Crider v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANEMARIE CRIDER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:20-cv-01518-SGC

)

ANITA WILLIAMS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

In their third amended complaint, the plaintiffs, Janemarie Crider and Tucker

Anderson (collectively, “the Parents”), name Anita Williams as the sole defendant

and assert three causes of action: (1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) malicious

prosecution, and (3) abuse of process. (Doc. 54).2 The Parents have moved for partial

summary judgment, and Williams has moved for summary judgment in full. (Docs.

103-107). The parties’ cross-motions are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

(Docs. 108-111, 113, 121, 126).

For the reasons stated below, the court will grant summary judgment in favor

of Williams on the Parents’ state law claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of

1 The parties have unanimously consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). (Doc.20).

2 Citations to the record refer to the document and page numbers assigned by the court’s CM/ECF

electronic document system and appear in the following format: (Doc. __ at __).

process and will deny the Parents’ motion for partial summary judgment. Further,

the Parents will be given an opportunity to address a fatal flaw with their § 1983

claim, identified by the court after a hearing in October 2024. See FED. R. CIV. P.

56(f).

I. Standard of Review

The standard of review for cross motions for summary judgment is the same

as when only one party files a motion for summary judgment. S. Pilot Ins. Co. v.

CECS, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1242–43 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citing Am. Bankers Ins.

Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005)). Under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying

those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its

burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by his own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the case will preclude summary

judgment. Id. All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are

resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,

1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If

the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary

judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.

Where, as here, a federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over state law

claims, the court must apply the substantive law of the forum state. See McMahan v.

Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1132 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.

64, 78 (1938)). Consequently, substantive Alabama law applies to the Parents’

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.

II. Undisputed Facts

A.C. (the “Child”) was born to the Parents on June 26, 2015, in Tennessee.

(Doc. 104-1 at 3). On the day the Child was discharged from the hospital, the Parents

were arrested for possession of marijuana. (Doc. 107-4 at 17; Doc. 107-5 at 13).

Anderson ultimately pleaded guilty, and the charges against Crider were dismissed.

(Doc. 107-4 at 33-34; Doc. 107-5 at 13-14).

At some point between August 2015 and March 2016, the Parents were

present for an extended time in Blount County, Alabama; there is conflicting

evidence as to whether they moved there for a period of several months, were simply

visiting for a few months, or were residing in both Alabama and Tennessee during

this period. Regardless of the length of their stay and the reason for their presence in

Alabama, the Parents stayed in a dwelling provided for them by Anderson’s mother,

Andrea Anderson (“Andrea”). (Doc. 104-1 at 17). The Parents allege that, at some

point, Andrea told them she would use the Department of Human Resources to take

the Child from them. (Id. at 15).

In March 2016, Williams worked as an investigator for the Blount County

Department of Human Resources (“DHR”). (Doc. 107-3 at 2). On March 18, 2016,

she went to the Parents’ home to investigate a report concerning the Parents and

Child. (Id.). When Anderson answered the door, Williams told him someone had

reported the Parents were using marijuana and distributing it to neighborhood

children and the Child was not receiving medical care. (Id.). Anderson told Williams

the Parents had been in Alabama for 3-4 months, his wife was bedbound, he had not

had time to find a pediatrician, and he did not smoke marijuana. (Id.). Although

Anderson did not allow Williams to enter the home, he did permit her to see the

Child. (Id.). Williams thought the Child appeared to be healthy. (Id.). Anderson and

Williams made an appointment for her to return a week later on March 23, 2016.

(Id.).

The Parents traveled to Knoxville, Tennessee on March 23, 2016, the day of

their follow-up appointment with Williams.3 (Doc. 104-1 at 15, 34). When Williams

returned to the Parents’ home for the appointment, no one was home; instead, she

found a note stating:

To whom it may concern, We have had personal issues arise & had to

leave suddenly. Please leave your contact info & we will get back to

you upon return. Thank you, God Bless

(Doc. 107-3 at 53). Williams left her card. (Id. at 42, 53). She also spoke to a

neighbor, who told her the family had lived in the house since the end of the prior

year. (Doc. 104-2 at 23).

On March 24, 2016, Williams received a phone call from Andrea. (Doc. 107-

3 at 3). Williams told Andrea she would not discuss the case but asked Andrea to

have the Parents contact Williams. (Id. at 12). On March 29, Andrea contacted

Williams and told her:

• Anderson had Asperger syndrome;

• Crider had mental health issues;

• the Parents frequently fought;

3 In their brief, the Parents assert this was because of Andrea’s comments to them, but the

testimony they cite does not directly support that contention.

• Anderson previously told Andrea that Crider tested positive for THC

before she delivered the Child;

• the night the Child came home from the hospital after his birth, the

Parents were arrested for marijuana possession;

• the Parents had been appointed a social services caseworker in

Tennessee after their arrest;

• Anderson was put on unsupervised probation and the charges against

Crider were dropped;

• the Child had seen a pediatrician only once and was losing weight;

• the Parents and Child had moved to an Alabama home Andrea rented

for them;

• Crider and the Child travelled back and forth between Knoxville and

Blount County until the first week of September;

• Anderson told Andrea the family returned to Knoxville, Tennessee.

(Id. at 13, 25-28, 39, 43-44). Andrea then emailed Williams to report that Anderson

suffered from anxiety, depression, and anger issues and he had placed his hands on

both her and Crider’s throats. (Id. at 25). She also reported (1) Crider had a

personality disorder, major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and many

medical issues; (2) she suspected both Parents self-medicated with drugs; (3)

Anderson had moved to Alabama following his arrest; (4) Crider and the Child

traveled back and forth to Tennessee until the first week of September; (5) Crider

spent a “good bit of time” in Knoxville during November; and (6) Andrea had

arranged for the last of the family’s belongings to be moved to Alabama in January.

(Id. at 25-28).

That same day, Williams contacted Ryan Malory with the Tennessee

Department of Children Services (“TDCS”) and learned TDCS’s case against the

Parents was closed. (Id. at 14). Malory told Williams to contact TDCS’s intake

department if the Child was in Knox County, Tennessee. (Id. at 14).

On March 30, 2016, the Parents traveled to the Blount County Courthouse in

Alabama, and Crider filed against Andrea a petition for protection from abuse in

which Crider alleged (1) she was a resident of Blount County and (2) she left her

residence because of the alleged abuse by Andrea.4 (Doc. 107-5 at 16, 40). The Child

remained in Knoxville with Crider’s parents (the “Maternal Grandparents”). (Doc.

107-5 at 35). Williams spoke with Blount County Circuit Judge Stephen King about

Crider’s petition, and Judge King stated he would contact Williams when the family

returned to court. (Doc. 107-3 at 17).

That same day, Andrea emailed Williams to report that her attorney saw the

Parents at the Blount County Courthouse and she saw the Parents’ car at Anderson’s

father’s home in Cullman County, Alabama. (Id. at 17, 30, 32, 39). She told Williams

the Parents spent the prior night at Anderson’s father’s house in Cullman. (Id.). She

later emailed Williams to report the Tennessee address at which the Parents were

staying. (Id. at 39).

4 Crider did not fill in the form’s blank indicating where she was temporarily located. (Doc. 107-

5 at 41).

Williams called the Parents again and left a voicemail. (Id.). She also

contacted Blount County DHR attorney Sherri Mitchell to begin the process for a

pick-up order. (Id.). Mitchell drafted a petition for dependency based on information

she received from Williams and Stan Glasscock, Andrea’s attorney. (Doc. 107-7 at

2). According to the information Mitchell received:

[Anderson] had made representations that the family was in Tennessee.

However, following those statements, [Andrea] had located their

vehicle in Cullman and Judge King had seen them at the Blount County

Courthouse. Immediately preceding the filing of the petition [for

dependency], Mr. Glasscock also advised [Mitchell] that the parents

were staying in Cullman County and were evading the investigation.

Ms. Williams filed the petition. At the time the petition was filed,

[DHR] really had no idea where the parents were but believed that they

remained in Alabama and were evading the investigation.

(Doc. 107-7 at 2). The Parents never responded to Williams’s attempts at contact, so

on March 31, 2016, DHR filed in the Juvenile Court of Blount County, Alabama

(the “Juvenile Court”) a petition for dependency, alleging the Child may be at risk

because of the Parents’ illegal drug use and domestic violence and the Parents were

actively avoiding DHR’s investigation (the “Dependency Action”). (Doc. 107-1 at

3). The petition, signed under oath by Williams, included the following allegations:

• On March 18, 2016, DHR received a report that the Parents were smoking

marijuana, Anderson was selling marijuana, the Child had not been

vaccinated or taken to a doctor since he was six weeks old, and the Parents

were arrested on drug charges the day the Child was discharged from the

hospital following his birth.

• When Williams visited the Parents’ home, Anderson stated he did not use

or sell marijuana, Crider was practically bedridden with fibromyalgia, he

was busy with work, they had not had time to find a pediatrician, and they

had only been in Alabama 3-4 months. Anderson was trying to get ready

for work. He did not permit Williams to enter the house, but he brought

the Child outside. The Child had no obvious marks or bruises and appeared

healthy. Williams stated she would return the following week.

• When Williams returned to the Parents’ home the following week, she

found a note from the Parents stating they had to leave because personal

matters had come up. Williams left her card with a note for the Parents to

call her. As of the date of the petition, the Parents had not called her.

Williams called Anderson, but no one ever answered. DHR received

additional information that the Parents were avoiding DHR, claiming they

had moved back to Knoxville, but they were really staying with

Anderson’s father.

• DHR learned Crider tested positive for THC the day the Child was born

and the Parents were both arrested on marijuana charges the day they

arrived home from the hospital. Anderson pleaded guilty to misdemeanor

possession and was still on probation in Tennessee, and the charges against

Crider were dismissed.

• DHR was concerned about the Parents’ alleged use of marijuana and

Crider’s reported mental and physical illnesses. Anderson had issues with

depression, anxiety, and anger management. The Parents were reported to

have numerous, volatile arguments.

• On March 30, 2016, Crider filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse

against Andrea in which she claimed to live in Blount County and in

Knoxville.

• After the Parents were arrested for marijuana possession, Anderson

returned to Blount County and Crider remained in Knoxville; however,

“they” were travelling back and forth between Alabama and Tennessee for

several months. Crider and the Child moved to Blount County in January

2016 and the family resided in Blount Springs. Since March 18, 2016, they

had not resided at their residence in Blount Springs.

• DHR believed the Parents were actively avoiding its investigation and the

Child was at risk from their illegal drug use, lifestyle, and domestic

violence and needed to be placed in DHR’s custody until it could

investigate the Parents.

(Id. at 3-5). Judge King signed an order awarding DHR temporary legal and physical

custody that same day; the order, which contains both a physical and electronic

stamp, was entered into the AlaFile/AlaCourt system at 2:01 p.m.5 (Id. at 7).

Williams then took the custody order to Anderson’s father’s home in Cullman

County, but she did not locate the Child.6 (Doc. 107-2 at 16). Mitchell then prepared

and filed an ex parte motion for immediate pickup order stating the Child was not at

the Cullman home. (Doc. 107-1 at 8). That motion, filed at 2:34 p.m. and signed by

Mitchell, stated: (1) the Parents were last reported to be visiting Anderson’s father’s

house in Cullman; (2) DHR could not locate the family at Anderson’s father’s house;

(3) the Parents stated they resided in both Alabama and Tennessee; and (4) DHR

believed the Parents fled Alabama to avoid DHR’s investigation. (Id.). Judge King

granted that motion at 3:00 p.m., entering an Order to Detain and Amended Order

for Temporary Shelter Care. (Id. at 9). Williams then sent a protective service alert

5 AlaCourt is an online system that provides access to Alabama state trial court records; AlaFile is

the web-based application by which registered users electronically file and receive service copies

of court documents related to the AlaCourt system. See https://efile.alacourt.gov/.

6 The Parents insist that Williams testified she traveled to Cullman on March 29, 2016. The

exchange references Williams’s March 30, 2016 note regarding an email from Andrea stating

Andrea rode by Anderson’s father’s home in Cullman and saw the Parents’ car there. (Doc. 104-2

at 35). At her deposition, Williams first stated the entry “is where I went to Cullman looking for

the [C]hild,” but she almost immediately clarified, “That is not where I went to [Anderson’s

father].” (Id. at 7). She then stated she did travel to Cullman on March 29, but there was no record

of that in her notes. (Id. at 8). Williams later clarified that she did not travel to Cullman until after

filing the Dependency Action. (Id. at 16).

to all Alabama DHRs and faxed the notice and order to both Cullman County DHR

and the Cullman City Police Department. (Doc. 107-3 at 5).

On April 4, 2016, Andrea moved to intervene in the Dependency Action,

alleging the Parents were unfit and unable to maintain custody of the Child. (See

Doc. 107-1 at 72). Also on April 4, 2016, Crider appeared for a hearing on her

petition for protection from abuse. (Doc. 107-5 at 20). After that hearing, she met

with Williams and Mitchell regarding the Dependency Action. (Id. at 21). The

Parents were served with the petition and temporary custody orders and were

appointed counsel. (Id. at 21). After the meeting, Williams traveled to Knox County,

Tennessee to locate the Child. (Doc. 107-3 at 5). On April 5, 2016, she spoke with

Knox County Juvenile Court Judge Timothy Irwin. (Id. at 5). Judge Irwin asked

about the Parents’ residence, and Williams replied that to the best of her knowledge

they had been in Alabama for more than six months. (Id.).

Judge Irwin testified that while he did not recall the conversation with

Williams, his normal practice is to review the submitted documentation, determine

whether there was a prior or pending action in Tennessee, and to contact the judge

who issued the pickup order. (Doc. 107-15 at 2).7 Judge Irwin issued an Attachment

7 Although Judge King signed the pickup order, Judge Irwin’s affidavit states that he contacted

Judge Sherry Burns, a Blount County Juvenile Court judge, and determined Alabama was the

appropriate jurisdiction. (Doc. 107-1 at 9; Doc. 107-15 at 2). Further, the record does not indicate

Judge Burns was involved in the Child’s case before Williams traveled to Tennessee. Therefore,

Pro Corpus, ordering the Child be delivered to DHR. (Doc. 104-10). Williams then

seized the Child from the Maternal Grandparents’ home in Tennessee. (Doc. 107-5

at 3).

A shelter care hearing occurred in Alabama on April 5, 2016. (Doc. 107-7 at

19). According to Judge Sherry Burns, to whom the Dependency Action was

ultimately assigned:

The petition for dependency filed by Ms. Williams disclosed several

possible jurisdictional issues. . . . [Judge Burns] was aware the child

had been born in Tennessee. [She] was aware that the father had

returned to Blount County shortly after the child’s birth and that the

mother remained in Knoxville and the family traveled back and forth

between the two states. The petition clearly stated that the mother

moved to Alabama with the child in January 2016.

(Doc. 107-8 at 2). At the shelter care hearing, Judge Burns

determined that [she] had proper jurisdiction. To [her] knowledge, there

had been no prior custody order and there was no other pending action

for custody at the time the [DHR] petition was filed. There was

conflicting evidence presented regarding the parents’ residency. The

parents asserted that there was no basis for emergency jurisdiction and

they had not resided in Alabama for six months but were only visiting

and thus Alabama was not the home state. However, other family

members asserted that they had in fact moved to Alabama and had been

residing in the State for over six months and were so residing at the time

of the petition. The information presented in court by the parents and

family members coincided with the information that Ms. Williams

presented to the Court. Ms. Williams did not present any information

that differed from the information that was provided by the Alabama

it is unclear whether Judge Irwin’s statement relates to Williams’s appearance before him in April

2016 or to a later discussion between Judge Irwin and Judge Burns, see infra.

family members to her and to [Judge Burns]. [The court] did not find

the parents’ position compelling or credible.

(Id. at 3). Because there was no agreement for placement of the Child with a relative,

Judge Burns awarded temporary custody to DHR and ordered the Parents to

complete drug screens. (Id.; Doc. 107-7 at 19). Anderson tested positive for

marijuana. (Doc. 107-3 at 24).

On April 14, 2016, the Maternal Grandparents moved to intervene in the

Dependency Action, stating that while they lacked sufficient knowledge to dispute

or confirm the allegations in DHR’s petition, they agreed it would be in the Child’s

best interests “to not allow custody to be placed with [the Parents] at this time.”8

(Doc. 107-1 at 10). They alleged that since his birth the Child’s home state was

Tennessee and it would be in his best interests to be placed with them pending

resolution of the Dependency Action. (Id.).

That same day, the Maternal Grandparents also filed in the Dependency

Action a Motion to Transfer the action to Knoxville, Tennessee. (Doc. 107-10 at 18).

They alleged Alabama had not been the Child’s home state for six months when the

Dependency Action was filed. (Id.). They further argued Tennessee was the Child’s

home state so the case should be transferred to Tennessee. (Id.).

8 This record is stamped filed on April 15, 2016, but was signed on April 14.

In May 2016, the Maternal Grandparents filed an “Emergency Petition for

Jurisdiction and Temporary Custody” in the Juvenile Court for Knox County,

Tennessee. (Doc. 107-1 at 21). They asked that court to enter an order “removing

jurisdiction of [the] matter from the Juvenile Court for Blount County, Alabama,”

assuming jurisdiction of the Dependency Action, and granting them custody of the

Child. (Id.). The Tennessee petition, which was assigned to Judge Irwin, was

dismissed with prejudice on August 22, 2016, because of the ongoing action in

Blount County. (Doc. 107-10 at 14).

On August 10, 2016, the Maternal Grandparents and Parents filed in the

Dependency Action a “Joint Motion to Transfer” that action to Tennessee. (Doc.

107-1 at 26). On August 23, 2016, the Juvenile Court held a hearing on the question

of jurisdiction. (Doc. 107-8 at 14). No testimony was taken, and according to Judge

Burns, no party requested to take testimony or otherwise offer evidence. (Id. at 3).

Judge Burns and Judge Irwin communicated pursuant to the Uniform Child-Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, but the parties were not present during their

discussion. (Id. at 14). Both Judge Burns and Judge Irwin agreed the action should

remain in Alabama. (Id. at 3).

At a November 21, 2016 hearing, Judge Burns ordered the Child to remain in

DHR’s custody. (Doc. 107-1 at 30). The Parents moved to dismiss or, alternatively,

for a 72-hour hearing. (Id. at 31). The Parents’ motion was denied, and the record

reflects no attempt by them to appeal. (Id. at 33).

In February 2017, the Parents filed in the Circuit Court of Blount County a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction

over the Dependency Action. (Doc. 107-11 at 95). That petition was ultimately

denied because the Circuit Court found (1) the Parents and Child were present in

Blount County Alabama between January 25, 2016, and March 23, 2016; (2) DHR

investigated allegations regarding the Child’s safety while he was present in Blount

County; and (3) the Blount County Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate

allegations of conduct regarding a minor Child that allegedly occurred in Blount

County. (Id. at 69). On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed and

remanded the case because it determined the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear

the petition and the jurisdictional challenge should have been resolved in the

Juvenile Court rather than through a habeas action in the Circuit Court. (Id. at 25-

30; see also B.J.C. v. Blount Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 263 So. 3d 705 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2017)). The Court of Civil Appeals specifically noted that the Parents had

failed to appeal the Juvenile Court’s custody order or file a post-judgment motion

challenging jurisdiction. (Id. at 29).

On December 18, 2017, the Juvenile Court ordered the Child be placed with

the Maternal Grandparents in Tennessee. (Doc. 107-1 at 44-46). On March 7, 2018,

DHR requested a hearing to place the Child with the Parents because TDCS had

approved placement of the Child with the Parents in Tennessee. (Id. at 47). The

motion was set for hearing on May 23, 2018, but then reset for September 2018

because the Parents did not attend the May hearing. (Id. at 49-50). Although DHR

requested an earlier hearing date, its request was denied because the Juvenile Court

did not have any earlier availability. (Id. at 50-52). The Parents requested the court

continue the September hearing date because of their medical issues, and the hearing

was again reset to October 24, 2018. (Id. at 54-56). When the Parents did not appear

at the October 2018 hearing, the court generally continued the hearing, stating:

Case called for trial on today’s date. Neither parent deemed it necessary

to appear for today’s proceedings. At [] this time this matter is

CONTINUED and shall be reset upon the motion of any party once the

time the parents have their priorities in order and decide to place the

best interest of the minor child first and foremost.

(Id. at 57).

On September 21, 2018, the Parents filed another emergency petition for

jurisdictional hearing in Tennessee. (Doc. 107-10 at 4). They alleged Williams had

either purposefully or negligently misled the Tennessee courts about the Child’s

residence when initiating the Dependency Action and complained the Alabama

courts lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the Child had not resided in

Alabama for six months. (Id.). Judge Irwin again dismissed their petition with

prejudice because of the ongoing case in Blount County. (Id. at 3). Although the

Parents appealed, that appeal was dismissed because “it appear[ed] to the Court that

the [Parents have] elected not to pursue [their] appeal.” (Doc. 107-9 at 3, 7).9

On October 30, 2018, the Juvenile Court entered an order addressing the

August 23, 2016 hearing. (Doc. 107-1 at 58). The court found (1) the Child and

Parents were residing in Blount County, Alabama during the timeframe at issue in

the Petition for Dependency, (2) no other court, including the Tennessee juvenile

court, would accept jurisdiction of the matter, and (3) Blount County was the

appropriate jurisdiction to determine the dependency of the Child. (Id.).

On November 1, 2018, DHR filed a notice of dismissal because TDCS had

approved the Child’s placement with the Parents, the Parents had completed

reunification services, and the Child no longer remained dependent.10 (Id. at 59). The

notice stated: “The child is no longer dependent in that neither [TDCS] nor [DHR]

has any present safety concerns with the child being placed with the parents.” (Id.)

(emphasis added). According to Mitchell, the dismissal was based on the Parents’

circumstances in 2018 and did not relate to their circumstances in 2016. (Doc. 107-

7 at 4). In December 2018, DHR moved the Juvenile Court for an order relieving it

of custody of the Child and dismissing it as a party to the Dependency Action. (Doc.

9 The Parents’ appeal was set for a hearing to determine whether the appeal would be pursued and

whether attorneys or a guardian ad litem needed to be appointed. (Doc. 107-9 at 4). The Parents

were cautioned: “If you fail to appear, the Appeal shall be dismissed.” (Id.).

10 According to Mitchell, the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children prohibited

placement of the Child without Tennessee approval. (Doc. 107-7 at 4).

107-1 at 66-67). The motion again stated that DHR no longer believed the Child was

dependent because neither it nor TDCS had present safety concerns with the Child

being placed with the Parents and the Parents had complied with reunification

services. (Id.).

The Juvenile Court set DHR’s Notice of Dismissal and Motion to Enter Order

for a February 28, 2019 hearing. (Id. at 68). When the Parents failed to appear at that

hearing, the court reset the hearing for April 1, 2019. (Id. at 69). DHR then requested

a permanency hearing, which was set for April 29, 2019. (Id. at 70-71).

The Parents did not personally appear at the permanency hearing. (Id. at 73).

On April 30, 2019, the Juvenile Court consolidated Andrea’s motion to intervene

and petition for dependency and dismissed DHR as a party to the proceedings. (Id.

at 72). That same day, the Juvenile Court also entered a “Permanency Hearing

Order” ordering the Child to remain in DHR’s custody. (Id. at 73). Two days later,

on May 2, 2019, the Juvenile Court entered an amended order awarding custody of

the Child to the Maternal Grandparents, who were then the temporary placement for

the Child. (Id. at 76). According to Judge Burns, the Parents made very little effort

to reunify with the Child and appeared to defer responsibility for his care (and their

own care) to the Maternal Grandparents. (Doc. 107-8 at 3). While Judge Burns

believed the Child was safe and well-cared for by the Maternal Grandparents, she

did not believe the same would be true if he was in the Parents’ care. (Id.). She “set

the case multiple times” and gave the Parents many opportunities to be reunified

with the Child, but she did not find credible their excuses for their failure to appear.

(Id.). Judge Burns further stated that “[f]ollowing a statutorily permanency hearing

applicable to dependency cases involving DHR, I entered [a] final order dated May

2, 2019 dismissing DHR as a party and awarding custody to the maternal

grandparents.” (Id. at 4). According to Judge Burns, “[t]his order was a final

dependency order with a disposition of custody to the maternal grandparents,” and

the Parents did not appeal from this order. (Id.). Judge Burns consolidated Andrea’s

claims “such that her request for visitation was separate and did not affect the finality

of the judgment.” (Id.).

On May 15, 2019, the Parents filed a motion for clarification. (Doc. 107-1 at

81). According to their motion, the May 2, 2019 order “appear[ed] to be an outright

award of custody.” (Id.). The Parents argued this was inappropriate because the

Child had never been found to be dependent, DHR filed a pleading acknowledging

the Child was not dependent, and no adjudicatory hearing or finding of dependency

had occurred. (Id.). The Parents requested the Juvenile Court enter an order

clarifying that the award of custody was temporary. (Id. at 82). It appears the

Juvenile Court never ruled on this motion.

Andrea died on September 13, 2022. (Id. at 103). Her claims became moot

upon her death, and on November 16, 2022, the Juvenile Court entered an “Order of

Dismissal” that stated: “The Petitioner is now deceased. The Petition is hereby

Dismissed and the Case is closed.” (Doc. 104-24; Doc. 107-8 at 3).

According to Judge Burns, custody of the Child remains with the Maternal

Grandparents. (Doc. 107-8 at 3). At her deposition, the Maternal Grandmother

testified that the Child has lived with her since May 2, 2019, and she is not aware of

any order amending or changing the Child’s custody placement with her. (Doc. 107-

12 at 10).

III. Procedural History

The Parents and Maternal Grandparents filed this action on October 1, 2020.

(Doc. 1). They amended their complaint once as a matter of course before Williams

answered. (Doc. 4). They again amended their complaint with leave of court in

December 2020, stating three counts: (1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) an

Alabama state law claim for malicious prosecution; and (3) an Alabama state law

claim for abuse of process. (Doc. 12).

Williams moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, and this court

granted the motion in September 2021 because it (1) held the Maternal Grandparents

lacked standing, (2) found Williams was entitled to qualified immunity on the

Parents’ § 1983 claim, and (3) declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the Parents’ remaining state law claims. (Doc. 30 at 13, 27, 28).

The Parents (but not the Maternal Grandparents) appealed, and on August 30,

2022, the Eleventh Circuit vacated this court’s dismissal and remanded the case.

(Doc. 51-1). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that (1) based on the allegations of the

second amended complaint, Williams was not entitled to qualified immunity in the

context of a motion to dismiss and (2) this court could not decline to hear the Parents’

state law claims because it had original diversity, not supplemental, jurisdiction over

those claims. (Id.).

In September 2022, after Williams answered the second amended complaint,

the Parents asked to amend their complaint again. (Docs. 46, 49). Their motion was

granted, and the Parents filed their third amended complaint in October 2022. (Doc.

54). Williams moved to dismiss the third amended complaint; this court denied that

motion on September 27, 2023. (Docs. 55, 76).

While Williams’s motion to dismiss was pending, the parties conducted

discovery, and the Parents filed separate motions for partial summary judgment.

(Docs. 70-75; 78-79; 86). Williams also moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 80-

85). The parties’ summary judgment filings were stricken because (1) the Parents’

separation of their summary judgment arguments into two distinct motions

circumvented the page limitations in the Initial Order and (2) the parties’ approach

to summary judgment resulted in unnecessarily complex briefing and scattered the

parties’ arguments and evidence across multiple filings. (Doc. 87). The parties were

directed to each resubmit a single dispositive motion that complied with the Initial

Order. (Doc. 87).

Williams answered the third amended complaint on October 20, 2023. (Doc.

92). In November 2023, Williams filed a suggestion of bankruptcy, and this action

was stayed. (Doc. 95). On December 11, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for the

Northern District of Alabama granted the Parents’ Emergency Motion to Lift the

Stay for the limited purpose of proceeding to a settlement or judgment. (Doc. 97-1).

In February 2024, the parties filed their respective motions for summary

judgment. (Docs. 103-107). A hearing on the parties’ motions was held in October

2024. (See Oct. 8, 2024 minute entry). In its order setting the motions for hearing,

the court advised the parties that the hearing would focus on the legal effect of six

orders from the Juvenile Court and the effect of those orders on Williams’s

affirmative defenses. (Doc. 122). During the hearing, the Parents clarified their

position that the Dependency Action terminated in their favor upon the November

2022 dismissal and closure of the case.

IV. Analysis

Williams argues she is entitled to summary judgment because the Parents have

failed to establish claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. (Doc. 106

at 3). She also asserts the Parents’ claims are barred by qualified immunity, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, issue preclusion, state-agent immunity, and statutory

immunity. (Id.). The Parents seek partial summary judgment on several factual

issues and ask the court to charge the jury accordingly. (Doc. 103). They also seek

summary judgment on Williams’s affirmative defenses. (Id.).

As explained below, the Parents have failed to put forth evidence to support

each element of their claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process under

Alabama state law.11 Neither side addressed the substantive elements of the Parents’

§ 1983 claim for a violation of procedural due process. Because the court concludes

this claim likely fails as a matter of law, the parties will be given an opportunity to

address the court’s conclusions before entering judgment in Williams’s favor. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). And the court will deny the Parents’ motion for partial

summary judgment.

A. Malicious Prosecution

To prove their claim of malicious prosecution under Alabama state law, the

Parents must show (1) Williams initiated a judicial proceeding, (2) she lacked

probable cause to do so, (3) she acted with malice, (4) the judicial proceeding

terminated in their favor, and (5) damages. See Ex parte Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201,

11 Because Williams is entitled to summary judgment on substantive grounds, the court declines

to address Williams’s affirmative defenses. Williams largely reiterates the arguments presented

and rejected in her second motion to dismiss. Because her arguments concerning the affirmative

defenses fail to address the concerns the court laid out in its order denying Williams’s motion to

dismiss, the court would reject those arguments for the reasons stated in its September 2023

Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See Doc. 76).

1214 (Ala. 2016). Malicious prosecution claims are disfavored in Alabama because

“public policy requires that all persons shall resort freely to the courts for redress of

wrongs and to enforce their rights, and that this may be done without the peril of a

suit for damages in the event of an unfavorable judgment by jury or judge.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Because neither DHR’s Dependency

Action nor any of the Tennessee Actions terminated in the Parents’ favor, Williams

is entitled to summary judgment on the Parents’ state law claim for malicious

prosecution.

In their briefing, the Parents argue the Dependency Action terminated in their

favor because (1) on May 2, 2019, DHR’s petition was dismissed on its own motion

and (2) after Andrea died, all claims were dismissed in a final order. (Doc. 108 at

23). This argument misrepresents the substance of the Juvenile Court’s order. While

the May 2, 2019 “Amended Order Dismissing Blount County DHR as a Party and

Order Consolidating Petitions” does dismiss DHR as a party, it vests custody of the

Child with the Maternal Grandparents, not the Parents. (Doc. 104-23). The Parents

have not explained how an order vesting custody of the Child in the Maternal

Grandparents, rather than the Parents, can possibly be an order terminating the

Dependency Action in favor of the Parents. In fact, at the summary judgment

hearing, the Parents instead argued that the November 2022 order dismissing the

case because of Andrea’s death is the operative order terminating the action in their

favor.12

The court rejects both arguments. Under Alabama law, when two actions are

consolidated, “they do not lose their separate identities, and the order of

consolidation does not merge the two actions into one civil action.” Ex parte 3M

Co., Inc., 42 So. 3d 1228, 1230 (Ala. 2010) n.4 (Ala. 2010).13 Further, “the parties

and pleadings in one action do not become parties and pleadings in the other.” Id.

Instead, an order consolidating cases represents a judicial determination that the

interests of justice would be better served by trying the cases together in one setting.

See Ex parte Hill, 166 So. 3d 701, 704 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

DHR instituted the dependency action because of legitimate concerns about

the safety and wellbeing of the Child. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court

awarded custody of the Child to DHR. On a court-ordered drug screen, the father

12 There is another fatal problem with this position. Even if the November 2022 “Order of

Dismissal” was the final adjudication in the Parents’ favor, it necessarily follows that DHR’s

petition remained pending until November 16, 2022. (Doc. 104-24). Because this lawsuit was filed

two years earlier in October 2020, the Younger abstention doctrine would prevent this court from

hearing the Parents’ claims. See Leonard v. Alabama State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902 (11th

Cir. 2023). “‘[T]he date of filing of the federal complaint is the relevant date for purposes of

determining Younger’s applicability’ because ‘the Supreme Court held that Younger applies if state

court proceedings were pending at the time of the filing of the federal complaint.’” Hale v. Pate,

694 F. App’x 682, 683–84 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting The News-J. Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499,

1510 (11th Cir. 1991)).

13 See also League v. McDonald, 355 So. 2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1978) (when actions are ordered

consolidated, “each action retains its separate identity and thus requires the entry of a separate

judgment.”)

tested positive for marijuana, despite his prior representations to Williams that he

did not use marijuana. Both Andrea and the Maternal Grandparents sought to

intervene in the Dependency Action stating it would be in the Child’s best interests

to be placed apart from the Parents. Approximately eighteen months later, Judge

Burns placed the Child with the Maternal Grandparents in Tennessee. Although

DHR later moved to have the Child placed with the Parents based on their eventual

compliance with reunification services, the Juvenile Court did not grant that motion;

it instead awarded custody to the Maternal Grandparents.

By filing their May 15, 2019 motion for clarification, the Parents

acknowledged the May 2, 2019 Amended Order is an outright award of custody.

According to the record before this court, no action was taken on the May 15, 2019

motion, and the Parents did not seek appellate or mandamus review. This court

declines to find that an order vesting custody of the Child in individuals other than

the Parents terminated the Dependency Action in the Parents’ favor. The May 2,

2019 Amended Order dismissing DHR as a party resolved DHR’s petition for

dependency, although the action continued as to Andrea’s separate motion to

intervene. To the extent the Parents prevailed, they prevailed on Andrea’s separate

petition as a result of her death, not DHR’s petition. Indeed, at her February 2023

deposition, the Maternal Grandmother stated that custody of the Child remained with

the Maternal Grandparents. (Doc. 107-12 at 10).

The court understands the Parents contend that the Juvenile Court improperly

awarded custody without a sufficient hearing. This court, however, is not the

appropriate forum to attempt to challenge a state court order. Instead, those concerns

could have and should have been resolved in the Alabama state courts via an appeal

or a Rule 62(b) motion. See, e.g., B.J.C., 263 So. 3d 705.

Further, the Parents have produced no order resolving the Tennessee actions

in their favor. There is no order vacating the April 5, 2016 Attachment Pro Corpus,

and both Tennessee actions filed by the Parents were ultimately dismissed.

Accordingly, to the extent the Parents seek to recover for Williams’s procurement

of the Tennessee Attachment Pro Corpus to obtain custody of the Child, that claim

fails because there is no evidence any of the Tennessee actions were terminated in

their favor.

For these reasons, the Parents’ state law malicious prosecution claim fails, and

summary judgment will be entered in Williams’s favor.14

14 The Parents also cannot show Williams lacked probable cause to instigate the Dependency

Action. “Probable cause in the context of a malicious-prosecution claim is defined as a reasonable

ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a

cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.” Ex parte

Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Ala. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In a

malicious prosecution case, a court asks whether “one or more undisputed facts [is] found in the

record [] establishing that the defendant acted in good faith on the appearance of things as they

existed when suit was filed, based upon direct evidence, or upon circumstantial evidence and

inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting Moon v. Pillion, 2 So. 3d 842,

846 (Ala. 2008)). While the Parents insist Williams lacked probable cause because she allegedly

knew both that the Child had not lived in Alabama for six months and that the Parents left Alabama

to avoid Andrea, not DHR, they ignore the substantial, undisputed evidence that (1) DHR received

B. Abuse of Process

In Alabama, a plaintiff seeking to establish an abuse of process claim must

demonstrate three elements: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose, (2) a wrongful

use of process, and (3) malice. Seibert v. Stricklen, No. SC-2023-0741, 2024 WL

1814532, at *4 (Ala. Apr. 26, 2024). Abuse of process is a separate claim from

malicious prosecution: “[m]alicious prosecution concerns the wrongful issuance of

process; abuse of process concerns the wrongful use of process after it has been

issued.” C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So. 2d 947, 950 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis

added). In Alabama, “an abuse of process claim is proper only when the action

results in the issuance of some form of special process from the court, such as a writ

of garnishment.” Ramsey v. Leath, 706 F.2d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1983).

To prevail here, the Parents must demonstrate Williams wrongfully used the

issuance of process against them to achieve an improper result. See Seibert, 2024

WL 1814532 at *4. To the extent Williams did nothing more than carry out the

a report that the Parents were arrested for possession of marijuana, they continued to possess and

use marijuana, the Child had not seen a physician in several months, and both Parents suffered

from mental health issues; (2) Williams received several reports regarding the Parents and Child,

their residence, and their location; (3) the Parents did not keep their appointment with Williams or

return her phone calls; (4) the Parents left a note indicating an intent to return to the Blount County

home; and (5) Anderson’s Petition for Protection from Abuse stated she was a Blount County

resident. The Parents also fail to acknowledge that Williams’s petition disclosed that the Parents

traveled back and forth between Alabama and Tennessee for several months, Crider and the Child

moved to Blount County in January 2016, and the family had not resided in Blount Springs after

March 18, 2016. Because these undisputed facts establish that Williams acted in good faith on the

appearance of things as they existed, she had probable cause to initiate the Dependency Action.

process to its authorized conclusion, even with bad intentions, the Parents do not

have a claim for abuse of process. See Willis v. Parker, 814 So. 2d 857, 863 (Ala.

2001) (citation omitted). The Parents must show the process was “use[d] to obtain a

result which the process was not intended by law to effect. If the action is confined

to its regular and legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the

complaint there is no abuse.” Id. (internal citations and quotation omitted, emphasis

in original).

Williams contends she is entitled to summary judgment on the Parents’ abuse

of process claim because the Parents have no evidence Williams had some motive

other than protecting the Child. (Doc. 107 at 33). The Parents respond by relying on

their own motion for partial summary judgment, which neither addresses the

elements of abuse of process nor distinguishes that claim from their malicious

prosecution claim. (See Doc. 108 at 24, referring the court to Doc. 105 at 1-12, 19-

20, 23-25).15

Alabama courts have provided examples of proper claims for abuse of

process. In Farm Country Homes, Inc. v. Rigsby, the court found abuse of process

where the defendant used an ejectment action to obtain a judgment against his ex-

wife so he could then garnish the alimony he paid her. 404 So. 2d 573, 575 (Ala.

15 Specifically, the Parents argue Williams lied to initiate the Dependency Action, but they do not

address the elements of abuse of process, which concerns the use of process after an action is

initiated.

1981). In Warwick Development Co., Inc. v. GV Corp., the court held that initiating

unlawful detainer hearings as retribution for the plaintiffs suing the defendant was

sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process, even if the unlawful detainer action

could be used to test the validity of a lease. 469 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Ala. 1985). The

court also noted that a claim for abuse of process would exist where an individual

initiated criminal proceedings for the purpose of collecting a debt.

Here, however, the Parents’ arguments here relate to the issuance of process—

that is, the initiation of the Dependency Action, the Alabama pickup order, and the

subsequent Tennessee Attachment Pro Corpus—not the subsequent use of that

process. They have failed entirely to articulate how Williams wrongfully used the

issuance of process against them, and their arguments relate only to a malicious

prosecution claim. See, e.g., Seibert, 2024 WL 1814532 at *4. The Parents have

presented no evidence that Williams used the Dependency Action for anything other

than its intended purpose—to determine whether the Child was dependent.

Accordingly, Williams is entitled to summary judgment on the Parents’ claim for

abuse of process.

C. § 1983 Claims

The Parents seek to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Williams’s alleged

violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.16 (Doc. 54 at 11).

Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, states may not “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. During

the summary judgment hearing, the Parents focused on an alleged violation of their

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to direct the care and/or

custody of the Child. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, however, the substance of

the Parents’ allegations—that Williams allegedly lied to various courts to obtain

custody of the Child—implicates a procedural due process violation. See Crider,

2022 WL 3867541 at *5 (stating that proceedings based on false statements

implicate a lack of procedural due process and citing Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th

1254, 1272 (11th Cir. 2022) and Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th

16 At the summary judgment hearing, the Parents suggested their third amended complaint, the

operative pleading, includes a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit previously read the second amended complaint to include such

a claim. See Crider v. Williams, No. 21-13797, 2022 WL 3867541, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022).

Although the Parents are represented by counsel and have now filed four versions of their

complaint (two of which postdate the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion), their third amended complaint

does not invoke the Fourth Amendment. In any event, as with a malicious prosecution claim under

Alabama law, the elements of Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution require the Parents to

prove that an action was instituted against them without probable cause and was ultimately

terminated in their favor. See, e.g., Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020). As

previously explained, neither DHR’s Dependency Action nor any of the Tennessee actions

terminated in the Parents’ favor. Thus, any Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims

would fail as well.

Cir. 1986)). Nevertheless, the Parents have no substantive due process claim because

“[s]ubstantive due process prohibits the government from engaging in certain

activity regardless of the procedure used to implement that activity. Since the

government may intervene in the family relationship when following proper

procedures upon appropriate facts, [the Parents have] no constitutional right which

can survive procedural due process.” See Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468

(11th Cir. 1990) (citing Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497

U.S. 261 (1990)). In other words, the Parents did not have an absolute right to direct

the care and/or custody of the Child.

To succeed on a procedural due process claim, the Parents must establish: (1)

a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; (2) state

action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process. See Huntsville Senior Servs. v.

Alabama Dep’t of Pub. Health, 645 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1262 (N.D. Ala. 2022)

(quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). There is no

dispute the Parents suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty

interest—the right to direct the care and custody of the Child—because of state

action through DHR. Consequently, the Due Process Clause entitled them to “notice

and some form of a hearing before state action” could deprive them of that interest.

See id., 645 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. Importantly, however, “‘unless the state refuses to

make available a means to remedy the deprivation,’ the claimant has not been denied

a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. (quoting Barr v. Jefferson Cnty. Barber

Comm’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2017)); see also McKinney v. Pate,

20 F.3d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994); Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 347

F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003); Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.

2000). This is not an exhaustion requirement; instead, this principle recognizes that

“due process violations do not even exist unless no adequate state remedies are

available.” Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1331, n.3. Further, it is not a requirement that states

courts were actually involved in or asked to provide a remedy in the specific case

before the federal court. See Huntsville Senior Servs., 645 F. Supp. 3d at 1267.

“Federal courts’ refusal to entertain procedural due process claims ‘unless

inadequate state procedures exist to remedy an alleged procedural deprivation’

makes good sense; ‘the state must have the opportunity to remedy the procedural

failings of its agencies, in the appropriate fora’ such as ‘state courts,’ before being

made subject to a claim for constitutional malfeasance.” Id. (quoting Cotton, 216

F.3d at 1331).

Because state remedies were available to them, it appears the Parents’

procedural due process claim fails. Alabama law permitted them to appeal the

custody orders or file Rule 60(b) motions:

The parents in this case filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in

the circuit court, alleging a procedural violation in the juvenile court.

Although the parents did not file a timely appeal to this court regarding

the juvenile court’s March 31, 2016, order awarding temporary custody

of the child to DHR, the question whether the juvenile court’s order was

void could have been raised in a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion

filed in the juvenile court.

B.J.C., 263 So. 3d at 707. Thus, as the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recognized,

there were at least two state remedies available to the Parents to address any denial

of due process that resulted from Williams’s actions.17 Alabama law also permits a

party to file a petition for writ of mandamus. See Ala. R. App. P. 21. Further, the

Parents acknowledged during the summary judgment hearing they could have

appealed the April 2016 order granting temporary custody of the Child to DHR. (See

Summary Judgment hearing transcript at 41-42). The availability of these state

remedies precludes the Parents’ procedural due process claim. See, e.g., Huntsville

Senior Servs., 645 F. Supp. 3d at 1267.

Consequently, it appears Williams is entitled to summary judgment on the

Parents’ § 1983 claim for a violation of procedural due process. However, neither

party has addressed the substantive elements of a procedural due process claim.

17 The court further questions whether the Parents’ procedural due process claim under § 1983

claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Beverly v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., No.

CV 17-3045, 2022 WL 4242515 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2022) (explaining that § 1983 actions in

Alabama are governed by the two-year statute of limitations codified at Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l)).

Here, Williams’s challenged actions appear to have been completed no later than April 5, 2016,

and the Parents contended, as early as March 2017 when they filed their petition for writ of habeas

corpus, the Petition for Dependency contained untrue allegations. (Doc. 107-11 at 82). Further, the

Parents were aware of Williams’s alleged misrepresentations to the Tennessee court no later than

September 21, 2018, when they filed their emergency petition for jurisdictional hearing in

Tennessee. (Doc. 107-10 at 6). Thus, even assuming the discovery rule applied in this case, the

two-year statute of limitations would have expired September 18, 2020, 13 days before this lawsuit

was filed on October 1, 2020.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows the entry of summary judgment on

grounds not raised by the parties after giving the parties notice and a reasonable time

to respond. Accordingly, the parties will be given an opportunity to address the

court’s conclusions.

D. The Parents’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The Parents ask the court to enter summary judgment in their favor on

Williams’s affirmative defenses. As explained above, because Williams is entitled

to summary judgment on substantive grounds, the court declines to address the

numerous affirmative defenses she raised. The Parents also ask the court to enter the

following jury instructions:

(1) Williams misrepresented to the Juvenile Court in Blount County,

Alabama that the child was in Cullman, Alabama to give the court

jurisdiction; the statement was false and Williams knew it was false

because she traveled to Cullman, Alabama on March 29, 2016 and

ascertained that the child was not in Cullman before she signed the

Petition for Dependency;

(2) the Child lived in Tennessee for seven months following his birth

and had lived in Alabama for two months before returning to

Tennessee;

(3) Williams’s statement to the Judge in Tennessee that the child had

lived in Alabama for six months prior to the filing of the petition was

false testimony;

(4) the Tennessee court would not have signed the Attachment Pro

Corpus Order but for Williams’s statement that the Child had, to the

best of her knowledge, lived in Alabama for six months before the

petition was filed; and

(5) Williams’s acts in Tennessee violated the Parents’ procedural due

process rights by denying the Parents a hearing in Tennessee both

before the seizure of their child and after the seizure of their child.

(Doc. 103 at 1-2). The Parents would not be entitled to a jury instruction on any of

these points because they have failed to establish any of these issues are undisputed.

First, the Parents are not entitled to any jury instruction that Williams

misrepresented to the Juvenile Court that the child was in Cullman, Alabama to give

the court jurisdiction. The Petition for Dependency did not state the Child was

definitely in Cullman, only that DHR received information that the family was

staying in Cullman. The Parents have not demonstrated this allegation is false.

Further, the Parents insist Williams knew the Child was not present in Cullman

because she first testified she traveled to Cullman on March 29, 2016, before the

Petition for Dependency was filed. But Williams later clarified she traveled to

Cullman only after filing the petition. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Williams, the court must accept as true her clarification that she traveled to Cullman

after filing the petition.

Second, the Parents are not entitled to any jury instruction that the Child lived

in Tennessee for seven months following his birth and had lived in Alabama for two

months before returning to Tennessee. There is conflicting evidence about where the

Child was located during the first several months of his life. The Parents’ current

testimony that the Child was in Alabama for only two months does not eliminate

their prior statements to Williams that he had been in Alabama for three to four

months.

Next, the Parents are not entitled to any jury instruction that Williams falsely

stated to Judge Irwin that the Child had lived in Alabama for six months prior to the

filing of the Petition for Dependency. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Williams, this statement was based on her decision to believe Andrea’s information

that the Child had moved to Alabama in September 2015 rather than Anderson’s

statements that the family had been in Alabama for three to four months.

Fourth, the Parents are not entitled to any jury instruction that the Tennessee

court would not have signed the Attachment Pro Corpus Order but for Williams’s

statement that the Child had, to the best of her knowledge, lived in Alabama for six

months before the petition was filed. The Parents presented no testimony from Judge

Irwin establishing this as fact.

Finally, the Parents are not entitled to any jury instruction that Williams’s acts

in Tennessee violated their procedural due process rights by denying them a hearing

in Tennessee both before the seizure of their child and after the seizure of their child.

They have not explained why the Tennessee court’s failure to provide them with

what they insist is a hearing required by Tennessee law is Williams’s responsibility.

Vv. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding

the Parents’ claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Accordingly,

Williams’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART with respect to

Counts I and III. (Doc. 106). The Parents’ motion for partial summary judgment is

DENIED. (Doc. 103).

Because neither party addressed the substantive elements of a procedural due

process claim, the Parents may object to the court’s conclusion with respect to their

§ 1983 claim (Count I) within 14 days of the date of entry of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (a court may enter judgment on grounds

not raised by a party after giving notice and a reasonable time to respond). Any reply

from Williams is due within 7 days thereafter. If the Parents do not file a timely

objection citing authority that would permit their procedural due process claim to

proceed, the court will enter summary judgment in favor of Williams on Count I.

DONE this 31st day of March, 2025.

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

38