Torres v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MIGUEL TORRES, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-212-ECM

) [WO]

AIRBUS HELICOPTERS, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Now pending before the Court is Defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc.’s (“AHI”)

motion to dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Doc. 81). Plaintiffs Miguel Torres (“Mr. Torres”); Dalia Torres; and Surisuda Przychoda

(“Ms. Przychoda”), individually and as personal representative1 of Brent Przychoda’s

(“Mr. Przychoda”) estate, (collectively the “Plaintiffs”)2 bring three causes of action

1 The Plaintiffs refer to Ms. Przychoda as the “[e]xecutrix” of Mr. Przychoda’s estate. (Doc. 71 at 2). An

“executrix” is an outdated term used to describe a woman who “carr[ies] out the provisions in [a] testator’s

will”—i.e., a “female executor.” See Executrix, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Executor,

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Alabama’s Probate Code uses “personal representative” to include

“executor[s] . . . and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law governing their

status.” ALA. CODE § 43-8-1(24). The Order granting of Letters Testamentary to Ms. Przychoda refers to

her as “Personal Representative under said Will[.]” (Doc. 57-1 at 2). The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to

correct the docket and refer to Ms. Przychoda as “Surisuda Przychoda, Individually, and as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Brent Przychoda.”

2 Mr. Przychoda died on July 15, 2023. (Doc. 71 at 3, para. 5). Throughout this Opinion, the Court uses

“the Plaintiffs” to generally refer to the parties who previously brought or continue to maintain claims

against the Defendants. At times, the “Plaintiffs” will include periods before and after Mr. Przychoda’s

death.

against AHI stemming from an April 2021 helicopter crash: product liability (Count I);

breach of warranties (Count II); and negligence (Count III). (Doc. 71 at 5–10, paras. 19–

43).3 Nearly twenty-seven months after the crash, Mr. Przychoda died by suicide on July

15, 2023.4 (Doc. 81 at 2–3). Consequently, Ms. Przychoda separately brings a wrongful-

death claim (Count IV) as personal representative of Mr. Przychoda’s estate. (Doc. 71 at

10–11, paras. 44–49).

AHI argues that Counts I, II, and III should be dismissed as time-barred. (Doc. 81

at 3–6). The Plaintiffs oppose AHI’s motion to dismiss and argue that Counts I and III of

the Second Amended Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) are timely because they relate

back to the original state court complaint (“Original Complaint”) pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(c). (Doc. 87 at 4–9). The Plaintiffs contend that Count II is timely

because the warranties provided by AHI extended to the future performance of the

helicopter. (Id. at 9–11). AHI argues that Count IV fails to state a claim because Mr.

Przychoda’s death by suicide exonerates AHI from liability. (Doc. 81 at 6–8). The

Plaintiffs argue that Count IV survives AHI’s motion to dismiss because AHI’s alleged

misconduct created an uncontrollable impulse which facilitated Mr. Przychoda’s suicide.

(Doc. 87 at 12–14). After careful consideration of the motion, briefs, and applicable law,

3 For clarity, the Court refers to the document and page numbers generated by CM/ECF.

4 The Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint merely alleges that Mr. Przychoda “died on July 15, 2023.”

(Doc. 71 at 3, para. 5). The Plaintiffs do not contest AHI’s characterization of Mr. Przychoda’s death and

later state that Mr. Przychoda “died by suicide.” (Doc. 87 at 12).

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the Court finds that AHI’s motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED as to Count IV and

DENIED as to Counts I, II, and III.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal

officer removal statute. (See doc. 49). Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and

the Court concludes that venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28

U.S.C. § 1391.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the

legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Conclusory allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to

rise “above the speculative level” are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

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me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Id.

IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND5

A. Factual Background

On April 20, 2021, a United States Army UH-72A Lakota helicopter occupied by

Miguel Torres and Brent Przychoda crashed at Fort Novosel’s Brown Stagefield in New

Brockton, Alabama. (Doc. 71 at 3–5, paras. 6, 12–18). Mr. Torres served as the pilot-in-

command and instructor, while Mr. Przychoda acted as the co-pilot. (Id. at 4, para. 13).

Mr. Torres instructed Mr. Pryzchoda to perform “a single engine failure to forced landing

drill,” during which Mr. Przychoda “rotated both throttles to idle”—leading the helicopter

“to lose altitude and ultimately lose control, causing an impact with the terrain[.]” (Id. at

4, paras. 14, 17). Mr. Torres and Mr. Pryzchoda were “catastrophically injured” and

became paraplegic as a result of the crash. (Id. at 2, para. 1; id. at 8, para. 34). Almost

twenty-seven months after the crash, Mr. Przychoda died by suicide. (Doc. 87 at 12).6

5 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court “view[s] the [Operative] [C]omplaint in the light most favorable

to the [P]laintiff[s] and accept[s] all of the [P]laintiff[s’] well-pleaded facts as true.” Ziyadat v.

Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

6 In its motion, AHI asserts that “the probate record establish[es] that Mr. Przychoda committed suicide

approximately 15 months after the accident.” (Doc. 81 at 7). Noting that Mr. Przychoda “died by suicide

on July 15, 2023,” the Plaintiffs carry forward AHI’s argument regarding a fifteen-month delay without

comment. (Doc. 87 at 12). AHI goes on to assert that Ms. Przychoda “concedes that Mr. Przychoda

unfortunately died of suicide approximately 15 months after the accident.” (Doc. 88 at 10).

Notwithstanding the parties’ assertion that the July 15, 2023 suicide occurred fifteen months after the

April 20, 2021 accident, the Court finds that the intervening time period is actually almost twenty-seven

months.

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B. Procedural Background

On March 10, 2023, nearly two years after the crash, the Plaintiffs filed suit against

several entities7 including: Airbus Americas, Inc. (“AAI”), Airbus DS Military Aircraft

Inc. (“ADSMA”), and Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc. (“Airbus U.S.”) (collectively the

“Airbus Entities”) in the Circuit Court of Dale County, Alabama. (Doc. 1-2 at 6, paras. 6–

8). The Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint included product liability, breach of warranties, and

negligence claims. (Id. at 8–13, paras. 20–44). The Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint did not

include any claims against AHI but did allege that the Airbus Entities “designed, machined,

maintained, manufactured, assembled, supplied, imported, distributed[,] and/or sold the

subject helicopter[.]” (Id. at 6, paras. 6–8). On April 13, 2023, the case was removed from

the Circuit Court of Dale County to this Court. (Doc. 1 at 1).

AAI and ADSMA filed motions to dismiss arguing that they did not “design,

manufacture, produce, market, warrant, distribute, sell, or otherwise ever have actual or

legal possession, custody, or control over the . . . helicopter.” (Doc. 7 at 2; doc. 8 at 2).

Airbus U.S. answered “that it supplied and sold the subject helicopter as originally

equipped” but denied that it designed, machined, maintained, or manufactured the

helicopter. (Doc. 11 at 4, para. 21). Airbus U.S. attached to its answer an affidavit from its

Senior Director of Government Contracts, which stated that Airbus U.S. “did not

7 The Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint included claims against M1 Support Services, [L.P.], BAE Systems,

Inc., BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc., and BAE Systems Technology

Solutions & Services, Inc. (Doc. 1-2 at 7, paras. 9–12).

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manufacture or assemble the UH-72A helicopter that is the subject of this lawsuit[.]” (Id.

at 17, para. 2).

On April 20, 2023, the Airbus Entities filed corporate disclosure statements which

placed AHI within the Airbus corporate structure. AHI is an AAI subsidiary and an

“affiliate” of Airbus U.S. and ADSMA. (Docs. 12–14, at 3). On May 12, 2023, the

Plaintiffs subsequently sought to remand this case to state court. (See doc. 36). In

opposition to remand, Airbus Entities’ counsel attached correspondence (dated

May 3, 2023) which stated, “the manufacturer and assembler of the subject helicopter is a

company named [AHI].” (Doc. 43-1 at 5). Counsel continued, “[a]s our office will also

represent AHI in this matter, we invite you to contact us should you require additional

information before dismissing [the Airbus Entities] and adding AHI as the proper Airbus

defendant.” (Id.). On February 1, 2024, this Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

(See doc. 49).

With the case firmly in federal court, Ms. Przychoda filed a suggestion of death

regarding Mr. Przychoda. (Doc. 53). Next, Ms. Przychoda, as personal representative of

Mr. Przychoda’s estate sought leave to amend the Original Complaint. (Doc. 58). On

March 25, 2024, the Court granted the motion for leave to amend, and Ms. Przychoda, as

personal representative, subsequently filed an amended complaint which maintained the

claims against the Airbus Entities. (Doc. 68 at 3, paras. 9–13). On April 5, 2024, the

Plaintiffs sought leave to file a second amended complaint to substitute AHI “in place of

the existing Airbus [E]ntities as the correct party in this action.” (Doc. 69-1 at 2). The

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Plaintiffs stated that “now that this Court has denied Plantiffs’ Motion to Remand and

exercised federal jurisdiction . . . Plaintiffs are now in a position to make . . . needed

corrections to the [Original] Complaint.” (Id. at 2). The Plaintiffs’ motion was granted,

and on April 8, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, the Operative

Complaint. (See docs. 70 & 71). The Operative Complaint removed the Airbus Entities as

named Defendants and added AHI—the only remaining Airbus affiliated entity in this

lawsuit.

AHI responded to the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint with this motion to dismiss,

which is now before the Court. (Doc. 81). This Opinion does not affect the Plaintiffs’

claims against the other remaining Defendants (M1 Support Services, L.P.8 and BAE

Systems Land & Armaments L.P.). AHI’s motion to dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for

review.

V. DISCUSSION

AHI moves to dismiss all four claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court begins its analysis by evaluating AHI’s affirmative

defenses that Counts I, II, and III are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Next, the Court analyzes Count IV and whether death by suicide, as a matter of law, is an

intervening cause which breaks the causal chain between AHI’s alleged misconduct and

Mr. Przychoda’s death.

8 In Defendant M1 Support Services, L.P.’s answer to the Operative Complaint, it represents that the docket

incorrectly identifies it as “M1 Support Services.” (Doc. 75 at 1). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

correct the docket to reflect this change.

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A. Statute of Limitations: Counts I, II, and III

“‘A statute of limitations bar is an affirmative defense,’ and a plaintiff is ‘not

required to negate an affirmative defense in [its] complaint.’” Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93

F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “A complaint

need not anticipate and negate affirmative defenses and should not ordinarily be dismissed

based on an affirmative defense unless the defense is apparent on the fact of the complaint.”

Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2020). But “[w]hen the

time bar is apparent from the face of the complaint, ‘the burden of alleging facts which

would give rise to the tolling [of] the limitations period falls upon the plaintiff.’” Oakley v.

Cepero Trucking, Inc., 2020 WL 6828743 at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2020) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted).9 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “a complaint may be

dismissed on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense only if it appears beyond a doubt

that [the] Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that toll the statute.” Lindley v. City of

Birmingham, 515 F. App’x 813, 815 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Because AHI

moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the claims should not be

dismissed unless the defense is apparent on the face of the Operative Complaint.

The parties agree that the Plaintiffs’ product liability (Count I) and negligence

(Count III) claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-

38(l) (“All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract

9 The Court here, and elsewhere in the Opinion, cites to nonbinding authority. While the Court recognizes

that these cases are not precedential, the Court finds them persuasive.

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and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.”). The

Plaintiffs’ breach of warranties claim (Count II) is subject to a four-year statute of

limitations period. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-725(1). AHI seeks dismissal of Counts I, II, and

III as time-barred. The Court will evaluate each statute of limitations period below,

beginning with Alabama’s two-year period for product liability and negligence claims.

1. Counts I and III: Product Liability and Negligence

The Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint named AHI as a defendant more than two years

after the April 2021 crash. The Plaintiffs do not argue these claims are timely. Instead,

they contend that the amendment (Operative Complaint) relates back to the date the

Original Complaint was filed—before the claims were time-barred. (Doc. 87 at 4–9).

The Court applies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this federal-question case

because the action was removed from state court.10 See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1) (“These

rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.”). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c) governs when an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading and provides two possible paths for the Plaintiffs’ claims to relate back.

First, “the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back[.]”11

10 The Court exercises federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). (See doc. 49).

11 The Eleventh Circuit, analyzing Rule 15(c)(1)(A), held that the subsection allows federal courts sitting

in diversity to apply state relation-back law when state law provided the pertinent statute of limitations. See

Saxon v. ACF Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 963 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed

whether the subsection would apply in federal-question cases in which the statute of limitations is supplied

by state law. See Pompey v. Lumpkin, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258–59 (M.D. Ala. 2004). Here, the statute

of limitations is supplied by Alabama law. Even if Rule 15(c)(1)(A) applies in federal-question cases

wherein state law provides the statute of limitations, Rule 15(c)(1)(A) would direct the Court to Alabama’s

laws regarding relation back. Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs when an amended pleading

dates back to the date of the original pleading. ALA. R. CIV. P. 15(c). Alabama’s Rule 15(c) is substantially

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FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(A). Second, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows for an amendment to change

a party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted if: (1) the amendment

asserts a claim that arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original

pleading; (2) the “party to be brought in by amendment . . . received such notice12 of the

action [and] it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits”; and (3) the party brought

in by amendment “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought

against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” FED. R. CIV. P.

15(c)(1)(C).

Here, the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint changed the party or the naming of the

party against whom a claim is asserted. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ amendment will relate

back to the date of the Original Complaint if Federal Rule 15(c)’s three requirements are

met. As explained below, the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint satisfies all three

requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) and relates back to the date the Original Complaint was

similar to its federal counterpart and its application would not alter this Court’s finding. See also Ex parte

Profit Boost Marketing Inc., 254 So. 3d 862, 869 (Ala. 2017) (“We note that federal decisions construing

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure because the Alabama Rules were patterned after the Federal Rules.”) (citation omitted). The

Court focuses its analysis on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C).

12 Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(C) references whether a party to be brought in by amendment “received such notice

of the action” and “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it” within

the “time period provided by Rule 4(m)”—ninety days. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). Alabama Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c)(3) provides a 120-day notice period. ALA. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3). The Plaintiffs filed their

Original Complaint on March 10, 2023, in the Circuit Court of Dale County, Alabama. (Doc. 1-2 at 5).

Because AHI received notice of the action within the more restrictive ninety-day window, the Court need

not discuss Alabama’s notice period. (See doc. 43-1 at 4–5) (Letter dated May 3, 2023, from the Airbus

Entities’ counsel indicating that “the manufacturer and assembler of the . . . helicopter is . . . [AHI]” and

that the same counsel “will also represent AHI in this matter[.]”). This fifty-four-day period shows that

AHI knew or should have known within the time period contemplated by Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(C) that the

action would have been brought against it, absent a mistake.

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filed. First, the Plaintiffs’ Operative and Original Complaints involve claims arising out

of the same occurrence—the April 2021 helicopter crash. Second, AHI received notice of

the action within the time period contemplated by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) and fails to show how

it would be prejudiced in defending the case on its merits. (See doc. 43-1 at 4–5)

(May 3, 2023 letter stating that counsel for the Airbus Entities, would “also represent AHI

in this matter[.]”). The parties’ dispute centers on Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s third requirement—

whether AHI “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against

it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)

(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court focuses its analysis on this prong.

Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) “asks what the prospective defendant knew or should have

known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what the plaintiff knew or should have known at

the time of filing [their] original complaint.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 560 U.S. 538, 548

(2010) (emphases in original). On March 10, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the

Airbus Entities. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). Shortly after the Original Complaint’s filing and within

the Rule 4(m) notice period, counsel for the Airbus Entities contacted the Plaintiffs and

informed them that AHI designed and manufactured the helicopter. (Doc. 43-1 at 4–5).

Counsel reiterated that the Airbus Entities’ counsel would also represent AHI in this matter.

(Id. at 5). Therefore, AHI affirmatively knew that the action should have been brought

against it. However, the key question for the Court is whether the Plaintiffs made a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.

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A mistake is “[a]n error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”

Kruspki, 560 U.S. at 548 (alteration in original) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1092 (9th

ed. 2009)). The Plaintiffs argue that their choice to sue the Airbus Entities was a mistake

as defined by Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The Plaintiffs “incorrectly” believed “that the

various Airbus [E]ntities were all elements of the same corporate whole of Airbus.” (Doc.

87 at 1–2). AHI argues that the Plaintiffs made “a deliberate choice to sue [the Airbus

Entities] instead of [AHI] while fully understanding the factual and legal differences

between the two parties [which] is the antithesis of making a mistake concerning the proper

party’s identity.” (Doc. 88 at 7) (citing Kruspki, 560 U.S. at 549). AHI contends that “[t]he

record supports . . . that [the] Plaintiffs deliberately decided not sue AHI despite knowing

its identity while (for whatever strategic reason) pursuing [the Airbus Entities] they knew

were incorrect.” (Id. 88 at 8).

The Original Complaint made clear that the Plaintiffs intended to sue the (company

or) companies responsible for designing, machining, maintaining, manufacturing,

assembling, supplying, importing, or distributing the UH-72A Lakota helicopter. (Doc. 1-

2 at 6, paras. 6–8). The Plaintiffs state that the decision to sue the Airbus Entities was due

to a misunderstanding about which Airbus entity designed and manufactured the

helicopter. (Doc. 87 at 1–2). The Airbus Entities and AHI were all represented by the same

counsel who reviewed the Original Complaint. Cf. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 544–45 (noting

that the same counsel represented the first named defendant and the defendant named in

the amended complaint). The Airbus Entities’ corporate disclosure statements highlight

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how related corporate entities with similar names could sow confusion and lead to a

mistake. “This interrelationship and similarity heighten the expectation that [AHI] should

[have] suspect[ed] a mistake ha[d] been made when [the Airbus Entities] [were] named in

a complaint that actually describes [AHI]’s activities.” See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 556.

AHI opposes characterizing the Plaintiffs’ conduct as a mistake and notes that a

“simple search on Google confirms that AHI is the manufacturer of the UH-72A ‘Lakota’

helicopter.” (Doc. 88 at 6 n.4). But the “reasonableness of the mistake is not itself at issue.”

Krupski, 560 at 549. A mistaken choice to sue an entity because a plaintiff misunderstands

its role in the events giving rise to the claims at issue does not foreclose a finding that Rule

15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s mistake element has been satisfied. Id. AHI also argues that the Plaintiffs

waited “more than eleven months after receiving AHI’s letter” informing them that AHI

manufactured the helicopter to amend the Original Complaint. (Doc. 88 at 6). The

Plaintiffs note the delay was caused in part because “the entire case was held in stasis”

while the Court considered their motion to remand. (Doc. 87 at 2). Although the Plaintiffs

are incorrect that a case is held in “stasis” while a motion to remand is pending, AHI’s

contention does not alter the Court’s findings.13 Even if the Plaintiffs operated dilatorily

and should have amended the Original Complaint sooner, an amending party’s diligence is

not part of Rule 15(c)’s analysis. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 552–53.

13 A plaintiff is not required to sit idle while a motion for remand is considered by the Court. See e.g., Royal

Canin U.S.A., Inc., v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 (Jan. 15, 2025) (“When a plaintiff amends her

complaint following her suit’s removal, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint

says.”) (emphasis added).

13

Federal Rule 15(c) “mandates relation back once the Rule’s requirements are

satisfied; it does not leave the decision whether to grant relation back to the district court’s

equitable discretion.” Id. The Plaintiffs changed the party or the naming of the party

against whom their claims are asserted and satisfied Rule 15(c)’s requirements. First, the

Operative Complaint arose out of the same occurrence as the Original Complaint. Second,

AHI received notice of the action within the period contemplated by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) and

failed to show prejudice in defending the merits of the case. Third, the Plaintiffs showed

that AHI knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it,

but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. Therefore, the Plaintiffs product

liability (Count I) and negligence (Count III) claims relate back to the date of the filing of

the Original Complaint.

2. Count II: Breach of Warranties

In Count II, the Plaintiffs claim AHI breached two implied warranties under

Alabama law: (1) the warranty of merchantability and (2) the warranty of fitness for a

particular purpose. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-314, 315, 318.14 The Plaintiffs claim that AHI

14 AHI manufactured and assembled the helicopter, which the Plaintiffs did not purchase. (See doc. 43-1 at

5). AHI sold the helicopter to “Airbus Defense and Space, Inc.” on September 28, 2016. (Doc. 81-1 at 8).

“[A] seller is anyone who sells, including a manufacturer or distributor.” Bishop v. Faroy Sales, 336 So. 2d

1340, 1343 (Ala. 1976). Under Alabama law, “[a] sellers’ warranty, whether express or implied, extends

to any natural person if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the

goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.” ALA. CODE § 7-2-318. “Thus, by the terms

of the statute, a manufacturer’s or distributor’s warranty would extend to the final buyer-consumer of the

product (as well as to other possible parties horizontally) if he is injured in person by the breach of the

warranty.” Bishop, 336 So. 2d at 1343. At this stage in the proceedings, and without the benefit of briefing

on the issue, the Court assumes that it is reasonable to expect that the Plaintiffs could be affected by the

helicopter, such that they would be considered “third-party beneficiaries” of AHI’s implied warranties

because their injuries allegedly stem from the helicopter’s operation and use. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-318.

Additionally, “privity is not required to enforce an implied warranty resulting in personal injury.” Parker

v. Exterior Restorations, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1111 (S.D. Ala. 2023); see also Rampey v. Novartis

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breached these implied warranties because the helicopter and its components were: (1)

“defective and inadequate for the purpose intended” and (2) “not fair or average quality as

compared to other helicopters made by competitors or of the same quality as others

manufactured or maintained by [AHI].” (Doc. 71 at 9, paras. 39–40). AHI argues that the

Plaintiffs’ implied warranties claim (Count II) is time-barred by a four-year statute of

limitations period. See ALA. CODE §7-2-725(1). The Plaintiffs argue that their breach of

warranties claim is timely because the warranties at issue extended to the future

performance of the helicopter. Although the Plaintiffs fail to show that the warranties

extended to the future performance of the helicopter, Count II survives the motion to

dismiss because AHI failed to meet their burden of establishing that the breach of

warranties claim is time-barred.

The Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranties claim (Count II) is subject to a four-

year statute of limitations.15 Id. Ordinarily, a “breach of warranty occurs when tender of

delivery is made.” Id. at (2). This general rule does not apply “where a warranty explicitly

extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time

of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been

Consumer Health, Inc., 867 So. 2d 1079, 1089 (Ala. 2003) (noting that Alabama law has “abolished privity

requirements [] in actions involving personal injury to natural persons.”). Although the Plaintiffs’

Operative Complaint does not establish a typical buyer-seller relationship with AHI, privity is not required

because the Plaintiffs claim that AHI’s breaches of implied warranties caused “severe and permanent

[personal] injuries” to Mr. Torres and Mr. Przychoda, natural persons. (Doc. 71 at 9).

15 The statute provides that “a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer

goods shall accrue when the injury occurs.” ALA. CODE § 7-2-725(2). A consumer good includes, “goods

that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. at § 7-9A-

102(a)(23). Here, both parties agree that the helicopter is not a “consumer good” as contemplated by the

statute.

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discovered.” Id. The Plaintiffs argue that the four-year statute of limitations period is tolled

because the helicopter “was sold with explicit and express warranties for its fitness for the

purpose[] of serving as a military helicopter[.]” (Doc. 87 at 11). The Plaintiffs also contend

that because AHI planned for the helicopter to be used in the United States military that

the “Federal Acquisition Regulations” apply which contemplate “warranties beyond the

date of delivery.” (Id. at 10). The Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint does not reference any

express warranties provided by AHI.

The Plaintiffs’ claim that AHI breached the warranty of fitness for a particular

purpose and the warranty of merchantability involve implied warranties—ones that are not

created by the overt words or actions of the seller. Cf. Express Warranty, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Operative Complaint and Alabama case law foreclose the

Plaintiffs’ argument that the helicopter was sold with express warranties. First, the

Operative Complaint only discusses implied warranties. Additionally, the exception to the

four-year limitations period for “future performance of goods” does not extend to an

implied warranty like the ones at issue here. Carrell v. Masonite Corp., 775 So. 2d 121,

124 (Ala. 2000); see also Wright v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 358 So. 2d 444, 445–46 (Ala.

1978) (“[T]he exception here considered applies only to express warranties which

explicitly extend the warranty to future performance.”). Therefore, because the Plaintiffs

failed to plead any claims related to an express warranty, and the Court is limited to the

Operative Complaint, the four-year statute of limitations period runs from the “tender of

delivery.” ALA. CODE § 7-2-725(2).

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Even though the four-year period applies, AHI still bears the burden of establishing

that the Plaintiffs’ breach of warranties claim is time-barred. See Wainberg, 93 F.4th at

1224. AHI asks the Court to take judicial notice of the “Bill of Sale for the [helicopter],

which is publicly available from [Federal Aviation Administration] records, [which] shows

that AHI sold [the helicopter] on September 28, 2016.” (Doc. 81 at 5). Even if the Court

took judicial notice of the bill of sale, AHI has failed to establish when “tender of delivery”

was made. See Lands v. Lull Int’l, Inc., 963 So.2d 626, 629 (Ala. 2007) (“[A] breach-of-

warranty claim accrues when the warrantied item is delivered.”). AHI simply provides a

bill of sale without establishing that AHI “put and h[e]ld conforming goods at the buyer’s

disposition and g[a]ve the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to

take delivery.” ALA. CODE § 7-2-503(1). Additionally, AHI does not describe the nature

of the agreement between AHI and Airbus U.S., or how tender of delivery was to be

effectuated. (See doc. 81-1 at 8). Without this information, at this stage, the Court cannot

determine when tender of delivery was made. Therefore, AHI fails to meet its burden to

establish the affirmative defense and Count II of the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint

survives the motion to dismiss.

B. Count IV: Wrongful Death

In Count IV, Ms. Przychoda, as personal representative of Mr. Przychoda’s estate

brings a wrongful-death claim under Alabama law.16 On July 15, 2023, Mr. Przychoda

16 In Section V.B, the Court refers to Ms. Przychoda in her capacity as personal representative of Mr.

Przychoda’s estate.

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died by suicide. (Doc. 87 at 12). Under Alabama’s wrongful-death statute, a decedent’s

personal representative may sue a corporation to recover damages for “the wrongful act,

omission, or negligence” that caused the decedent’s death. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410(a). Ms.

Przychoda timely sued AHI to recover damages for Mr. Pryzchoda’s death, arguing that

AHI’s “negligence caused the injuries and w[as] the proximate cause that later led to [Mr.]

Przychoda’s death.” (Doc. 71 at 10, para. 46). AHI argues that Mr. Przychoda’s suicide

was an intervening act, which exonerates it from legal liability. (Doc. 81 at 6–7).

Here, AHI’s alleged negligent conduct underlies Ms. Przychoda’s wrongful-death

claim—which requires her to show proximate cause between AHI’s breach of duty and the

actionable injury—Mr. Pryzchoda’s death. Lemley v. Wilson, 178 So. 3d 834, 841–42

(Ala. 2015). “Proximate cause is an act or omission that in a natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any new independent causes, produces the injury and without which

the injury would not have occurred.” Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994).

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court resolves whether Mr. Przychoda’s death by

suicide, as a matter of law, was an independent cause that severed the causation chain

between AHI’s alleged negligence and his death.

“Under Alabama law, suicide generally functions as an efficient intervening cause

which serves to break all causal connections between the alleged wrongful or negligent

acts and the death at issue.” Vinson v. Clarke Cnty., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1303 (S.D. Ala.

1998). Although “in most circumstances, no action will lie to recover damages for

allegedly causing another person’s suicide[,]” a defendant can be held liable for a

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decedent’s suicide “when the defendant’s actions are alleged to have created an

‘uncontrollable impulse’ in the victim leading to suicide.” Rondini v. Bunn, 338 So. 3d 749,

752 (Ala. 2021) (citing Prill v. Marone, 23 So. 3d 1, 8 (Ala. 2009)). A victim’s

uncontrollable impulse consists of “‘a delirium, frenzy[,] or rage, during which the

deceased commits suicides without conscious volition to produce death.’” Prill, 23 So. 3d

at 8 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The facts as pled, establish that Mr. Przychoda was injured in an April 20, 2021

helicopter crash, which caused “catastrophic[] injur[ies] . . . [to] [his] health, strength, and

activity.” (Doc. 71 at 8, para. 34). He sustained “injury to [his] body and shock to [his]

nervous system and person[.]” (Id.). Additionally, Mr. Przychoda’s injuries caused “great

pain and suffering . . . [and he] became . . . paraplegic[.]” (Id.). Without explanation, the

Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint notes that Mr. Przychoda

“died on July 15, 2023.” (Id. at 3, para. 5). The Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint does not

establish Mr. Przychoda’s cause of death or the circumstances surrounding his death. Put

plainly, an unfamiliar reader reviewing the Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint would not

know that Mr. Przychoda died by suicide. Ms. Przychoda has not plainly alleged that Mr.

Przychoda died by suicide. Cf. Rondini v. Bunn, 2018 WL 317713, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Jan.

8, 2018) (“The Personal Representative plainly alleges that [the decedent] committed

suicide.”). Similarly, Ms. Przychoda’s suggestion of death does not state Mr. Przychoda’s

cause of death. (Doc. 53 at 1).

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The Operative Complaint fails to allege that Mr. Pryzchoda died by suicide and fails

to plead that AHI’s allegedly negligent conduct created an uncontrollable impulse leading

to suicide. Therefore, even when reading the facts as pled in the Operative Complaint as

true and construing them in the light most favorable to Ms. Przychoda, the Court is left to

speculate how Mr. Pryzchoda died and what occurred in the intervening months between

the April 2021 crash and his July 2023 death.

In response to AHI’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Przychoda acknowledged Mr.

Przychoda’s death by suicide and argues that her wrongful-death claim meets the

“uncontrollable impulse” exception to Alabama’s general rule that no action will lie to

recover damages for causing another person’s suicide. (Doc. 87 at 12–14); see also

Rondini, 338 So. 3d at 752 (citing Prill, 23 So. 3d at 8.). Ms. Przychoda, for the first time,

argues that Mr. Przychoda suffered “a severe traumatic brain injury, with systemic

widespread damage to his brain.” (Id. at 14). Ms. Przychoda asks the Court to consider

Mr. Przychoda’s medical records and literature from the Defense Suicide Prevention

Office, in support of her uncontrollable impulse theory. (See docs. 87-3, 87-4, & 87-5).

She argues the Court can draw “a reasonable inference . . . between the significant traumatic

brain injury, [and Mr.] Pryzchoda’s long, difficult, and incomplete recovery, [coupled

with] the known relation to a loss of impulse control, and suicide” to establish that the

uncontrollable impulse exception applies. (Doc. 87 at 14).

“When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint

‘are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits

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attached thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)

(per curiam) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). The

Court cabined its review to the Operative Complaint and did not consider the exhibits

attached to the Plaintiffs’ response. Even if the Court considered the medical records and

suicide prevention literature, because Mr. Przychoda died by suicide, Ms. Przychoda would

still have to show that the uncontrollable impulse exception applies. See Rondini, 338 So.

3d at 752.

The facts as pled show that Mr. Przychoda suffered severe injuries and sustained a

“shock” to his nervous system, but the Operative Complaint does not allege facts to

establish that AHI’s negligent conduct created an uncontrollable impulse. Ms. Przychoda

did not allege facts regarding Mr. Przychoda’s condition which are sufficient to establish

an uncontrollable impulse—especially when his cause of death was not included in the

Operative Complaint. There are no facts to suggest Mr. Przychoda was in “a delirium,

frenzy[,] or rage” and died by suicide “‘without conscious volition to produce death.’”

Prill, 23 So. 3d at 8 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Indeed, the nearly twenty-

seven-month gap between the helicopter crash and Przychoda’s death “is long enough to

doubt the irresistibility of Mr. [Pryzchoda’s] actions due to” AHI’s alleged misconduct.

Missildine v. City of Montgomery, 907 F. Supp. 1501, 1506 (M.D. Ala. 1995).

Ms. Przychoda notes that “justice requires discovery into this topic to determine the

extent of the damage and loss of impulse control and other cognitive deficits that Przychoda

suffered post-crash that relate to his emotional processing, impulse control, and mental

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health.” (Doc. 87 at 14). “Discovery should follow the filing of a well-pleaded complaint.

It is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when h[er] complaint has failed to

state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted). Indeed, Ms. Pryzchoda had from July 15, 2023, to April 8, 2024 (the

filing of the Operative Complaint) to craft a well-pleaded complaint. The Court finds that

Ms. Pryzchoda failed to meet her burden to establish that as a matter of law, Mr.

Przychoda’s suicide did not break the chain of causation between AHI’s alleged

misconduct and Mr. Przychoda’s death. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count IV of the

Operative Complaint against AHI.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. AHI’s motion to dismiss (doc. 81) is GRANTED as to Count IV brought by

Plaintiff Surisuda Przychoda, as personal representative of Brent Przychoda’s estate.

2. AHI’s motion to dismiss (doc. 81) is DENIED as to Counts I, II, and III.

DONE this 28th day of March, 2025.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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