Opinion

Outterbridge, D. v. Abington Memorial Hospital

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 28, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Panella
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.6%

The opinion

J-A06023-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

DAREN OUTTERBRIDGE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS : PENNSYLVANIA

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF :

YHVETTA P. OUTTERBRIDGE, :

DECEASED :

:

Appellant :

:

: No. 1261 EDA 2024

v. :

:

:

TRI-COUNTY EMERGENCY :

PHYSICIANS, LLC, WYNCOTE FAMILY :

MEDICINE, PC, SUZANNE SHORTEN, :

MD, KENNETH S. WEISS, DO, BRENT :

C. BEDDIS, DO, ABINGTON :

JEFFERSON HEALTH, ABINGTON :

HEALTH PHYSICIANS, ABINGTON :

OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL :

ASSOCIATES, KATIE GARRELTS, MD, :

CHESTNUT HILL HOSPITAL, :

CHESTNUT HILL HOSPITAL, LLC, :

CHESTNUT HILL HEALTH SYSTEM, :

LLC, CHHS HOSPITAL COMPANY, :

LLC, READING HEALTH SYSTEM, :

TOWER HEALTH, AMANDA HOWELL, :

MD, TRI-COUNTY EMERGENCY :

PHYSICIANS AT CHESTNUT HILL :

HOSPITAL, ABINGTON HEALTH :

PHYSICIANS

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 1, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 191200157

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 28, 2025

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A06023-25

Appellant, Darren Outterbridge, individually and as administrator of the

estate of Yhvetta P. Outterbridge, appeals from the judgment entered on May

1, 2024 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after the jury

returned a verdict in favor of Appellees, Abington Memorial Hospital

(“Abington”), Suzanne Shorten, M.D., Kenneth Weiss, D.O., and Brent C.

Beddis, D.O., and the court denied his motion for a new trial. After careful

review, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court

dated September 12, 2024.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of the

case. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/24, at 1-6. Therefore, a detailed recitation

of the underlying facts is unnecessary. It is sufficient for our disposition to

state that Appellant initiated this medical malpractice action after his late wife

passed unexpectedly on May 10, 2018 at the age of 39. Mrs. Outterbridge’s

cause of death, which the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s Office determined

to be dilated cardiomyopathy, was disputed at trial. From 2009 to 2018, Mrs.

Outterbridge treated with the Appellee primary care physicians at Wyncote

Family Medicine, which is owned by Abington. Appellant alleges the Appellee

physicians breached the standard of care by not referring Mrs. Outterbridge

to a cardiologist for complaints of chest pain.

During the trial that took place from February 12 to March 1, 2024, the

jury heard the testimony of expert witnesses and of the individual Appellee

physicians, who maintained that they did not breach the standard of care

-2-

J-A06023-25

because they did not believe Mrs. Outterbridge’s complaints of chest pain were

cardiac. The jury credited this testimony and returned a verdict for Appellees.

Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, in which he alleged that “the

jury’s verdict resulted from erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary and legal

rulings.” Motion for New Trial, 3/11/24, at 4. The trial court denied Appellant’s

post-trial motion by order dated April 11, 2024. On May 10, 2024, Appellant

filed a notice of appeal.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by improperly precluding

[Appellant’s] counsel from impeaching [Appellees’] expert

cardiology witness, Eliott Gerber, MD, and Brent Beddis, DO, with

standard literature, a Heart Rhythm Society/American Heart

Association Expert Consensus Statement, that [Appellant’s]

expert had already authenticated, and which contradicted

[Appellees’] witnesses’ testimony.

2. Whether the trial court erroneously permitted [Appellees] to

argue, over [Appellant’s] objections, that they were vindicated by

the actions of Mrs. Outterbridge’s medical providers in other

specialties who did not refer [Mrs. Outterbridge] to a cardiologist,

including her treating gynecologist, creating the prejudicial and

misleading impression that Mrs. Outterbridge’s treating

gynecologist and other specialists agreed that [Appellees] met the

standard of care by not referring [Mrs. Outterbridge] to a

cardiologist, and the Court further precluded [Appellant] from

introducing testimony that refuted [Appellees’] argument, in

particular testimony from Mrs. Outterbridge’s treating

gynecologist that if a patient needed an outpatient workup with a

cardiologist she expected the patient’s primary care physician

would manage that referral.

3. Whether the trial court improperly denied [Appellant’s] request

for Abington Memorial Hospital to appear on the verdict sheet for

the negligence of its staff despite the physician [Appellees]

themselves offering testimony that its clerical staff may have

negligently failed to follow protocol and provide the physician

-3-

J-A06023-25

[Appellees] with important faxes from outside sources regarding

Mrs. Outterbridge’s cardiac condition, thereby permitting the jury

to conclude that none of the physician [Appellees] on the verdict

sheet were liable for [Appellant’s] harm.

4. Whether the trial court improperly granted [Appellees’] motion

in limine and precluded [Appellant’s] counsel from referring to or

cross examining the [Appellee] doctors about their deposition

testimony that their real-time, contemporaneous, rationale for

assessing Mrs. Outterbridge’s cardiac risk factors as being low

despite her having a brother who suffered a premature sudden

cardiac death included that they thought Mrs. Outterbridge’s

brother could have been a drug user.

5. Whether the trial court erroneously denied [Appellant’s] motion

in limine and allowed [Appellees] to introduce irrelevant

questioning and evidence that [Appellant] continued to treat with

[Appellees’] primary care practice group after his wife’s death, and

thereby permitted [Appellees] to misleadingly and prejudicially

argue that Mr. Outterbridge was “lying” about this collateral and

irrelevant issue, and that [Appellant’s] entire case was

untrustworthy and unmeritorious as a result of his continued

treatment.

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8 (trial court answers omitted). Appellant maintains

that a new trial is warranted based on these alleged errors. See id., at 73-74.

“We will reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial

only if the trial court abused its discretion[,]” which exists where “the trial

court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or

capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Risperdal Litig. W.C. v. Janssen Pharm., Inc.,

174 A.3d 1110, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).

Furthermore,

[d]ecisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are within the

discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only if

-4-

J-A06023-25

the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.…

We will grant a request for a new trial based upon a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings only if those rulings not only are erroneous,

but also are harmful to the complaining party.… Evidence is

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case,

tends to make the fact at issue more or less probable, or supports

a reasonable inference or presumption about the existence of a

material fact.

A.Y. v. Janssen Pharm. Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 21 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

Similarly, we review a trial court’s decision regarding what is included

on a jury verdict sheet for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. See Seels

v. Tenet Health Sys. Hahnemann, LLC, 167 A.3d 190, 207-08 n.5 (Pa.

Super. 2017); see also Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.,

978 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa. Super. 2009).

After careful consideration of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the

Honorable Angelo J. Foglietta’s 28-page opinion dated September 12, 2024,

we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court’s opinion

comprehensively disposes of the issues raised by Appellant, with citations to

the record, and we discern no abuse of discretion or legal error.

Accordingly, we affirm on this basis of the September 12, 2024 opinion,

which we have attached for the convenience of the parties.

Judgment affirmed.

-5-

J-A06023-25

Date: 10/3/2023

-6-

03/21/2025 11:09

Circulated 03/2102025 11.09 AM

COURT

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA

PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

FIRST JUDICIAL

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAREN OUTTERBRIDGE, Individually

DAREN OUTTERBRIDGE, Individually :

-

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And as

And as Administrator of the

Administrator of the Estate of

Estate of DECEMBER TERM, 2019

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OPINION OF THE COURT 6 n

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This is the appeal

appeal of Plaintiff Darren Outterbridge, individually and as administrator of the

estate of Yhvetta P. Outterbridge, following

following a

a jury's determination that Defendants Abington

Memorial Hospital, Suzanne Shorten, M.D., Kenneth

Memorial Hospital, Kenneth S. Weiss, D.O.,

D.O., and Brent

Brent C. Beddis,

Beddis, D.O.,

did not breach the standard of care necessary to provide proper medical care and services to Mrs.

Outterbridge whose

Outterbridge whose cause of death at thirty-nine

thirty-nine years old was disputed at

at trial.

trial.

On October 12, 2009, Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge became aaprimary

primary care patient of Wyncote Family

Hospital.

Hospital. On

On her

her first

first visit

visit there,

there, she saw Dr. Shorten

she saw Shorten for

for a

a physical

physical exam.

exam. Because

Because Mrs.

Outterbridge's intake paperwork

Outterbridge's paperwork indicated that she wanted to

to address ongoing chest pain, Dr.

Shorten took a

a history prior chest pain that was relieved by a

history which detailed prior a "GI Dr.

GI cocktail" and Dr

Shorten listened to Mrs. Outterbridge's

Outterbridge's heart and performed an electrocardiogram

electrocardiogram ("EKG") in the

office. Dr. Shorten found both to be

office. be "normal." She prescribed antiacids and ordered bloodwork to

check Mrs. Outterbridge's

Outterbridge's cholesterol,

cholesterol. N.T. Feb.

Feb. 13, 2024 P,41-42

P. 41-42.

A

A few months later, on January 4, 2010, Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge returned to Wyncote Family

Hospital

Hospital to

to be

be treated for stomach

treated for stomach pain.

pain. She saw Dr.

She saw Shorten who

Dr. Shorten checked her

who checked her heart and reported

heart and reported

aanormal rate and regular

regular rhythm.

rhythm. In November 2010, Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge presented

presented to Abington

Hospital

Hospital for abdominal pain

pain where she was examined and found again to have a "normal" heart

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rate

rate and rhythm

rhythm and no complaints of chest pain.

no complaints pain. N.T. Feb.

Feb. 13,

13, 2024,

2024, P.

P 48-49.

48-49, She saw her

gynecologist complaints of chest pain, palpitations,

gynecologist in 2012 with no complaints palpitations, or shortness of breath. Id. P.

P

52. In

In April

April 2012,

2012, Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge presented to

Outterbridge presented to her

her primary

primary care practice

practice with gynecologic

gynecologic

problems

problems and then presented

presented to Chestnut Hill Hospital

Hospital for the same in September

September 2012.

2012

On December 8, 2012, Mrs. Outterbridge's

Outterbridge's brother, Nathaniel Woodard, died at forty-three

forty-three

years old from

years old athererosclerotic disease/

from athererosclerotic disease/ a myocardial infarction

a myocardial infarction (heart attack). N.T.

(heart attack). N.T. Feb. 13, 2024,

Feb. 13, 2024,

P. 31, L. 16-20.

P.31,L. 16-20. On

On December 30-31, Mrs.

December 30-31, Mrs. Outterbridge was admitted

Outterbridge was admitted into Chestnut Hill

into Chestnut Hill Hospital

Hospital

for a

a uterine

uterine issue

issue causing vaginal bleeding, blood

vaginal bleeding, groin pain.

blood clots, and groin pain. N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb. 13,

13, 2024

2024 PM,

PM,

P.

P. 55,L.

L. 12-14,

12-14, P. 58, L.19-25.

P. 58,L.19-25.

Nine days later, on January 9, 2013, Mrs. Outterbridge saw her gynecologist,

Mrs. Outterbridge gynecologist, Dr. Lynda

Lynda

Thomas-Mabine, in

Thomas-Mabine, in office

office and

and complained

complained of

of chest

chest pain—her

pain first complaints

her first complaints of

of chest

chest pain since

pain since

2009. N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb. 13, 2024, P.

P 60, L. 2-13, N.T. Feb. 21, 2024, P.

P, 81-82. Dr. Thomas-Mabine

referred

referred Mrs. Outterbridge to

Mrs. Outterbridge to the emergency room

the emergency room for

for problems

problems with

with her

her hemoglobin,

hemoglobin, hematocrit,

hematocrit,

and pulse oximetry; Mrs.

pulse oximetry; Mrs. Outterbridge

Outterbridge had significant marked

had significant anemia and

marked anemia and aahemoglobin level

hemoglobin level

around six

around six or seven, which

or seven, which is

is half of aanormal

half of normal level.

level. In

In the hospital, Mrs. Outterbridge

the hospital, Outterbridge received

received aa

blood

blood transfusion which relieved

transfusion which relieved her chest pain.

her chest pain. N.T.

N.T. Feb. 21, 2024,

Feb. 21, 2024, P. 82, L.

P 82, L. 10-12.

10-12. Staff

performed an EKG on

performed an on her,

her, and

and the

the computer

computer reported

reported a

aseptal

septal infarction of unidentified

infarction of age. N.T.

unidentified age. N.T.

Feb. 13,

Feb. 2024, P. 62, L. 6-22.

13,2024,P.62,L. 6-22. The

The EKG was also

EKG was also read

read by cardiologist Dr. Rodriguez

by cardiologist Rodriguez who

who disagreed

disagreed

with

with the "computer read" and reported

the "computer reported that Outterbridge had normal

that Mrs. Outterbridge normal sinus rhythm

rhythm and her

blood

blood tests

tests for clots and

for clots cardiac enzymes

and cardiac enzymes were

were reported as normal.

reported as N.T. Feb.

normal. N.T. Feb. 13, 2024, P. 52,

13, 2024,P 52, 61-

61-

63. 1

63.'

'Plaintiff

Plaintiffssexpert cardiologist, Dr. Ash, disagreed with

with both

both Dr. Shorten's and

and Dr.

Dr. Rodriguez's

Rodriguez's interpretation

interpretation of

Mrs. Outterbridge's EKGs read in 2009 and 2013.

22

In

In June

June 2014, Outterbridge was admitted to

2014, Mrs. Outterbridge to the emergency room at Chestnut Hill

Hill

Hospital sharp chest pains

Hospital for sharp pains which she reported

reported had lasted for three days. Emergency room

doctors ordered another EKG and by x-ray found that she had a

by chest x-ray a normal

normal "cardiomediastinal

silhouette," meaning

silhouette," meaning dimensions of the heart appeared normal. Mrs. Outterbridge was diagnosed

with

with hypokalemia

hypokalemia (low

(low potassium) and discharge

potassium) and discharge instructions

instructions advised

advised her

her to

to follow up with

follow up with her

her

Thomas-Mabine, within five to seven days.

gynecologist, Dr. 'Thomas-Mabine,

At Mrs.

At Outterbridge's next

Mrs. Outterbridge's visit with

next visit with Dr. Shorten

Shorten in 2014,

2014, she

she was

was pregnant, she

pregnant, and she

denied any

any shortness of breath or chest pain reported to have a

pain and was reported a normal heart rhythm. There

were no reports

reports of chest pain

pain or shortness of breath throughout

throughout the remainder of her pregnancy.

On August

August 10,

I0, 2015, Mrs. Outterbridge Dr. Weiss following chest pain that she stated lasted

Outterbridge saw Dr

two weeks which was relieved with the antacid "Tums."

"Turns." Plaintiffs expert cardiologist testified

that indigestion

indigestion can

can "absolutely" pain in the chest. N.T.

absolutely" cause pain N.T Feb.

Feb. 14, 2024, AM,

AM,PP. 28, L. 12-15.

28,L.

This was

was the complaint of chest pain

the last complaint pain that

that Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge had

had before she passed.

passed.

July 7, 2017, Dr. Beddis saw Mrs.

On July Mrs. Outterbridge for fatigue and after labs, found her

hemoglobin to

hemoglobin to be

be 6.6.5.

5. Dr. Beddis

Beddis referred

referred Mrs. Outterbridge to

Mrs. Outterbridge to a

ahematologist,

hematologist, Dr.

Dr. LaPar, and

LaPar, and

there she complained

there she complained of

of "mild

"mild occasional

occasional lightheadedness, with mild

lightheadedness, with mild intermittent fatigue." N.T.

intermittent fatigue." N.T

Feb.

Feb. 26, 2024 AM,P.96,L,7.9,

26,2024 AM, P. 96, L. 7-9. Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's expert cardiologist admitted

expert cardiologist admitted Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge's

Outterbridge's severe

severe

iron

iron deficiency

deficiency anemia could cause

anemia could cause light-headedness.

light-headedness. N.T. Feb.

Feb. 13, 2024 PM,

13, 2024 PM, P. L. 8-13

P. 56,L. 8-13.

May 10,

On May 2018, the morning

10, 2018, morning of aascheduled gynecologic

gynecologic surgery,

surgery, Mrs. Outterbridge was

found unresponsive

unresponsive in the bed

bed that she shared

shared with her husband and two-year-old

two-year-old daughter

daughter and

was unable

was unable to

to be revived.

revived. The

The Philadelphia

Philadelphia Medical Examiner's Office,

Medical Examiner's Office, where her autopsy

where her autopsy was

was

performed,

performed, listed her cause of death as dilated cardiomyopathy.

cardiomyopathy. Plaintiff Darren Outterbridge

33

initiated this

this medical

medical malpractice complaint on March

malpractice action by complaint March 9, 2019 and this

this matter was tried

tried

before aajury

jury from February 12, 2024 to March 1, 2024. At trial, Defendant's expert cardiologist,

February 12,

Gerber, and

Dr. Elliot Gerber, and medical examiner forensic pathologist, Dr. Kevin Horn, disagreed with the

Philadelphia

Philadelphia Medical Examiner's cause of death and stated it was their belief to aareasonable

degree of medical certainty

degree certainty that Mrs. Outterbridge

Outterbridge did not die of the medical examiner's listed

cause.

cause.

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff's primary care medicine

primary care specialist and

medicine specialist and primary care standard

primary care standard of

of care

care expert,

expert, Dr

Dr.

Brian Ash testified that many times people are diagnosed with dilated cardiomyopathy as an

"incidental finding"

finding" when,

when, for example,

example, "someone might go to the ER with abdominal pain that

turns

turns out to be an appendix,

appendix, but the ER protocol

protocol is to do an EKG which might show abnormalities.

N.T.

NT. Feb. 12, 2024 P. 43. [emphasis

Feb.12, [emphasis added]. He continued, "So after the emergent situation has

with, the appendicitis

been dealt with, of the abnormal EKG that was

appendicitis then dealt with, the issue of was found,

and subsequently,

and subsequently, the cardiologist diagnosed

the cardiologist diagnosed the cause of

the cause of the abnormal EKG

the abnormal EKG to be

be some

some type of

of

cardiomyopathy.

cardiomyopathy. Id.

Id. [emphasis

[emphasis added]. Throughout years

added]. Throughout years of care by various doctors, including

trips

trips to the

the hospital

hospital for gynecologic issues

for gynecologic surgeries aimed to

issues and surgeries to stop

stop her severe gynecologic

bleeding that caused marked and significant

bleeding significant anemia, Mrs. Outterbridge did not have abnormal

EKG

EKG readings. She did

readings. She did have

have aalow level (grade

low level (grade two or three)

two or three) heart

heart murmur,

murmur, but

but Dr.

Dr. Ash also

Ash also

testified

testified that

that Mrs. Outterbridge's anemia

Mrs. Outterbridge's anemia could have

have caused that.

that. N.T. Feb. 13, 2024 P.

N.T. Feb. P. 17. Dr.

Ash also agreed

agreed that Mrs. Outterbridge's

Outterbridge's low potassium

potassium could cause symptoms of weakness and

abnormal heart rhythms.

rhythms. N.T. Feb. 14, 2024 AM, P.15, L. 20-25.

Gerber, Defendants' expert

Dr. Gerber, expert cardiologist,

cardiologist, also testified that Plaintiff's very severe

pain, difficulty

anemia would cause chest pain, difficulty in the heart and the rest of the body

body and organs getting

enough nutrients

enough nutrients and oxygen, as

and oxygen, as well as fatigue.

well as N.T. Feb.

fatigue. N.T. 27, 2024, P. 44-45,

Feb. 27,2024,P. L. 20-19.

44-45,L. 20-19. Dr. Gerber

Gerber

4

4

testified

testified that

that Mrs.

Mrs. Outterbridge's heart murmurs

Outterbridge's heart murmurs generally during periods

generally occurred during that she

periods that she was

was

anemic and as her hemoglobin

hemoglobin increased,

increased, her murmur was no longer

longer detectable, which ruled out aa

cardiac cause of her heart problems.

problems. N.T. Feb. 27, 2024 PM,P.

PM, P. 3-5.

3-5

Dr.

Dr. Gerber testified to a degree of medical certainty that he

a reasonable degree he did not believe the

Defendant

Defendant doctors caused harm

harm or increased

increased the

the risk of harm

harm to

to Mrs. Outterbridge in

in their

their

treatment of her because she had infrequent

infrequent complaints

complaints of chest pain

pain that were remedied either

with

with antacids or osteopathic

osteopathic manipulation

manipulation of her

her ribs.

ribs. N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb, 27, 2024 PM,

PM, P. 17, L. 3-19,

P. 17,L. 3-19. He

He

testified that Mrs. Outterbridge

testified that Outterbridge complained

complained to doctors of

to doctors of five

five instances

instances of chest pain

of chest pain over

over a

a period

period

of eleven years

years which was "never

which was never typical

typical of heart

heart pain."

pain." Id. He

He testified

testified that

that Mrs. Outterbridge's

complaints of chest pain

complaints pain were

were never

never consistent with

with aacardiac source because "you

source because "you can't create

heart pain

pain by

by touching

touching the

the chest wall, palpating it.

wall, by palpating it. Heart

Heart pain does not go away

away with antacids.

Heart pain, when it

Heart pain, comes, if

it comes, you have

if you have chest pain

pain and it

it comes, it doesn't disappear for

for two,

two, three

years

years at a

a time,

time, because the source of the heart pain has been there all the time." N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb, 28,

2024, P. 69-70,

2024, L. 1-7. Further,

69-70,L. Further, he testified that she could not have had dilated cardiomyopathy

from

from 2007 to

t0 2018

2018 without

without there

there ever being

being aachange

change in

in the

the pattern

pattern of her

her EKG

EKG and

and that

that her

her heart,

which measured 400

which measured grams on

400 grams on autopsy,

autopsy, was within

within a

a normal range. Id.,

normal range. Id., P. 70, L. 8-14.

P. 70,L. 8-14. He

He also

also

testified that

testified that the of her

the chambers of her heart

heart were

were normal

normal in size, contradicting

in size, contradicting the

the idea that she

idea that she could

could

have dilated cardiomyopathy

cardiomyopathy because by

by its very

very definition, the heart needs to be dilated. Id. at 71,

71.

Dr. Shorten, Dr. Weiss, and Dr. Beddis all testified that they believed that they did not

breach the standard of care by

by not referring

referring Mrs. Outterbridge

Outterbridge to aacardiologist for her complaints

of chest pain looking at the patient

pain because in looking patient as a

a whole, they did not believe any of her complaints

were cardiac in nature. Dr. Beddis testified that all of Mrs. Outterbridge's EKGs were normal.

Mrs. Outterbridge's normal. Dr.

Shorten testified

Shorten testified that

that when she treated

when she Mrs. Outterbridge,

treated Mrs. she did

Outterbridge, she did not have any

not have any symptoms

symptoms of

of dilated

dilated

55

cardiomyopathy like

cardiomyopathy like palpitations,

palpitations, shortness of breath,

breath, edema, or fatigue.

fatigue. N.T.

N.T. Feb.

Feb. 21,

21, 2024

2024 AM,

AM,

P. 85, L. 17-22.

P. 85,L. 17-22. Dr. Weiss testified

Dr. Weiss testified that

that her

her risk

risk factors

factors for

for heart disease were

heart disease were low—she

she was not

low not

smoking, was

smoking, was not overweight, her

not overweight, her cholesterol

cholesterol was not high, and her

not high, blood pressure

her blood pressure was controlled.

controlled.

N.T.

NT. Feb. 27, 2024

Feb. 27, 2024 PM,

PM, P. 103, L. 2-6. Although

P. 103,L. Although she had

had aabrother

brother who

who died from

from a

a heart-attack,

heart-attack,

siblings and parents

her other six siblings parents were alive, and he believed her chest pain was musculoskeletal

and not

not heart disease. Id

heart disease. Id.

Credibility of witnesses is within the sole province

Credibility jury

province of the jury and on March 1, 2024, the

jury returned aaverdict

jury returned in favor

verdict in of the

favor of defendant doctors,

the defendant doctors, finding

finding that

that Dr. Shorten, Dr. Weiss,

Dr. Shorten, Weiss, and

and

Dr.

Dr. Beddis

Beddis were not negligent

were not negligent in

in the care and

the care and treatment of Yhvetta

treatment of Yhvetta Outterbridge.

Outterbridge. On

On March

March 11,

1H,

2024, Plaintiff

2024, Plaintiff filed

filed aapost-trial

post-trial motion for

for new

new trial. Defendants answered

answered in opposition, and on

April 11,

April 11, 2024 this Court heard oral argument

argument and denied Plaintiff's motion in its entirety.

entirety. On May

1,

1, 2024,

2024, Plaintiff filed aapraecipe

Plaintiff filed praecipe to enter judgment

to enter judgment on

on the

the verdict and on

verdict and on May 3, 2024,

May 3, 2024, Plaintiff

Plaintiff

filed aaNotice of Appeal

Appeal to

to the Superior Court.

the Superior Court. On May

May 7, 2024, this

this Court issued aa1925(b)

1925(b) Order

Order

May 17,

and on May 17, 2024,

2024, Plaintiff timely

timely raised five issues on appeal.

appeal. On July 31, 2024, this Court

issued Plaintiff aasubsequent

subsequent 1925(b)

1925(b) order asking

asking for more specificity

specificity regarding the first issue on

appeal. Plaintiff

appeal. complied and

Plaintiff complied and on

on August 5, 2024,

August 5, 2024, returned

retumed the

the following statement of

following statement of matters

matters

complained of

complained of on

on appeal

appeal (with

(with the clarification for

the clarification for issue one put

issue one put in footnote 4

in footnote below):

4 below)

1.

I. The

The Trial Court committed reversible by improperly

reversible error by improperly precluding

precluding Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel

from impeaching

impeaching Defendants'

Defendants' expert

expert cardiology

cardiology witness,

witness, Eliot Gerber, MD,

MD, and Brent

Brent

Beddis,

Beddis, DO, with standard literature, aaHeart Rhythm

Rhythm Society/American Heart Association

2 See e.g., Keating v. Belcher, 384 Pa.

See e.g., eating • Beleher, 384 Pa. 129, 133, 119 A.2d 535, 538 538 ((1956('It

1956)(`It is the exclusive province of the jury,

not

not the court, to

the court, decide all

to decide all the

the facts, the inferences

facts, the inferences therefrom,

therefrom, the credibility of

the credibility of the

the witnesses

witnesses and the weight and

the weight and

effect to

to be

be given to all of the testimony')

testimony.')

66

Expert Consensus

Expert Statement, that

Consensus Statement, that Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's expert

expert had already authenticated,

had already authenticated, and

and which

which

contradicted Defendants'

Defendants' witnesses' testimony. 3

witnesses' testimony'

2. The

The Trial Court erroneously permitted

permitted Defendants argue, over Plaintiff's

Defendants to argue, objections, that

Plaintiffs objections, that

they were vindicated by the actions of plaintiff-decedent's

plaintiff-decedent's medical providers

providers in other

specialties who

specialties did not

who did not refer

refer plaintiff-decedent

plaintiff-decedent to to aacardiologist,

cardiologist, including

including her treating

her treating

psychologist,

psychologist, creating the

the prejudicial

prejudicial and misleading

misleading impression

impression that

that plaintiff-decedent's

plaintiff-decedent's

treating gynecologist and other specialists

specialists agreed that Defendants met the standard of care

by

by not

not referring

referring plaintiff decedent to

plaintiff-decedent to aa cardiologist,

cardiologist, and

and the Court further

the Court further precluded

precluded

Plaintiff

Plaintiff from introducing

introducing testimony

testimony thatthat refuted

refuted Defendants' argument, in

Defendants' argument, in particular

particular

testimony from plaintiff-decedent's treatingtreating gynecologist that if a a patient

patient needed an

outpatient workup with a a cardiologist

cardiologist she expected the patient's

patient's primary

primary care physician

physician

would manage

manage that referral.

referral

3. The Trial Court improperly

improperly denied Plaintiff s request

Plaintiffs request for Abington

Abington Memorial Hospital

Hospital to

appear

appear onon the verdict sheet

the verdict sheet for the negligence

for the negligence ofof its staff despite

its staff despite Defendant themselves

Defendant themselves

offering testimony that

that its may have

its clerical staff may have negligently

negligently failed

failed to

to follow

follow protocol

protocol and

provide the defendant physicians with importantimportant faces from outside sources regarding

regarding

plaintiff-decedent's cardiac condition thereby

thereby permitting

permitting the jury

jury to conclude that none of

the physician defendants

the physician defendants onon the

the verdict sheet were

verdict sheet liable for

were liable for Plaintiff's harm.

Plaintiffs harm.

4. The Trial Court improperly granted Defendants' motion in limine and precluded

4. precluded Plaintiff's

counsel from referring

counsel from referring to

to or

or cross-examining

cross-examining thethe defendant doctors about

defendant doctors about their deposition

their deposition

testimony that their real-time, contemporaneous, rationale for assessing assessing plaintiff-

plaintiff-

decedent's cardiac risk

decedent's cardiac risk factors as being

factors as being low despite her having

low despite having a

a brother

brother who

who suffered

suffered from

from

a

a premature sudden cardiac

premature sudden death was

cardiac death was that

that they thought

they thought the

the decedent's

decedent's brother

brother could

could have

have

been aadrug

drug user.

user.

erroneously denied

5. The Trial Court erroneously Plaintiff's motion in

denied Plaintiffs in limine and permitted

permitted Defendants

to introduce irrelevant questioning and evidence that plaintiff-decedent's

plaintiff.decedent's husband,

husband, Mr.

Outterbridge, continued to

to treat with Defendants' primary

primary care practice

practice group

group after his

The trial court

The

3 court precluded

precluded Plaintiff's counsel from cross

Plaintiffs counsel cross examining

examining Defendants' cardiology expert,

Defendants cardiology expert, Eliot Gerber,

Eliot Gerber,

MD, and Brent

MD, and Brent Beddis, DO, with

Beddis, DO, with an Expert Consensus

an Expert Consensus Statement

Statement ("Expert Consensus Statement")

("Expert Consensus Statement") published

published byby the

the

Heart

Heart Rhythm Society/American Heart

Rhythm Society/American Heart Association

Association in in 2013

2013 related

related to

to screening and testing

screening and of first-degree

testing of first-degree relatives

relatives

of victims

of of unexplained

victims of sudden cardiac

unexplained sudden cardiac death

death at

at aayoung

young age.

age. Plaintiff sexpert,

Plaintiffs expert, Dr.

Dr. Hayek, authenticated the

Hayek, authenticated the

Expert Consensus Statement as standard within the field. N.T. 2/20/24

N.T 2/20/24 at 75- 75-76.

76. Dr.

Dr. Gerber testified that there was

no

o reason for Mrs. Mrs. Outterbridge to undergo echocardiogram, even if referred to aacardiologist. N.T. 2/27/24 PM at

cardiologist. N.T,

63-64. Plaintiff's

63-64. counsel sought

Plaintiff's counsel sought to

to impeach

impeach Dr. Gerber with

Dr. Gerber the Expert

with the Consensus Statement

Expert Consensus Statement indicating

indicating that Mrs.

that Mrs.

Outterbridge's family

Outterbridge's family history ofof sudden

sudden unexplained cardiac death at

unexplained cardiac at aayoung age required

young age required anan echocardiogram,

echocardiogram, but but

the trial

the court precluded

trial court precluded this use of

this use of the

the treatise

treatise for

for impeachment.

impeachment,NT N.T. 2/28/24

1/28/24 AMAM at 35:12-51:16.

at 35:12-51 16, The

The trial court

trial court

made clear

made clear that

that its

its ruling

ruling was

was based on on relevance and "that

relevance and "that Dr. didn't agree

Dr. Gerber didn't agree that

that it

it was authoritative." Tr.

was authoritative." Tr. of

of

4/11/24 Post-Trial

4/1124 Post- Trial Motion Argument at

Motion Argument 69-74.

at 69.74.

Further, Dr. Beddis,

Further, Dr. Beddis, whowho Defendants

Defendants represented

represented toto the

the jury

jury was

was an expert, opined

an expert, opined that

that it

it was

was "never

"never indicated" for

indicated" for

him to obtain an echocardiogram for Mrs. Mrs. Outterbridge,

Outterbridge, that the medical literature did not requirerequire such,

such, and

and that he

provided

provided Mrs. Outterbridge with

Mrs. Outterbridge with good

"good care." See,See, e.g.,

e.g., N,T,

N.T. 2/28/24

2/28/24 PMPM atat 16-17.

16.17. Dr.

pr. Beddis admitted that the

Beddis admitted the

Expert Consensus Statement was was the kind of resource that primary

primary care physicians

physicians generally

generally can go

go to and would

use. N.T. 2/26/24

use. N.T 2/26/24 AM AM atat 18:5-15.

18:5-15. However,

However, the court precluded

the trial court impeachment of

precluded impeachment of Dr.

Dr. Beddis

Beddis with the Expert

with the Expert

Consensus Statement. N.T N.T. 2/26/24 AM at 6.25-15(The

6:25-15 ("The objection

objection is sustained.");

sustained."); N.T. 2/26/24 AM at 1820-2118:20-21.

77

wife's death, and

wife's death, and thereby

thereby permitted

permitted Defendants to misleadingly

Defendants to misleadingly and

and prejudicially argue

prejudicially argue

that Mr. Outterbridge

Outterbridge was "lying"

"lying" about this collateral and irrelevant issue, and that

Plaintiff's was untrustworthy

Plaintiffs entire case was untrustworthy and unmeritorious.

For

For the

the foregoing

foregoing reasons, these

these five legal error

five claims of legal error presented

presented by

by Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel

are unmeritorious and should be denied in their entirety,

entirety.

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff's first

first issue

issue on appeal,

appeal, that

that this Court committed reversible

reversible error by precluding

precluding

Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel from impeaching

impeaching Defendants' expert cardiology

Defendants' cxpert cardiology witness,

witness, Elliot

Elliot Gerber, MD,

and Defendant Brent Beddis, DO, with an article

article "The Expert

Expert Consensus Statement on the

Diagnosis

Diagnosis and Management

Management of Patients

Patients with

with Inherited Primary

Primary Arrhythmia Symptoms" by

Arrhythmia Symptoms" by the

the

Heart Rhythm

Rhythm Society

Society and endorsed by the American College of Cardiology Foundation and the

American Heart Association, should be deemed meritless as this Court's decisions were in

accordance with the Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. First, Plaintiff was precluded from

questioning Dr.

questioning Gerber about

Dr. Gerber about the

the article

article because

because it was not

it was relevant to

not relevant to the issues at trial.

issues at The article

trial. The article

guidelines for

articulated guidelines cardiologists when

for cardiologists when managing

managing aapatient

patient who

who is

is referred

referred to

to them

them who

who has

a

a family

family history of heart issues

issues and what a

a cardiologist could/should do when learning

learning of a

a patient

patient

who has a

a family member die of an

an "unspecified" cardiac condition, is not relevant as to what aa

primary physician could/should do to

primary care physician good care.

to render good

Next,

Next, Plaintiff

Plaintiff was precluded

precluded from questioning Dr.

from questioning Dr. Beddis

Beddis with

with this

this article

article because

because it

it was

not properly authenticated— it is outside of his specialty, was not authenticated as relied on as

properly authenticated

standard in his field, and he did not personally

personally rely

rely on it. Fundamentally,

Fundamentally, for evidence to be

admissible, it

it must

must be relevant. Pa.R.E.

Pa.RR.E. 402. Evidence

Evidence is

is relevant

relevant if.

if: (a)

(a) it has any tendency

has any tendency to

to

make a

afact more or less probable

probable than it would be without the evidence; and

and (b)

(b) the fact is of

consequence in determining the action. Pa.R.E.

Pa.RE. 401.

401,

8

8

Additionally, our rules

Additionally, rules of

of evidence do not recognize

recognize aahearsay

hearsay exception

exception for

for a

a learned

learned

treatise. See Pa.R.E. 803(18).'

803(18). 4 AA "learned

learned treatise" is any textbook, published

published work, or periodical

periodical

that

that has been accepted as authoritative or as reliable

been accepted authority by

reliable authority by members

members of a specific

a specific

professional of Evidence 703.15[3].

professional community. See Ohlbaum on the Pennsylvania Rules of 703.15[3]. Under

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania law,

law, the

the contents of aalearned

learned treatise

treatise offered at trial

trial to establish principles

principles or theories

is inadmissible hearsay, an extrajudicial declaration offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. See Aldridge

asserted. See Aldridge •

v. Edmunds, 561 Pa.

Edmunds, 561 Pa. 323,

323, 750

750 A.2d

A.2d 292, 296 (2000).

292, 296 Experts may

(2000). Experts rely on

may rely on

authoritative publications in formulating

formulating their opinions, and, to aalimited extent, our courts permit

permit

experts to

experts to briefly

briefly reference

reference materials

materials to explain the

to explain the reasons underlying their

reasons underlying opinions. Id.

their opinions. Id. at

297.

297, While such materials are not admissible, an expert may be impeached

impeached with statements

contained in aatext or publication reliable by him_or

publication deemed authoritative or reliable_h him or other experts in the

same field.

ae field, See McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp &

& Dohme, 367 Pa.Super. 600, 533 A.2d 436

(1987). [emphasis added],

(1987).[emphasis added], Pa.

Pa. R.

R. Evid.

Evid. 803(18).

Further, a credibility may

a fact witness's credibility may be challenged

challenged on cross-examination with respect

respect

to any

to any publication

publication in the

the field that zenerally reliable.

that he considers generally reliable. Crespo v.

• Hughes, 167

167 A.3d

A.3d

168,

168, 182

182 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citing

(Pa.Super. 2017) Majdic, supra at 339)

(citing Majdie, 339) [emphasis

[emphasis added].

added]. See also Burton-Lister

v.

• Siegel, & Lebed Assocs.,

e Sivitz &

Sigel, Assoes., 798 A.2d 231, 239

239 (Pa.Super.

(Pa.Super. 2002)

2002) (finding it permissible

(finding it permissible to

cross-examine defendant

cross-examine defendant physician

physician with

with a

a publication

publication that

that he deemed

deemed authoritative).

authoritative), Dr.

Dr. Beddis

Beddis

aRule 803,

"Rule 803. Exceptions

Exceptions to

to the

the Rule

Rule Against

Against Hearsay--Regardless

Hearsay--Regardless of Whether Is Available

Whether the Declarant ls Available as aaWitness

Witness

18)

18) Statements in

in Learned

Leamed Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets

Pamphlets (Not

(Not Adopted)

Comment: Pennsylvania has

Comment: Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E.

not adopted 803(18). Pennsylvania

F.RR.E. 803(18). does not recognize

Pennsylvania does an exception

recognize an exception to the

to the

hearsay

hearsay rule treatises. See

rule for learned treatises. See Majdic

Majdie v.

• Cincinnati Machine Co.,370

Machine Co,, 370 Pa. Super. 611, 537

pa. Super. 537 A.2d 334 ((1988)

A.2d 334 1988).

Regarding

Regarding the permissible

permissible uses of learned treatises under Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania law, see Aldridge v.

v. Edmunds, 561 Pa. 323,

750 A.2d

750 A.2d 292

292 (Pa. 2000).

(Pa. 2000)

Pa.R.E. 803(18)

803(18).

99

testified

testified in

in this

this trial

trial as aafact witness,

witness, despite

despite defense

defense counsel's

counsel's reference

reference to

to him as

as an

an "expert"

expert" in

in

opening statements.°

opening statements. 5

The law

law is

is well

well settled that Superior Court's "standard of review of an

that the Superior an evidentiary

ruling

ruling made by

by the trial court is extremely

extremely narrow." Capoferri,

Capoferri, supra at 143. "The

The admission or

exclusion of

of evidence

evidence is aamatter

matter within

within the sound discretion of the trial court,

court, which may

may only be

reversed upon

upon aashowing

showing of a

amanifest abuse of discretion. To constitute reversible error, an

evidentiary ruling must

evidentiary ruling must not only be

not only be erroneous, but also harmful

harmful or prejudicial

prejudicial to

to the

the complaining

party."

party." Potochnick

Potochnick v.

• Perry,

Perry, 861 A.2d 277, 282

282 (Pa.Super.

(Pa.Super. 2004).

2004)

In

In Charlton v.

• Troy,

Troy, 236 A.3d 22, (Pa.Super,

(Pa.Super. 2020), the Superior Court found

found the

the trial

trial

extremely prejudicial

court committed an extremely prejudicial error and mandated aanew trial following the trial court's

allowance of counsel utilizing

utilizing a

a neurology

neurology textbook to impeach the defendant obstetrician, Dr.

Troy. Superior Court found that without Dr.

Troy. The Superior Dr. Troy's acknowledgment that the text was aa

standard or authoritative work in the field, "no

"no foundation was laid that would establish the Volpe

textbook

textbook as aalearned

learned treatise

treatise for

for the limited purpose

purpose of impeaching

impeaching Dr. Troy."

Further,

Further, the article discussed

the article discussed head

head position during delivery

position during delivery—which

which was

was the

the exact issue on

issue on

trial—and

trial and whether Dr. Troy

Troy breached the standard of care of an obstetrician and harmed the baby

baby

he delivered when he did not use ultrasound technology to make sure the neck was flexed during

delivery to

delivery snapping the dura and causing paralysis

to avoid snapping the ultimate injury to the Plaintiff. The

paralysis--the

Defense Counsel:

Defense

5 Counsel: You

You areare going

going to

to hear

hear from expert

expert witnesses.

witnesses. AsAs aapoint of fact,

point of the three

fact, the three doctors I have the

I have the

privilege to represent

privilege represent in this case, Dr. Beddis, Dr. Weiss, and Dr.

Dr. Shorten, they are experts too. Just means you're a

a

doctor and

doctor and you

you practice and that's

practice and that's what

what you do for

you do for aaliving.

living. And

And they

they are

are going

going toto explain

explain to

to you, in their

you, in own words,

their own words,

why

why they

they absolutely complied with with the

the standard

standard of care in

in this case. And I agree, absolutely, you're going

I agree, going to

to get all

your law in this case from His Honor.

Honor. N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb. 12, 2024 AM P. 53. L. 16-25,

P. 5$3.L. 16-25,P.P. 54, 1-3.

54,1-3

This Court corrected Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs misunderstanding

misunderstanding regarding Defense counsel's statement that the defendant doctors

were experts.

experts. See. N.T.

N.T Feb.

Feb. 26, 2024 AM, P. 11. H

10

Superior Court stated that "[ilt

"[i]t is beyond cavil that the Volpe

Volpe text was used as substantive evidence,

•e., for the truth of the matter asserted,

i.e., asserted. The reading of excerpts from the text invited the jury

jury to

view the

the `'snapping'

snapping' or

or `popping'

'popping' sound heard during G.C's

G.C.'s delivery both as evidence of Dr. Troy's

Troy's

negligence

negligence and

and as proof

proof that

that he caused the

the injury. Burton-Lister, supra at 239

injury. See Burton-Lister, 239 (finding

(finding error

where a

a publication was used to cross-examine aaparty physician by reading in portions as this use

was

was "an implicit invitation to the jury to view the substance of the material as true")."

true")." Charlton v.

Troy,

Tray, 2020

2020 PA

PA Super

Super 170,

170, 236 40 (2020).

236 A.3d 22, 40 (2020)

This Court did not commit the same error. This Court first precluded

precluded Plaintiff from

questioning fact

questioning fact witness Dr. Beddis, aafamily

family care

care practitioner,

practitioner, with evidence of what is standard

for a

a cardiologist

cardiologist to do as published

published in an article in the cardiology journal Heart Rhythm

Rhythm Society

because Dr. Beddis, or any other primary

primary care physician

physician testifying

testifying in this trial, did not establish

this journal as generally reliable in his field as a

a primary care physician and Dr.

Dr. Beddis did not

state that he was familiar with the article or the journal

journal in

in which it was published.

published.

At side bar,

At side bar, Mr

Mr. Ross advised the

Ross advised Court that

the Court he wanted

that he wanted to ask Dr. Beddis

to ask Beddis if

if aastudy

study done

done in

in

collaboration with the American Heart Association is the kind of standard literature and study that

would be within

would be within the field

field of what aaprimary

primary care

care physician

physician like himself would

would look

look at."

at." The Court

inquired with Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel further if it was

was "within the standard of care that he must follow.

Is that what you're

ls that going to ask him." Mr. Ross answered that it was his intention to ask him

you're going him "with

with

respect to

respect to primary care, is

primary care, standard?"NT.

is it standard N.T. Feb.

Feb. 26,

26, 2024

2024 AM,

AM, P. 13, L. 15-17

P. 13,L. 15-17.

In accordance with Pennsylvania law regarding questioning a

regarding questioning a fact witness, the Court

Plaintiff's counsel that

advised Plaintiffs that if the

the proper

proper foundation

foundation was laid, meaning

meaning that

that Dr. Beddis was

familiar

familiar with

with that

that Journal and stated

Journal and stated that

that it

it was generally

generally reliable

reliable in

in the

the field of primary

field of care,

primary care,

Plaintiff's counsel could question

question Dr. Beddis about this article. The Court further advised

11

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's counsel that

that if Dr. Beddis, in the

the alternative, rejected knowledge

knowledge of the study and states

that it is not what he relies on to

to establish general

general practice

practice for good care to his patients in stating

something like,

something like, "I'm not

not aware of the study,

study, and,

and, I

I don't consider it,

it, IIdon't

don't consider it

it in

in my

my field

of practice,

practice, and

and the

the studies

studies that

that I do --

I do -- IImean, the

the studies that

that I

I review

review and the

the journal that

that I

I utilize

utilize

-- I

I don't know if he would say

say this,

this, but they

they set the standard of care of how I

I treat patients with

cardiac issues. I'm not aware of this and as far as I'm concerned this has no bearing on how I

I treat

patients. Then [Plaintiff

patients. Then [Plaintiffsscounsel]

counsel] can't ask him

him about it."

it." Id.,

Id., P. 13-14. Returning

P. 13-14, Returning to

to open court,

Plaintiffs counsel's questioning

Plaintiff's questioning of Dr. Beddis proceeded

proceeded as follows:

Q.

0. Now,

Now, in in terms

terms ofof you

you trying

trying to to stay abreast of

stay abreast of the

the literature

literature with

with respect

respect to cardiac issues,

to cardiac issues,

the management

management of your your patients

patients as aaprimary

primary care physician, the management of patients

cardiology issues, is this the kind of literature that is sort of a

with cardiology a standard piece of

literature for even a a primary

primary care physician

physician to read, to understand cardiac issues, in

particular

particular issues having

having to deal with sudden cardiac death in a a young person? Is this the

kind

kind of literature that you you would look to that that physicians

physicians like yourself, in in primary

primary care

medicine, would

medicine, look to?

would look to?

A. I

I mean,

mean, I I don't

don't think

think that I I would

would read specifically. IIprobably

read this specifically. probably wait

wait for

for it to

to be

be

mentioned in the family family medicine article that would guide guide us in how to, you know,

manage these patients.

manage patients. But we ean can say

sav that_it'sa

that it's aresource_to_be_used,

resource to be used, but but it's

it's not,

not, no

one is saving

one_is saving it's the standard.

it's_the standard.

Q.

0. I'm

I'm not getting there

not getting there yet.

yet. I'm just asking

I'm just asking you,

you, is it

it the

the type of resource that

type of that is

is used

used byby

primary care physicians

primary physicians in general,

general, to make

make themselves aware of the management of

cardiac issues; specifically, the

issues; and specifically, the management

management of aapatient

patient who

who has

has aafirst-degree

relative

relative who

who has dieddied ofof sudden

sudden cardiac death. Is

cardiac death. Is it

it the kind of

the kind of resource

resource that primary

that primary

care physicians

care generally can

physicians generally en go go to and

and would

would use? That's what I'm

use? That'swhat I'm asking.

asking. I'mI'm not

not

getting to standard of

getting of care yet.

yet.

A.

A. Certainly it's something

Certainlv it's something we could use,

we could sure.

use, sure,

MR. ROSS: May

May I proceed, Your Honor?

I proceed,

THE WITNESS:

WITNESS: AlongAlong with

with many other resources.

many other resources,

Id., P. 17-18.

Id.,P. 17-18.

objected and this Court instructed Plaintiff's

Defense counsel objected Plaintiffs counsel to lay more of a

a

foundation

foundation before proceeding

proceeding to question Dr. Beddis

to question about the

Beddis about article because

the article because he stated that

he stated that he

he

would not

would read this

not read this specifically, and that

specifically, and that it was the

it was type of

the type of resource

resource that

that could be

be used

used in

in the field

the field

with other

with other resources

resources but did not

but did not answer affirmatively, within

answer affirmatively, within this Court's discretion,

this Court's discretion, to establish

establish

12

12

that this resource was generally

generally reliable and he had also just

just testified in a

aprior

prior moment that it was

not the standard in his field. Plaintiff's counsel's questioning continued:

0.

Q. I'm asking you

l'masking if this

you if is the

this is the type of literature

type of literature that

that primary care physicians,

primary care physicians, the

the type of just

type of just

standard literature

standard literature that

that primary

primary care physicians

physicians would look to

would look to in

in order

order to keep themselves

to keep themselves

types

abreast of these types of issues? And I'm

I' m not asking if you in particular would read it, but

people

people in your

your specialty.

specialty. Is it the kind of literature theythey would look to?

A. I can only

Ican only comment on myself. myself.

0.

Q. I'm sorry?

A. I guess I

guess only comment on myself. IIdon't know.

I can only

Q.

Q. Was there cardiology literature that you

cardiology you would look keep yourself

look to keep yourself knowledgeable and

cardiology issues that would pertain

current on cardiology pertain to your clients? Was there cardiology

literature that you

you would look to, separate and apart from family physician literature?

separate

Was

Was there cardiology literature?

there cardiology literature? And

And if if so,

so, what was

was it?

A.

A. Iguess

guess not

not separate

separate specific

specific cardiac resources.

resources. I

I would

would do it it all

all under

under family

medicine resources.

Q.

Q. I

I see.

see. So

So you

you wouldn't look at any cardiology resources?

resources?

A.

A. Maybe I

Maybe I would

would -- --

Q.

0. If

If so,

so, what?

THE COURT: Let him finish the answer.

THE WITNESS: I I don't know off the top of my head.

Id.,

Id,P P. 18-19.

Dr. Beddis

Beddis named

named "the

"the American

American Heart

Heart Association,

Association, the

the American College of Cardiology,

American College Cardiology,

anything"

anything" and stated "In AFP [family

In our AFP [family practice]

practice] journal

journal they publish articles from them, so I

they publish I

say the AFP journal"

would say as cardiology specific resources that he would use

journal" as use to keep himself

knowledgeable cardiology specific

knowledgeable and current on cardiology specific issues.

issues. N.T. Feb.

Feb. 26, 2024,

2024, AM,

AM, P.20,

P.20, L. 4-14.

Plaintiff proceeded

proceeded to question

question the witness and the Court believed Plaintiff was trying to back-

door this article into evidence by just

just asking

asking about medical literature in general and advised

Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel how to ask the question

question to elicit the information he was seeking.

seeking. Instead,

Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel moved onto

moved on discussing a

to discussing adifferent article that

that was published

published in

in aaJournal that

Dr.

Dr Beddis stated that he relies on for information.

information. Accordingly,

Accordingly, it was Dr. Beddis' responses to

Plaintiff's questions, in accordance with Pennsylvania

Plaintiffs questions, Plaintiff's counsel from

Pennsylvania law, that precluded Plaintiffs

asking

asking Dr.

Dr. Beddis further detailed information regarding

regarding an article in aacardiology

cardiology journal

journal with

13

13

which Dr.

which Dr. Beddis

Beddis was

was unfamiliar and was

unfamiliar and was not established as

not established as generally

generally relied

relied on

on in

in his

his field as a

field as a

primary

primary care physician.

physician.

It would have been an abuse of discretion if this Court would have allowed Plaintiff to

to

question

question Dr. Beddis regarding

regarding an article that he was

was unfamiliar with, in a

a medical journal that was

not established to

not established to be

be relied on as

relied on standard in

as standard in his

his field of primary

field of primary care. This Court

care. This Court advised

advised Plaintiff

Plaintiff

correctly

correctly that

that Dr. Beddis,

Beddis, as

as aafact

fact witness, could be

witness, could be questioned about articles

questioned about articles that

that are generally

are generally

relied

relied on in

in their

their respective

respective fields,

fields, but

but Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's counsel

counsel could not

not establish through testimony

testimony

that this article was

was just

just that.

Next,

Next, Plaintiff's counsel argues

argues that they

they were precluded

precluded from "impeaching an expert with

from "impeaching

standard literature in his field," which Plaintiff states his cardiologist Dr. Hayek qualified as such."

such.'

acknowledges that an expert can be impeached with standard literature in his field,

This Court acknowledges

however, to be permissible,

however, permissible, that evidence must still be relevant to the issue at trial, as relevancy is

the fundamental consideration regarding

regarding admission of evidence. Pa.R.E. 607.

Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel correctly

correctly stated that this Court focused on relevancy as the reason for

precluding him from

precluding him from improperly questioning Dr.

improperly questioning Gerber regarding

Dr. Gerber regarding literature

literature that

that Plaintiff

Plaintiff believes

believes

establishes the standard of care for aacardiologist regarding finding out that aapatient's relative died

under

under the age of

the age of fifty

fifty years old from

years old from an

an unexplained condition. As

cardiac condition.

unexplained cardiac this Court

As this Court explained

explained to

to

Plaintiff's counsel,

counsel, the established standard of care for a

acardiologist

cardiologist is

is not the same as the standard

of care for aaprimary physician. See 40 P.S.

primary care physician. PS. $§ 1303.512, v. Hecht,

1303.512, see also Wexler • Hecht, A.2d 95

(Pa.Super. 2004(finding

(Pa.Super. 2004)(finding that

that the

the trial court did

trial court did not abuse its

not abuse its discretion

discretion in declining to

in declining hear

to hear

testimony of a

testimony of apodiatrist regarding evidence

podiatrist regarding of an

evidence of an orthopedic

orthopedic surgeon's

surgeon's standard

standard of

of care)

care) and

and

This Court notes that Dr

'This

6 Dr. Gerber also referred to this article in one of his expert reports.

reports

14

evidence established at trial

trial was

was that

that Plaintiff's decedent's brother did not

not die of an "unexplained"

an "unexplained

cause—he died of a

cause--he amyocardial

myocardial infarction, or heart attack.

I

This Court heard and considered extensive argument from Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs counsel regarding his

desire to impeach

impeach Dr.

Dr. Gerber with the Expert Consensus Report on the Diagnosis and Management

of Patients

Patients with

with Inherited

Inherited Arrhythmia

Arrhythmia Symptoms

Symptoms and ruled

ruled that

that this

this impeachment

impeachment was irrelevant

I

and thus inadmissible under Pennsylvania law

law.

COURT:

THE COURT: Let me say, if I'm not mistaken, this is an article that Dr. Gerber indicated

reports and he indicated he relied at least in part

he referred to in one of his reports

upon

upon this report

report in

in forming

forming thethe basis for his opinion. Correct?

MR. TROY:

MR, TROY: Not quite, Your Honor. What he was doing, both Dr. Dr. Gerber and Dr. Hayek

wrote about standard of care in their reports.

reports. And where Gerber mentions

it in his response

response here, he is responding to Hayek about standard of

care. And to be clear, here's the line he is about to read, which is about -—

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS. I'm not going

going to do that. I I know what you're getting at. I'm going to do it in

this fashion, and I I don't think youyou will have an objection to it. First of all, I

I

will show the two definitions here, one, to to show he was wrong in terms of

the definition he gave

gave to the jury

jury yesterday. That's what I'm doing with Items

1

I and 2.

THE COURT:

COURT: About the sudden unexplained death'? death?

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS Correct. That's exactly

exactly right. And then, what I'm going to do is do exactly

what Dr. Hayek

Hayek said, which is, if a a patient like this is referred to me as

a cardiologist, here's what I

a cardiologist, I have to do. So when I I go here, to the point

that you're circling there, Paul, I'm going to say, now, Dr. Hayek has

you're eireling

told this jury, if aapatient

patient with this family history is referred to him as

aacardiologist,

cardiologist, these are the things things he has to do. And he said there are

guidelines

guidelines out there that require

require him, as aa cardiologist, to do these

things.

things. I'm going

going to say

say to the witness, from your vantage point as a a

cardiologist,

cardiologist, when a a SUDS patient comes to you, this is what this

consensus statement says says you

you as the cardiologist have to do. do, And that's

relevant in this case.

THE COURT:

THE. COURT; I

I don't understand the relevance of that because there is no

cardiologist being sued here.

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS The relevance is causation. Because Dr. Hayek says absolutely, 100 percent,

when

when aapatient

patient gets

gets referred

referred to

to me as aacardiologist, I

I have

have to

to do an echo.

That's what this says that the cardiologist has to do. I'm not going to

comment on what the primary

primary care doctors have to do. I'm going to say

to him, you

you as aa cardiologist, they have recommendations in here. In

fact, Dr.

Dr. Beddis said these don't even apply to us. He said these are

cardiology

cardiology things.

things.

15

15

THE COURT: Right.

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS: And

And IIwill say,

say, establish with him that's what has to be done when the patient

is

is sent over there.

there.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: To what end?

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS: What do you mean? mean'?

THE COURT:

THE COURT: What does it matter what a a cardiologist should or should not do?

MR.

MR, ROSS:

ROSS: Because part part of Hayek's

Hayek's opinion is, had the patient been referred to a

opinion a

cardiologist,

cardiologist, an an echo

echo absolutely

absolutely would

would have

have been

been donedone because

because it it has

has to

to be

be

done, under

done, under the guidelines.

guidelines. That's why it's relevant.

why it's relevant.

MR. TROY:

MR. TROY: If

IfIImay,

may, Your Honor, when you look at this that he is about to read, the

premise

premise is, is, if you

you have a a first-degree

first-degree relative who died of SUDS, sudden

unexplained

unexplained death syndrome,syndrome, and the relative should have been sent to aa

cardiologist

cardiologist and should get get this workup, the issue is, we have all seen the

brother's

brother's autopsy

autopsy report

report multiple

multiple times. He did not die of sudden

unexplained

unexplained death syndrome. It was a

death syndrome. a very

very definite diagnosis

diagnosis that

that he hadhad of

6oronary

coronary this and that and the other thing.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: Atherosclerosis

Atherosclerosis disease.

MR. TROY:

MR. TROY- What a cardiologist would do getting

a cardiologist getting aareferral of aarelative of a a SUDS

victim is

victim is of

of no

no bearing,

bearing, moment

moment or or probative

probative value

value to to the jury.

the jury

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS: It is for the reasons I I said. He was

was aa SUDS victim when they were treating

him.

THE COURT-

COURT: Who was?was

MR. ROSS:

MR. ROSS: The brother. He was aa SUDS victim when they were treating him

because they they didn't know what caused his sudden cardiac death. It was

unexplained.

unexplained. I I established that already with Dr. Beddis. That's in his

testimony.

testimony, But we can debate that, on redirect. He can try to establish

he is

he is not

not a a SUDS

SUDS victim.

victim.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: Let

Let me preface,

preface, I I believe both of you are much smarter than than me. My

question

question is

is much

much more

more basic.

basic. My

My question

question is, what

what is

is the

the relevance

relevance_of of

what acardiologist

cardiologist would do when someone is referred to them?

referred_to them7 The

fact

fet of the matter is,

the_matter is, and I I know you're putting up your vour hand,

hand, but

but what

is

is the relevance

relevance what of what a

a cardiologist

cardiologist should or

or should

should not

not do or

or would

would

gr

or would

would_not not dodo when

when a a patient

patient is is referred

referred to to them, since you're

them, since you're not

not

suing

suing thethe cardiologist,

cardiologist, you're

vou're suing the primary

primary care physicians?

MR.

MR. ROSS:

ROSS The relevance is causation. We have to establish, it's our burden to

establish here,

here, if the patient

patient had gone to aacardiologist, she would have

gotten

gotten an echo. That's our burden. That's why this is super relevant. It

is extremely relevant. I

is extremely I have to prove

prove to this jury that if she had gone

to a

a cardiologist

cardiologist she would have gotten an echo. It is part of what

echo.It Imust

what_I_must

prove

prove to

to the fury.

jury, If

If the fury

jury believes,

believes, hev,

hey, if she had gone to aa

cardiologist,

cardiologist, they

they still wouldn't have done an echo, echo, we lose.

lose, This, that is

critical

critical evidence andand it's

it's my

my burden

burden toto establish that

that with

with this

this jury.

jury. And

And

that's exactly

that's exactly what Dr. Hayek

Hayek said. And now I

I can establish with this

witness that what Dr. Hayek

Hayek said is 100 percent correct. Because this is what

the cardiologists need to do. do

16

MR. TROY:

MR. TROY: SUDS is aadiagnosis,

diagnosis. And And we already established with with this

this witness and

another one that SUDS is something a a pathologist does all their work and

says, I

says, I don't know. And it's diagnosed sudden unexplained unexplained death syndrome.

That never happened

happened with Nathaniel Woodard. Woodard. That autopsy report did

reach a a conclusion. The argumentargument counsel is making

making is that my doctors had

not seen that autopsy

autopsy report,

report, therefore somehow that means aadiagnosis of

SUDS. That

SUDS. That idea

idea isis absurd

absurd because what they

because what they were

were told was he

told was he had

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