Dennis v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

FEAYANEE D.,1 :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:24-cv-143

:

vs. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

:

COMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

:

SECURITY,

:

:

Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Presently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12) (the “R&R”)

issued by Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman on February 13, 2025. The

Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court affirm the Commissioner’s non-disability

determination as to Plaintiff’s minor child, M.T. Doc. 12, PageID 766. Plaintiff has filed

objections to the R&R (Doc. 14), to which the Commissioner has responded (Doc. 15).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation issued by a

magistrate judge, the District Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” Id. § 636(b)(1). The Court “may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter

1 See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of

the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns in

social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials.”).

to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. Here, like in any Social Security appeal, the

Court’s “review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported

by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 615 Fed. App’x. 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“‘Substantial evidence’ means ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Kirk v. Secretary of

Health & Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). On review, if a court finds that an ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, that decision must be affirmed even if “substantial evidence exists in the

record to support a different conclusion.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises two objections. She alleges that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding

(1) that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that M.T. has a less than marked

limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information, and (2) that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision that M.T. has a less than marked limitation in the domain of

attending and completing tasks. Doc. 14, PageID 841–44. Plaintiff contends that M.T. has at

least a marked limitation in these two domains—acquiring and using information and

attending and completing tasks. Id. The Commissioner disagrees. Doc. 15.

An individual under the age of eighteen will be considered to be under a disability if

the child “has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in

marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). To decide whether a child is entitled to disability benefits, an

ALJ engages in a three-step inquiry: (1) is the claimant working, (2) does the claimant have a

severe, medically determinable impairment, and (3) does the impairment meet or equal the

listings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b)–(d). The focus here is on the third step in the inquiry set

forth above.

Under step three, to establish that an impairment meets or equals a listing, the claimant

must show an extreme limitation in one, or a marked limitation in at least two, of the six

domains set forth in § 416.926a(b)(1). Those six domains are: (1) acquiring and using

information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4)

moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical

well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)–(vi). Here, the ALJ determined that M.T. had no

extreme limitations, and a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, but less

than marked limitations in acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks,

caring for himself, and in health and physical well-being, and no limitation in moving about

and manipulating objects. Doc. 6-2, PageID 42. In light of Plaintiff’s objections, the concern

here is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that M.T. has less than

marked limitations in acquiring and using information and attending and completing tasks.

To qualify as a marked limitation, a child’s limitation must “interfere[] seriously with [his or

her] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

415.926a(e)(2)(i). A marked limitation is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.” Id.

Acquiring and Using Information. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion

that M.T. has a less than marked limitation in acquiring and using information. Plaintiff

attempts to draw an inconsistency in the ALJ’s findings as they relate to this domain and the

domain of interacting and relating with others. Plaintiff seems to suggest that the ALJ relied

on M.T.’s medication non-compliance in a contradictory way when arriving at the conclusion

that M.T. had a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, while finding a less

than marked limitation in acquiring and using information. But it does not appear that way

to the Court. There is substantial evidence in the record that differentiates the ALJ’s findings

regarding the limitation of acquiring and using information from interacting and relating with

others. Although Dr. Bokelman noted deficits in M.T.’s cognitive abilities, he did not

recommend any significant treatment interventions. Doc. 6-2, PageID 47. However, Dr.

Bokelman did suggest that M.T. “be provided access to participation in programs with peers

that would facilitate activities and opportunities for interactions.” Id. at PageID 46. The

opinions of state agency medical consultants at the reconsideration level also align with the

ALJ’s findings. Id. at PageID 49–50. Based on the evidence in the record, the Court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ properly considered Dr. Bokelman’s findings and the

objective evidence of record, including M.T.’s grades, treatment history, medication

compliance and school absences in arriving at the conclusion that M.T. has a less than marked

limitation in acquiring and using information. Doc. 12, PageID 833. Plaintiff’s first objection

must therefore be overruled.

Attending and Completing Tasks. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding

that M.T. has a less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. Plaintiff

advances a similar argument in relation to this limitation—emphasizing an alleged

inconsistency in relation to M.T.’s medication compliance. But similar to the other domain,

there is evidence in the record that differentiates the ALJ’s respective domain findings. The

state agency medical consultants at the reconsideration level found M.T. to have a less than

marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. Doc. 6-2, PageID 49–50. Further, the

ALJ observed as part of Dr. Bokelman’s testing that M.T. “exhibited adequate task

persistence,” “showed no signs of distractibility,” and “was able to complete all items

required.” Id. at PageID 46. The ALJ also appropriately considered the relevance of M.T.’s

participation in extracurricular activities as non-dispositive evidence related to M.T.’s ability

to sustain attention and concentration to reach predictable goals. Jd. at PageID 48. The Court

therefore agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ properly considered M.T.’s school

records, records from the St. Joseph Orphanage related to his medication management and

mental health treatment, and his participation in extracurricular activities in finding that M.T.

has a less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. Doc. 12, PageID 835-

36. Because the ALJ’s analysis falls within a “zone of choice,” Plaintiff's second objection

must be overruled. Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1035 (“The substantial evidence standard presupposes

that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference

from the courts.”) (citing Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.3d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).

IW. CONCLUSION

Thus, Plaintiff's objections (Doc. 14) are OVERRULED, the Magistrate Judge’s R&R

(Doc. 12) is ADOPTED in its entirety, and the Commissioner’s non-disability decision is

AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2025 □□ as Lhe ,

on “éffezy P. Hopkin

United States District Judge