Opinion

Lafferty v. Highland County Community Action Organization, Inc.

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Mar 31, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.7%

“Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

NICKLAS RAYMOND LAFFERTY,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-CV-636

v. Judge Michael R. Barrett

HIGHLAND COUNTY COMMUNITY

ACTION ORGANIZATION, INC., et al., ORDER

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the report and recommendation (“R&R”) filed by

the Magistrate Judge on March 25, 2025, (Doc. 44). Proper notice has been afforded to

the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), including notice to Plaintiff Nicklas Lafferty

that he may forfeit rights on appeal if he failed to file objections to the R&R in a timely

manner. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Lafferty timely objects,

(Doc. 45), but for the following reasons the Court will overrule his objections and adopt

the R&R in full.

I. BACKGROUND

As summarized by the Magistrate Judge, Lafferty’s complaint begins with a claim

that the Highland County Board of Commissioners and Highland County Community

Action Organization arranged to have weatherization and repair work performed on his

house under the Community Housing Improvement Program, but the work was either not

completed or poorly performed. (Doc. 44, PageID 1598). The allegations spread from

there, with Lafferty claiming that (1) the Highland County Sheriff’s Office ignored a report

from a “forgery expert” that someone within the Highland County Community Action

Organization forged his signature on a document; (2) Defendant Joel Mark Current

referred to him as a stalker at a meeting of the Highland County Commissioners, which

Defendant newspapers then republished; (3) Defendant Matthew Spies videotaped his

home without permission during an inspection; and (4) Defendant Glenn Scott Warrick

referred to him as a stalker in a statement that was uploaded to the website of Defendant

American Arbitration Association. Lafferty “seeks $30 million ‘for the bad workmanship,

name slander, forgery, invasion of privacy, and stress and emotions,’ and ‘an apology’

from all the defendants.” (Id., PageID 1600).

Following various motions to dismiss filed by Defendants, the Magistrate Judge

found that (1) the Court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of

citizenship over any state law claims” in Lafferty’s complaint; and (2) Lafferty “failed to

plead sufficient facts” to show that Defendants “are liable for any federal constitutional or

statutory violations in this case.” (Id., PageID 1603, 1606). In addition, the Magistrate

Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Lafferty’s claims against a number of

defendants who were not properly served. (Id., PageID 1606). The next day, Lafferty

submitted a two-page document “appealing” the R&R. (Doc. 45).

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Magistrate Judges are authorized to decide both dispositive and non-dispositive

matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. When

objections are made to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R on a dispositive matter, the Court “must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

But “[t]he filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the

requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole

v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d

721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection

requirement.”). And the Court “need not provide de novo review where the objections are

‘frivolous, conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637-38 (6th Cir. 1986)

(per curiam) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)).

III. ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the Court concludes that Lafferty’s response to the R&R

addresses neither the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted, nor the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he failed to state

a claim for which subject matter jurisdiction lies with this Court. Instead, Lafferty largely

repeats unsupported claims and fails to address the Magistrate Judge’s legal reasoning

or put forth any meaningful, non-frivolous objections to the R&R. See Miller v. Currie, 50

F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate's report, which fails

to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be

filed. The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those

issues that are dispositive and contentious.”); Stamtec, Inc. v. Anson, 296 F. App'x 518,

520 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Objections disputing the correctness of the magistrate's

recommendation, but failing to specify the findings believed to be in error are too general

and therefore insufficient.”).

The same holds true for Lafferty’s unfounded assertion that the Magistrate Judge

did not consider his voluminous and repetitive filings, which the Magistrate Judge was not

even “obligated to sift through” in the first place to “construct claims” for Lafferty. Welch

v. City Cnty. Prosecution Office, No. 1:18-CV-2548, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37740, at *3

(N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2019) (noting that a pro se plaintiff may not simply “refer[] the Court to

voluminous exhibits” in lieu of stating a claim for relief). And although Lafferty briefly

registers general opposition to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion to appoint

counsel, that opposition is limited to the conclusory statement that the Sixth Amendment

guarantees his right to appointed counsel. In any event, Lafferty’s argument is without

merit because “the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases.” Turner v. Rogers, 564

U.S. 431, 441 (2011).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lafferty’s objections, (Doc. 45), are OVERRULED, and

the R&R, (Doc. 44), is ADOPTED in full.

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss, (Docs. 8; 11; 14; 16; 23; 28) are GRANTED;

2. Lafferty’s claims against remaining Defendants are DISMISSED for lack of

service and for failure to state a claim for relief over which this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction; and

3. Defendant Don Dale Throckmorton’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. 43), is DENIED

as moot.

The Court further CERTIFIES that an appeal of this order would not be taken in

good faith and DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. See Fed. R. App.

P. 24(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Michael R. Barrett

Michael R. Barrett

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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