Robert Brown v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2024-1583

LT Case No. 2014-CF-000122-A

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ROBERT BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Jeb T. Branham, Judge.

Robert Brown, Bushnell, pro se.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

March 28, 2025

EISNAUGLE, J.

Robert Brown appeals the denial of his motion filed under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) challenging his three

sentences imposed pursuant to section 316.193, Florida Statutes

(2014). In his motion, Brown argued that his sentence is illegal

because it does not include “monthly reporting probation” and

completion of a substance abuse program as required by section

316.193(5), Florida Statutes. In denying the motion, the

postconviction court reasoned that “adding probation at this time

would only inure to Defendant’s detriment.” We affirm because

Brown is not prejudiced by the alleged error.

Brown was sentenced for one count of driving under the

influence (“DUI”) manslaughter and two counts of DUI serious

bodily injury under section 316.193, Florida Statutes. As to the

first count, the trial court sentenced Brown to the statutory

maximum of 15 years in prison pursuant to section

316.193(3)(c)3.a.

The trial court did not impose the statutory maximum

sentence as to the two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury.

Instead, on each of those counts, Brown received 2.5 years in

prison. Importantly, Brown’s sentences run consecutive to each

other for a total composite sentence of 20 years.

On appeal, Brown argues that his sentences are illegal

because he “did not receive a period of probation,” citing to section

316.193(5), Florida Statutes.1 See Powers v. State, 316 So. 3d 352

(Fla. 4th DCA 2021); Archer v. State, 332 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA

2021). Section 316.193(5), in pertinent part, provides:

The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating

this section on monthly reporting probation and shall

require completion of a substance abuse course conducted

by a DUI program licensed by the department under

s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation

of the offender.

Brown is entitled to no relief because he has not demonstrated

prejudice. Even if the statute requires a probationary period in

this case, rule 3.800(a) does not permit a defendant to challenge an

1 Brown does not argue on appeal that he was required to

receive a probationary period for each qualifying conviction or that

he is prejudiced because a probationary period, if applied

specifically to his 15-year statutory maximum sentence, would

reduce his time in prison on that count (but still not necessarily on

the composite sentence).

2

“unlawfully lenient sentence[]” absent some showing of prejudice.

Earl v. State, 314 So. 3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2021). As the Earl court

observed, section 924.051 makes abundantly clear that, to

challenge a court order, a defendant must demonstrate prejudicial

error. For instance, section 924.051(7) expressly applies to

collateral proceedings and provides:

In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party

challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has

the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error

occurred in the trial court. A conviction or sentence may

not be reversed absent an express finding that a

prejudicial error occurred in the trial court.

§ 924.051(7), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Brown cannot establish prejudice because his composite

sentence does not include the statutory maximum sentence for two

counts in his composite sentence. Therefore, unlike the defendants

in Powers and Archer, the sentencing judge could have ordered

probation to follow completion of the sentence for one of those

counts, and Brown is not aggrieved by the trial court’s failure to do

so.2

Brown argues that he is prejudiced because, if he receives a

de novo resentencing, the trial court could render a shorter

composite sentence. While that might be theoretically true, we see

at least two flaws with this argument.

2 Interestingly, Brown’s argument necessarily attempts to

isolate the part of his sentence imposing a prison term from any

requirement for monthly probation. Cf. Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d

238, 239 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]e analyze and resolve the conflict by

holding that the could-have-been-imposed harmless error test

applies to claims of sentencing error raised by rule 3.800(a)

motions.”). Given our application of Earl, we need not also decide

if our supreme court’s decision in Brooks, while certainly not

directly on point, might also be instructive.

3

First, as framed, Brown claims prejudice based on the

possibility of receiving a more lenient sentence at a de novo

resentencing. But while this argument might establish that

Brown is aggrieved on appeal (in some marginal sense) by the

denial of his 3.800(a) motion,3 he makes no argument that he was

prejudiced by the alleged error in his original sentence.

In the collateral proceeding below, Brown was required to

establish “prejudicial error . . . in the trial court.” § 924.051(7); see

also Earl, 314 So. 3d at 1255. In other words, Brown needed to

establish below that he is prejudiced by an error in his original

sentence. He cannot do so.

Second, Brown’s attempt to establish prejudice is entirely

speculative. See Earl, 314 So. 3d at 1255 (“[D]efendants are not

entitled to . . . relief under . . . rule [3.800(a)] absent a showing of

prejudice.”). Given the length and structure of his sentences,

unlike in Powers and Archer,4 Brown cannot allege, on the face of

the record, that a probationary period would reduce his term in

prison. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1) (“A court may at any time

correct an illegal sentence imposed by it . . . when it is affirmatively

alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an

entitlement to that relief.”). In short, the rule does not offer relief

based on a movant’s rank speculation.

3 We are aware that the Earl court approved the first district’s

opinion, which dismissed the defendant’s appeal in that case.

However, it appears that the relief requested in Earl could not

have resulted in any benefit to the movant. Earl, 314 So. 3d at

1255 (“As the postconviction court noted, had Earl been granted

the relief he requested, his sentence would not have been changed

by a single day.”). In this case, Brown requested de novo

resentencing, which he strenuously argues could have resulted in

a reduced sentence if granted.

4 In both Powers and Archer, the movant received the

maximum sentence in prison. Therefore, any mandatory

probationary period would have necessarily reduced the movant’s

prison term.

4

In conclusion, Brown was not aggrieved by the alleged error

in his sentence. Absent a showing of prejudice, Brown is not

entitled to relief.

AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT, and PRATT, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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