Seagle v. The City Hueytown, Alabama

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY M. SEAGLE, }

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Plaintiff,

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} Case No.: 2:23-CV-582-MHH

vs.

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THE CITY OF HUEYTOWN,

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ALABAMA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Timothy M. Seagle filed this lawsuit against The City of

Hueytown, Alabama, Mayor Steve Ware, Mike Yarbrough, Sgt. Chad Mitchell,

Officer Todd Easterwood, Three Unidentified Hueytown Police Officers, and

Catherine Lawrence Snow. Mr. Seagle alleges several claims, all stemming from

his arrest in 2021. (Doc. 1). The City, Mayor Ware, Chief Yarbrough, Sgt. Mitchell,

Officer Easterwood, and Ms. Snow have filed motions to dismiss this action. (Docs.

14, 18, 28, 31). Mr. Seagle has filed a motion for default judgment against Ms.

Snow. (Doc. 26).

To address these motions, the Court first describes the legal standard for

motions to dismiss. Then, applying that legal standard, the Court summarizes Mr.

Seagle’s factual allegations. Finally, the Court examines Mr. Seagle’s claims against

the defendants to determine which claims may proceed.

I.

Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the “liberal

pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). A Rule 8(a)(2) statement of a claim “need only ‘give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson, 551

U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2009)).

“Thus, the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

evaluates the plausibility of the facts alleged, and the notice stemming from a

complaint’s allegations.” Keene v. Prine, 477 Fed. Appx. 575, 583 (11th Cir. 2012).

“Where those two requirements are met . . . the form of the complaint is not

significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be granted, even if it fails to

categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim.” Keene, 477 Fed. Appx.

at 583.

This is particularly true with respect to pro se complaints. Courts must

liberally construe pro se documents. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A district court must

hold a pro se complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976)). Still, a district court “may not serve as de facto counsel for a party, or …

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Ausar-El ex.

rel. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of America) Home Loans Servicing LP, 448 Fed. Appx.

1, 2 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court accepts as

true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v. Jiangbo Pharms. Inc., 781 F.3d 1296, 1301

(11th Cir. 2015). In doing so, the court recognizes that facts may develop during

discovery that tell a different story.

II.

Viewing Mr. Seagle’s allegations in the light most favorable to him, he asserts

that he and Ms. Snow were involved in a romantic relationship for more than a year.

(Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 9). In January 2021, Mr. Seagle and Ms. Snow had a disagreement,

and she punched him in the chest. (Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 10). Afterwards, Mr. Seagle and

Ms. Snow blocked each other on social media. (Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 11). One week after

the disagreement, Mr. Seagle learned that Ms. Snow had posted derogatory remarks

about him on her Facebook page and had published details of their altercation. (Doc.

1, p. 3, ¶ 11). Ms. Snow privately admitted to Mr. Seagle via text message that she

assaulted him. (Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 10).

Ms. Snow contacted the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department and filed a false

incident report. In the report, Ms. Snow falsely asserted that Mr. Seagle posed a

danger to her. (Doc. 1, pp. 3–4, ¶ 12). The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department

sent patrol officers to monitor the parking lot of Ms. Snow’s apartment complex to

make sure that Mr. Seagle was not stalking her. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 12). All the while,

Ms. Snow was contacting Mr. Seagle, meeting him at bars, clubs, restaurants, and

home. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 12). Ms. Snow initiated every contact. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 12).

On May 14, 2021, while Mr. Seagle was visiting Sportster’s Bar & Grill, Ms.

Snow parked her car next to his. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 15). The cars were parked under a

security camera. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 15). When Mr. Seagle returned to Sportster’s Bar

& Grill on May 19, the owner told him that Ms. Snow had reported that someone

had tampered with her car. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 17). Ms. Snow had a cell-phone recording

of the bar’s security camera footage showing Mr. Seagle walking near her car. (Doc.

1, p. 5, ¶ 17). Mr. Seagle shared the video footage with the Hueytown Police

Department. (Doc. 1, pp. 5–9, 11–12). Hueytown’s District Attorney, Teresa

Hester, and Hueytown Magistrate, Rebecca Henderson, used the clip as the basis for

an arrest warrant for Mr. Seagle. (Doc. 1, pp. 7–8, ¶ 26). According to Mr. Seagle,

Chief Yarbrough and Sgt. Mitchell knew or should have known that the arrest

warrant was invalid, but they arrested him anyway on May 24, 2021 for domestic

violence. (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 12, ¶¶ 18, 40).

Mr. Seagle alleges that Magistrate Henderson instructed Ms. Snow to file a

protection from abuse motion. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 27). Mr. Seagle asserts that

Magistrate Henderson instructed Ms. Snow to do so to conceal the unlawful warrant

for his arrest. (Doc. 1, p. 12, ¶ 41).

After his arrest, Mr. Seagle posted bail at Hueytown City Hall with the help

of his neighbor, Barry Higginbotham. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 18). Mr. Seagle alleges that

while speaking with his bail bondsman in the City Hall, two unidentified Hueytown

police officers accused Mr. Higginbotham of being an alcoholic, a drug addict, and

a drug dealer, and threatened to arrest Mr. Higginbotham for trespassing if he

returned to Hueytown City Hall. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 18). According to Mr. Seagle, Ms.

Hester eventually admitted that the video footage that Ms. Snow used to obtain an

arrest warrant for Mr. Seagle was “a legally invalid copy,” and Judge Thrash

dismissed the criminal charge against Mr. Seagle in March 2023. (Doc. 1, p. 12, ¶

40).

Based on these alleged events, Mr. Seagle states fourteen claims against the

defendants. He asserts Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims against all defendants;

a Fifth Amendment claim against Ms. Snow and the City; a “deliberate indifference

through custom” claim against the City, Mayor Ware, and Chief Yarborough; an

inadequate training and supervision claim against the City, Mayor Ware, and Chief

Yarborough; a defamation claim against Chief Yarborough, Sgt. Mitchell, Officer

Easterwood, the three unidentified officers, the City, and Ms. Snow under Alabama

Code § 13A-11-163; a malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution claim

against Ms. Snow, Chief Yarborough, Sgt. Mitchell, Officer Easterwood, and the

City; Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims against Ms.

Snow, Chief Yarborough, Sgt. Mitchell, Officer Easterwood, and the City; a First

and Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of the right to freedom of association

against Ms. Snow; willful infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and

domestic violence against Ms. Snow. (Doc. 1, pp. 15–19). Mr. Seagle names Mayor

Ware, Chief Yarbrough, Sgt. Mitchell, and Officer Easterwood in their official and

individual capacities.

III.

Fictitious Party Practice

Mr. Seagle asserts claims against three unidentified Hueytown police officers.

Generally, fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal courts. FED. R. CIV. P.

10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties.”); see also Estate of

West v. Smith, 9 F.4th 1361, 1368 n.6 (11th Cir. 2021) (“As a general matter,

fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”) (quoting Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010)). There is a limited exception to this

rule. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

There may be times when, for one reason or another, the plaintiff is

unwilling or unable to use a party’s real name. Also, one may be able

to describe an individual (e.g., the driver of an automobile) without

stating his name precisely or correctly.

Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Cf.

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding a pro se

improperly named a fictitious party when the plaintiff merely “identified the

defendant as ‘John Doe (Unknown Legal Name), Guard, Charlotte Correctional

Institute”).

Here, Mr. Seagle has not sufficiently described the three unidentified police

officers to maintain claims against those defendants. Aside from the caption and

introductory paragraph, Mr. Seagle mentions the unnamed officers twice in his

complaint. Mr. Seagle alleges that he encountered two of the unnamed officers on

May 24, 2021, in the Hueytown Police Department parking lot when he returned

from posting bail and found the officers standing on the passenger side of his car,

arguing with his neighbor. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 18). Mr. Seagle overheard his neighbor

tell the officers that he was a witness in Mr. Seagle’s false arrest case. (Doc. 1, p. 5,

¶ 18). Mr. Seagle has not described identifying physical characteristics of the

officers or provided other details to assist in identifying these two officers.

Mr. Seagle alleges that he encountered the third unnamed officer on

September 16, when the officer refused to let Mr. Seagle’s neighbor enter the

Hueytown municipal courtroom so he could serve as Mr. Seagle’s witness. (Doc. 1,

p. 10, ¶ 32). Again, Mr. Seagle has not provided details describing this officer.

Supplying an unnamed defendant’s occupation and employer is not sufficient to

satisfy fictitious party exception’s specificity requirement when the employer has

many employees who fit the general description. See Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738.

If nothing more were required, the exception would swallow the rule. Consequently,

the Court will dismiss Mr. Seagle’s claims against these three defendants without

prejudice. If Mr. Seagle identifies the officers during discovery and wishes to pursue

claims against them, he may ask for permission to amend his complaint to name

them.

Official Capacity Claims

Mr. Seagle asserts federal and state-law claims against the City and several

city officials. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “suits against a municipal

officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are

functionally equivalent.” Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405

F.3d 1298, 1303 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). “[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983

in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply ‘another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931

F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985)). “A municipality can be sued directly under § 1983 when one of its customs,

practices, or policies causes a constitutional injury.” Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d

1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). “Because suits against a municipal officer sued in

his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally

equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against

local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly.”

Busby, 931 F.2d at 776; see Abusaid, 405 F.3d 1298 at 1302 n. 3 (stating that when

an officer is sued in his official capacity, the officer’s employer is the proper party

to the action).

Because Mr. Seagle has sued the City of Hueytown, the Court will dismiss his

official capacity claims against Mayor Ware, Chief Yarborough, Sgt. Mitchell, and

Officer Easterwood.

Constitutional Claims against the City

In Counts 1–5, 7, and 9–11, Mr. Seagle asserts claims against the City under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for several alleged constitutional violations. To succeed in a claim

against a municipality, a plaintiff must identify an official policy or an unofficial

municipal custom or practice that produced the alleged violation. Knight ex rel. Kerr

v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir. 2017). Either way, “a plaintiff

must show that the [municipality] ‘has authority and responsibility over the

governmental function in issue’ and must also ‘identify those officials who speak

with final policymaking authority for that local governmental entity concerning the

act alleged to have caused the particular constitutional violation in issue.’” Knight,

856 F.3d at 819 (citations omitted). Here, Mr. Seagle must allege that the City has

a custom or practice of allowing the constitutional violations he identifies and that

the City’s custom is “the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Knight,

856 F.3d at 819; McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Mr. Seagle alleges that the City has a criminal policy of “arresting[] and

convicting every person[] accused of committing domestic violence,” which

“involves the concealment of exculpatory evidence, the fabrication, and/or

spoilation of inculpatory evidence, the introduction of known, legally-invalid

evidence, and the criminal intimidation of defense witnesses.” (Doc. 1, p. 10, ¶ 32).

Quoting Rasche v. Village of Beecher, 336 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2000), Mr. Seagle

argues that the City has an “unconstitutional custom or policy which creates

municipal liability, and results from widespread practice that although not

authorized by written law, nor express municipal policy, is so well settled as to

constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with force of law.” (Doc. 1, p. 13, ¶ 42) (emphasis in

complaint).

These conclusory allegations are not sufficient to identify a municipal policy

or practice. Mr. Seagle’s allegations pertain to either his or Mr. Higginbotham’s

interactions with City officials. Mr. Seagle has not identified arrests other than his

for domestic violence, and he has not identified a conviction, not even his own.

Rather, Mr. Seagle acknowledges in his complaint the Judge Thrasher dismissed the

domestic violence charge in his case. (Doc. 1, p. 12, ¶ 40). As the Supreme Court

has held, formulaic recitations of the law and legal conclusions cannot establish a

plausible claim against a defendant. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Counts 1–5, 7, and 9–11 against the City.

State-law Claims against the City

In Counts 6, 8, and 13, Mr. Seagle alleges against the City state-law claims

for defamation, malicious abuse of process/prosecution, and willful infliction of

emotional distress. Under Alabama Code § 11-47-190, “[n]o city or town shall be

liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation,

unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness,

or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality engaged in

work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty[.]” The Alabama

Supreme Court has held that under this statute, a city may not be held liable for

intentional torts that a municipal official allegedly commits. See Ex parte City of

Gadsden, 718 So. 2d 716, 721 (Ala. 1998); see also Ex parte Labbe, 156 So. 3d 368,

374 (Ala. 2014) (citing Ala. Code § 11-47-190).

The state-law claims that Mr. Seagle asserts against the City are intentional

torts. To state a malicious prosecution claim or a malicious abuse of process claim,

a plaintiff must plausibly allege, among other things, that the wrongdoer acted with

malice. Moon v. Pillion, 2 So. 3d 842, 845 (Ala. 2008) (malicious prosecution);

Willis v. Parker, 814 So. 2d 857, 866 (Ala. 2001) (malicious abuse of process).

Likewise, a willful or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim involves an

intentional act. Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172 (Ala. 2011); Harris v.

McDavid, 553 So. 2d 567, 569–570 (Ala. 1989).1 And defamation is an intentional

tort under Alabama law. Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2023)

(citing Gary v. Crouch, 867 So. 2d 310, 313 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So.

3d 192, 202–03 (Ala. 2022); Slack v. Stream, 988 So. 2d 516, 531 (Ala. 2008)).

Therefore, the Court grants the City’s motion to dismiss Mr. Seagle’s state-

law claims against it under § 11-47-190 because the City has state-agent immunity

for those claims. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1192–93.

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Mr. Seagle’s claims against

the City.

Constitutional Claims against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarborough

In Count 4, Mr. Seagle alleges that Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough were

deliberately indifferent to their officers’ deprivations of his rights. (Doc. 1, p. 15, ¶

1 Intentional infliction of emotional distress is also known as the tort of outrage under Alabama

law. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 836 (Ala. 2003).

55). In Count 5, Mr. Seagle alleges that Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough

inadequately trained and supervised the Hueytown Police Officers who harmed him.

(Doc. 1, p. 16, ¶ 57). These constitutional claims are supervisory liability claims.2

Typically, a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a government official

who allegedly violated his constitutional rights must establish that official was acting

under color of state law and that the official’s conduct caused the plaintiff to be

deprived of a federal right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). For

supervisory liability claims under § 1983 claims, the legal standard is more rigorous.

Christmas v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

A supervisor is not liable for the acts of subordinates under traditional respondeat

superior or vicarious liability theories. Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1355. Rather, “[a]

supervisor is liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only if she ‘personally

participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct’ or causes the constitutional

violation.” A.W. ex rel. J.W. v. Coweta Cnty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.4th 1309, 1316 (11th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1355). Mr. Seagle does not allege that

Mayor Ware or Chief Yarbrough personally participated in the constitutional

violations he alleges, so Mr. Seagle’s constitutional claims against these defendants

may proceed only if he adequately alleges that Mayor Ware or Chief Yarbrough

2 Counts 1–3 and 11 which Mr. Seagle asserts against “all defendants” also are supervisory liability

claims with respect to Mayor Ware and Chief Yarborough.

caused the alleged constitutional violations. See Coweta Cnty., 110 F.4th at 1316.

To meet this pleading requirement, Mr. Seagle must allege that “a history of

widespread abuse put[] the supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and he fail[ed] to do so.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048

(11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Alternatively, Mr. Seagle may meet the pleading

requirement by alleging that Mayor Ware and/or Chief Yarbrough’s “custom or

policy result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights” or that either

defendant (or both) “directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Keith,

749 F.3d at 1048 (citation omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread

abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant,

and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048

(citation omitted).

In Count 4, Mr. Seagle alleges that Mayor Ware and Chief Yarborough “have

tolerated the continued, and illegal seizures of the citizens of its community, such

that the conduct is so persistent and widespread, as to constitute custom and policy

of the City, and the Police Dept.” (Doc. 1, p. 16, ¶ 55). He states that Mayor Ware

and Chief Yarbrough received notice of the officers’ crimes against him and against

his neighbor, Mr. Higginbotham, but failed to take any corrective action. (Doc. 1,

p. 15, ¶ 55). These allegations are not sufficient to support a supervisory liability

claim against Mayor Ware or Chief Yarbrough for deliberate indifference.

First, when he asserts that Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough have tolerated

constitutional deprivations so that the deprivations have become customary, Mr.

Seagle merely restates the law and provides “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action,” and that “will not do” under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Mr. Seagle has not alleged facts which, if proven, would provide evidence of

widespread constitutional violations. The only misconduct Mr. Seagle describes in

his complaint is purported misconduct directed to him and to Mr. Higginbotham.

(Doc. 1, p. 15, ¶ 55). This alleged conduct does not support an allegation of

“widespread abuse” or an allegation that Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough knew of

allegedly prevalent violations. See Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048. Therefore, Mr. Seagle

has not plausibly alleged a deliberate indifference claims against Mayor Ware and

Chief Yarborough in their individual capacities under a supervisory liability theory.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count 4 without prejudice.

With respect to Mr. Seagle’s failure to adequately train and supervise claim

in Count 5, a supervisor’s “culpability for a deprivation of rights is at most tenuous

where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). A plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation

under a failure to train theory “‘must demonstrate that the supervisor had actual or

constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program cause[d] [his

or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights,’ and that armed with that

knowledge the supervisor chose to retain the training program.” Keith, 749 F.3d at

1052 (alteration in original) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). “To establish that

supervisor was on actual or constructive notice of the deficiency of training, ‘[a]

pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily

necessary.’” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053.

Mr. Seagle has not alleged facts to support his failure to train and failure to

supervise claims against Mayor Ware or Chief Yarbrough. In his complaint, Mr.

Seagle summarily states that these defendants “failed to adequately train[] and

supervise the Hueytown Police Officers” in various areas, which “resulted in injuries

to [Mr. Seagle] and his witnesses.” (Doc. 1, p. 16, ¶ 57). Mr. Seagle states that

Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough inadequately trained Hueytown officers on

“arrest warrant procedures; [d]ue diligence in the proper investigation of criminal

complaints, and evidence; [i]llegal seizures without probable cause; [t]he criminal

intimidation of witnesses; and the constitutional rights of their citizens,” but he does

not allege facts that could constitute a pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees. See Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052. Therefore, the Court will

dismiss Count 5.

In two of the counts that Mr. Seagle asserts against “all defendants,” Counts

1 and 2, Mr. Seagle asserts a § 1983 claim unlawful seizure, false arrest, and false

imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. “A claim of false arrest or imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment

concerns seizures without legal process, such as warrantless arrests.” Williams v.

Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020). In contrast, a wrongful arrest made

pursuant to legal process (a warrant) constitutes malicious prosecution. Williams,

965 F.3d at 1168. Here, Mr. Seagle challenges his arrest which officers made

pursuant to a warrant. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 18).3 As such, Mr. Seagle’s claims for false

arrest and false imprisonment substantively are a claim for malicious prosecution.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim turns on the validity of the

legal process. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162. To authorize an arrest warrant, a judicial

officer must have “sufficient information to support an independent judgment that

probable cause exists for the warrant.” Luke v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90, 95 (11th Cir.

2022) (citation omitted). An officer “ordinarily does not violate the Fourth

Amendment when he executes a facially valid arrest warrant, regardless of whether

facts known to the officer support probable cause.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162. To

establish a malicious prosecution claim against an individual other than the judicial

officer issuing the warrant, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the legal process

justifying his seizure was constitutionally infirm and (2) that his seizure would not

3 Though it is not entirely clear in the complaint, it appears that Mr. Seagle turned himself in after

receiving notice that a warrant was issued for his arrest. This is immaterial to the Court’s analysis

of a malicious prosecution claim.

otherwise be justified without legal process.” Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120, 1133

(11th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).

Here, Mr. Seagle has not alleged facts that plausibly give rise to a malicious

prosecution claim under a supervisory liability theory. Mr. Seagle has not alleged

facts that show a history of invalid arrest warrants about which Mayor Ware or Chief

Yarbrough knew or should have known. See Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048. Similarly,

Mr. Seagle has not identified or otherwise described a “custom or policy resulting in

deliberate indifference” towards the issuance or execution of invalid arrest warrants.

He has also not alleged facts to support an inference that Mayor Ware or Chief

Yarbrough directed the individual officers to unlawfully arrest citizens. See Keith,

749 F.3d at 1048. For example, Mr. Seagle summarily states that “he was subjected

to an Illegal Seizure, and False Arrest on May 26th, 2021, by the Defendant,

Catherine L. Snow, and all other[] named defendants.” (Doc. 1, p. 15, ¶ 49). This

is insufficient to plausibly state a malicious prosecution claim under a supervisory

liability theory against a supervisor, even construed liberally. Therefore, the Court

will dismiss Counts 1 and 2 against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough.

In Count 3, Mr. Seagle alleges that “all [] named defendants” violated his

constitutional rights by conspiring to intimidate his witness. (Doc. 1, p. 15).4 “A

4 Mr. Seagle articulates the same conspiracy theory in Count 2, so the analysis for Count 3 applies

equally to Count 2.

plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by

showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying

constitutional right.” Worthy v. City of Phenix City, 930 F.3d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir.

2019) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must allege that “the defendants reached an

understanding to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that an actionable

wrong occurred.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1224 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Mr. Seagle’s allegations fail to plausibly establish a conspiracy claim against

Mayor Ware or Chief Yarbrough. Mr. Seagle has not alleged facts the demonstrate

an agreement or understanding between the defendants to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. Mr. Seagle summarily states that Ms. Snow “conspired with

employees of the City of Hueytown to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate him.”

(Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ 23). He does not provide allegations to explain the existence or

means of the conspiracy. Therefore the Court will dismiss Count 3 against Mayor

Ware and Chief Yarbrough.

In Count 11, Mr. Seagle asserts a § 1983 claim for violation of the Sixth

Amendment’s speedy trial clause against all defendants, including Mayor Ware and

Chief Yarbrough. (Doc. 1, p. 17). The Sixth Amendment provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have

been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against

him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,

and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

U.S. Const. amend. VI. In determining whether there has been a violation of an

individual’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, a court must consider:

whether a pretrial delay was uncommonly long, whether the government or the

criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether the defendant asserted

his right to speedy trial, and whether the defendant suffered prejudice because of

the delay. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).

Here, Mr. Seagle’s speedy trial claim is moot because Judge Thrash

dismissed the charge against him. See e.g., Powers v. Schwartz, 587 F.2d 783, 783–

84 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the case was moot once the plaintiff was “no longer

a pretrial detainee; [and] has not shown a reasonable probability that she will again

acquire that status in the future”); (see Doc. 1, p. 14, ¶ 47).5 A federal court may

not “give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or declare

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before

it.” Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018). Therefore,

the Court will dismiss Count 11 against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough.

5 Decisions issued by the 5th Circuit before September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in this

Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), overruled on

other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

State-law Claim against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough

In Count 13, Mr. Seagle alleges a willful infliction of emotional distress claim

against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough; this claim is substantively a tort of

outrage claim. See Smitherman, 872 So. 2d at 836. Mr. Seagle alleges that Ms.

Snow “conspire[d] with all [] named defendants to aggravate[] and compound his

serious[] medical conditions.” (Doc. 1, p. 18, ¶ 13). Under Alabama law, “[t]he tort

of outrage is an extremely limited cause of action.” Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172. To

state a plausible claim for outrage, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege “that the

defendant’s conduct ‘(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and

outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person

could be expected to endure it.’” Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172 (citations omitted).

Conduct must be so outrageous and so extreme that it extends “beyond all possible

bounds of human decency” and is “regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a

civilized society.” Little, 72 So. 3d at 1173 (citations omitted).

Mr. Seagle has not plausibly pleaded a claim for outrage against Mayor Ware

and Chief Yarbrough. He does not allege that either engaged in conduct directed at

him, much less conduct that was so extreme as to give rise to this narrow cause of

action. Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172. Consequently, the Court will dismiss Count 13

against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough.

Claims against Sargeant Mitchell and Officer Easterwood

As discussed, the Court must examine Mr. Seagle’s Fourth Amendment

claims in Counts 1 and 2 as a malicious prosecution claim. Because there was a

warrant for Mr. Seagle’s arrest, to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, Mr.

Seagle must allege: “(1) that the legal process justifying his seizure was

constitutionally infirm and (2) that his seizure would not otherwise be justified

without legal process.” Harris, 102 F.4th at 1133 (citations omitted). Mr. Seagle

has not alleged facts to satisfy either requirement. He has not alleged facts to support

his contention that the arrest warrant was unconstitutional, and he has not alleged

that the arrest would be improper without a valid warrant.6 Therefore, the Court will

dismiss Counts 1 and 2 against Sergeant Mitchell and Officer Easterwood.

For Count 3, Mr. Seagle alleges that “all [] named defendants” conspired to

falsely imprison him and intimidate his witness. As noted, to state a § 1983 claim

for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, a plaintiff must allege facts to establish

6 Mr. Seagle alleges that the warrant was based on a video clip that Ms. Snow obtained by using

her cell phone to record a security camera recording that showed him walking near Ms. Snow’s

car. Mr. Seagle asserts that the video recording is inadmissible because “the original video file ad

been destroyed[] and could not be subjected to a forensic examination.” (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 7-8, ¶ 17,

26). The rules of evidence are relaxed for arrest warrants which rest on probable cause. See Turner

v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 581–82 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Probable cause only requires that there be a

substantial chance of criminal activity. We do not require there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt

of an arrestee’s guilt, or even that there be a preponderance of evidence to support arrest. In other

words, [p]robable cause is not a high bar.” (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in

Turner)). Moreover, Mr. Seagle does not contend that the video recording did not depict him.

Rather he contends that the video does not depict him violating the law. (Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 17).

a conspiracy and “the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.”

Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1206 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must allege that “the

defendants reached an understanding to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights

and that an actionable wrong occurred. Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1224 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). Mr. Seagle does not allege how Sgt. Mitchell and

Officer Easterwood reached an understanding to violate his constitutional rights.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count 3 against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer

Easterwood without prejudice.

In Count 6, Mr. Seagle claims that Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood are

liable for defamation. Mr. Seagle alleges that through the acts of Ms. Henderson

and Ms. Snow, Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood “published the lie that [he] had

vandalized . . . [Ms. Snow’s] car, and that [such was] Domestic Violence.” (Doc. 1,

p. 16, ¶ 59). A plaintiff asserting a defamation claim under Alabama law must

plausibly allege: “1) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; 2) an

unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at

least to negligence on the part of the defendant; 4) and either actionability of the

statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the

publication of the statement.” Smitherman, 872 So. 2d at 840 (internal quotations

and citation omitted).

Mr. Seagle has not sufficiently alleged the existence of a publication by Sgt.

Mitchell or Officer Easterwood. Mr. Seagle asserts in a conclusory fashion that

these defendants “repeatedly publish[ed] the lie that [Mr. Seagle] had vandalized

[Ms. Snow’s] car, and that said vandalism constituted Domestic Violence in the

Third Degree,” but the facts that follow pertain to Ms. Snow’s conduct, not the

conduct of these officers. (Doc. 1, p. 16, ¶ 59). Mr. Seagle alleges that Ms. Snow

attempted to provide a flash drive containing purported proof of Mr. Seagle

damaging Ms. Snow’s car during a court appearance, which the judge refused to

receive into evidence. (Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 27). By Mr. Seagle’s own admission, the

judge did not accept the flash drive, so there was an unsuccessful attempt at

publication, and Ms. Snow made the attempt, not Sgt. Mitchell or Officer

Easterwood. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count 6 against Sgt. Mitchell and

Officer Easterwood.

In Count 8, Mr. Seagle alleges that Ms. Snow, Sgt. Mitchell, and Officer

Easterwood, through the actions of Ms. Henderson and Mr. Hester, subjected Mr.

Seagle to malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Although similar

in name, the elements of these torts differ. Abuse of process concerns “‘the wrongful

use of process after it has been issued,” while malicious prosecution “is concerned

with ‘the wrongful issuance of process.’” Hurst v. Cook, 981 So. 2d 1143, 1153

(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (emphasis in Hurst). To plausibly allege a claim for abuse of

process, “a plaintiff must [allege] the existence of an ulterior purpose, the wrongful

use of process, and malice.” Hurst, 981 So. 2d at 1153. To plausibly allege a claim

for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that there was a judicial

proceeding initiated by the present defendant; (2) that it was initiated with malice on

the part of the present defendant; (4) that the judicial proceeding was terminated n

favor of the present plaintiff; and (5) that the present plaintiff suffered damage from

the prosecution of that earlier action.” Ex parte Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Ala.

2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, as Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood correctly point out in their

motion, Mr. Seagle has not alleged that either defendant wrongfully executed legal

process or that either behaved maliciously. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count

8 against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood without prejudice.

In Count 9, Mr. Seagle alleges that Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood

violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. His claim reads:

The Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a Denial of Due Process,

by the Defendant, Catherine L. Snow, the Defendant Officers of the

Hueytown Policy Dept., and the City of Hueytown, through the actions

of Rebecca Henderson and Teresa Hester. As alleged in paragraphs

23-27, and paragraph[s] 32-47.

(Doc. 1, p. 17, ¶ 65) (emphasis in complaint). This conclusory allegation is not

sufficient to assert a claim. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Mr. Seagle’s due

process claim against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood.

As discussed above, Mr. Seagle’s Sixth Amendment claim is moot. See

Gagliardi, 889 F.3d at 733; Powers, 587 F.2d 783, 783–84. Therefore, the Court

will dismiss Count 11 against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood without

prejudice.

In Count 13, Mr. Seagle alleges that Sgt. Mitchell and Officer Easterwood

willfully inflicted emotional distress upon him, meaning these defendants allegedly

committed the tort of outrage. See Smitherman, 872 So. 2d at 836; Keene, 477 Fed.

Appx. At 583. As noted, under Alabama law, this is an extremely narrow tort.

Mr. Seagle asserts that Ms. Snow “conspire[d] with all [] named defendants

to aggravate[] and compound his serious[] medical conditions.” (Doc. 1, p. 18, ¶

13), but he does not identify anything that Sgt. Mitchell or Officer Easterwood

allegedly did to aggravate his medical conditions. Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count 13 against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer

Easterwood without prejudice.

Motion for Default Judgment against Ms. Snow

Mr. Seagle has filed a motion for default judgment against Ms. Snow for her

failure to answer the complaint. (Doc. 26). Before moving for a default judgment,

a plaintiff first must ask the Clerk of Court to enter a default against a defendant.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Mr. Seagle has not taken that preliminary step.

Consequently, the Court will deny Mr. Seagle’s motion for a default judgment.

Ms. Snow’s Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Snow has asked the Court to dismiss Mr. Seagle’s claims against her for

improper service. Ms. Snow contends that her name is not properly stated on the

summons, and the copy of the complaint that she received is missing pages. (Docs.

28, 28-1). To perfect service, a summons must be served with the complaint within

90 days after the complaint is filed. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b), (m). A summons must

contain the name of the court and the parties and be directed to the defendant. FED.

R. CIV. P. 4(a).

Mr. Seagle filed this complaint on May 8, 2023. (Doc. 1). The record

demonstrates that several summonses were issued to Ms. Snow, (See Docs. 5, 8, 12,

22, 25, 29), and were not served successfully for various reasons. (See Docs. 7, 13,

and 24). Given these issues and because Mr. Seagle is pro se, the Court will extend

the time for Mr. Seagle to serve Ms. Snow and deny her motion to dismiss for

improper service.

Before Mr. Seagle attempts to serve Ms. Snow again, the Court must consider

a preliminary matter. Per this opinion and related dismissal orders, (Docs. 33, 34),

Mr. Seagle has not stated claims against the City, Mayor Ware, or the police officers

Mr. Seagle named in his complaint. In his complaint, in addition to his state-law

claims, Mr. Seagle asserts constitutional claims against Ms. Snow pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. With narrow exceptions, § 1983 claims are actionable only against

government officials; generally, private citizens are not proper §1983 defendants.

Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 693–94 (11th Cir. 2021); see also 42 U.S.C.

§1983. To hold a private individual liable under § 1983, “the conduct at issue must

be ‘fairly attributable’ to the state,” meaning the relevant governmental entity.

Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 696 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson

Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)). A private individual’s conduct is “fairly

attributable” to a governmental entity when:

(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action

alleged to violate the Constitution (“State compulsion test”); (2) the

private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the State (“public function test”); or (3) the

State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with

the private parties that it was a joint participant in the enterprise

(“nexus/joint action test”).

Charles, 18 F.4th at 694 (quoting Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341,

1347 (11th Cir. 2001)). Within 21 days, Mr. Seagle shall explain in writing how he

contends his § 1983 claims against Ms. Snow fall under one or more of these three

categories such that he may proceed on his constitutional claims against Ms. Snow.

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Court:

i. dismisses the three unidentified officers as parties to this

matter, (Docs. 18, 34);

ii. dismisses all claims against the City and the defendants named

in their official capacities, (Docs. 14, 33);

ili. dismisses all claims against Mayor Ware and Chief Yarbrough

in their individual capacity, (Docs. 14, 33);

iv. dismisses all claims against Sgt. Mitchell and Officer

Easterling in their individual capacity, (Docs. 14, 33);

v. denies Mr. Seagle’s motion for default judgment against Ms.

Snow, (Docs. 26, 35); and

vi. denies Ms. Snow’s motion to dismiss for improper service,

(Docs. 28, 31, 36, 37); and

vii. orders Mr. Seagle to explain in writing within 21 days how his

federal claims against Ms. Snow may proceed under Charles v.

Johnson.

DONE and ORDERED this April 1, 2025.

debi Si Hosa

Mfaditat

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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