Talbert v. Shapiro

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES TALBERT, ;

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-1338

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are several motions filed by pro se Plaintiff

Charles Talbert (“Talbert”) in this civil action in which he raises claims

generally based on the lack of mental health treatment he has received while

in state prison and his repeated placement in the Restricted Housing Unit

(‘“RHU”) after acting out, allegedly due to his mental health issues. Those

motions include three (3) motions for preliminary injunctions, a motion for

summary judgment, a motion for a default judgment, a motion seeking the

undersigned’s recusal or the transfer of this case to the Western District of

Pennsylvania, and a motion to exceed the Local Rules’ page limitation for

his brief in support of the motion for recusal. In addition, one set of

Defendants have filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response to

Talbert’s motion for summary judgment, and a motion to stay discovery in

this action until the Court resolves their pending motion to dismiss Talbert's

operative complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will (1) deem

the first of Talbert’s motions for a preliminary injunction withdrawn due to his

failure to file a brief in support of the motion in accordance with the Local

Rules, (2) deny his other two (2) motions for a preliminary injunction, (3) deny

without prejudice his motion for summary judgment as premature, (4) deny

his motion for a default judgment, (5) grant Talbert’s motion to exceed the

page limitations for his brief in support of his motion for recusal, (6) deny

Talbert’s motion for recusal or transfer of this action to the Western District,

(7) deny as moot Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file a

response to Talbert's motion for summary judgment, and (8) grant

Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending resolution of their motion to

dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Pro se Plaintiff Charles Talbert (“Talbert”), a prolific federal court

litigant and convicted and sentenced state prisoner, commenced this action

by filing a complaint against Josh Shapiro, the Governor of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, along with a separately docketed exhibit,

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on

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June 14, 2023.1 (Docs. 1, 2.) Talbert also filed a motion for a preliminary

injunction (Doc. 4), which the Honorable Mark A. Kearney dismissed without

prejudice via an Order issued on June 20, 2023 (Doc. 6).

Because Talbert was seeking “redress from a governmental entity or

officer or employer of a governmental entity,” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a), Judge

Kearney screened the complaint and issued a Memorandum and Order on

July 14, 2023. (Docs. 11, 12.) In Judge Kearney’s Memorandum, he

described Talbert’s allegations and legal claims in his complaint, as well as

certain matters of public record relating to Talbert, as follows:

Unnamed officers arrested Charles Talbert for an

unidentified crime and detained him in an unidentified facility on

January 8, 2019. An unnamed Philadelphia Court of Common

Pleas judge “realized” Mr. Talbert suffered from serious mental

illness about a year later. The judge ordered the Commonwealth

' It appears that Talbert has filed approximately eighty (80) non-habeas

civil actions in the Eastern District, ten (10) non-habeas civil actions in this

District, and three (3) non-habeas civil actions in the Western District. He

also has more than “three strikes” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). See,

e.g., Talbert v. Pa. State Corr. Officer, Assoc., Nos. 20-cv-1154, 20-cv-1902,

2021 WL 963454, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2021) (“Talbert has had three, or

more, previously lawsuits which constitute ‘three strikes’ within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).”); Talbert v. Commonwealth, No. 458 M.D. 2023,

2025 WL 66511, at *1 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 10, 2025) (noting that

“[c]ourts have labeled Talbert a serial litigant” and citing cases in support of

notation); see also Talbert v. Corr. Dental Assocs., No. 18-cv-5112, 2020 WL

5517455, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020) (explaining that Talbert sought

recusal of district judge because Talbert was identified as, inter alia, a “serial

litigant,” and denying recusal on this ground because “[h]e is, by Congress’

definition [in 28 U.S.C. §1915], a serial litigant’).

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provide Mr. Talbert with mental health treatment and appropriate

housing the same day.

But the Commonwealth instead has held Mr. Talbert in the

restrictive housing unit in solitary confinement at unidentified

facilities since January 13, 2020 because of his behaviors related

to his mental health conditions. Mr. Talbert is not being treated

for his mental health diagnoses while in solitary confinement.

The Parole Board denies Mr. Talbert’s access to parole

hearings.

Mr. Talbert has accrued time in the restrictive housing unit

while incarcerated at unnamed facilities lasting through 2032

“[djue to the symptoms of [his] mental health conditions[.]” Mr.

Talbert claims he completed his minimum sentence eleven

months ago in July 2022, but the Parole Board denied him a

parole hearing because he is in the restrictive housing unit.

Mr. Talbert claims the Commonwealth’s Parole Board has

a process where it considers whether an incarcerated person will

be eligible for parole after reaching a minimum sentence. But if

an incarcerated person is placed in the restrictive housing unit,

he will not be eligible for a Parole Board hearing. So Mr. Talbert’s

“maximum term” is now up in 2026 which is five years “beyond”

his minimum sentence since the Parole Board is not holding a

hearing for him in the restrictive housing unit. Mr. Talbert is

“being forced to do the remainder of his sentence in isolation.”

The Governor ignores Mr. Talbert’s prolonged isolation.

The Department of Justice at some unknown time informed

the Commonwealth and its past and present governors through

its investigative report the Department of Corrections keeps

incarcerated persons with serious mental illness in prolonged

isolated confinement. Governor Shapiro “[u]pon being elected

into the office” at some unknown time “knowingly, intentionally,

and in reckless disregard for the mental health of [incarcerated

persons] in prolonged isolated confinement, failed to take any

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reasonable, meaningful, [or] appropriate measure to cease,

desist, and correct the [] unconstitutional practice.”

Mr. Talbert claims Governor Shapiro “[t]hrough his

chairmanship of the Executive Board” and “administrative and

policy statements contained in Executive orders, or by

Management and other Directives” establishes policies and

practices for all employees and agencies under his jurisdiction.

And the Department of Corrections “is an agency under

[Governor Shapiro’s] jurisdiction.” So, because of the

Department of Justice’s investigation report on_ the

unconstitutional practice along with “other Federal and

International laws[,]” Governor Shapiro knew he had a duty to

rectify the “unconstitutional practice of torturing inmates with

serious mental health conditions, by taking reasonable measures

to reform the manner in which they can be punished . . . for their

behavior caused by [] mental health symptoms.”

But instead Governor Shapiro “turned a blind eye” and

“approved[ed] the [Commonwealth’s] unconstitutional practice

without any intent of correction.” And Governor Shapiro failed to

take reasonable measures to “cease, desist, and correct” the

Commonwealth’s practice of punishing incarcerated individuals’

mental health behavior by isolating them instead of providing

them court ordered treatment and housing, and he “recklessly”

denied them parole. Mr. Talbert alleges Governor Shapiro’s “acts

and inactions” subjected him to unnecessary and wanton

infliction of psychological pain and_ suffering; _ inflicted

disproportionate punishment to the severity of his misdemeanor;

affected his serious mental health needs; deprived him of his

protected liberty interests without due process; deprived him

equal access to parole hearings; and aggravated his preexisting

hypertension.

Mr. Talbert pro se sues Governor Shapiro in his individual

and official capacities and separately under a theory of

supervisory liability. Mr. Talbert’s Complaint, construed in the

most liberal fashion without speculation, seemingly tries to plead

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civil rights claims against Governor Shapiro for depriving him of

his due process rights, his Eighth Amendment rights, and his

right to equal protection. Mr. Talbert seeks more than

$250,000.00, costs, punitive damages, fees, and injunctive relief.

(Doc. 11 at 2-4.)

After identifying these factual allegations and legal claims, Judge

Kearney dismissed the complaint with prejudice in part, and without

prejudice in part. (Doc. 12.) To the extent that Talbert asserted official-

capacity claims for monetary damages against Governor Shapiro, Judge

Kearney dismissed those claims with prejudice. (/d.) Insofar as Talbert

asserted official-capacity claims for injunctive relief or individual-capacity

claims for monetary damages against Governor Shapiro, Judge Kearney

dismissed those claims without prejudice. (/d.) Judge Kearney also provided

Talbert with leave until August 14, 2023, to file an amended complaint

“pleading facts demonstrating the Governor's personal involvement or

supervisory liability arising from [Talbert’s] conditions of confinement.” (/d.)

Prior to filing an amended complaint, Talbert filed his second motion

for a preliminary injunction on July 26, 2023. (Doc. 14.) Judge Kearney

denied this motion without prejudice through an Order entered on July 28,

2023. (Doc. 15.)

Talbert timely filed an amended complaint, along with a third motion for

a preliminary injunction, on August 9, 2023. (Docs. 17, 18.) In the amended

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complaint, Talbert names six (6) Defendants: (1) Governor Shapiro; (2) the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the “Commonwealth”); (3) the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “DOC”); (4)

Laurel Harry (“Harry”), the Secretary of the DOC; (5) Centurion, a company

providing mental health services to the DOC; and (6) Dr. Adam Gluskakow,

a psychiatrist employed by Centurion.” (Doc. 17 at 2.)

On August 10, 2023, Judge Kearney issued an Order denying Talbert's

motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice to him refiling it after

Judge Kearney screened the amended complaint under Section 1915A(a).

(Doc. 19.) The next day, Judge Kearney entered an Order transferring the

case here. (Doc. 20.)

On August 21, 2023, this Court issued an Order which, inter alia,

directed the Clerk of Court to send waiver of service forms to Defendants.

(Doc. 23.) Approximately twenty (20) days later, Talbert filed a “Motion to

Renew Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.”

(Doc. 26.) Then, on September 18 and 19, 2023, Defendants Harry, the

Commonwealth, the DOC, and Governor Shapiro (collectively, the

“Commonwealth Defendants’) waived service, and waiver of service forms

2 The Court provides more details about Talbert’s amended complaint

infra.

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sent to Dr. Glushakow and Centurion were returned unexecuted. (Docs. 27,

29, 30.)

On October 20, 2023, the Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss Talbert’s amended complaint (Doc. 34), and they filed a brief in

support of their motion on October 25, 2023 (Doc. 35). Talbert responded to

this motion on November 7, 2023, by filing not only a brief in opposition to it

(Doc. 38), but also a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support of

this motion (Docs. 36, 37). On November 9, 2023, the Commonwealth

Defendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response to

Talbert’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39.) Talbert filed a brief in

opposition to the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion for an extension of

time on December 1, 2023. (Doc. 41.)

Talbert filed another motion for a preliminary injunction and supporting

brief on December 4, 2023. (Docs. 45, 46.) Four (4) days later, Talbert filed

a motion for a default judgment as to Dr. Glushakow and Centurion. (Doc.

47.) The Commonwealth Defendants then filed a brief in opposition to

Talbert’s motion for a preliminary injunction on December 14, 2023. (Doc.

52.)

On December 20, 2023, Centurion and Dr. Glushakow (the “Medical

Defendants’) filed a notice of their intent to seek a judgment of non pros as

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to any professional liability claims asserted against them. (Doc. 53.) Talbert

filed a reply brief in opposition to this notice on January 8, 2024 (Doc. 54),

and he filed a reply brief in further support of his motion for a preliminary

inunction on January 9, 2024 (Doc. 55).

The Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery

pending resolution of their motion to dismiss along with a brief in support of

the motion to stay on February 8, 2024. (Docs. 56, 57.) Four (4) days later,

the Medical Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Talbert’s amended

complaint along with a supporting brief. (Docs. 58, 59.) Talbert filed briefs in

opposition to the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to stay and the Medical

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on March 13, 2024, and March 15, 2024,

respectively. (Docs. 62, 63.) The Medical Defendants then filed a reply brief

in further support of their motion to dismiss on March 28, 2024 (Doc. 64), to

which Talbert filed an unauthorized surreply brief on April 15, 2024 (Doc. 65).

On April 26, 2024, Talbert filed another motion for a preliminary

injunction, a supporting brief, and a motion to exceed page limitations. (Docs.

66-68.) The Commonwealth Defendants filed a brief in opposition to

Talbert’s motion for a preliminary injunction on May 10, 2024 (Doc. 69), and

Talbert filed a reply brief in further support of his motion on May 29, 2024

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(Doc. 70). On July 10, 2024, Talbert filed a motion for recusal and motion to

transfer case, along with a supporting brief.

B. Allegations, Causes of Action, and requests for relief in the

Amended Complaint®

1. Talbert’s Underlying Convictions and Sentence

In December 2019, Talbert was sentenced to a period of state

incarceration for a minimum of three-and-a-half (3 %) years to a maximum

of seven (7) years in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

(Doc. 17 at 3, 18-19); see also Talbert v. Harry, No. 22-cv-2011, 2024 WL

3606320, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2024) (setting forth Talbert’s convictions

and sentence). As part of his sentence, the trial judge ordered Talbert to

receive “anger management, drug and mental health treatment, [and] job

training.” (Doc. 17 at 3, 10, 19); see also Talbert v. Walker, No. 24-cv-3061,

2024 WL 5098498, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2024) (noting that Talbert was “to

receive drug, mental health and anger management treatment while

incarcerated”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5096212

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2024). The trial judge also “recommend{ed]” Talbert be

incarcerated at SCI Waymart for mental health and drug treatment.” (Doc.

3 Due to Talbert presenting his factual allegations in a scattershot

manner, the Court has attempted to sync them together as well as possible.

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17 at 19.) Talbert asserts that Defendants “have all been placed on notice,

on separate occasions,” of the duration of his sentence as well as “mental

health treatment, and necessary housing, as conditions of that sentence.”

(Doc. 17 at 3.)*

2. Centurion

The Commonwealth, Governor Shapiro, the DOC, and Harry

contracted with Centurion to provide mental health services in DOC facilities.

(Id. at 3.) These Defendants knew, or should have known, that Centurion

“has been known, nationwide, to obtain government funding for inmate

mental health psychiatric treatment [and] not provid[e] those constitutional

and contractual services.” (/d.) Among other things, Centurion failed to select

and retain only competent physicians. (/d. at 11.)

* Contrary to Talbert’s allegation, the trial court did not direct the DOC

to incarcerate him at SCI Waymart; instead, the trial court “recommend{ed]”

that the DOC incarcerate Talbert at SCI Waymart for mental health

treatment. (Doc. 17 at 19.) Nor could the trial court direct the DOC to place

Talbert in a particular correctional facility or a housing unit therein because,

as the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has previously explained to

Talbert, “while the sentencing court may make recommendations to [the]

DOC, [the] DOC has the ultimate authority to determine where and under

what conditions an inmate will be housed.” Ta/bert v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 125

M.D. 2022, 2023 WL 2579062, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 21, 2023)

(citations omitted). “Thus, even though the [t]rial [c]ourt recommended

that... Talbert be housed at SCI[]Waymart for mental health treatment, [the]

DOC was not bound by that recommendation.” (/d.)

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Talbert sought treatment from several Centurion-employed

“psychiatric physicians,” and he explained “the multiple, negative effects of

longterm [sic] isolated confinement,” which “factor[ed] into him suffering from

decompensation,” as well as his “not being prescribed mediation and other

psychiatric treatment, as was ordered by the court, and to which he received

previously before his DOC commitment.” (/d.) Nevertheless, “on numerous

occasions,” the Centurion physicians denied Talbert treatment. (/d.) In

addition, referrals from DOC psychologists to Centurion physicians to

evaluate Talbert from reported decompensation were canceled and denied.

c. Alleged Incidents

Talbert avers that he has been diagnosed with the following mental

health or behavioral issues: (1) anxiety; (2) post-traumatic stress disorder;

(3) attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder; (4) major depression; (5) antisocial

personality disorder; (6) borderline personality disorder; (7) paranoia; (8)

schizophrenia; (9) suicidal behavior; and (10) impulse control disorder. (/d.

at 9.) The combination of these issues “substantially impairs [Talbert’s]

thinking, perception, and behavior.” (/d.)

On January 13, 2020, Talbert had a “psychotic episode” “while not

being treated for his paranoia” during which he assaulted another inmate.

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(Id. at 10.) This incident caused Talbert to be placed into solitary

confinement. (/d.) Talbert avers that the DOC “failed to consider [his] mental

illness as the moving [sic] factor of [Jhis psychotic behavior at [his]

misconduct hearing,” which led the “hearing examiner to impose 45 [days] of

solitary confinement under disciplinary custody . . . without privileges of

phone, electronics, or commissary food.” (/d.) During those forty-five (45)

days, the DOC failed to provide Talbert with his “court-ordered treatment,”

resulting in Talbert “beg[inning] to decompensate, and allow the effects of

total isolation, and extreme restrictions, . . . impair his ability to control his

triggered, negative behavior.” (/d.) When Talbert had this “mental health

crisis,” instead of the Commonwealth and the DOC treating him, he “was

routinely given written misconduct reports for a period of 3% years.” (/d.)

Talbert was denied, and continues to be denied, “those services because of

his mental health disorders’ symptoms that substantially impair[] his

behavior.” (/d.)

While Talbert was incarcerated at SCI Phoenix in 2020, Dr. Glushakow

placed him in a psychiatric observation cell due to Talbert’s “psychotic

behavior until [he] became stable.” (/d. at 4, 20.) In February 2022, Talbert

sued Dr. Glushakow in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.

(Id. at 4, 21.)

As of 2023, Talbert informed Centurion staff members “of his long-term

confinement in isolation causing him to suffer from anxiety, hallucinations,

paranoid [sic], the inability to effectively concentrate and think, and [become]

reactive and unable to control his impulses.” (/d. at 4, 22-24.) Then, on June

6, 2023, Talbert sent Governor Shapiro a letter about his complaint in the

instant case and his “suffering from untreated mental illness in solitary

confinement for 3% consecutive years.” (/d. at 4, 25-26.) Talbert believes

that Governor Shapiro has not complied with 42 Pa. C.S. §9727(b)(1), which

pertains to the “[d]isposition of persons found guilty but mentally ill.” (/d. at

4), 42 Pa. C.S. §9727. In particular, Talbert avers that Governor Shapiro

should “obtain information from the DOC and Harry [regarding] those

inmates guilty but mentally ill, and to see if those inmates are receiving the

mental health [sic] they were sentenced to receive, since such treatment

would be paid for by the State.” (/d.) In addition to allegedly not complying

with Section 9727, Talbert believes that Governor Shapiro has not complied

with 42 Pa. C.S. §9764(a)(2) and (3), which require the “sheriff or

transporting official” to provide certain documents and records to the

correctional institution’s records officer. (/d. at 5.)

Harry, in her prior role as Superintendent of Pennsylvania State

Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Camp Hill, was also aware that Talbert was

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“on the mental health case load[] and [was in] solitary confinement.” (/d. at

3.)

Talbert asserts that the Commonwealth and the DOC have established

an “unconstitutional practice of discriminating against inmates suffering from

serious mental health conditions . . . by allowing their staff members to

punish them with longterm [sic] isolated confinement for their mental health

sysymptomatic [sic] behavior.” (/d.) This practice exists despite the United

States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issuing a “Findings Letter” on May 31,

2013, to then Governor Thomas Corbett, the Commonwealth, the DOC, and

then-DOC Secretary, John Wetzel, in which the DOJ “concluded that they all

were responsible for a wide array of policies and practices that were

responsible for systematic deficiencies in their treatment of mentally ill

prisoners.” (/d. at 6; Doc. 2.) Due to Governor Shapiro’s role as the

Commonwealth’s Attorney General prior to becoming Governor, Talbert

asserts that he had “adequate knowledge of the aforesaid systematic

deficiencies, as his office, then, was apprised of this investigation, including

various civil matters that were filed against the [Commonwealth] and DOC

because of these ongoing deficiencies.” (/d. at 6.) Yet, Governor Shapiro and

Harry have also maintained an unconstitutional practice of “failing to

constitutionally and lawfully account for all inmates that suffer from serious

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mental health conditions,” leading to “various suffering inmates with serious

mental illness being punished, instead of treated, for symptomatic behavior.”

(Id.) Moreover, they contracted with Centurion, which has contributed to the

“systematic deficiencies in the treatment of mentally disabled inmates.” (/d.)

Overall, Defendants have established a “system-wide” practice of:

[S]Jecurity staff to consider mental health issues appropriately; a

fragmented and ineffective mental health care program;

insufficient mental healthcare staffing to meet the prison

population’s needs; poor screening and diagnostic procedures;

poor recordkeeping[,] contributing to a dysfunctional system that

undermines the continuity of care; deficient oversight

mechanisms including the failure to collect necessary

information on critical incidents; and, a lack of training in the

proper response to warning signs by inmates with serious mental

health conditions.

(Id. at 7.)

In June 2023, a psychiatric referral was sent to Centurion for Dr.

Glushakow, who was now a regional psychiatrist, to evaluate Talbert “due to

him feeling suicidal . . . [and] suffering from decompensation from the 3%

consecutive years that he has been in isolated confinement.” (/d.) However,

due to Talbert’s prior Cumberland County lawsuit against Dr. Glushakow and

Centurion, Dr. Glushakow canceled the referral for “no medical reasoning,

which denied [Talbert] access to necessary psychiatric treatment.” (/d.)

Talbert also avers that on January 19, 2023, June 14, 2023, and July

9, 2023, while he was at SCI Phoenix and SCI Coal Township, he sought

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treatment from Centurion only to have Centurion’s staff acknowledge

Talbert’s suffering but refuse to “assess and evaluate him, causing his

decompensation, in prolonged isolation, to become worse, and substantially

affect his behavior.” (/d.) Centurion also has a practice of denying Talbert’s

“treatment and hiring of incompetent psychiatric staff members.” (/d. at 8.)

Talbert asserts that he “just settled 14 civil cases against the State and

DOC, including several state executive agencies and agents, on March 7,

2023, to which some involved his mental illness and him being in long term

isolated confinement without treatment.” (/d.) The Commonwealth, Governor

Shapiro, the DOC, and Harry are “all constructively and actually aware of

these settlements through [Governor] Shapiro’s previous office of Attorney

General,” which gives “them knowledge that changes need to be made to its

defecient [sic] and dysfunctional mental health services.” (/d.) However,

Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to Talbert’s court-ordered

psychiatric treatment and housing, and they continue to deny him access to

services, “possibly in retaliation of those 14 settled lawsuits.” (/d.)

4. Causes of Action and Requests for Relief

Based on the above factual allegations, Talbert asserts causes of

action against: (1) the Commonwealth and the DOC for violating the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act

Bag

(“ADA”); (2) Centurion for state-law corporate negligence; (3) Dr. Glushakow

for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the

Eighth Amendment; (4) Dr. Glushakow for retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment; (5) Governor Shapiro and Harry for deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs and unlawful conditions of confinement in violation

of the Eighth Amendment, as well as supervisory liability. (/d. at 9-17.) For

relief, Talbert seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and

unspecified injunctive relief. (/d. at 17.)

ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle by which private citizens may

seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state

officials. See 42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress...

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means

through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state

actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.

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2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To

state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [they

are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in

[their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.

Res. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). These factors inform a balancing

test, but the first two factors—likelihood of success and irreparable harm—

are essential. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir.

2017) (“[W]e have repeated that a district court—in its sound discretion—

should balance those four factors so long as the party seeking the injunction

meets the threshold on the first two.” (citations omitted)). So “[i]f these

gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors

and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together,

balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” /d. at 179.

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In addition, preliminary injunctions are designed to:

preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly

and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and

according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635

F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief

is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in

limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.

Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir.

1994) (quoting Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor

Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must

support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result

to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v.

Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.”

Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); [ECRI v.

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)] (it is not

enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the

burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more

than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be

redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of

immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary

injunctive relief.

Moreover, because the purpose of preliminary injunctive

relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the

underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the

motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct

alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiff's complaint.”

James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7,

2017). In other words, “there must be a connection between the

underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a

preliminary injunction.” /d. (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 F. App’x

836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). A district court “should not issue an

injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same

character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues

in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir.

1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S.

212, 220 (1945)).

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Finally, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief

“must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial

restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and

intractable problems of prison administration.” Goff v. Harper, 60

F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d

1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a

tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the

terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because

they are “in court” . . .”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL

2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v.

Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan.

22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that

would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a

prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of

federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable

relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal

courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of

prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as

the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an

extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should

be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and

execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve

internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v.

Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 527 (1979).

Talbert v. Irvin, No. 24-cv-122, 2024 WL 3678875, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. July 2,

2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Talbert v. Irwin, 2024

WL 3677495 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2024).

Finally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes certain

limitations on district courts when granting temporary restraining orders or

preliminary injunctive relief in cases filed by prisoners in which they challenge

-21-

their prison conditions. In this regard, the PLRA provides in relevant part as

follows:

In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the extent

otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary

restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief.

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no

further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds

requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means

necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial

weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of

a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and

shall respect the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B)

in tailoring any preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctive relief

shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its

entry, unless the court makes the findings required under

subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief and makes

the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period.

18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2).

C. Motions to Recuse

There are two federal statutes pertaining to recusal, 28 U.S.C. §§144

and 455. Although Talbert has not identified whether he is proceeding under

either, or both, statutes, the Court will discuss only Section 455 because

Talbert has not taken appropriate actions to invoke Section 144 here.°

Section 144 states that

[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes

and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice

either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge

(footnote continued on next page)

+302

Section 455 governs:

disqualification based on the appearance of impropriety or actual

bias. Under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), a judge “shall disqualify

[themselves] in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §455(a). The test for

disqualification under this provision is “whether a reasonable

person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” /n re

Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). The

standard is objective; “[t]he judge does not have to be

subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be

so.” United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 718 (3d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2, 114 S.Ct.

1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)): see also Mass. Sch. of Law at

Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir.

1997) (“The standard for recusal is whether an objective

observer reasonably might question the judge’s impartiality.”).

Under 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1), recusal is required where a judge

“has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1).

shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be

assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief

that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten

days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is

to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it

within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any

case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record

stating that it is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. §144. As demonstrated by the language in Section 144, a motion

to recuse under this section is initiated upon a party filing of an affidavit. See

id. Talbert has not filed an affidavit, and his motion is untimely insofar as he

did not file it within ten (10) days of the assignment of this matter to the

undersigned or state good cause for his failure to file it within ten (10) days.

. 93:

Unlike the analysis under 28 U.S.C. §144, “when deciding a

motion for recusal under Section 455(a) [or Section 455(b)], the

court need not accept the Movant's allegations as true.” Cooney

[v. Booth, 262 F. Supp. 2d 494, 504 (E.D. Pa. 2003)] (collecting

cases); see also United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 625 n.12

(3d Cir. 1988) (noting the “considerable authority for the

proposition that the factual accuracy of affidavits submitted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455 may be scrutinized by the court

deciding the motion for recusal”); 13D Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice & Procedure §3550 (3d ed. 2023 update) (“If a

party does move for disqualification under §455, and the motion

is supported by an affidavit, . . . the court is not required to accept

the factual statements as true.”). Rather, the judge is permitted

to contradict the factual allegations made in the movant’s affidavit

based on [their] own knowledge and the record. Cooney, 262 F.

Supp. 2d at 504 (citing Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 872

F. Supp. at 1349).

United States v. Gedeon, No. 21-cr-210, 2023 WL 3097651, at *1-2 (E.D.

Pa. Apr. 26, 2023) (all alterations except second-to-last alteration in original).

lll. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Recuse and Transfer Action to the Western

District

Talbert moves to have the undersigned recuse himself? from this case

or transfer it to the Western District. (Docs. 72-73.) Talbert indicates that he

has “filed numerous complaints of judicial misconduct against [the

undersigned] with the Office of the Circuit Executive,” one of which is on

review with the “Judicial Council” after it was denied. (Doc. 72 at 1.) He has

5 Talbert repeatedly refers to the undersigned with feminine pronouns.

2

also filed motions for preliminary injunctions which have not been scheduled

for hearings or otherwise resolved, which causes him to “unreasonably suffer

without [the undersigned] properly revising his conditions of confinement and

providing timely relief.” (/d.; Doc. 73 at 1.) Talbert believes that “[iJt is

effectively impossible to deem [the undersigned] a fair and impartial Judge

with judicial complaints filed against her [sic],” the existence of a “running,

bitter controversy between [the undersigned] and [Talbert].” (Docs. 72 at 1;

73 at 2 (citing Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2003); Commonwealth v. Perry, 364 A.2d 312 (Pa. 1976); Williams v.

Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974)).

Talbert’s motion to recuse will be denied for three (3) reasons. First,

none of Talbert’s case citations are applicable here. His citations to

Pennsylvania state-court cases have no bearing on this Court’s analysis

under Section 455, and none of his cases involved circumstances remotely

like those in this case. For instance, two (2) of the cases addressed issues

about, inter alia, whether a trial judge should have recused themselves after

holding someone in contempt of court, which has not happened here. See

Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501 (concluding that respondent judge should not preside

over retrial of petitioner judge held in contempt because, after “examin[ing]

the record in this case, . . . it appears to us that respondent [became]

-25-

embroiled in a running controversy with petitioner’ and “as the trial

progressed, there was a mounting display of an unfavorable personal

attitude toward petitioner, his ability, and his motives, sufficiently so that the

contempt issue should have been finally adjudicated by another judge’);

Debose, 833 A.2d 150 (“Finally, we address appellant’s argument [that the

trial judge] abused her discretion by failing to recuse after previously having

found appellant guilty of the contempt charges and subsequently vacating

the convictions.”). The third case involved whether a Pennsylvania Supreme

Court Justice should have recused himself from participating in an inmate's

appeal from a death sentence when the Justice previously served as the

district attorney who approved seeking the death penalty against the inmate.

See Williams, 579 U.S. at 3. The fourth, and final case, involved an issue

about whether a trial judge should have recused after they were “a mourner

at the funeral of the deceased in the case.” Perry, 364 A.2d at 317. Again,

none of those circumstances are present here. Moreover, Talbert identifies

no facts evidencing a “running, bitter controversy” between him and the

undersigned, nor could he, because none exists.

Second, the fact that Talbert filed a judicial conduct complaint against

the undersigned and appealed from the denial of said complaint is not a basis

for recusal. “The mere filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct is not

- 26 -

grounds for recusal” because “it would be detrimental to the judicial system

if a judge had to disqualify [themselves] anytime someone filed a complaint

about [their] conduct. A party would only have to file a complaint to get a

different judge.” In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.

2009); see also In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] per se

rule of disqualification would allow litigants to judge shop by filing a suit

against the presiding judge.”); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d

1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that litigant cannot force a judge’s

recusal merely by filing a complaint or lawsuit against that judge); United

States v. Moskovits, No. 87-cr-284-1, 1994 WL 583179, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

26, 1994) (“If the simple act of filing a complaint, even one which would later

prove meritless, would necessitate the recusal of the judge who was the

subject of the complaint, litigants would have free reign to wantonly require

the recusal of judges at will.”). Therefore, Talbert’s filing of a judicial

misconduct complaint does not warrant recusal.

Third, to the extent that Talbert bases his motion on delays in resolving

his motions in this action, this also is not a ground for recusal. “[T]he manner

in which a court controls its docket is discretionary.” Conklin v. Kane, No. 13-

cv-3058, 2014 WL 4411593, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (citing /n re Fine

Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982)), aff'd, 634 F. App’x

27 -

69 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished). Therefore, a litigant’s “allegations of

inexcusable delay . . . provide no grounds for recusal.” /d.; see also

Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 329

(3d Cir. 2015) (denying litigant’s request to reassign case to different district

judge on remand due to, inter alia, district judge’s delay in ruling on a motion

for preliminary relief because “[w]Je have never held that delay alone merits

reassignment”); Qualls v. United States, Nos. 07-cr-14, 09-cr-418, 2018 WL

1513625, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (“Delays in entering judgment or

rendering a decision are not bases for recusal.”); Klayman v. Jud. Watch,

Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 252, 262 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying motion to recuse

based on perceived delay in ruling on motion to dismiss); Ba/dyga v. United

States, 337 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying motion for

recusal premises on delay in ruling on pending motion because such a delay

is not a ground for recusal under any statute or case law); United States v.

LaMorte, 940 F. Supp. 572, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (45-month delay in

resolving motion did not warrant recusal), aff'd sub nom. United States v.

Moritz, 112 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 1997). Furthermore, Talbert does not argue

that any delay was limited to his case so as to raise a possible suggestion of

bias or partiality, and he has not explained how any delays demonstrate bias

on the part of the undersigned. See Wereko v. Rosen, No. 22-cv-2177, 2022

i ale

WL 16573746, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2022) (denying motion to recuse due

to plaintiffs “perceived lack of progress of the case since its filing [as]

suggest[ing] bias on the part of [the district judge]” in part because “delays

are inherent in litigation”). Instead, he posits a conclusory and unsupported

assertion that the undersigned is biased against him because of a “running,

bitter controversy” that exists only in his own mind. As such, a reasonable

person, with knowledge of all the facts in this case, would not conclude that

the undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Accordingly,

the Court will deny Talbert’s motion to recuse or transfer this case to the

Western District.

B. Talbert’s Motion for a Default Judgment

On December 8, 2023, Talbert filed a document that he titled as

“Plaintiffs motion for Default Judgment.” (Doc. 47.) Despite this title, this

document was a combined request for the Clerk of Court to enter default

against Dr. Glushakow and Centurion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55(a) and grant judgment in Talbert’s favor. (/d.) The Court will

direct the Clerk of Court not to enter default in Talbert’s favor and will deny

the motion for a default judgment.

Rule 55, which governs the process for default judgments, has two (2)

steps. First, a plaintiff must request that the Clerk of Court enter default

. 29:

against a nonresponding defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a

party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to

plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,

the clerk must enter the party’s default.”); Universitas Educ., LLC v.

Granderson, 98 F.4th 357, 377 (1st Cir. 2024) (“Rule 55 provides a two-step

process for default judgment. Step one is entry of default under Rule

55(a)... .”). Once the Clerk of Court enters default, unless “the plaintiff's

claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,”

the plaintiff may proceed to the second step, and “apply to the court for a

default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), (2).

As stated above, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to deny

entering default against Dr. Glushakow and Centurion because Talbert's

request for entry of default is deficient. In the Order issued directing the Clerk

of Court to send copies of Talbert’s amended complaint and waiver of service

forms to Defendants, Talbert was directed to “correct [the] deficiency” if

“service is unable to be completed due to [his] failure to . . . provide an

accurate mailing address.” (Doc. 23 at 1.) The envelopes containing copies

of the amended complaint and waiver of service forms sent to Dr. Glushakow

and Centurion were returned as undeliverable. (Docs. 27, 30.) At that point,

it was incumbent upon Talbert to “correct this deficiency.” (Doc. 23 at 1.)

- 30 -

Instead, Talbert took no action to serve Dr. Glushakow and Centurion

thereafter, such as requesting the Clerk of Court to issue summonses for

those Defendants.’ Since Talbert did not show that Dr. Glushakow and

Centurion were properly served with his amended complaint in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they could not have been in default

at the time Talbert requested that the Clerk of Court enter default against

them.

The Court also notes that Talbert represented in his request for entry

of default that “Centurion and [Dr.] Glushakow . . . acted in bad faith by

willfully failing to enter an appearance, waive service, and file a responsive

pleading.” (Doc. 47 at 1.) Talbert has not supported these assertions with

any evidence, and he is the individual who failed to serve them with his

amended complaint. Therefore, any entry of default against Dr. Glushakow

or Centurion would be improper and unjustified.

7 Talbert was not entitled to an order directing that the United States

Marshals serve summonses and his amended complaint on Dr. Glushakow

and Centurion because he is not proceeding in forma pauperis in this action.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (providing that “[t]he court must [order that service

be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person

specially appointed by the court] if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915”). Therefore, it was incumbent upon

him, and not the Court, to take appropriate steps to ensure that Dr.

Glushakow and Centurion were timely served with his amended complaint.

-31-

As for Talbert’s motion for a default judgment, he is not entitled to a

default judgment because default has not yet been entered (and will not be

entered at this time) against Dr. Glushakow and Centurion. Accordingly, the

Court will deny Talbert’s motion for a default judgment as well.

C. Talbert’s Motion for Summary Judgment and_ the

Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion for an Extension of

Time to File a Response to the Motion for Summary

Judgment

Almost three (3) weeks after the Commonwealth Defendants filed their

motion to dismiss in this case, and before the Medical Defendants had

counsel enter appearances on their behalf, Talbert filed a motion for

summary judgment and a supporting brief. (Docs. 36, 37.) Two (2) days later,

the Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion seeking an extension of time

to file a response to Talbert’s motion for summary judgment until after the

Court resolves their motion to dismiss (Doc. 39.) The Court will deny without

prejudice Talbert’s motion for summary judgment because it is premature

and will deny as moot the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion for an

extension of time.

As indicated above, Talbert filed his motion for summary judgment

before Defendants filed a responsive pleading in the case. Regarding

motions for summary judgment filed in the pleadings phase of a case, the

Court notes that:

39 .

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[uJnless a

different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a

party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until

30 days after the close of all discovery.” [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).]

Analyzing the text of Rule 56, it is clear that “[nJothing precludes

either party from moving for summary judgment before the

defendant answers the complaint.” [Rule 56. Summary

Judgment, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and

Commentary (Feb. 2021).] That said, “[w]hether a motion is

appropriate so early in the case depends on the circumstances.”

[/d.] The advisory committee instructs that “[a]lthough the rule

allows a motion for summary judgment to be filed at the

commencement of an action, in many cases, the motion will be

premature until the nonmovant has had time to file a responsive

pleading or other pretrial proceedings have been had.” [Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes (2010); see a/so Rule 56.

Summary Judgment, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules

and Commentary (Feb. 2021) (“It generally does not make sense

for the court to act on plaintiff motions filed before the defendant

answers. In most cases, it is preferable to wait and see whether

the defendant is opposing the complaint and on what basis.”).]

The decision of whether to consider or dismiss as premature a

plaintiffs motion for summary judgment filed before a

defendant's answer is left to the sound discretion of the District

Court. [See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes (2010)

(“Scheduling orders or other pretrial orders can regulate timing

to fit the needs of the case.”); see also Ferreiras v. York County,

Pennsylvania, No. 04-cv-1799, 2006 WL 1967365, at *2 (July 12,

2006) (“[T]he district court is empowered with discretion to decide

whether the movant's motion [for summary judgment] is ripe.”).]

Kendall v. EQT AMD LLC, No. 21-cv-1491, 2021 WL 5866597, at *1 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 10, 2021) (internal footnotes omitted) (all alterations other than

insertions of citations in original).

Here, Talbert’s motion for summary judgment is premature because he

filed it prior to the Medical Defendants being served, during the briefing

- 33.

period for the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss, prior to any

Defendant filing a responsive pleading, and prior to discovery. Under these

circumstances, the Court

must first assess the merits of . . . Defendants’ motion[s] to

dismiss. If the motion[s are] denied (at least in part), the Court

will then instruct . . . Defendants to file their responsive pleadings

in the form of an Answer. [See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(a)(4).] At

that point, [Talbert] may elect to seek judicial resolution of certain

or all facets of the case, either in the form of a Rule 56 motion for

summary judgment or a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the

pleadings.

There is an order to these things. [Talbert’s] attempt to bypass

that order with “[a] premature motion for summary judgment is

unhelpful to both the parties and the Court.” [Sam Mannino

Enters., Inc. v. CIT Railcar Funding Co., LLC, No. 19-cv-2075,

2021 WL 2376662, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2021).]

Kendall, 2021 WL 5866597, at *1 (internal footnotes omitted) (all alterations

other than insertions of citations in original). Therefore, the Court will deny

without prejudice Talbert’s motion for summary judgment and deny as moot

the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion for an extension of time because

they need not file any response to Talbert’s motion.

D. Talbert’s Motions for Preliminary Injunctive Relief

1. Talbert’s “Motion to Renew Motion for Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order”

On September 11, 2023, Talbert moved to have the Court issue an

“order setting a date at its earliest convenience for his filed Motion for

- 34 -

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (E[CF] No. 18).”

(Doc. 26 at 1.) The Court will deem this motion withdrawn due to Talbert's

failure to file a brief in support of the motion in accordance with the Court's

Local Rules. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5 (“Within fourteen (14) days after the filing

of any motion, the party filing the motion shall file a brief in support of the

motion. . . . If a supporting brief is not filed within the time provided in this

rule the motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”). Even if the Court did not

deem this motion withdrawn, the Court would deny it because Judge

Kearney denied Talbert’s motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order, see (Doc. 19), so there was no motion upon which to set a

date for a hearing.

2. Talbert’s December 4, 2023 Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction

Talbert filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a supporting brief

on December 4, 2023. (Docs. 45, 46.) The Court will deny this motion as

moot due to Talbert’s filing another motion for a preliminary injunction with a

supporting brief on April 26, 2024. (Docs. 66, 67.); see, e.g., Casey v. Dixon,

No. 22-cv-69, 2022 WL 4370451, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2022) (denying

plaintiffs second motion for a preliminary injunction as moot in light of

plaintiff's filing of a third motion for a preliminary injunction), report and

. 35 -

recommendation adopted and modified on other grounds sub nom., Casey

v. Proctor, 2022 WL 4369979 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2022).

Even if the Court was not denying this motion as moot, it would be

denied on its merits. In this motion, Talbert seeks an injunction to stop

“Defendants and those acting in participation and concert with them from: (i)

depriving [him] the treatment and housing ordered and imposed by the

sentencing court[;] and (ii) depriving [him] the same privileges that other

inmates receive in long-term Administrative Custody and/or General

Population.” (Doc. 46 at 7.) As evidenced by these requests, Talbert is not

seeking to merely preserve the status quo. Rather, he is seeking to have this

Court order Defendants to alter the status quo, which is a mandatory

preliminary injunction. See Mandatory Injunction, Black’s Law Dictionary

(12th ed. 2024) (defining a “mandatory injunction” as “[a]n injunction that

compels a party to do some act or mandates a specified course of conduct”

and noting that “[cJourts are typically more reluctant to grant a mandatory

injunction than a prohibitory one”). “A party seeking a mandatory preliminary

injunction that will alter the status quo bears a particularly heavy burden in

demonstrating its necessity.” Acierno v. New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 653

(3d Cir. 1994).

- 36 -

Talbert fails to satisfy his “heavy burden” to demonstrate the necessity

of his requested injunctive relief. Even if the Court presumed that Talbert

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his claims

in the amended complaint, he has not shown irreparable harm. “[A]n

injunction cannot issue to simply eliminate the possibility of a future

denigration in [a prisoner-plaintiffs] mental health or as a redress for past

harms.” Thomas v. Little, No. 22-cv-2246, 2024 WL 3295584, at *6 (E.D. Pa.

July 3, 2024). Talbert presents no plausible argument or evidence that he is

in an “imminent emergency that would necessitate this extraordinary form of

relief.” /d.8 Because Talbert does not satisfy the irreparable-harm factor for

issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court will not evaluate the remaining

factors, and will deny his motion for a preliminary injunction.

8 It is unclear that Talbert remains in any RHU to date. He has, since

the filing of this motion for a preliminary injunction, been transferred from

Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Forest (“SCI Forest’) to SCI

Phoenix via a notice submitted on February 27, 2024 (Doc. 60). Then from

SCI Phoenix back to SCI Forest via a notice submitted on March 12, 2024

(Doc. 61). Then again from SCI Forest to SCI Phoenix via a notice submitted

on July 1, 2024 (Doc. 71). And finally, from SCI Phoenix to Pennsylvania

State Correctional Institution Fayette via a notice submitted on July 22, 2024

(Doc. 74). See Miller v. Hartwell, 834 F. App’x 692, 694 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“Because [plaintiff] has been transferred from the facility at which the named

defendants oversaw his medical care, he can demonstrate neither likelihood

of success on the merits of his claim for prospective injunctive relief nor

irreparable injury from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and therefore

both are equally moot.”).

. 37 <

3. Talbert’s April 26, 2024 Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction

In Talbert’s motion for a preliminary injunction and supporting brief

docketed on April 26, 2024,° he seeks a preliminary injunction:

1. [E]njoining Defendants from using Disciplinary Segregation

beyond 30 days as a punishment, and alternatively place

inmates under long-term administrative segregation upon

their 30th day.

2. [E]njoining Defendants from using Disciplinary Segregation as

a means to punish inmates for their mental health behavior,

and alternatively place them in 24 hour [sic] psychiatric

observation cells until their behavior becomes stable.

3. [C]lease the practice of Disciplinary Segregation altogether

and just use Administrative Segregation as a means to

punish.

(Doc. 67 at 15-16.) As with his prior motion for a preliminary injunction,

Talbert is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction and, thus, has a heavy

burden to satisfy to obtain his requested relief. Talbert again has failed to

satisfy that burden. In addition, this motion presents two other bases upon

which to deny him relief.

Talbert once again fails to demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable

harm without injunctive relief for the same reasons discussed above.

° Talbert filed a motion for leave to exceed the page limitations under

the Local Rules for his supporting brief. (Doc. 68.) The Court will grant this

motion.

- 38 -

Additionally, Talbert lacks standing under Article Ill of the United States

Constitution to obtain his first two (2) requested forms of injunctive relief

insofar as he is seeking relief on behalf of other inmates. See Weaver v.

Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Courts have held consistently that

an inmate does not have standing to sue on behalf of [their] fellow

prisoners.”). In this regard, “a plaintiff must assert his or her own legal

interests rather than those of a third party [to have standing to bring a claim].”

Twp. of Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir.

2001); see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991) (“In the ordinary

course, a litigant... cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests

of third parties.”).

Finally, Talbert’s third form of requested preliminary injunctive relief

exceeds his allegations in the amended complaint. There are neither legal

claims nor factual allegations in the amended complaint that would warrant

Talbert’s requested change to how the DOC disciplines all inmates. Instead,

his amended complaint generally involves, inter alia, the lack of appropriate

mental health treatment for his behavioral issues that he has received. See

generally (Doc. 17 at 1-17). A party cannot demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits when their request for injunctive relief has no relation

to the operative complaint. See Moneyham v. Ebbert, 723 F. App’x 89, 92

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(3d Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (“The District Court was correct to deny this

requested injunction because it involved allegations unrelated to the

complaint”). Accordingly, for all the above reasons, the Court will deny this

motion for a preliminary injunction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will (1) deem the first of

Talbert’s motions for a preliminary injunction withdrawn due to his failure to

file a brief in support of the motion in accordance with the Local Rules, (2)

deny his other two (2) motions for a preliminary injunction, (3) deny without

prejudice his motion for summary judgment as premature, (4) deny his

motion for a default judgment and direct the Clerk of Court not to enter default

against Dr. Glushakow and Centurion, (5) grant Talbert’s motion to exceed

the page limitations for his brief in support of his motion for recusal, (6) deny

Talbert’s motion for recusal or to transfer of this action to the Western District,

and (7) deny as moot Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file a

response to Talbert's motion for summary judgment. Although not

referenced above, the Court will also grant Defendants’ motion to stay

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discovery pending resolution of their motion to dismiss.'° An appropriate

Order follows.

dis E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 31, 2025

23-1338-01

10 The Court will address Defendants separately filed motions to

dismiss the amended complaint (Docs. 34, 58) via a separate Memorandum

and Order. Nevertheless, the Court will grant this motion to stay discovery

pending resolution of those motions.

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