonably be resolved
2 in favor of either party.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan
3 Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
4 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). Courts should grant summary judgment against a party
5 who fails to make a sufficient showing on an element essential to her case when she
6 will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
7 In ruling on summary judgment motions, courts “view the facts and draw
8 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party. Scott v.
9 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when
10 parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court “evaluate[s] each motion
11 separately, giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable
12 inferences.” A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790–91 (9th Cir.
13 2006). The court considers “each party’s evidence, regardless under which motion the
14 evidence is offered.” Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir.
15 2011). Conclusory, speculative, or “uncorroborated and self-serving” testimony will
16 not raise genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Villiarimo v.
17 Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Thornhill Publ’g Co. v.
18 Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the
19 Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, there
20 must be more than a mere scintilla of contradictory evidence to survive summary
21 judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
22 The Court may assume that material facts claimed and adequately supported are
23 undisputed except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the
24 opposing party’s responsive statement of disputes and (b) controverted by declaration
25 or competent written evidence. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-4. The Court is not obligated to
26 look any further in the record for supporting evidence other than what is actually and
27 specifically referenced. Id.
28
1 C. Discussion
2 The parties’ primarily dispute whether CRST’s piece-rate pay structure
3 compensated Class Members by the mile or the load. (See DMSJ 9–16; PMSJ 9–19.)
4 Additionally, CRST argues that California minimum wage laws do not apply to Class
5 Members’ work performed outside of California. (DMSJ 16–19.) Finally, CRST
6 contends it is entitled to summary judgment on the UCL and individual claims as a
7 matter of law. (DMSJ 16, 19–21.)
8 1. Piece-Rate Pay Structure
9 CRST argues the “piece” in its piece-rate pay structure is the “safe delivery of a
10 load,” which includes all necessary nondriving tasks directly related to delivery of the
11 load. (DMSJ 1.) Huckaby argues the “piece” for which CRST promised
12 compensation is miles driven, not load delivered, and this pay structure violates
13 California wage laws because it does not compensate drivers for required nondriving
14 tasks. (PMSJ 1–2.)
15 California law guarantees a minimum wage but also expressly protects
16 employees’ right to receive the wages promised in a contract. Oman v. Delta Air
17 Lines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 762, 780 (2020). This means that an employer may not
18 underpay wages promised in a contract. Id. Nor may an employer “borrow[]” wages
19 from hours compensable per the contract to satisfy the statutory minimum wage. Id.
20 For example, “an employer who contracts to pay $18 per hour for two hours of work,
21 but who then demands a third hour of unpaid work, cannot argue that it has complied
22 with a $12 hourly minimum wage because it has paid $36 over three hours.” Id.
23 (citations omitted). Rather, to satisfy its contractual and statutory obligations, “the
24 employer must pay the full $18 required by contract for the first two hours,” and “no
25 less than the applicable minimum wage” for the third uncontracted hour. Id.
26 This prohibition on wage borrowing applies equally to piece rate compensation
27 structures. Id. at 781. “Under a piece-rate system, employers pay their employees not
28 by the number of hours worked, but rather by the number of activities, tasks, or units
1 of production completed, such as the quantity of produce picked, the amount of carpet
2 installed, or the number of miles driven.” Ayala v. U.S Xpress Enters., Inc. (Ayala I),
3 No. 5:16-cv-00137-GW (KKx), 2020 WL 3071707, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2020),
4 aff’d, 851 F. App’x 53 (9th Cir. 2021). The California legislature enacted Labor Code
5 section 226.2 to codify the prohibition on wage borrowing under piece-rate systems.
6 Nisei Farmers League v. Lab. & Workforce Dev. Agency, 30 Cal. App. 5th 997, 1006
7 (2019). Under section 226.2, an employer who pays by the piece must also provide
8 separate compensation for “other nonproductive time.” Ayala v. U.S. Xpress Enters.,
9 Inc. (Ayala II), 851 F. App’x 53, 54 (9th Cir. 2021); Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a)(1).
10 “Other nonproductive time” is defined as “time under the employer’s control,
11 exclusive of rest and recovery periods, that is not directly related to the activity being
12 compensated on a piece-rate basis.” Ayala I, 2020 WL 3071707, at *7; Cal. Lab. Code
13 § 226.2.
14 As “‘[t]he compensation owed employees is a matter determined primarily by
15 contract,’ section 226.2 permits an employer and its employees to define the scope of
16 its piece-rate compensation system.” Ayala II, 851 F. App’x at 54 (citation omitted)
17 (quoting Oman, 9 Cal. 5th at 781)). Thus, to determine the scope of the piece-rate
18 pay, courts must look to the “mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
19 contracting.” Oman, 9 Cal. 5th at 782 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1636); accord Ayala
20 II, 851 F. App’x at 54.
21 Huckaby argues CRST agreed to pay Class Members a piece-rate by the mile
22 and does not compensate them for required nondriving tasks. (PMSJ 1–2.) He
23 contends CRST unlawfully borrows wages from the per-mile piece-rate to compensate
24 for the nondriving tasks in violation of California labor law. (Id. at 1, 12.) In contrast,
25 CRST argues it agreed to pay Class Members a piece-rate by the load, using a
26 computer formula that calculates the number of miles required to complete a safe
27 delivery. (DMSJ 9–10.) CRST contends the nondriving tasks Huckaby identifies are
28 all attendant to safely delivering a load, and thus CRST does not unlawfully “borrow
1 wages” to compensate for the nondriving tasks. (DMSJ 10.) Thus, the parties’
2 disagreement boils down to the scope of the agreed-upon piece: CRST’s “load-based
3 pay structure,” (DMSJ 1), or Huckaby’s “per-mile rate,” (PMSJ 1).
4 Huckaby points to CRST’s Wage Verification Pay Scale documents as the
5 parties’ agreement, arguing this document is the only compensation plan that Class
6 Members signed. (PMSJ 5; PAMF 2 (citing Decl. Shadie L. Berenji ISO Opp’n
7 DMSJ (“Berenji Opp’n Decl.”) Exs. 30 (“Wage Verification Pay Scale 2018”), 31
8 (“Wage Verification Pay Scale May 2021”), 32 (“Wage Verification Pay Scale
9 Dec. 2021”), ECF No. 119-3)); see also Decl. Lee Coblentz ISO DMSJ (“Coblentz
10 DMSJ Decl.”) ¶ 16, Ex. D (“Sample Wage Verification”), ECF No. 109-3.) He
11 contends these pay scale documents are evidence that CRST compensated Class
12 Members by the mile because the documents represent that “[p]ay rates are based on
13 Split Mile Pay.” (E.g., Sample Wage Verification (indicating 0.40 cents/mile); accord
14 PMSJ 5–6.) A driver with CRST signs this Wage Verification, in part, to acknowledge
15 the driver’s specific experience-based rate: “My wage rate will be ______ cents per
16 mile.” (See, e.g., Wage Verification Pay Scale May 2021.) This supports Huckaby’s
17 position that the compensation structure is a per-mile piece-rate.
18 CRST argues that nothing in the Wage Verification or pay scale suggests that
19 CRST was compensating drivers only for miles. (Reply ISO DMSJ 3, ECF No. 126.)
20 Indeed, the Wage Verifications clearly provide for a rate enhancement when a load is
21 booked as Hazardous Materials. (See, e.g., Wage Verification Pay Scale May 2021.)
22 This supports CRST’s position that the per-mile rate is simply one input to the formula
23 for calculating load-based pay. (See DMSJ 1, 9–10; see also Cobletz DMSJ Decl.
24 ¶ 15 (“Compensation for safe delivery of a load uses a simple pay formula where
25 payment is calculated using . . . the number of computerized miles associated with a
26 load [multiplied by] the [driver’s] per mile rate.”).)
27 However, nothing in the Wage Verification Pay Scale documents suggest which
28 specific tasks are included or excluded from the scope of the “piece” for which CRST
1 compensated drivers. (See e.g., Wage Verification Pay Scale May 2021.) Therefore,
2 these documents are ambiguous in that they can be construed to support both parties’
3 versions of the piece-rate. As such, the Court must look to other evidence to
4 determine the parties’ mutually intended scope of the compensated piece.
5 Far from resolving the question, the additional evidence the parties proffer only
6 further highlights that a genuine dispute exists concerning the meaning of the parties’
7 agreed-upon “piece.” For instance, Huckaby points to CRST recruitment materials
8 with talking points that emphasize “[m]iles = money” to argue that CRST paid drivers
9 by the mile. (PAMF 6; Berenji Opp’n Decl. Ex. 21 (“Recruiting Manual 2019–20”)
10 at CRSTF391212, ECF No. 119-3; see also PMSJ 4–5 (discussing recruitment,
11 training, and onboarding policies).) But these talking points are not directives to
12 recruiters, merely suggestions, and establish nothing regarding CRST’s compensation
13 structure. (See Recruiting Manual 2019–20 at CRSTF391191; see also Defs. Resp.
14 PAMF 6, ECF No. 126-1.)
15 Similarly, CRST points to its Driver Handbooks from 2014, 2016, 2021, and
16 2023, to argue that it has always paid drivers by the load and included nondriving
17 tasks in the definition of the “normal duties” attendant to safe delivery of a load.
18 (DMSJ 6–7; Decl. Angela Stastny ISO DMSJ (“Stastny DMSJ Decl.”) Exs. A–D, ECF
19 No. 109-4.) However, only two Handbooks expressly include nondriving tasks in
20 “normal duties” or “job functions”: the 2014 Handbook and June 2023 Handbook.
21 (See Stastny DMSJ Decl. Ex. A (“2014 Handbook”) CRSTF407677 (“Normal duties
22 of a driver include but are not limited to pre-trip and post-trip inspections, fueling,
23 driving, travel and waiting time . . . , completing paperwork, [and] loading and
24 unloading the freight . . . .”), Ex. D (“June 2023 Handbook”) CRSTF390322
25 (including similar tasks for “job functions in completing the trip and delivering the
26 load”).) Neither of these Handbooks was effective during the Class Period in this
27 case, August 9, 2017, through April 10, 2023.
28
1 CRST concedes that, in 2016, before the Class Period, it made significant edits
2 to its Driver Handbook. (Stastny DMSJ Decl. ¶ 8.) In doing so, CRST removed the
3 “normal work duties” section. (Id.) Although CRST argues the revisions did not alter
4 “CRST’s longstanding compensation policies for company drivers,” (id. ¶ 10), the
5 undisputed fact is that the Driver Handbooks in effect during the Class Period did not
6 explicitly define a Class Member’s normal duties or job functions as including the
7 nondriving tasks at issue here. (See Stastny DMSJ Decl. Exs. B–C.) Further, the
8 Driver Handbooks in effect during the Class Period both state “This Handbook
9 supersedes any prior versions published or distributed by the Company . . . .” (E.g.,
10 Berenji Opp’n Decl. Ex. 49 (“2016 Handbook”) at CRSTF000911, ECF No. 119-3.)
11 The above disputes are sufficient to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material
12 fact exists regarding the parties’ mutually intended scope of the compensated piece in
13 CRST’s piece-rate. The Court need not wade into the conflicting Class Member
14 testimony, the disputed CRST employee testimony, or the various interpretations of
15 Class Members’ wage statements. Suffice it to say that additional evidence only
16 solidifies the intractable triable issue as to the agreed-upon “piece.”
17 The parties’ further arguments on this point do not alter this conclusion. While
18 a written policy explicitly incorporating nondriving tasks into the piece rate may
19 suffice to establish a mutual understanding that these tasks are included, the absence
20 of such an explicit written policy does not conclusively prove the inverse, that the
21 nondriving tasks are not included. See Ayala I, 2020 WL 3071707, at *11, 18
22 (granting summary judgment for defendant for the time period following “issuance of
23 USX’s 2013 driver handbook,” which explicitly included nondriving tasks in the piece
24 rate, but finding a triable issue of fact precluded summary judgment as to whether that
25 was the case before the 2013 handbook issued).
26 For the same reason, although CRST claims its compensation system remained
27 the same for over thirty years irrespective of revisions to the Driver Handbooks, “the
28 record does not support a finding that the parties agreed that the” piece rate here
1 included all load-based tasks. Id. at 11 (denying summary judgment because, even if
2 “the payment system [was] the same, the record does not support a finding that the
3 parties agreed that the compensation covered all delivery-related tasks”).
4 Finally, summary judgment is not warranted for the time period following
5 issuance of the June 2023 Handbook because that Handbook is immaterial to the
6 Amended Piece Rate Class, as defined. (See Order Recons. Certification 8 (defining
7 class to include those “who were compensated by a piece-rate” from August 9, 2017,
8 to April 10, 2023, not those who were hired during the Class Period (emphasis
9 added)).)
10 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Huckaby’s motion for summary judgment in
11 full, because a triable issue exists regarding the parties’ mutual understanding of the
12 agreed “piece” in CRST’s piece-rate compensation system. For the same reason, the
13 Court DENIES CRST’s motion for summary judgment as to Huckaby’s minimum
14 wage and statutory/contractual wage claims.5
15 2. Minimum Wage
16 CRST next argues Class Members’ minimum wage claim must be limited to
17 time worked in California because “California’s minimum wage laws do not apply to
18 work performed outside of California.” (DMSJ 16–19 (emphasis omitted).) CRST
19 also contends that the evidence in this case does not present the kinds of California
20 connections sufficient to trigger application of California law. (Id. at 17.)
21 In certifying the Amended Piece-Rate Class, the Court found the evidence
22 presented at that time was sufficient to apply California law, based on the California
23 Supreme Court’s decision in Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 732 (2020).
24 (Order re Certification 11–12.) In Ward, the court established a test for evaluating
25
26 5 This denial encompasses rejecting CRST’s argument for summary judgment concerning
“directly-related activities,” in which CRST contends nondriving tasks are “directly-related” to safe
27
delivery of the load. As the agreed-upon “piece” remains in dispute and this necessarily includes
28 what may be considered “directly-related” to the piece, summary judgment is not appropriate for
tasks “directly-related” to the piece.
1 whether California employment law applies to interstate employees who do not work
2 a majority of the time in any single state. 9 Cal. 5th at 760. Rather than looking only
3 to the extraterritoriality or intraterritoriality of a statute, the court found the “better
4 question is what kinds of California connections will suffice to trigger the relevant
5 provisions of California law.” Id. at 752 (“[T]he connections that suffice for purposes
6 of one statute may not necessarily suffice for another.”). To evaluate the sufficiency
7 of California connections where an interstate employee does “not work principally in
8 any one state, a court should consider . . . whether the employee has a definite base of
9 operations in California, in addition to performing at least some work in the state for
10 the employer.” Id. at 760. An employee may be considered as based in California if
11 “California serves as the physical location where the worker presents himself or
12 herself to begin work.” Id. at 755.
13 Although the court in Ward was concerned with section 226, which governs
14 wage statements, courts have applied the Ward connections test to substantive wage
15 laws as well, such as overtime and minimum wage, for work performed outside of
16 California. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 3 F.4th 1127, 1136–38 (9th Cir.
17 2021) (considering Ward and applying California overtime law to California residents’
18 out-of-state work for a California-based employer). The Court agrees with these
19 decisions and finds that the policies underlying California substantive wage and hour
20 laws support the availability of minimum wage protections where sufficient California
21 connections exist per Ward, irrespective of whether the work to be compensated is
22 performed within or outside of California. Accordingly, the Court rejects CRST’s first
23 challenge on this point.
24 Turning to CRST’s second challenge—that the evidence fails to establish
25 sufficient California connections to apply California law, (DMSJ 18–19)—the Court
26 previously found the evidence supported that Class Members effectively had a
27 “designated home-base” in California and this was sufficient to support application of
28 California law to Class Members’ minimum wage claim. (Order re Certification 12.)
1 The evidence before the Court on summary judgment also supports that finding.
2 Class Members are all California residents, they store their trucks at the CRST
3 terminal in Riverside, California or another local location approved by CRST, and
4 most were hired, onboarded, and completed their training at the Riverside location.
5 (See, e.g., PAMF 36–40.) CRST’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. That
6 Class Members had the option of completing their training and storing their trucks
7 elsewhere, and that CRST itself is based in and dispatches routes from Iowa, (Defs.
8 Resp. PAMF 38, 40), does not negate Class Members’ sufficient California
9 connections.
10 In light of the strong public policies underlying California minimum wage law,
11 including “to ensure that workers receive adequate and fair pay,” Oman, 9 Cal. 5th
12 at 789, the Court finds the undisputed evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to
13 establish California connections that support application of California law to Class
14 Members’ minimum wage claim, irrespective of whether the work was performed
15 within or outside of California. Accordingly, the Court DENIES CRST’s motion for
16 summary judgment as to application of California minimum wage law to Class
17 Members’ work performed outside of California.
18 3. UCL
19 CRST also argues that the UCL claim fails for two reasons: (1) Huckaby lacks
20 standing to seek injunctive relief, specifically, because he is not a current CRST
21 employee, and (2) he also lacks standing to pursue a UCL claim, generally, because he
22 has adequate remedies at law. (DMSJ 16.) Through the UCL claim, Huckaby seeks
23 both injunctive relief and restitution. (FAC, Prayer ¶¶ 11–12.)
24 Former employees lack standing to seek injunctive relief against their
25 employer’s employment practices. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 988
26 (9th Cir. 2011). Huckaby does not dispute that he is a former employee or oppose
27 CRST’s motion for summary judgment as to UCL injunctive relief. (PSGI 2; see
28
1 generally Opp’n DMSJ 18–19, ECF No. 119.) As Huckaby is not currently employed
2 by CRST, he has no claim for injunctive relief.
3 Even where injunctive relief is not awarded, a UCL plaintiff may still recover
4 restitution. ABC Int’l Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 1247, 1270–
5 71 (1997). However, to do so, he must establish that he lacks an adequate remedy at
6 law. Sonner v. Premium Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). Huckaby
7 contends that Class Members have no adequate remedy at law for the first year of the
8 Class Period because, while the UCL carries a statute of limitations of four years, the
9 Labor Code provides only three years. (Opp’n DMSJ 18.) Yet, this does not establish
10 that the existing remedy is inadequate, “only that additional damages may be
11 available.” Wood v. Marathon Ref. Logistics Serv. LLC, No. 4:19-cv-04287-YGR,
12 2024 WL 2242688, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2024). “Consistent with other courts
13 that have considered this question, this Court holds that [Huckaby has] not
14 demonstrated why a three-year statute of limitations for [the] Labor Code claims
15 renders [his] legal remedies inadequate under the Labor Code.” Id. (internal quotation
16 marks omitted) (collecting cases); Guzman v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1312
17 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[The] failure to have timely pursued his [legal] claim cannot confer
18 equitable jurisdiction on a federal court to entertain his UCL claim.”).
19 Therefore, Huckaby lacks standing to pursue restitution or injunctive relief
20 under the UCL. Consequently, the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over this claim.
21 Diaz v. Ga. Pac. Corrugated LLC, No. 2:21-cv-02151-DMG (KSx), 2022 WL
22 20689543, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022) (“[F]ederal courts lack equitable
23 jurisdiction of [UCL] claims if the plaintiff could have obtained an adequate remedy
24 at law, even where that legal remedy is now barred by the statute of limitations.”).
25 Huckaby requests, in the event the Court finds it lacks equitable jurisdiction, the Court
26 sever the UCL claim and remand it to the state court. (Opp’n DMSJ 18–19.) At this
27 late stage in the proceedings, the Court finds it would be inequitable and prejudicial to
28 sever and remand as Huckaby requests.
1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES CRST’s motion for summary judgment as to
2 the UCL claim and DISMISSES that claim without prejudice and without leave to
3 amend, for lack of equitable jurisdiction. See Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1313 (“Because the
4 district court lacked equitable jurisdiction . . . it should have denied [defendant’s]
5 motion for summary judgment and dismissed [plaintiff’s] UCL claim without
6 prejudice for lack of equitable jurisdiction.”).
7 4. Individual Claims
8 CRST’s last argument on summary judgment is that Huckaby’s remaining
9 individual claims for unreimbursed cell phone expenses and derivative wage statement
10 and waiting time penalties fail as a matter of law. (DMSJ 19–21.)
11 First, the wage statement and waiting time penalty claims are derivative of the
12 minimum wage and contractual/statutory wage claims. Thus, the same triable issues
13 discussed above also preclude summary judgment here.
14 Next, regarding unreimbursed cell phone expenses, under California law, “[a]n
15 employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses
16 incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.”
17 Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a). “[W]hen employees must use their personal cell phones for
18 work related calls, [California] Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to
19 reimburse them.” Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1078 (9th Cir. 2020)
20 (alterations in original). However, ascertaining whether an expense is “necessary”
21 “depends on the reasonableness of the employee’s choices.” Gattuso v. Harte Hanks
22 Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 554, 569 (2007).
23 CRST argues it was not necessary or reasonable for Huckaby to use his cell
24 phone on the job because he could have used the onboard Qualcomm system in his
25 truck to communicate with CRST for all work-related tasks. (DMSJ 19–20.)
26 Huckaby’s deposition testimony supports that he had a Qualcomm system in his truck
27 and that he routinely used it to communicate with CRST. (DSUF 49 (citing Decl.
28 Charles Andrewscavage ISO DMSJ (“Andrewscavage DMSJ Decl.”) Ex. A
1 (“Huckaby Tr. DMSJ”), ECF No. 110).) However, Huckaby also testified that the
2 Qualcomm system would “go down” unpredictably, meaning he needed to use his cell
3 phone to communicate with CRST at least occasionally. (PSGI 49 (citing Berenji
4 Opp’n Decl. Ex. 5 (“Huckaby Tr. Opp’n DMSJ”) 109:16–110:8, ECF No. 119-3.)
5 Thus, the evidence demonstrates a triable dispute of fact as to whether it was
6 reasonable or necessary for Huckaby to use his cell phone for work-related tasks.
7 CRST argues Huckaby testified that he used his cell phone “every day” for his
8 job, and that this is demonstrably false because he identified only twelve work-related
9 calls totaling twenty-eight minutes over the entirety of his employment with CRST.
10 (Defs. Resp. PSGI 49 (citing Andrewscavage DMSJ Decl. Ex. M (“Huckaby
11 Cellphone Records”)), ECF No. 126-1.) This inconsistency goes to Huckaby’s
12 credibility and is for the jury to evaluate when considering whether it was reasonable
13 or necessary for him to use his cell phone for work-related tasks. It does not negate
14 that Huckaby did, at times, use his cell phone for work.
15 Accordingly, the Court DENIES CRST’s motion for summary judgment on
16 Huckaby’s individual claims for unreimbursed cell phone expenses and derivative
17 wage statement and waiting time penalties.
18 D. Conclusion—Summary Judgment
19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES both motions for summary
20 judgment in full. (PMSJ, ECF No. 108; DMSJ, ECF No. 109.) Also, the Court
21 DISMISSES Huckaby’s UCL claim, without prejudice and without leave to amend.
22 IV. MOTION FOR DECERTIFICATION
23 The Court previously found that Huckaby’s causes of action for minimum
24 wages and statutory/contractual wages were appropriate for class treatment and
25 certified the Amended Piece-Rate Class on those claims. (Order re Certification 18.)6
26 CRST now moves to decertify the Amended Piece-Rate Class. (Mot. Decert.)
27
6 The Court also certified the class as to the UCL claim. (Order re Certification 18.) As the Court
28 dismisses the UCL claim, it need not consider that claim in the context of CRST’s motion to
decertify the class.
1 A. Legal Standard
2 A district court has discretion to decertify a class. See Knight v. Kenai
3 Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 131 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 1997)); Fed. R. Civ.
4 P. 23(c)(1)(C). The “party seeking decertification bears the burden of demonstrating
5 that the elements of Rule 23 have not been established.” Zakaria v. Gerber Prods.
6 Co., No. 2:15-cv-00200-JAK (Ex), 2017 WL 9512587, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9,
7 2017) (collecting cases) (quoting Cole v. CRST, Inc., 317 F.R.D. 141, 144 (C.D. Cal.
8 2016)). “This burden is relatively heavy, since any doubts regarding the propriety of
9 class certification should be resolved in favor of certification.” Sandoval v. M1 Auto
10 Collisions Ctrs., No. 13-cv-03230-EDL, 2016 WL 6561580, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
11 Sept. 23, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for decertification
12 should not be granted “except for good cause, such as discovery of new facts or
13 changes in the parties or in the substantive or procedural law.” Morales v. Kraft Foods
14 Grp., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-04387-JAK (PJWx), 2017 WL 2598556, at *20 (C.D. Cal.
15 June 9, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 B. Discussion
17 The Court previously found that the Amended Piece-Rate Class satisfied the
18 threshold requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
19 adequacy of representation. (Order re Certification 5–9); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a);
20 Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 663
21 (9th Cir. 2022) (demanding all four Rule 23(a) requirements for class treatment).
22 Additionally, the Court found that the class satisfied the predominance and superiority
23 necessary for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). (Order re Certification 9–13); see
24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011) (“[T]he proposed class must
25 satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).”).
26 CRST argues decertification is warranted for two reasons: (1) discovery has
27 revealed that individual issues will predominate at trial over common questions, and
28 (2) class treatment is not superior because Huckaby’s damages model lacks common
1 proof, making trial on a class-wide basis unmanageable. (Mot. Decert. 1–2.)
2 Huckaby responds that CRST’s latest attempt to avoid class treatment is merely a
3 rehashing of its failed arguments raised in opposition to the class certification and in
4 support of its motion for reconsideration. (Opp’n Decert. 1, ECF No. 120.)
5 1. Predominance
6 CRST first argues that individual issues predominate over common questions
7 concerning Huckaby’s minimum and contractual wage claims. (Mot. Decert. 6–15.)
8 CRST contends that the scope of CRST’s piece-rate compensation plan must be
9 determined by considering what each individual driver understood the “piece” to
10 cover. (Id.) The Court has already rejected this argument:
11 Although an employee’s testimony can be relevant in interpreting a
piece-rate pay plan, see [Ayala I, 851 F. App’x at 54], this does not mean
12
that each employee is subject to an individualized piece-rate plan, the
13 scope of which differs from employee to employee based on their
14 subjective understanding. In determining the scope of any contract,
including CRST’s Piece-Rate Pay Plan, “the relevant intent is . . . the
15 objective intent as evidenced by the words of the instrument, not a party’s
16 subjective intent.” Here, Huckaby presents evidence that CRST’s
Piece-Rate Pay Plan applies uniformly to all putative class members.
17
The Court finds that interpreting CRST’s uniform Piece-Rate Pay Plan is
18 a common issue driven by the parties’ objective intent and that individual
issues will not predominate.
19
20 (Order re Certification 10–11 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).)
21 CRST offers nothing new in its motion for decertification that alters the Court’s
22 previous conclusion. That discovery now reveals Class Members may have different
23 subjective understandings of the piece-rate plan does not prevent a jury from resolving
24 the single predominating common question based on representative evidence
25 presented at trial: what is the uniform “piece” for which CRST compensated Class
26 Members. Representative evidence of CRST’s uniform pay policy remains sufficient
27 to satisfy predominance. See Ridgeway v. Walmart Inc., 946 F.3d 1066, 1088 (9th Cir.
28 2020) (“Representative evidence may include the testifying plaintiffs . . . .”); Taylor v.
1 Fedex Freight, Inc., No. 13-cv-1137-LJO-BAM, 2015 WL 2358248, at *11 (E.D. Cal.
2 May 15, 2015) (finding proof of defendant’s uniform pay policy was sufficient to
3 satisfy predominance for class certification), report and recommendation adopted,
4 2015 WL 4557412 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2015).7
5 2. Superiority
6 CRST also challenges superiority by arguing that Huckaby’s damages model
7 shows damages cannot be calculated on a class wide basis. (Mot. Decert. 2, 16–20.)
8 Specifically, CRST contends Huckaby’s experts’ opinions are contradicted by class
9 members’ testimony and impermissibly unreliable. (Id.) The Court previously found,
10 consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, that managing individualized damages
11 calculations generally does not defeat class action treatment. (Order re
12 Certification 13 (citing Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094
13 (9th Cir. 2010).) And the Court already rejected arguments similar to those CRST
14 raises here when the Court denied CRST’s motion for reconsideration. (See Order
15 Recons. Certification 4–6.) Nevertheless, the Court again considers CRST’s damages
16 arguments.
17 Statistical and representative evidence is permissible when “the evidence is
18 reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action,”
19 including damages. Ridgeway, 946 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
20 Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 455 (2016)). Representative evidence may include
21 employee testimony, video recordings, and expert studies. Id. (quoting Tyson Foods,
22 577 U.S. at 450). Where “a representative sample is the only practicable means to
23 collect and present relevant data to show damages, such representative evidence [is]
24 properly admitted.” Id. at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 CRST argues Huckaby’s damages expert, Dr. Steve Viscelli, opines that the
26 only timekeeping records for drivers—drivers logs—are unreliable and cannot be used
27
7 The Court finds CRSTs argument regarding a modification defense unpersuasive, particularly in
28 light of the lack of an unambiguous written agreement. (See Mot. Decert. 15; Opp’n Mot.
Decert. 14–15; Reply ISO Mot. Decert. 8–9, ECF No. 127.)
1 to estimate the amount of time Class Members spen[t] performing compensable work.
2 (Mot. Decert. 18). According to CRST, this means that Huckaby cannot prove class
3 wide damages. (Id. at 17–18.) But Viscelli accounted for the reliability, or lack
4 thereof, of driver logs in forming his opinions based on his own substantial empirical
5 research in the industry. (See Berenji DMSJ Decl. Ex. 61, ECF No. 119-3.) Further,
6 Huckaby’s experts’ properly consider multiple sources of common evidence in
7 formulating their opinions, including CRST compensation data, GPS data, and
8 instructions to drivers for logging time. See Ridgeway, 946 F.3d at 1088 (finding
9 expert methodology sound where based on payroll data, class questionnaires, DOT
10 inspections, driver logs, and databases).
11 CRST’s argument that there is no way to prove damages for each class member
12 and that Huckaby’s experts’ assumptions are inconsistent with Class Member
13 individual testimony fares no better. (Mot. Decert. 17–19.) For instance, CRST
14 argues that “Dr. Viscelli concluded 22.5 minutes is a ‘modest and reasonable’ estimate
15 of how long it takes all class members to complete pre- and post-trip inspections. But
16 some class members testified that the amount of time spent on pre-trip inspections
17 varied between approximately 10 and 35 minutes.” (Mot. Decert. 18 (citation
18 omitted).) The purported inconsistencies actually reveal correlation between Viscelli’s
19 assumptions and representative Class Member testimony. Viscelli’s estimate falls
20 within the range of figures given in testimony and is not, as CRST contends,
21 inconsistent. Ultimately, CRST’s damages argument fails because “[d]rivers need not
22 prove that they all took the same time to complete required” tasks. Ridgeway,
23 946 F.3d at 1088. “All that is required is enough representative evidence to allow a
24 jury to draw a reasonable inference about the unpaid hours worked.” Id. (citing Tyson
25 at 455–59). Huckaby offers that here.
26 C. Conclusion—Decertification
27 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES CRST’s Motion for
28 Decertification. (Mot. Decert., ECF No. 115.)
1 Vv. CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES both motions for summary
3 || judgment, (ECF Nos. 108, 109), and DENIES CRST’s motion for decertification,
4|| (ECF No. 115). Additionally, the Court DISMISSES the UCL claim without
5 || prejudice and without leave to amend, for lack of equitable jurisdiction.
6
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
9 April 1, 2025 □□
10 “th
Géed lion
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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