“When a plaintiff does not correct the defects in an initial pleading through the filing of a more detailed amended complaint, the amended complaint may be dismissed with prejudice.”
How later courts described this case
- “When a plaintiff does not correct the defects in an initial pleading through the filing of a more detailed amended complaint, the amended complaint may be dismissed with prejudice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x
WILLIAM F. CORR,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
22-CV-7563 (EK)(LB)
-against-
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.1
------------------------------------x
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
William Corr brings this action alleging religious
discrimination by his former employer, the City of New York.
Corr worked at the Department of Homeless Services. He alleges
that the City engaged in religious discrimination by refusing to
exempt him from the masking and testing requirements it imposed
on its employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. The City now
moves to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons outlined below,
that motion is granted.
Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from the second amended
complaint. ECF No. 21. They are presumed true for purposes of
1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to update the caption of
the case as noted here.
this motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572
(2007).
Corr worked for the New York City Department of
Homeless Services. Second Am. Compl. 3. He is a Christian.
Id. at 5. In early 2022, he requested a religious exemption
from the City’s COVID-19 vaccine requirement, saying that it
violated (unspecified) divine laws. Id. at 5.2 He requested a
similar exemption from the City’s “mandatory mask wearing and
testing” requirement. Id. The City acknowledged the sincerity
of his opposition, but nevertheless responded that exempting
Corr from the masking and testing requirements would cause
“unnecessary hardship.” It then placed Corr on leave without
pay. Id.
B. Procedural Background
Corr filed his initial complaint in December 2022.
See ECF No. 1. In that complaint, Corr sued the Department of
Homeless Services. On April 12, 2023, Corr moved to substitute
the City of New York as the defendant in this action. See Corr
Let., ECF No. 14. The Court granted Corr’s request. See June
7, 2023 Order.
In a pre-motion conference letter, the City argued
that the complaint lacked any allegation that Corr “ha[d] a
2 The complaint does not specify whether the department granted or
denied this request.
religious belief . . . that conflict[ed] with the City’s masking
and testing requirements.” ECF No. 10 at 2. Corr then filed an
amended complaint, see ECF No. 15, following which the City
lodged the same objection in a second pre-motion conference
letter. ECF No. 16 at 2. This prompted Corr to file a second
amended complaint, which is now the operative pleading. See ECF
No. 21.
Legal Standard
Corr is representing himself in this action. When a
plaintiff lacks counsel, a court must construe his or her
filings “liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241,
248 (2d Cir. 2006).3 However, this more lenient standard of
review “does not exempt a [pro se] party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v.
Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
pleading that simply offers a “labels and conclusions” or a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Twombly,
3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
550 U.S. at 555. Instead, the complaint must allege facts that
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
Discussion
Corr brings claims for religious discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State
Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
Second Am. Compl. at 3-4.
A. The Title VII Claim
To state a Title VII claim for religious
discrimination, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he “held a bona
fide religious belief conflicting with an employment
requirement,” (2) that he “informed [his] employers of this
belief,” and (3) that he was “disciplined for failure to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement.” Knight v. Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
A plaintiff satisfies the first element of this
standard by pleading “non-conclusory facts about [his] religious
beliefs” and about why those “beliefs would conflict with the
[challenged] requirement.” Cagle v. Weill Cornell Med., 680 F.
Supp. 3d 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Merely stating that a
conflicting belief is “religious” does not make it so. Mason v.
Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1988) (“An
individual’s assertion that the belief he holds [is sincerely
held] does not, however, automatically mean that the belief is
religious.”). The plaintiff must “assert sufficient allegations
to establish that [his] claim is based upon a sincerely held
religious belief,” and then explain why that belief conflicts
with the challenged employment requirement. Meadows v. Lesh,
No. 10-CV-00223, 2010 WL 3730105, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2010); see also Cagle, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
Corr has not satisfied this requirement. The
complaint never explains what Corr’s religious beliefs are, or
how they conflict with the department’s masking and testing
requirements. Instead, Corr simply avers that he is a Christian
and that the challenged requirements violate “a number of”
divine laws. Second Am. Compl. 5. This is little more than a
“bald allegation that [Corr] has a religious belief and that
those religious beliefs conflict with an employment
requirement.” Cagle, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 435. Courts have
dismissed similarly conclusory complaints. See, e.g., Matos v.
Discovery Commc’ns, LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 307, 324, , at *3,
322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (Christian plaintiff did not plausibly
allege a “religious basis” for her belief that vaccine would
“tarnish and defile” her body); Marte v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.,
No. 22-CV-03491, 2022 WL 7059182, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2022)
(allegation that plaintiff was a “Born-Again Christian” who was
“unwilling to receive the COVID-19 vaccinations” was
insufficient to plead conflict between religious belief and
employment requirement).
Because Corr has not alleged a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement, his Title
VII claim is dismissed.4
B. The State-Law and City-Law Claims
District courts will generally decline supplemental
jurisdiction after dismissing all claims over which they have
original jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367; Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
(1988). Because Corr’s federal Title VII claim cannot survive,
and there is no basis for invoking diversity jurisdiction, the
Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over Corr’s state- and
city-law claims. Those claims are dismissed without prejudice.
See id. at 350, 350 n.7.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is
granted. Because the defects in the second amended complaint
4 In his opposition brief, Corr asserts that wearing a mask is
inconsistent with his Christian beliefs because “Christians do not veil our
face, as that is a sign of submission under Muslim law.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n
to Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 25. However, the Court need not consider
whether this allegation renders Corr’s religious discrimination claim
plausible, because it is “axiomatic that the [c]omplaint cannot be amended by
the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Milligan v. GEICO Gen.
Ins. Co., No. 20-3726-CV, 2022 WL 433289, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 2022).
Moreover, the suggestion that masking (or a related practice) might be
consistent with another belief system does not suffice to demonstrate that it
is prohibited under plaintiff’s own.
are the same as those the City identified in Corr’s prior
pleadings, dismissal is with prejudice. See Liner v. Goord, 115
F. Supp. 2d 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“When a plaintiff does not
correct the defects in an initial pleading through the filing of
a more detailed amended complaint, the amended complaint may be
dismissed with prejudice.”); see also Scriven v. Barnum,
No. 24-CV-1805, 2024 WL 1769318, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2024)
(applying this rule to a pro se plaintiff). The Clerk of the
Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this
case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State s District Judge
D ated: March 31, 2025
Brooklyn, New York