Williams v. Cuyahoga County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JUSTIN WILLIAMS, ) Case No. 1:23-cv-1879

)

and ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

TIARA THOMAS, ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

CUYAHOGA COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Justin Williams and Tiara Thomas filed suit challenging Ohio’s

administrative process for dispositions of child abuse or neglect that have the effect

of preventing a person from working in or around childcare for ten years. Plaintiffs

allege that Cuyahoga County, certain of its officials, and the Director of the Ohio

Department of Job and Family Services violated their rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause through the processes by which Defendants

determined that they were responsible for abuse or neglect that barred employment.

Specifically, they contend that Ohio law and administrative practice deprive them of

a protected liberty interest without adequate notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, and

post-deprivation procedures that do not meet the minimum requirements of due

process. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons that follow, the

Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from separate child abuse or neglect investigations, during

or after which each Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated their right to Due

Process. Plaintiffs challenge both the administrative appeals process and the effect

of child abuse and neglect findings on their right to work in childcare or facilities that

provide childcare.

A. Background Ohio Law and Administrative Regime

Chapter 5104 of the Ohio Revised Code governs childcare centers. State law

defines a “child care center” as “any place that is not the permanent residence of the

licensee or administrator in which child care or publicly funded child care is provided

for seven or more children at one time.” Ohio Rev. Code § 5104.01(L). Under Ohio

law, childcare includes care for infants to school age children, outside school hours by

persons other than parents, guardians, or custodians, outside the home. Id.

§ 5104.01(K). The Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services licenses certain in-

home childcare providers, called type A and type B family childcare homes. Id.

§§ 5104.01(DD), (UU) & (VV). Type A and type B providers are distinguished by how

many children they may have in their care. Generally, type B providers may only

care for up to six children at one time. Id. This type of childcare may operate without

a license, and only requires a State license if the center provides publicly funded

childcare. See id. § 5104.31(A) (listing who may provide publicly funded childcare);

see also id. § 5104.02(B) (listing exemptions from State licensing requirements).

Employees of licensed childcare providers must undergo certain background

checks. See generally Ohio Rev. Code § 5104.013. At issue in this case, State law

mandates: “the director of job and family services shall search the uniform statewide

automated child welfare information system for information concerning any abuse or

neglect report” by employees or job applicants, among others. Id. § 5104.013(C)(1)(f);

see also Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-12-09(B).

If a search of the uniform statewide automated child welfare information

system identifies a person “as the perpetrator for a substantiated finding of child

abuse or neglect in the previous ten years,” then the State makes that person

ineligible for employment at a licensed childcare provider. Ohio Admin. Code

§ 5101:2-12-09(G)(3); see also id. § 5101:2-13-09(G)(3) (similar rule for family child

care providers).

A.1. Child Abuse and Neglect Investigations

In this regime, the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services does not itself

make findings regarding child abuse and neglect. Instead, public children services

agencies investigate and make dispositions related to alleged child abuse and neglect

based on reports from mandatory reporters and the general public. Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2151.421; Ohio Admin. Code §§ 5101:2-36-01 & 5101:2-36-03(V) & (AA). These

agencies include a county department of job and family services or a county children

services board. Ohio Rev. Code § 5153.02.

When a public children services agency closes an investigation, it makes a

disposition finding whether the allegation of abuse or neglect is substantiated,

indicated, unsubstantiated, or unable to be completed for various reasons. Ohio

Admin. Code § 5101:2-1-1(B)(46). A substantiated report covers “an admission of

child abuse or neglect by the person(s) responsible; an adjudication of child abuse or

neglect in court; or other forms of confirmation deemed valid by the [public children

services agency].” Id. § 5101:2-1-01(B)(313). An indicated report means that “there

[are] circumstantial or other isolated indicators of child abuse or neglect lacking

confirmation; or a determination by the caseworker that the child may have been

abused or neglected based upon completion of an assessment/investigation.” Id.

§ 5101:2-1-01(B)(161). An unsubstantiated report means that “the assessment/

investigation determined no occurrence of child abuse or neglect.” Id. § 5101:2-1-

01(B)(344).

During a public children services agency’s investigation, an individual

suspected of abuse or neglect does not have a right to counsel. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 26,

PageID #5.) According to Plaintiffs, individuals are “not provided a written statement

of the specific acts which are alleged to constitute abuse or neglect, given the

opportunity to inspect the evidence against them, nor informed of the identity of the

person who made the allegations or a right to know about the specific facts creating

the basis for the allegations.” (Id., ¶ 25.) Under Ohio law, the definitions of abuse

and neglect do not include a standard of proof for administrative dispositions. See

Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.03 & 2151.031; see also Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-33-20. In

court, Ohio law demands proof of abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence.

Id., § 2151.35(A)(1).

Within two working days of completing an investigation, the public children

services agency shall “[n]otify the alleged perpetrator in writing of the report

disposition; the right to appeal; and the method by which the alleged perpetrator may

appeal the disposition.” Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-36-03(AA)(2). Additionally, it

enters the disposition into the statewide automated child welfare information system.

Id. § 5101:2-33-70(G).

A.2. Cuyahoga County Appeals Process

Ohio law allows for the appeal of every “final order, adjudication, or decision”

of any department or agency of a political subdivision to a court of common pleas

within thirty days of the decision. Ohio Rev. Code § 2506.01(A). The State provides

rules for counties to use when developing policies for individuals to dispute a

disposition of abuse or neglect. See Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-33-20. Each county

must develop and implement a written policy for resolving an appeal “by alleged

perpetrators who disagree with” the disposition. Id. § 5101:2:-33-20(A)(2). State

regulations broadly identify the types of information for such policies without

mandating specifics. Id. § 5101:2-33-20(B). But they do require a public children

services agency to “provide written copies of the [agency’s] complaint review and

report disposition appeal policies.” Id. § 5101:2-33-20(C). Additionally, the outcome

of the appeal must be updated in the statewide automated child welfare information

system. Id. § 5101:2-33-20(I).

In Cuyahoga County, the public children services agency is the Cuyahoga

County Department of Child and Family Services. Pursuant to Section 5101.2:33-

20(A)(2) of the Ohio Administrative Code, the Department issued a policy for appeals

of dispositions of abuse or neglect. (ECF No. 1-1.) Under the policy, the Department

mails a written notice called a disposition letter notifying the alleged perpetrator of

“the outcome of the investigation and [his or her] right to appeal.” (Id., PageID #34.)

That person then has thirty days in which to appeal a disposition of indicated or

substantiated allegations of abuse or neglect. (Id., PageID #35.)

A.3. Working in a Childcare Setting

Under Ohio law, any prospective employer, owner, or operator of a licensed

childcare provider must request the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to

perform a search of the statewide automated child welfare information system when

an employee begins employment and in five-year intervals after that. Ohio Rev. Code

§ 5104.013(C)(2); Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-12-09. Similarly, any organization or

agency that cares for children, such as a residential facility or youth shelter, must

request a summary report from the system before employing or engaging any new

employee, intern, or volunteer. Ohio Rev. Code § 5103.0310(A)(2).

Under State law, the Director of the agency shall search the statewide

automated child welfare information system and determine whether that

“information, when viewed within the totality of the circumstances, reasonably leads

to the conclusion that the person may directly or indirectly endanger the health,

safety, or welfare of children.” Ohio Rev. Code § 5104.013(C)(3). The agency’s

regulations make a person who receives a substantiated finding of abuse or neglect

in the previous ten years ineligible to work in a childcare center. Id. § 5101:2-12-

09(G)(3).

Notwithstanding this time period after a substantiated disposition, the

statewide automated child welfare information system retains disposition

information indefinitely. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 77, PageID #14.) Further, an organization or

agency that cares for children may refuse to hire a person or accept a volunteer or

intern “based solely on the results of the search” of the statewide automated child

welfare information system. Ohio Rev. Code § 5103.0310(D).

B. The Plaintiffs

On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the pleadings establish the following facts,

which the Court construes in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as it must in the

current procedural posture.

B.1. Tiara Thomas

Plaintiff Tiara Thomas worked in childcare for more than twelve years. (Id.,

¶ 106, PageID #17.) In June 2020, the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and

Family Services investigated Ms. Thomas, including a visit to her home. (Id., ¶ 101.)

After this visit, Ms. Thomas received no contact or notice about the allegations. (Id.,

¶¶ 103–05, PageID #16–17.) In October 2021, Ms. Thomas’s employer submitted a

routine five-year background check request. (Id., ¶ 107, PageID #17.) In response,

the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services issued a notice dated October 20,

2021 that Ms. Thomas is ineligible to work in childcare due to a substantiated

disposition of medical neglect in June 2020. (Id., ¶ 108.) As a result, Ms. Thomas

lost her job. (Id., ¶ 109.) Ms. Thomas requested that the Ohio Department of Job

and Family Services review its eligibility determination, and the agency upheld the

decision on November 18, 2021. (Id., ¶¶ 110–12.) Also, she appealed the disposition

within the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services. (Id., ¶ 113.)

Following a hearing by phone, during which Ms. Thomas requested but was not given

information about the allegations against her, the agency upheld its disposition of

neglect. (Id., ¶¶ 114–16.)

B.2. Justin Williams

In 2013, local police investigated Plaintiff Justin Williams and his roommates

based on allegations of improper conduct with a minor who visited their apartment.

(Id., ¶ 120, PageID #18.) The victim’s statement and DNA testing cleared

Mr. Williams of criminal activity, and he was not charged with a crime, though some

of his roommates were. (Id., ¶ 121–22.)

Seven years later, Mr. Williams applied for a job with a youth shelter. (Id.,

¶ 124.) When the employer checked the statewide automated child welfare

information system, it denied Mr. Williams employment on the basis that he had an

indicated disposition of child sexual abuse in 2013. (Id., ¶ 125–26.) Mr. Williams

received no notice of any such disposition. (Id., ¶ 123.)

Mr. Williams appealed with the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and

Family Services. (Id., ¶ 127.) During an appeal meeting, an employee with the

County agency informed Mr. Williams, incorrectly, that the disposition “would only

affect his career with youth for ten years.” (Id., ¶ 128.) On April 14, 2020, the agency

upheld the indicated disposition. (Id., ¶ 129.) In early 2023, Mr. Williams contacted

the County agency to confirm that he was now eligible to work with children in youth

shelters and residential facilities. (Id., ¶ 131.) Then, agency staff told him for the

first time that the disposition would remain in the statewide automated child welfare

information system for life. (Id., ¶ 132, PageID #19.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against four individuals

and entities: (1) Cuyahoga County, (2) Jacqueline Fletcher in her official capacity as

Director of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family, (3) Chris Ronayne

in his official capacity as County Executive of Cuyahoga County, and (4) Matt

Damschroder in his official capacity as the Director of the Ohio Department of Job

and Family Services. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege procedural due process violations

under the Fourteenth Amendment, stemming from Defendant’s denial of Plaintiffs’

eligibility to work in childcare and their appeals of the dispositions. Plaintiffs seek

damages and injunctive relief. (Id., PageID #29–31.)

Arguing that Plaintiffs have no protected liberty interest and are procedurally

time barred, Defendants move to dismiss the complaint. Also, Defendants object to

the naming of two individual Defendants in their official capacities as redundant.

Finally, they assert that one type of relief that Plaintiffs request is not cognizable in

federal court.

Initially, a third Plaintiff, Nancy Williams, filed suit as well. (ECF No. 1.)

However, she advised her lawyers that she wished to dismiss her claims. (ECF

No. 40.) Following a hearing, the Court did so. (Id., PageID #371.)

ANALYSIS

In any civil action, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible,

when measured against the elements” of a claim. Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d

440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. American Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 345–46

(6th Cir. 2016)). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the “realm

of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.

In assessing plausibility, the Court construes factual allegations in the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations

of the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a motion

to dismiss, the Court distinguishes between “well-pled factual allegations,” which it

must treat as true, and “naked assertions,” which it need not treat as true. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 628. The Court will also not accept as true “[c]onclusory allegations or

legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations . . . .” Edison v. Tennessee Dep’t

of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).

On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court limits its inquiry to the content of

the complaint, although it may also consider “matters of public record, orders, items

appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint” or “to a

motion to dismiss” as long those exhibits are referenced in the complaint and central

to the claims. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001); Bassett v.

National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).

I. Due Process

Analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims presents something of a puzzle in light of the

labyrinthine jurisprudence that has grown up around Section 1 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. In addition, the parties complicate matters further. Plaintiffs plead

general claims under Section 1983 alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s

command that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The County Defendants move to

dismiss arguing that the so-called “stigma plus” framework applies and that

Plaintiffs failed to plead under it. At oral argument, Plaintiffs agreed that this

framework applies. But the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family

Services does not and argues more generally that Plaintiffs fail to identify a protected

liberty interest. The Court begins with the “stigma plus” analysis before turning to

Director Damschroder’s argument. In doing so, the Court assumes without deciding

that each presents an appropriate mode of analysis for a claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

I.A. “Stigma Plus”

“The stigma-plus test is used to analyze a due process claim where the action

taken by the state injures the plaintiff’s reputation.” Doe v. Michigan Dep't of State

Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701

(1976)). But the stigma of reputational harm by itself is not enough does not amount

to protected liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul, 424 at 701.

Instead, a viable claim must rest on a more tangible interest (the “plus”), such as

employment. Id. “[I]t is not entirely clear what the ‘plus’ is.” DiBlasio v. Novello,

344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). But courts explain it this way: “‘[s]tigma plus’ refers

to a claim brought for injury to one’s reputation (the stigma) coupled with the

deprivation of some ‘tangible interest’ [e.g., the loss of government employment] or

property right (the plus), without adequate process.” Printup v. Director, Ohio Dep’t

of Job & Fam. Servs., 654 F. App'x 781, 785 (6th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

I.A.1. Falsity

Within the sigma-plus framework, the parties disagree whether the stigma or

reputational harm requires an element of falsity. In other words, a plaintiff who

claims stigma as a protected liberty or property interest cannot, as a matter of law,

have suffered harm if the facts giving rise to the stigma are true. (ECF No. 28,

PageID #263; ECF No. 31, PageID #315.) To make this argument, Defendants rely

on cases originating in the employment context. See, e.g., Hasanaj v. Detroit Pub.

Sch. Cmty. Dist., 35 F.4th 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2022); Crosby v. University of Ky., 863

F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2017). This line of case law sets out a five-factor test, which

includes a falsity requirement, to determine whether a plaintiff was deprived of a

liberty interest and is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. See, e.g., Quinn v. Shirey,

293 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2002).

But Defendants cite no authority extending this requirement beyond the public

employment context. To try to do so, they rely on Hart v. Hillsdale County, Michigan,

973 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2020). But Hart shows why a falsity requirement does not

apply in this case. There, Michigan changed its sex offender registration

requirements, relieving the plaintiff of the obligation to register. Nonetheless, the

police failed to update their database to reflect the change in the law and arrested

the plaintiff on several occasions for failing to register. Among other claims, the

plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim for defamation under the Fourteenth

Amendment, which the Sixth Circuit analyzed under the stigma-plus framework. In

that framework, the court recognized that the plaintiff factually committed certain

offenses or acts but was not a sex offender covered by Michigan’s registration

requirements. Id. at 644. Although in some sense true, the plaintiff still suffered

stigmatizing harm in the form of arrests through improper inclusion in the registry.

Similarly, Plaintiffs here claim not a mistake of fact or actual innocence but a

designation or inclusion in a database that subjects them to stigma and, ultimately,

harm that infringes protected liberty or property interests—all without the

opportunity to challenge whether the conduct at issue makes the designation

appropriate.

At bottom, “the stigma-plus test is used to analyze a due process claim where

the action taken by the state injures the plaintiff’s reputation.” Id., at 501 (emphasis

added). Doe v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2007)

(emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit does not require falsity for claims of the sort

Plaintiffs bring here. And the Court declines to read such a requirement into the

Fourteenth Amendment in the first instance. Even if the law requires an element of

falsity, and the Court thinks it does not, Plaintiffs allege that they are unable to plead

falsity because they are not privy to the allegations against them that underlie the

administrative dispositions at issue. (ECF No. 28, PageID #265.) Fair enough. If

required to establish falsity as an element, a plaintiff’s claims would necessarily fail

at the outset where, as here, the government—for good reason—keeps the basis for

its action secret. That fact does not close the doors of the courthouse to those who

allege harm at the hands of their government.

I.A.2. Tangible Injury

Plaintiff Tiara Thomas alleges that after working in childcare for over twelve

years, the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services made a

disposition of substantiated neglect against her. (ECF No. 1, PageID #: 17.) That

disposition was entered into the Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information

System, the case management system for Ohio’s public children services agencies and

Ohio’s child abuse and neglect registry, which Plaintiffs allege certain employers

check before and at appointed times during employment. (Id., ¶ 37, PageID #7.) She

claims that she is unable to work in childcare until 2030 and that the disposition will

be reported any time she applies to work at a youth shelter or residential facility for

the rest of her life. (Id., PageID #: 17.) Plaintiff Justin Williams discovered that he

has an indicated disposition for sexual abuse after the Statewide Automated Child

Welfare Information System was checked. (Id., ¶ 125, PageID #18.) In 2023, he

learned that this disposition will be disclosed to youth shelters and residential

facilities for life. (Id., ¶ 132, PageID #19.) Without question, a label of child neglect

or child sexual abuse carries stigma.

As for the “plus,” Ms. Thomas alleges that she worked in childcare for over

twelve years, lost her job as a result of the disposition, is barred from working in

childcare until 2030, and the disposition will be reported anytime she applies to a

youth shelter or residential facility. (ECF No. 1, PageID #17.) With respect to

Mr. Williams, his disposition resulted in being turned down for a job in a youth

shelter. (Id., ¶ 125–26, PageID #18.) These allegations plead more than just

reputational harm and state a claim under the stigma-plus framework.

Defendants argue that Mr. Williams fails to claim that he is foreclosed from

working in his chosen profession altogether. (ECF No. 22, PageID #195.) Further,

because his disposition is indicated, not substantiated, Defendants point out that he

is not barred from working in childcare. (Id., PageID #197.) They maintain that a

viable claim requires a complete bar to work in a profession, not just a charge that

makes him less attractive as a potential employee. (Id., PageID #196.) But the text

of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the complete deprivation of a chosen

profession. Nor does the judicial gloss of the stigma-plus framework. It asks a

plaintiff to plead and prove some deprivation of some liberty or property interested

recognized under State or federal law or alter a plaintiff’s legal status under a State’s

laws. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim under this standard.

In this respect, the Court agrees with those courts concluding that placement

in a database or registry of suspected child abuse or neglect implicates an interest

that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See e.g. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that inclusion in a child abuse

database alters an individual’s rights or status because such databases “play[] an

integral role in obtaining many rights under California law, including . . . licenses,

volunteer opportunities, and even child custody”); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493,

511 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that one’s name in a central database of child abuse or

neglect works a significant impediment to obtaining a position in the entire field of

child care); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a tangible

burden on employment prospects results from inclusion in a registry of suspected

child abusers, amounting to a “plus”); Finch v. New York State Off. of Child. & Fam.

Servs., 499 F. Supp. 2d 521, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that the State’s action

in listing subjects in a child abuse registry impairs a protected liberty interest); see

also Thomas Buckner, No. 2:11-cv-245-WKW, 2012 WL 3978671, at *7 (M.D. Ala.

Sept. 11, 2012) (same); D.W. ex rel. Wright v. O'Day, No. 2:11:0064, 2013 WL 3283484,

at *6-7 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2013) (holding placement on a child abuse registry is a

lifelong scarlet letter that implicates a liberty interest).

I.B. Liberty Interest

Turning to Director Damschroder’s argument based on the more conventional,

but no less tortured, jurisprudence on a person’s liberty interest, Plaintiffs allege that

inclusion in the uniform statewide automated child welfare information system

infringes their interest in pursuing the occupations of their choice. Liberty as

understood under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “has long

included occupational liberty—‘the liberty to follow a trade, profession, or other

calling.’” Wroblewski v. Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted); see also Bowler v. Mt. Sterling, 44 F. App’x 670, 674–75 (6th Cir. 2002).

When the State makes it “virtually impossible for the [individual] to find new

employment in his chosen field, the government has infringed upon that individual’s

liberty interest to pursue the occupation of his choice.” Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers,

Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); see also Kohus v. Ohio

State Highway Patrol, No. 1:09-cv-658, 2011 WL 1234021, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15,

2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-cv-658, 2011 WL 1187836 (S.D.

Ohio Mar. 29, 2011); Helm v. Eells, No. 3:14-cv-00654-TBR, 2015 WL 1778367 (W.D.

Ky. Apr. 20, 2015), aff'd, 642 F. App'x 558 (6th Cir. 2016).

Director Damschroder contends, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have suffered no

deprivation of this liberty interest because they can still work in childcare in general

and that Mr. Williams cannot show that childcare is his chosen field of employment.

(ECF No. 22, PageID #190–92.) Mr. Williams alleges that he is unable to work with

youth in shelters or residential facilities because of the indicated disposition he

received. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 12, PageID #4.) Mr. Williams has alleged an inability to

pursue employment in a chosen field, not just a particular job or role, but a field. At

the pleading stage, this allegation suffices. As for Ms. Thomas, Director Damschroder

does not argue that she has failed to state a claim for deprivation of a protected liberty

interest. (Id., PageID #192.) And for good reason. Ms. Thomas pleads that she is

“unable to work in child care because of a substantiated disposition of medical

neglect.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 11, PageID #3.) At the pleading stage, she has alleged a

liberty interest in employment in childcare, from which she alleges she is barred

through this disposition.

One final note. None of this is to say that the State does not have a legitimate

interest, even a compelling interest, in taking steps to keep known or suspected child

abusers away from children. But the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limit on

State power. No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens. No State

shall deprive any person of liberty or property without due process. These limitations

do not invite policymaking through judicial interest balancing—for obvious historical

reasons that motivated the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers and reinforce the text

and its original public meaning.

I.C. Procedural Protections

Once the existence of some property or liberty interest is established, the

question becomes what process is due. At bottom, due process requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Due process requires that when a

State seeks to terminate a protected interest, it must afford notice and opportunity

for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the termination becomes

effective.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716,

729 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)).

A few preliminary matters at the outset. First, Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants cannot cite or describe the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and

Family Services policy at issue (Policy No. 2.03.03) because it falls outside the

materials that can be considered on a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28, PageID #273;

ECF No. 20-2.) However, the policy is a public record and central to the allegations

of the complaint; therefore, the Court may and does consider it without converting

the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259

F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2021).

Second, in their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs present a “newly

disclosed Parratt claim” in their response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 31,

PageID #321.) In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981), the Supreme Court

recognized that, where a State provides adequate post-deprivation remedies, even a

public employee’s random and unauthorized deprivation of liberty and property does

not violate due process. See, e.g., Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 901

(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). But nothing in

Plaintiffs’ argument suggests that they proceed under Parratt—indeed, they do not

even cite the case. Instead, they question whether Defendants followed their own

policies. (ECF No. 28, PageID #277.) Accordingly, the Court views Plaintiffs as

distinguishing between their facial challenge to the policy as written and their as-

applied challenge to application of the policy to each of them.

Third, Plaintiffs bring claims both facially and as applied to the individual

named Plaintiffs (ECF No. 1, PageID #30). A facially unconstitutional law is

“incapable of any valid application.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974).

A facial attack is an effort “to invalidate the law in each of its applications” and, in

effect, to “take the law off the books completely.” Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder,

557 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc). A facial challenge is “the most difficult

challenge to mount successfully,” because a plaintiff must carry a “heavy burden” to

“establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The Court cannot say that no set

of circumstances exist under which application the laws and policies at issue would

be valid. Accordingly, the Court proceeds only with Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge.

I.C.1. Process Afforded to Plaintiffs

“Procedural due process ‘generally requires that the state provide a person

with notice and an opportunity to be heard depriving that person of a property

or liberty interest.’” , No. 21-3499, 2022 WL 16647974, at *5 (6th Cir.

Nov. 3, 2022) (citing , 411 F.3d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 2005)). In

most cases, “when a deprivation occurs through an established state procedure, then

it is both practicable and feasible for the state to provide pre-deprivation process, and

the state must do so regardless of the adequacy of any post-deprivation remedy.”

, 980 F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

I.C.1.a. Pre-Deprivation Process

Defendants argue that Policy No. 2.03.03 of the Cuyahoga County Department

of Child and Family Services and Ohio law, Ohio Admin. Code § 5101:2-36-03 (now

Section 5180:2-36-03), provide adequate pre-deprivation safeguards and process.

(ECF No. 22, PageID #198.) They explain that a child protection specialist

investigates reported abuse or neglect. ( ., PageID #199.) Within hours of the report

of abuse or neglect, the specialist talks to the alleged perpetrator, either in person or

on the phone, advising him or her of the specific complaint, allegations, or concerns

made against the person. ( .) “[B]ecause the contact with the alleged perpetrator

occurs within hours of the abuse/neglect report, the CCDCFS has in its

possession , which are fully disclosed.” ( .)

The Ohio Administrative Code provides that the agency will conduct and

document face-to-face interviews with the alleged perpetrator, Ohio Admin. Code

§ 5180:2-36-03(P), but there is no other pre-deprivation process afforded to the

alleged perpetrator. Defendants argue that the interview or possible interviews

provide alleged perpetrators “with a full and unobstructed opportunity to present

their side of the story and identify and provide corroborating witnesses or evidence.”

(ECF No. 22, PageID #199.) This pre-deprivation process, Defendants argue, meets

the constitutional requirements under ,

470 U.S. 532 (1985).

But the policy and the rule are silent about notice of the potential dispositions

and their potential consequences as a part of any pre-deprivation process. Discovery

might show that notice and process in practice are adequate in many cases, which

defeats Plaintiffs’ facial attack. But at the pleading stage, the pre-deprivation process

allegedly failed to provide Ms. Thomas or Mr. Williams adequate notice or

opportunity to be heard before a disposition. As applied to Ms. Thomas and

Mr. Williams, the record leaves questions about the adequacy of the process,

including whether in their cases that process required a more formal hearing.

I.C.1.b. Post-Deprivation Process

At the same time, “pre- and postdeprivation processes should be considered

together as a single package.” , 795 F.3d 553, 559 (6th

Cir. 2015). Therefore, the Court considers the post-deprivation processes available

to Plaintiffs when evaluating the procedural protections afforded to Plaintiffs.

Defendants argue that administrative appeal and judicial review under

Section 2506.01 of the Ohio Revised Code provide adequate post-deprivation process

that cure any alleged deprivation of a liberty interest. (ECF No. 22, PageID #207.)

An alleged perpetrator is entitled to an administrative appeal after an “indicated” or

“substantiated” disposition is issued. This appeal is “an informal meeting to permit

you an opportunity to present information you deem relevant concerning the

indicated or substantiated report finding.” (ECF No. 1-3, PageID #45.) While

witnesses can be brought, witnesses cannot be subpoenaed, and cross-examination is

not permitted. ( .) The appeal is conducted by a senior supervisor or administrator

at the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services. ( ., at 44.)

Further, given the nature of the proceedings, certain guidelines apply to this appeal:

1. Due to the confidentiality of the information which may be

discussed, the Hearing Panel Chair may require the alleged

perpetrator to complete a release form permitting others to hear

the information about the AP.

2. The AP and /or representative are provided a reasonable amount

of time to present new information, which could include

documents he or she deems relevant to assist the review panel in

understanding the circumstances at the time of the incident or

investigation.

3. The AP and/or representative are expected to present their

information in a respectful and non-adversarial manner.

4. The hearing panel may ask questions or request additional

clarification regarding their understanding of the circumstances

as outlined by the AP.

(ECF No. 1-3, PageID #37.) Following the decision on the appeal, the decision is final

and not subject to state hearing review under Section 5101.35 of the Ohio Revised

Code, which governs certain State agency appeals. (Id., PageID #38.) Plaintiffs

assert that the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services conducts

the administrative appeal more as a meeting than a hearing. (ECF No. 28, PageID

#278.)

Defendants largely pin their argument on Section 2506.01 of the Ohio Revised

Code. This statute provides for judicial review of “every final order, adjudication, or

decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department,

or other division of any political subdivision of the state” in “the court of common

pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located.”

Ohio Rev. Code § 2506.01(A). In , 175

Ohio St. 3d 392, 2024-Ohio-2898, 243 N.E.3d 65, ¶ 14, decided after briefing and

argument, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a public children-services agency’s

disposition is not a final order that can be appealed under this statute. Accordingly,

the only post-deprivation relief available is the informal appeal set out in the informal

agency policy for appeals. While that policy might be adequate in many or most cases,

at this stage of the proceedings, the limitations attending that process, such as the

inability of a person to cross-examination witnesses, presents questions that require

resolution with the benefit of a more complete record.

I.C.2. Eldridge Factors

When deciding the process due, the Court must balance three factors: (1) the

private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the government’s

interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedures would entail; and (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

such interest through the procedures used, and probable value if any, of additional

procedural safeguards. , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

First, Plaintiffs have an interest affecting their professions and their

reputations in remaining out of the uniform statewide automated child welfare

information system based on false, erroneous, or unreliable determinations that they

committed child abuse or neglect.

Second, the State has an interest, too, in protecting children.

, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (6th Cir. 2006). However, this interest is bound up with

“whether [a state] has a significant interest in having a limited process by which an

individual can challenge inclusion on [a child abuse registry], and to what extent

adding additional processes will interfere with the overarching interest in protecting

children from abuse.” , 554 F.3d at 1194. While the State has an interest

in investigating and adjudicating these allegations, the State also has an interest in

creating databases that contain accurate and reliable information.

Third, the Court must consider “the fiscal and administrative burdens that [ ]

additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” , 424 U.S.

at 335. At the pleading stage, the record provides information about the formalities

of the process. For example, the State has 45 days to complete an investigation (ECF

No. 22, PageID #199), and during that time, according to the policy of the Cuyahoga

County Department of Child and Family Services, an initial conversation occurs. But

the record contains no information from which the Court would make any

determination of the burdens associated with the process as formally outlined or how

it operates in practice.

Finally, the Court must consider the risk of erroneous deprivation. A pre-

deprivation hearing is more appropriate where “a wide variety of information may be

deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity [ ] are critical to the

decisionmaking process.” , 424 U.S. at 343–44. Additionally, given the

nature of the allegations, time can be of the essence. Judicial review on the back end

might well provide adequate process to guard against erroneous deprivation. But it

is no longer available. , 2024-Ohio-2898, ¶ 14.

In this case, the allegations raise questions about the adequacy of the pre- and

post-deprivation processes available to Plaintiffs. Ms. Thomas alleges that she spoke

to an investigator once then received no notice of the disposition, making it impossible

for her to pursue post-deprivation relief. She managed to file an untimely appeal, but

that appeal consisted of a phone call, and the evidence against her was never

disclosed. As for Mr. Williams, he was not timely informed of a disposition. Then, he

was misinformed about the length of time that the disposition would affect him.

These allegations place the adequacy of process squarely at issue. At this stage of

the proceedings, the factors on balance either weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor or the record

does not contain enough information to make a determination that Plaintiffs were

afforded adequate process.

II. Statute of Limitations

Section 1983 itself does not provide a statute of limitations. In such

circumstances, federal courts borrow the applicable limitations period from the most

analogous one available under State law. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50

(1989). Here, the most closely analogous limitations period under Ohio law is the

general two-year limitations period for bringing a tort action. See Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2305.10; see Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

II.A. When the Statute Begins to Run

When a cause of action under Section 1983 accrues and begins to run presents

“a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The limitations period begins to run “when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the claim.”

Holson v. Good, 579 F. App’x 363, 366 (6th Cir. 2014). To ascertain when that occurs,

a court determines “what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect

his or her rights.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc., v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th

Cir. 1997); see also Printup, 654 F. Appx. at 785. This discovery rule accounts for

situations “where the injury complained of may not manifest itself immediately and,

therefore, fairness necessitates allowing the assertion of a claim when discovery of

the injury occurs beyond the statute of limitations.” Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia,

LLC, 717 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.

Co., 72 Ohio St. 3d 269, 1995-Ohio-191, 649 N.E.2d 175, 177 (1995)).

Courts may grant motions to dismiss on the grounds of an applicable statute

of limitations only if “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the

claim is time-barred.” Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir.

2022) (quoting Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir.

2013)). Generally, it is inappropriate to dispose of a claim as time-barred on a motion

to dismiss, Jodway v. Orlans, 759 F. App'x 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2018), because “the

statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bears the

burden of proof,” Spencer v. City of Hendersonville, 487 F. Supp. 3d 661, 678 (M.D.

Tenn. 2020); Cataldo v. United States Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012).

“To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs’ complaint must simply assert facts showing that it is

plausible that their claims are timely or that the statute of limitations was tolled.”

Grover v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 434 F. Supp. 3d 617, 630 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (citation

omitted).

II.B. Plaintiff Justin Williams

Defendants do not dispute that Ms. Thomas’s claim is timely. However, they

contend that Mr. Williams knew or had reason to know of the disposition of which he

complains more than two years before filing suit. (ECF No. 22, PageID #207–08.)

Plaintiff asserts that a different set of events triggered the statute of limitations,

making his claim timely. (ECF No. 28, PageID #282–83.)

According to the complaint, Mr. Williams learned of his disposition in 2020

when he was refused employment at a youth shelter. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 124–26, PageID

#18.) After receiving notice, Mr. Williams appealed and a county employee told him

that “his disposition would only affect his career with youth for ten years,” which by

that time was only three years away. (Id., ¶ 128, PageID #18.) The Cuyahoga County

Department of Child and Family Services upheld Mr. Williams’ disposition in April

2020. (Id., ¶ 129, PageID #18.) When Mr. Williams contacted the County in 2023 to

confirm that the disposition was no longer on his record, Mr. Williams found out for

the first time that the disposition would remain in statewide automated child welfare

information system for his lifetime. (Id., ¶ 132, PageID #19.)

II.B.1. Discovery Rule

Mr. Williams admits that he knew the job-related consequences of his

disposition at least by April 2020. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 124–25, PageID #18.) Instead, he

argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the 2023 phone call,

when he learned of the full extent of his injury. (ECF No. 28, PageID #284.) But the

discovery rule does not require a plaintiff to know the full extent of his injury. “The

cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or

predictable.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (cleaned up). Even under a stigma plus

framework, the injury is complete once Defendant knows, or has reason to know, of

the job-related consequence, discoverable through due diligence. Sevier v. Turner,

742 F.2d 262, 272−73 (6th Cir. 1984). Indeed, Mr. Williams’s appeal demonstrates

his awareness of the injury. See Printup, 654 F. App’x at 787–88; J.H. v. Ohio

Department of Job & Family Servs., No. 2:21-cv-206, 2021 WL 5240231, at *3 (S.D.

Ohio 2021).

Taking his allegations as true, Mr. Williams knew of his disposition and his

resulting inability to work at the youth shelter at least by April 2020. That injury

triggered the statute of limitations, even if Mr. Williams did not know then that the

disposition would have more permanent and lasting effects. Such was the case in

Printup. 654 F. App’x at 787–88. There, the Sixth Circuit held that the statute of

limitations began to run when the plaintiff, a teacher who lost her job as a result of

placement on the child welfare registry, suffered both the stigma and the plus.

“Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] constitutional injury occurred when she lost her job as

a result of her designation as a child abuser and her placement on Ohio's Central

Registry without due process of law.” Id. at 787. For Mr. Williams, those events

occurred more than two years before he filed suit, when his disposition caused him to

lose out on the job at the youth shelter. Applying the discovery rule, the statute of

limitations bars Mr. Williams’s claims as untimely.

II.B.2. Tolling

Mr. Williams also seeks equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment.

(ECF No. 28, PageID #285.) Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, a statute of

limitations may be tolled “where there is some conduct of the adverse party, such as

misrepresentation, which excludes suspicion and prevents inquiry.” Lutz, 717 F.3d

at 474 (quoting Bryant v. Doe, 50 Ohio App. 3d 19, 552 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ohio Ct. App.

1988).) Because the allegations of the complaint, taken as true, demonstrate that

Mr. Williams had sufficient notice to protect his rights in 2020, any fraudulent

concealment would not have prejudiced him and do not provide a basis to toll the

statute of limitations.

In any event, Mr. Williams is not eligible for equitable tolling based on

fraudulent concealment. First, Director Damschroder argues that Mr. Williams

cannot rely on fraudulent concealment as to him because the State did not participate

in any of the alleged actions constituting concealment. (ECF No. 31, PageID

#332–33.) Because fraudulent concealment must be pled against each individual

defendant, Metz v. Unizan Bank, No. 5:05-cv-1510, 2006 WL 8427066 at *8 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 28, 2006); Pate v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 560 F. App'x 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2014),

the Court finds that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claims against Director

Damschroder.

As for the remaining Defendants, they argue that Mr. Williams has not met

the standard under Rule 9(b) for pleading fraudulent concealment. (ECF No. 31,

PageID #333.) The parties disagree over the appropriate test for tolling the statute

of limitations. (ECF No. 31, PageID #333; ECF No. 28, PageID #285.) Whatever the

case, tolling “never continues beyond the time that a plaintiff, by exercising

reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts at issue.” Lutz, 717 F.3d at

475 (citing Zemcik v. LaPine Truck Sales & Equip. Co., 124 Ohio App. 3d 581, 706

N.E.2d 860, 865 (1998)). But nothing in the complaint or in Plaintiff’s brief suggests

diligence on the part of Mr. Williams after he learned of his injury in 2020.

In Lutz, the court’s analysis turned on the plaintiffs’ diligence. There, they

alleged that they relied on falsified accounting statements from defendants and

alleged that they had no practical means to verify the information for themselves. Id.

Those allegations survived dismissal. In contrast, however, the exercise of reasonable

diligence on the part of Mr. Williams would have led to the timely discovery of the

permanence of his disposition. That information is publicly available and reasonably

accessible. Plaintiff’s failure to make any allegation showing diligence is

determinative. See Evans, 434 F.3d at 851. “Absent some means of diligence,

Plaintiff[] [is] not entitled to tolling of the limitations period.” Lutz v. Chesapeake

Appalachia, LLC, 807 F. App’x 528, 532 (6th Cir. 2020).

III. Redundancy of Defendants

Plaintiffs filed this action against Cuyahoga County and against two

individuals in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants object to the

individual Defendants as parties to this action, arguing that their inclusion is

redundant. (ECF No. 22, PageID #210.) A suit against an individual in his or her

official capacity is “equivalent [to] a suit against the governmental entity,” Matthews

v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994), and acts as “another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,” Monell v. New York City

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978); see also Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d

802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). A suit that is brought against both the entity, and the

individual in his official capacity “is ‘superfluous’ and may be dismissed.” Ruffin v.

Cuyahoga Cnty., No. 1:16-cv-640, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117398, at *6 (N.D. Ohio

Aug. 31, 2016) (citing Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322, 327

(6th Cir. 2013).

Both Jacqueline Fletcher and Chris Ronayne are public officials of Cuyahoga

County and are named in this lawsuit only in their official capacities. Cuyahoga

County is also a named Defendant. While Plaintiffs argue that formal dismissal is

unnecessary, the Court finds that dismissal of Ms. Fletcher and Mr. Ronayne from is

appropriate. This dismissal does not affect any claims against Cuyahoga County or

Director Damschroder.

IV. Claim Barred by Sovereign Immunity

Finally, Defendants ask the Court to hold that, to the extent that Plaintiffs

request the Court to cause the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to comply

with State law, that request for relief violates principles of sovereign immunity. (ECF

No. 22, PageID #210; ECF No. 1, PageID #31.) In response, Plaintiffs confirm that

they only seek an order requiring that the agency comply with due process as a matter

of federal constitutional law. (ECF No. 28, PageID #286.) Accordingly, the Court sees

no reason to consider the matter further.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN

PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court dismisses the claims of

Plaintiff Justin Williams as time-barred but otherwise denies the motion as to

Plaintiff Tiara Thomas. Additionally, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Defendants Jacqueline Fletcher and Chris Ronayne.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2025

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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