REDENBAUGH v. DUDEK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TABITHA REDENBAUGH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-205

)

LELAND DUDEK,1 )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845

F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because

1 Leland Dudek is substituted as the defendant in this matter, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend

the docket to reflect this change.

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it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff raises several points of alleged error in the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”)’s decision denying her disability benefits. (Doc. No. 11). First, she contends

that the ALJ failed to address relevant evidence of her physical and mental impairments

and erred by relying on her “conservative treatment” to reject her claim. (Id. at 8-17).

Second, she argues the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the medical opinion evidence.

(Id. at 17-22). Third, she contends that the ALJ erred by inadequately analyzing her

obesity and migraine headache impairments, and by failing to adequately address her

testimony. (Id. at 22-25, 28-30). As a result of these asserted errors, Plaintiff posits that

her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding is inaccurate. (Id. at 25-28). For the

following reasons, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence.

Upon reviewing all the evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

following RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b), except that she is limited to occasional climbing, balancing,

stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. She should avoid extreme

cold. She cannot be exposed to moving mechanical parts. The claimant

is able to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, perform

simple, routine tasks, and make simple work related decisions. She

requires a low-stress environment, defined as no production rate pace work,

but rather goal-oriented work with occasional and routine changes in the

work setting. “Routine change” is defined as that which does not require

alteration in work method. She can perform occasional work interacting

with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.

(R. 28). The Court finds this RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence for the

following reasons.

The ALJ addressed all relevant evidence of Plaintiff’s physical impairments.

Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding as to her

walking ability and mental impairments, specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed

harmful error by mischaracterizing the record and failing to discuss relevant evidence as to

these impairments. (Doc. No. 11 at 8-17). As to her walking abilities, Plaintiff contends

the ALJ ignored evidence that she would have trouble walking, including her diagnoses

that would impact her ability to walk and the treating orthopedic surgeon’s opinion that

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Plaintiff had significant limitations in walking and standing. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff

also argues that the ALJ failed to adequately discuss her subjective complaints related to

walking. (Id. at 10-12). The decision, however, shows that the ALJ considered all this

evidence. As to Plaintiff’s diagnoses, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s arthritis, feet and

hip issues, and chronic pain. (R. 29, 31). The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints

of pain but rejected these because Plaintiff had only diffuse muscular tenderness on

examination. (R. 29). Additionally, exams showed Plaintiff could walk with a normal

gait and could walk on her heels and toes without difficulty. (R. 31). The ALJ also

considered the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Carl Hasselman,

M.D., who limited Plaintiff to sedentary work, and the ALJ found it not persuasive. (R.

35). Further, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and rejected

these because they were inconsistent with the evidence. (R. 32-33). Specifically, the

ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s complaints of foot pain were “inconsistent with the June 2021

consultative examination, in which she was able to perform most tasks and ambulate

normally[.]” (R. 33). Accordingly, the ALJ addressed all of the evidence in regard to

Plaintiff’s physical impairments.

Similarly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider

evidence related to her mental impairments. (Doc. No. 11 at 12-16). Plaintiff contends

the ALJ ignored a treating physician opinion, that of Dr. Aleksandr Mikhaylovskiy, M.D.,

that noted she was “quite difficult to manage” because she is “constantly asking questions”

without “listening to the answer” and erred by failing to incorporate social limitations into

her RFC to address these impairments. (Id. at 12 (quoting R. 2907)). Plaintiff argues

this doctor’s notation as to her social limitations was consistent with the record and,

therefore, should have been adopted. (Id. at 12-15). Additionally, Plaintiff contends the

ALJ ignored evidence that she is a hoarder and how this would impact her ability to perform

unskilled work on a regular and continuous basis. (Id. at 16). The Court disagrees.

The ALJ considered records of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Mikhaylovskiy,

noting that Plaintiff visited Dr. Mikhaylovskiy with complaints of mid-back pain radiating

to her chest, but that upon examination she had normal findings and was recommended

physical therapy. (R. 30 (citing Ex. 31F)). While the ALJ did not explicitly note that

Dr. Mikhaylovskiy observed that Plaintiff was “quite difficult to manage” for the reasons

stated above, this is not harmful error as the ALJ is not required to mention every piece of

evidence within the record. Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed. Appx. 743,

747 (3d Cir. 2009). Moreover, the ALJ specifically mentioned Plaintiff’s hoarding

tendencies when analyzing the treatment records from Dr. Megan Boyle, D.N.P. (R. 32).

Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s social limitations and added that Plaintiff be

limited to only occasional work interacting with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.

(R. 28). This was based, in part, on her analysis of the opinion of Dylan McKessey,

LCSW, who opined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would impact her ability to respond

appropriately to supervision, workers, and work pressures. (Ex. 26F/4). The ALJ found

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this statement partially persuasive because there was very little to support the opinion and

it was inconsistent with contemporaneous mental health records. (R. 35). In sum,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and that

the formulated RFC fully accounts for them. Plaintiff does not point to evidence that

would lead the Court to conclude that remand is warranted.

Additionally, the ALJ did not improperly rely on Plaintiff’s “conservative

treatment” to reject her claim for benefits. Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s statement that her

treatment has been “conservative” was not supported by substantial evidence because the

record is almost 5,000 pages long and the Plaintiff has undergone transcranial magnetic

stimulation (“TMS”) treatment to reduce obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”)

symptoms, which involves shocking the brain. (Doc. No. 11 at 16-17). Further,

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to recognize that she suffers from significant mental health

disorders that cause maladaptive thinking and place barriers to her treatment regimen and

that she is petrified to ingest medication due to her tardive dyskinesia. (Id.). Plaintiff

overlooks that the ALJ explained her reasoning for finding that Plaintiff’s treatment was

“generally routine and conservative.” (R. 33). Indeed, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff “was

able to mitigate her depression and other mental symptoms with adherence to medication

and treatment[.]” (R. 33). While this did not specifically note Plaintiff’s TMS

treatment, her maladaptive thinking, or her aversion to medication, the ALJ was aware of

Plaintiff’s tardive dyskinesia, mental disorders, and treatments as she noted these

throughout her decision. (R. 31, 32, 33 (noting Plaintiff’s tardive dyskinesia and mental

impairments, and treatments generally)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point

is without merit.

Further, the ALJ evaluated the medical opinion evidence in accordance with the

relevant regulations. Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the ALJ’s analysis of the

consultative examiner’s opinion, and the opinions of Dr. Hasselman, Ms. Boyle, and Mr.

McKessey. Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to address two of Dr. Hasselman’s four

opinions and rejected two of his opinions without addressing the consistency and

supportability factors. (Doc. No. 11 at 21). Additionally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred

by rejecting Ms. Boyle’s and Mr. McKessey’s opinions because their opined work

restrictions were “inconsistent” with treatment notes showing “relatively normal

functioning[,]” yet the treatment notes showed that Plaintiff had maladaptive functioning.

(Id. at 21-22). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff for the following reasons.

The ALJ did not err by failing to address two of Dr. Hasselman’s four opinions, as

the regulations only require that the ALJ provide “source level” analysis where the

persuasiveness of the medical source is evaluated rather than each medical opinion

individually. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1). The two opinions not discussed by the ALJ

did not differ materially from the two that the ALJ did address. (R. 2348, 3303-07, 3627-

28, 3656) (all limiting Plaintiff to a range of sedentary work)). Additionally, the ALJ

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sufficiently addressed the consistency and supportability factors when analyzing Dr.

Hasselman’s other two opinions. Dr. Hasselman opined that Plaintiff was quite limited

in that she could only lift or carry 10 pounds occasionally, could occasionally stoop or

climb stairs, and would miss more than four days per month of work, among other

limitations. (Ex. 35F). However, just four months later, in July 2022, he opined that

Plaintiff was “capable of sedentary work[.]” (Ex. 42F/12). The ALJ found this opinion

not persuasive because although it was “supported by direct examination, this opinion

nevertheless overstates the claimant’s physical condition, as evidenced by her physical

examinations[.]” (R. 35). This consistency and supportability analysis was adequate

and complied with the relevant regulations. 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(b) and (c).

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by rejecting

Ms. Boyle’s and Mr. McKessey’s opinions. (Doc. No. 11 at 21-22). Ms. Boyle opined

that Plaintiff would miss four or more days of work per-month, was unable to meet

competitive work standards in many areas of mental functioning, and had no ability to

function, concentrate, persist, maintain pace, or maintain attendance, among other

limitations. (R. 35; Ex. 39F). The ALJ found this opinion not to be persuasive because

while it was supported by firsthand examination, it was inconsistent with the treatment

records. (R. 35). Similarly, Mr. McKessey opined that Plaintiff would have difficulty

comprehending and following instructions due to extreme high distress, among other

limitations. (R. 34-35; Ex. 26F/4). The ALJ found this opinion only partially persuasive

because there was very little support for the opinion and it was inconsistent with Ms.

Boyle’s contemporaneous mental health records, which revealed relatively normal

functioning. (R. 35 (citing Ex. 41F)). The Court views Plaintiff’s attempt to undermine

the ALJ’s reasoning by pointing to “maladaptive functioning” in the treatment records as

a request to reweigh the evidence, as the ALJ considered much of the evidence upon which

Plaintiff relies. (Doc. No. 11 at 21-22). The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff was in an

intensive outpatient program, had hoarding tendencies, suffered from mental impairments,

and had emotional dysregulation. (R. 27, 32). The ALJ incorporated limitations into

Plaintiff’s RFC to account for her “credibly established limitations[,]” including social and

mental limitations. (R. 28); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005).

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff points to evidence that the ALJ did not explicitly

consider, the Court again notes that the ALJ was under no obligation to mention every

piece of evidence in the record. See Beety-Monticelli, 343 Fed. Appx. at 747.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

Further, the ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s obesity and migraine headache

impairments. Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to explain her finding that Plaintiff’s

obesity would result in no functional work restrictions. (Doc. No. 11 at 22-23). The

Court disagrees. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s obesity was a nonsevere impairment and

the ALJ noted she “fully considered obesity in the context of the case record in making this

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decision[.]” (R. 25). In her RFC discussion, the ALJ stated that she “considered all

symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as

consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (R. 28). This is

enough for the Court to find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis as to

Plaintiff’s obesity, and the Court does so. See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 297 Fed.

Appx. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating “we take the ALJ at [her] word”).

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ did not adequately compensate for her migraine

headaches by limiting Plaintiff to avoid “extreme cold.” (Doc. No. 11 at 25). Plaintiff

contends this limitation is based on the ALJ’s flawed reading of the opinion of Linda

Myers, M.D. as this source never mentioned Plaintiff’s migraines as a reason for avoiding

temperature extremes. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff argues that her migraines are the result

of her cervical impairment and that the ALJ erred by not including appropriate limitations

to address these symptoms. (Id.). However, the ALJ analyzed Dr. Myers’ opinion, and

stated that she opined, in part, that Plaintiff avoid exposure to extreme cold. (R. 34 (citing

Ex. 1A/15-19); Ex. 3A/7). Dr. Myers noted that Plaintiff’s cervical issues, as evidenced

by a 2019 cervical MRI, supported this limitation. (Ex. 3A/7). This opinion was

affirmed by Dr. Margel Guie, D.O., and the ALJ found Dr. Guie’s opinion to be slightly

more persuasive because he had access to more evidence. (R. 34). The ALJ explained

that she incorporated the limitation from extreme cold into Plaintiff’s RFC because it was

consistent with Plaintiff’s history of migraines and narcolepsy. (R. 34). This

explanation was adequate as the ALJ is able to formulate the RFC based on the entirety of

the record without being constrained by a medical source’s explanation for such

limitations. Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting “[t]here

is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ

adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”). Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s

argument on this point.

Lastly, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony and adequately explained her

reasons for rejecting it. Plaintiff contends the ALJ overlooked her testimony regarding

limitations in standing and walking, chronic pain, mood instability, severe anxiety, panic

attacks, and struggles with OCD. (Doc. No. 11 at 29-30). The Court disagrees. The

ALJ explicitly acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged that she had pain all over her body and

had trouble standing, walking, sitting, and stair climbing, among other complaints. (R.

28-33). Moreover, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental struggles and impairments,

including anxiety, panic attacks, and OCD. (R. 25, 29, 32, 35). The ALJ recognized

that Plaintiff was in multiple programs through Western Psychiatric Hospital for OCD,

anxiety, and depression. (R. 32). Further, the ALJ classified Plaintiff’s chronic pain,

bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety as severe impairments at Step Two of the

sequential process. (R. 25). The ALJ explained that she considered Plaintiff’s

testimony, but found it was not entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record.

(R. 32-33). This was logical as the record showed that Plaintiff could perform light work,

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

had been “dealing very well” with her pain without medications, and showed that Plaintiff

was managing her mental impairments after attending programs at Western Psychiatric

Hospital. (R. 30). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is therefore without merit.

In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence

and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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