Gideon v. Treglia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES A. GIDEON, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 2087

Petitioner,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

MATTHEW B. TREGLIA, SHERIFF,

Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Petitioner James A. Gideon (“Petitioner”), a prisoner in state custody at the time of filing,

filed a counseled Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). This

case was referred to Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong for a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) regarding the Petition under Local Civil Rule 72.2(b)(2).1 On May 10,

2024, Judge Armstrong issued an R&R recommending the Petition be dismissed and/or denied.

(Doc. 23). Petitioner, through counsel, filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 26).

The Court has jurisdiction over the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections, adopts the R&R, and denies the Petition.

The Court also denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

This habeas case, filed on November 4, 2021, stems from Petitioner’s convictions on three

third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code §

2907.06(A)(1). (Doc. 1, at 1). In his Petition, he raised four grounds for relief:

1. The case was originally referred to Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr.; it was

subsequently referred to Judge Armstrong upon Judge Baughman’s retirement.

Ground One: The prosecution’s use of Petitioner’s compelled statements to a state

medical board investigator to convict him violated his 5th and 14th Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination.

Ground Two: The erroneous joinder of separately-filed sexual imposition charges

for trial violated [] Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment right to due process and a

fundamentally fair trial.

Ground Three: Erroneous jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct violated

Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment right to due process and a fundamentally fair

trial.

Ground Four: Petitioner’s conviction for the sexual imposition charge relating to

M.M. was not supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the

Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

(Doc. 1, at 5, 7, 8, 10).

In her R&R, Judge Armstrong recommends the Court deny all four grounds for relief on

the merits. See Doc. 23.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the district judge “must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected

to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further

evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

This Court adopts all uncontested findings and conclusions from the R&R and reviews de

novo those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Hill

v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1213–14 (6th Cir. 1981). To trigger de novo review, objections

must be specific, not “vague, general, or conclusory.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th

Cir. 2001). This specific-objection requirement is meant to direct this Court to “specific issues for

review.” Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). General

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objections, by contrast, ask this Court to review the entire matter de novo, “making the initial

reference to the magistrate useless.” Id.

“A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented and

addressed by the Magistrate Judge, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the [R&R]” to

trigger de novo review. Fondren v. American Home Shield Corp., 2018 WL 3414322, at *2 (W.D.

Tenn. 2018); see also Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“An

‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested

resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term

is used in this context.”). General objections trigger only clear-error review. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm’n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2017), aff'd, 899

F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2018).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s objection focuses exclusively on the R&R’s resolution of Ground One, the

Fifth Amendment claim. See Doc. 23. He contends the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision represents

an unreasonable application of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Garrity, Spevack,

and Murphy. Petitioner presents two specific arguments. First, he argues the R&R incorrectly

concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court properly applied Murphy; he contends the Ohio court

improperly required proof of an explicit threat to trigger the Garrity rule. Second, he contends the

R&R incorrectly concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court held the imposition of a penalty must be

absolutely certain for Garrity/Spevack to apply. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Petitioner first argues that the R&R failed to address the core issue of his Petition, asserting

the Ohio Supreme Court paid mere “lip service” to Murphy’s inclusion of implied economic threats

in the Garrity analysis while effectively applying a standard requiring an explicit disciplinary

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threat. (Doc. 26, at 5). The Court disagrees with Petitioner on this point and finds the R&R

correctly analyzed the Ohio Supreme Court holding.

Before addressing Petitioner’s arguments, the Court first reiterates pertinent case law. In

Garrity, the Supreme Court held that statements made by state employees under threat of

significant penalties — such as job loss — violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-

incrimination and thus cannot be used in criminal trials. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497

(1967). Spevack extended this rule to include the threat of disciplinary proceedings against

individuals who are licensed by the state, including where the individual is threatened with the loss

of that license. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). Murphy further extended these

principles to situations involving implicit coercion. In Murphy, the Supreme Court stated that there

was “a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the state, either expressly or by

implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to the revocation of probation, it

would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be

excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal

prosecution.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) (emphasis added).

The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged Gideon’s property interest in his medical license

and recognized that potential license revocation could represent coercion impacting his Fifth

Amendment privilege. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the R&R correctly noted, and this Court

agrees, that in looking at the decision as a whole, the Ohio Supreme Court did not err in holding

the municipal court judge did not require Petitioner to prove an explicit threat. (Doc. 23, at 23).

Although the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the lack of explicit threat, it also discussed the

existence of other facts which it determined rendered Petitioner’s belief not objectively reasonable

in its application of the “objectively reasonable” “subjective belief” test from State v. Graham,

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136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 130-31 (2013). In applying the test, the Ohio State Supreme Court reasonably

concluded Gideon’s subjective belief—that refusal to answer the questions might threaten his

license—was not objectively reasonable. State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St. 3d 156, 161 (2020). The

Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that the Ohio Supreme Court’s application of the Graham

test is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

particularly because the U.S. Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether an objective or

subjective standard applies under Garrity. See Doc. 23, at 23-24 (listing different approaches

courts have taken). The Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that the Ohio Supreme Court “said one

thing, but . . . did something completely different” when it denied his Garrity claim. (Doc. 26, at

5).

Second, Petitioner asserts the R&R “misreads the state supreme court opinion” (Doc. 26,

at 7) in stating that court “did not hold that imposition of a penalty must be absolutely certain”

(Doc. 23, at 25). He asserts the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision effectively requires a penalty’s

imposition to be absolutely certain before Garrity/Spivak applies. Petitioner highlights language

from Ohio Revised Code § 4731.22(B) (the statute governing the licensing of physicians), which

the Ohio Supreme Court cited in its opinion, that “emphasize[d] discipline under the state statute

‘is not automatic,’ that the investigator did not ‘directly’ threaten Gideon with discipline ‘for

failure to cooperate,’ and that Gideon ‘only’ faced “the possibility of discipline.” (Doc. 26, at 6-

7). He asserts these statements reflect the state court’s erroneous understanding that

Garrity/Spevack only apply when penalty is certain. Id. The Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion

that the Ohio Supreme Court improperly required certainty of penalty, and instead agrees with the

R&R’s interpretation that while the Ohio Supreme Court noted the discretionary nature of

discipline under the statute, it did so in conjunction with assessing the lack of evidence showing

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Petitioner’s subjective belief that he would lose his medical license was not objectively reasonable.

See Doc. 23, at 25.

The Court reiterates the R&R’s observations regarding Petitioner’s argument that he was

placed in a “classic penalty situation is not without some force” and that the case “might present a

closer question” on direct review. (Doc. 23, at 25). But as the R&R correctly concludes, under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Petitioner must show that the

Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Petitioner has not done so here.

Certificate of Appealability

As amended by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) provides that a petitioner may not

appeal a denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless a judge issues a certificate of

appealability. The statute further provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only

if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates “that

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation

omitted).

This Court finds reasonable jurists could debate whether the Ground One – Petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment claim – should have been resolved in a different manner and that the issue

presented is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, the Court grants a

certificate of appealability as to this Ground. The Court finds Petitioner has not, however, made a

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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to Grounds Two through Four of the

Petition and denies a certificate of appealability as to those grounds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Judge Armstrong’s R&R (Doc. 23) be, and the same hereby is, ADOPTED

as the Order of this Court, and the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED as set forth therein and herein; and

it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Court GRANTS Petitioner a certificate of appealability as

to Ground One of the Petition, but DENIES a certificate of appealability is denied as to the other

grounds in the Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Rule 11 of Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 28, 2025

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