Brandon Deshawn Webster v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-22-148)

Rel: March 28, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

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CR-2023-0721

_________________________

Brandon Deshawn Webster

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court

(CC-22-148)

COLE, Judge.

Brandon Deshawn Webster appeals his convictions for capital

murder for killing Tanisha Pughsley while a valid protective order was

in place, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(19), Ala. Code 1975; capital murder

for killing Pughsley during a first-degree burglary, a violation of § 13A-

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5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975; and attempted first-degree assault of Jeremy

Walker, a violation of § 13A-4-2 and § 13A-6-20(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; and

his resulting concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for each of his capital-murder convictions and 10

years' imprisonment for his attempted-first-degree-assault conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2019, Pughsley and Walker, both members of the Montgomery

Police Department, met through a mutual friend, Michael Westbrook.

They began "talking" between April and June 2020. On July 5, 2020,

Pughsley and Walker went on a date to Birmingham before returning to

Pughsley's residence in Montgomery at some point after 1:00 a.m. on July

6, 2020. During an interview with Walker, which was admitted into

evidence as State's Exhibit 6, Walker stated that Pughsley had told him

that Webster, her ex-husband, had been physically abusive and that she

had put a restraining order on Webster. Thus, upon returning to

Pughsley's residence, which she previously had shared with Webster,

Pughsley told Walker to park away from her house in the nearby cul-de-

sac because Webster might drive by the house.

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Around 2:00 a.m. on July 6, 2020, Walker heard a gunshot and then

the burglar alarm went off because a door was opened. Both Pughsley

and Walker pushed the bedroom door to keep it closed, but Webster fired

two shots through the door. Walker fell back onto the bed while Pughsley

fell back "towards the sofa" in the bedroom. Once Webster entered the

bedroom, he pointed his gun at Walker before Webster and Walker began

to struggle over the gun. Eventually, Walker gained control over the gun

and threw it "into the bathroom." (R. 269.) Walker fled the house

through the front door after Pughsley told him to run. Walker denied

that Pughsley had been shot before he left the house, and he did not hear

any gunshots after he left Pughsley's house. Once outside, Walker

knocked on the doors of three to five neighboring houses, but no one

answered. Walker, thereafter, fled on foot to Westbrook's house, which

was almost three miles away.

Walker fled Pughsley's house in only his underwear, leaving his

clothes, telephone, and keys behind. Pughsley had told Walker that

Webster drove a gold-colored Cadillac sedan with rims, which Walker

saw parked in front of his vehicle in the cul-de-sac when he fled

Pughsley's house. While Walker had never formally met Webster,

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Walker had seen Webster with Pughsley at Westbrook's house once

before in 2019. Walker described Webster as being about his height, dark

skinned, heavy set, and with a beard.

An emergency 911 call was made at approximately 2:11 a.m. on

July 6, 2020. The caller stated that someone had called him informing

him that a shooting had occurred at Pughsley's residence. See State's

Exhibit 15. The caller further explained that he was not there and did

not know what had occurred but mentioned that his ex-wife may have

been there. Finally, the caller identified himself as "Rodney" and

indicated that he thought, but did not know, that someone had been shot.

That call was the only 911 call received regarding the shooting; however,

there was one alarm-company 911 call and "maybe two more" alarm-

company calls. The cellular-telephone number of the 911 caller was

recorded, and that same number was listed as Webster's telephone

number with Saddleback Ridge apartments, which is where Webster

lived. Law-enforcement officers arrived at Pughsley's house at 2:29 a.m.

and found the back door open. They located Pughsley, shot in the chest

and hip, in the bedroom at approximately 2:33 a.m.

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Officer David Stewart, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police

Department, was one of the first officers to respond to the scene. Officer

Stewart's body-camera footage was admitted into evidence, as State's

Exhibit 16, over Webster's objection. Officer Stewart found Pughsley's

back door ajar upon his arrival, and he was unable to hear Pughsley's

burglar alarm until he entered the residence. Officer Stewart, along with

another officer, located Pughsley in the master bedroom and performed

medical assistance until medical personnel arrived.

Marvia Scott, one of Pughsley's neighbors, provided video-camera

footage from her house showing Walker fleeing the neighborhood. Scott

called the police after seeing Walker fleeing through her yard, but she

denied hearing anyone knock on her door or gunshots. Video-camera

footage from both Chance Webster ("Chance") and Fred Judkins, which

showed the traffic flowing through Pughsley's neighborhood around the

time of the shooting, was admitted into evidence. Chance's video-camera

footage showed a gold-colored Cadillac sedan driving into Pughsley's

neighborhood at approximately 2:03 a.m. and leaving the neighborhood

at approximately 2:06 a.m. Additionally, Chance's video-camera footage

showed the gold-colored Cadillac sedan come back into the neighborhood

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with its lights off at approximately 2:11 a.m. and leaving the

neighborhood again at 2:16 a.m. Judkins's video-camera footage covered

Saddleback Ridge apartments, the same apartment complex where

Webster resided. A gold-colored Cadillac sedan can be seen entering and

leaving the Saddleback Ridge apartment complex around the same time

as depicted in Chance's video. 1

Terrence Bowens, an officer with the Montgomery Police

Department, heard that Pughsley had been shot while he was with his

dating partner, Detective Usen, 2 who was also with the Montgomery

Police Department. After hearing about Pughsley, Officer Bowens

proceeded to Pughsley's residence even though he was not on duty, but

he was not able to get on scene. Thereafter, Officer Bowens proceeded to

Westbrook's house. 3 When Officer Bowens arrived, he told Westbrook

that Pughsley "had possibly been hurt or shot." (R. 439.) Westbrook

1The time stamps of the videos were not accurate with each other

because they were not synchronized.

2Detective Usen's first name does not appear in the record.

3In2020, Westbrook was an officer with the Montgomery Police

Department and was close friends with Pughsley. (R. 438.) However, at

the time of trial, Westbrook was no longer employed with the

Montgomery Police Department.

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"broke down and left the house" to see what he could do to assist

Pughsley. (R. 439.) Officer Bowens proceeded to go home but turned

around after he received a call from Westbrook. When Officer Bowens

returned to Westbrook's house, Walker was present.

On July 6, 2020, Westbrook, then an officer with the Montgomery

Police Department, was not on duty. Westbrook testified that Officer

Bowens came to his house on July 6, 2020, and told him about Pughsley

being shot. Thereafter, Westbrook left his house to go to Pughsley's

residence to see what he could do to assist. Halfway to Pughsley's

residence, Westbrook turned around because he got a camera notification

on his cellular telephone that showed Walker "naked, sweating, drenched

in sweat" at his house trying to get his attention through the camera. (R.

452-53.) Westbrook attempted to calm Walker and got Walker some

clothes to wear. Finally, Westbrook called Officer Bowens to find out who

was the supervisor on duty, and then "a few units came and took

[Westbrook] and [Walker] down to the detectives division." (R. 455.)

Detective S. Agosto, with the Montgomery Police Department,

testified that she, along with Detective R.B. Dabney, were the crime-

scene investigators for the shooting at Pughsley's residence. Only one

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"spent [.223] shell casing" was located at the scene -- found in the living

room area. (R. 491.) However, the bedroom door had three gunshot holes.

It was determined that at least one projectile "came from inside the

[bed]room," striking a wall before going "through the laundry room and

out [of] the residence." (R. 494-95.) Based on the blood evidence and an

indention in the concrete below the carpet, it was determined that

Pughsley had been shot in the corner of the master bedroom.

Dr. Edward Reedy, the chief medical examiner with the Alabama

Department of Forensic Sciences ("the ADFS"), testified as an expert in

the field of forensic pathology. Dr. Reedy did not perform Pughsley's

autopsy,4 but he "conducted a second peer review" of Pughsley's autopsy

and came to his own opinions. (R. 672-74.) Dr. Reedy's independent

opinion reached the same conclusions as those found in the original

autopsy report. Based upon the stippling seen on Pughsley's arms and

chest, Dr. Reedy opined that when Pughsley was shot "the muzzle of the

weapon was around two feet away from" her. Moreover, Dr. Reedy opined

4Dr. Christopher Geffre conducted Pughsley's autopsy; however, at

the time of trial, Dr. Geffre was no longer employed with the ADFS. Dr.

Geffre's autopsy results were initially peer-reviewed by Dr. Stephen

Boudreau; however, at the time of trial, Dr. Boudreau was deceased.

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that the trajectory of the gunshot was "downward." Pughsley's death was

caused by the gunshot wound passing through her left lung and aorta

artery. While death would not have been immediate, Dr. Reedy opined

that death "would have been very rapid." (R. 694-95.)

Detective Brian Goza, with Montgomery Police Department at the

time of the offense, testified to examining Pughsley's cellular telephone.

Several text messages and email exchanges between Pughsley and

Webster were introduced, showing Webster's aggressive behavior toward

Pughsley. Sergeant Greg Schnupp, also with the Montgomery Police

Department, testified to searching Webster's apartment at Saddleback

Ridge apartments. In Webster's bedroom, "an AR magazine" was located

"on top of the dresser." (R. 801.) In the top left drawer of the dresser,

Sergeant Schnupp located a copy of the protective order. Sergeant

Schnupp also searched Webster's vehicle. In the trunk of Webster's

vehicle, Sergeant Schnupp located "an[other] AR magazine." Also located

in Webster's vehicle was "a badge belonging to … Pughsley." (R. 811.)

No ammunition was located either at Webster's apartment or in his

vehicle. However, Michael Dugan, a firearm and tool-marks specialist

with the ADFS, testified that the spent .223 shell casing found at

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Pughsley's residence would fit into the magazines located in Webster's

apartment and vehicle.

Webster did not testify in his own defense and presented only one

witness, Reginald K. Dabney, a homicide detective who had worked for

the Montgomery Police Department in 2020. Detective Dabney

interviewed Walker after the shooting. Through Detective Dabney,

Webster attempted to show that Walker was unreliable.

Thereafter, the jury convicted Webster of two counts of capital

murder and one count of attempted first-degree assault of Walker, a

lesser-included offense of attempted murder. The trial court sentenced

Webster to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for each capital-murder conviction and to 10 years'

imprisonment for the attempted-first-degree-assault conviction. This

appeal followed.

Discussion

On appeal, Webster raises six arguments: (1) whether the trial

court erred in finding that sufficient evidence existed to convict and

whether the weight of the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether his right

to confront his accusers was violated when the autopsy doctor was not

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available to testify; (3) whether the trial court erred in not making a

competency determination; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting

the body-camera footage depicting Pughsley's death; (5) whether the trial

court erred in admitting prior statements made by Webster; and (6)

whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on intent. None

of these issues entitles Webster to relief.

I. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Webster argues on appeal that the sufficiency and weight of the

evidence do not support his convictions for capital murder and for

attempted first-degree assault. Specifically, Webster argues that "no

physical evidence … support[ed] Walker's claim that Pughsley was shot

after he left the home," which, he says, showed that his version of events

(that Pughsley was shot accidentally during the struggle for the gun) was

more credible. (Webster's brief, pp. 8-9.) This fact alone, Webster says,

"negates [his] guilt on all three convictions" because there was doubt as

to his intent. (Webster's brief, p. 9.)

We first note that, as the State asserts, Webster failed to preserve

for appellate review his argument regarding the weight of the evidence.

A defendant can preserve an argument about the weight of the evidence

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by filing a timely motion for a new trial stating "that the verdict is

contrary to law or the weight of the evidence." See Zumbado v. State, 615

So. 2d 1223, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Rule 24.1(c)(1), Ala. R. Crim.

P. Webster did not file any motion for new trial, nor did he raise his

weight-of-the-evidence argument to the trial court. Therefore, this issue

is not preserved for appellate review. Webster, thus, is due no relief on

this claim.

Regarding Webster's sufficiency argument, both at the conclusion

of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence, Webster

moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the State's failure to present

a prima facie case as to each count charged in the indictment. Those

motions were denied. Webster's motion for judgment of acquittal as to

the charges of capital murder while a valid protective order was in place

and capital murder during a first-degree burglary preserved his

arguments on appeal. However, as the State asserts, because Webster

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence only as it related to his charge

of attempted murder, his motion for judgment of acquittal failed to

preserve for appellate review his argument as to the lesser-included

offense of attempted first-degree assault. See Jones v. State, 895 So. 2d

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376, 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding motion for judgment of acquittal

attacking indicted offense, but not the lesser-included offense, failed to

preserve the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge as to the lesser-

included offense). Thus, Webster failed to preserve for appellate review

the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument as to his attempted-first-

degree-assault conviction.

Thus, we turn to the merits of whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to support Webster's convictions for capital murder

while a valid protective order was in place and capital murder during a

first-degree burglary.

" ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain [a] conviction, this Court must accept as

true the evidence introduced by the State, accord

the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and

consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution." Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d

485, 489 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), affirmed, Ex parte

Faircloth, [471] So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985).'

"White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)."

Tate v. State, 305 So. 3d 254, 257 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).

A. Capital Murder While a Valid Protective Order Was In Place

To convict Webster of capital murder while a valid protective order

was in place, the State had to prove that: (1) Pughsley was dead; (2)

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Webster caused Pughsley's death after a court issued a valid protective

order against Webster pursuant to § 30-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975; (3)

the protective order was still in place at the time of Pughsley's death; and

(4) Webster intended to kill Pughsley. § 13A-5-40(a)(19), Ala. Code 1975.

Webster's argument on appeal challenges only the last element --

whether Webster had the intent to kill Pughsley. (Webster's brief, pp. 6-

9.)

Both the State and Webster stipulated, before the trial, that on

June 19, 2020, Pughsley had applied for and been granted a protective

order that restrained Webster from "having physical or violent contact"

with Pughsley, her residence, or her place of employment. (R. 219-21.)

That protective order was in place until December 19, 2020. Thus, the

State, through the stipulation, provided sufficient proof that a valid

protective order had been issued against Webster and was still in place

at the time of Pughsley's death. The State also presented sufficient proof

that Pughsley was deceased and that Webster caused her death.

Regarding the issue of intent, § 13A-2-2(1), Ala. Code 1975, states

that "[a] person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct

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described by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to cause

that result or to engage in that conduct."

"This Court has repeatedly observed that intent is a state of

mind that is rarely, if ever, established by direct evidence and

must be inferred from the facts. E.g., Chambers v. State, 181

So. 3d 429, 434 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015); Morton v. State, 154

So. 3d 1065, 1080 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); Brown v. State, 11

So. 3d 866, 914 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).

" 'Intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly

weapon. See Long v. State, 668 So. 2d 56, 60 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1995); Buskey v. State, 650 So. 2d 605,

609 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Additionally, "[t]he

question of a defendant's intent at the time of the

commission of the crime is usually an issue for the

jury to resolve." Rowell v. State, 570 So. 2d [848,]

850 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1990)], citing Crowe v. State,

435 So. 2d 1371, 1379 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).

Intent may be " 'inferred from the character of the

assault, the use of deadly weapon and other

attendant circumstances.' " Jones v. State, 591 So.

2d 569, 574 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), quoting

Johnson v. State, 390 So. 2d 1160, 1167 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1980).'

"Waldrop v. State, 859 So. 2d 1138, 1162 (Ala. Crim. App.

2000), aff'd, 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002)."

Henderson v. State, 248 So. 3d 992, 1007-08 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).

Here, Webster entered Pughsley's house around 2:00 a.m. armed

with a loaded gun. Webster proceeded to fire two shots through the

master-bedroom door that both Pughsley and Walker were pushing

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against to keep closed. Upon entering the master bedroom, Webster

pointed the gun at Walker and a struggle over the gun ensued. Once

Walker wrestled the gun away from Webster, Walker threw the gun into

the bathroom and fled when Pughsley told him to run. Walker testified

that, when he left Pughsley's house, Pughsley had not been shot. When

law-enforcement officers arrived, they found Pughsley in the corner of

the master bedroom with a gunshot wound to the chest struggling to

breathe. The blood evidence, bullet damage to the concrete floor, and Dr.

Reedy's testimony all indicated that Pughsley was shot while she may

have been in a crouched position and that the shot was fired from no more

than two feet away. That evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude

that Webster killed Pughsley and that he acted with the intent to kill.

Any contradictions in the evidence go to the weight of the evidence, not

the sufficiency of the evidence, and were for the jury to decide. Webster

is due no relief on this claim.

B. Capital Murder During a First-Degree Burglary

To convict Webster of capital murder during a first-degree burglary,

the State had to prove that: (1) Pughsley was dead; (2) Webster killed

Pughsley and acted with intent; (3) Webster knowingly and unlawfully

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entered or remained unlawfully in Pughsley's house; (4) in entering

Pughsley's house, Webster intended to commit a crime -- assault or

murder; and (5) while in Pughsley's house, Webster caused physical

injury to a person, Pughsley or Walker, or, while in Pughsley's home or

in immediate flight therefrom, Webster used or threatened the use of a

deadly weapon, a gun, against another person, Pughsley or Walker. §

13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975; § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; § 13A-7-

5(a)(2) and (3), Ala. Code 1975. Again, Webster's argument on appeal

challenges only the second element -- whether Webster had the intent to

kill Pughsley.

Because Webster does not challenge the other elements of capital

murder during a first-degree burglary, this Court will address only the

element of "intent" that Webster contests. As discussed in Part I.A.

above, § 13A-2-2(1), Ala. Code 1975, defines when a person acts

intentionally. Intent is rarely established by direct evidence and thus is

inferred from the facts. Henderson, 248 So. 3d at 1007-08. The use of a

deadly weapon, the character of an assault, or other attendant

circumstances may provide the necessary inference to show an accused's

intent. Id. The same set of facts and circumstances found in Part I.A. to

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establish the intent for capital murder while a valid protective order was

in place also establishes the intent element for capital murder during a

first-degree burglary. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence to

establish that Webster committed capital murder during a first-degree

burglary, and Webster is due no relief on this claim.

II. Confrontation

Webster also argues that his right to confront his accusers was

violated. Specifically, Webster argues that his right of confrontation, as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

was denied because Dr. Reedy testified to Pughsley's autopsy results, but

the autopsy and the autopsy report were conducted and written by Dr.

Christopher Geffre. See note 4, supra. Webster concedes in his brief that

this issue was not objected to at trial, but he requests this Court to find

plain error on this issue.

This issue was not preserved for appellate review, and the plain-

error doctrine does not apply. This Court has repeatedly held that

"[p]lain error review does not apply to convictions in which the death

penalty has not been imposed." Hicks v. State, 378 So. 3d 1071, 1130

(Ala. Crim. App. 2019); see Keaton v. State, 375 So. 3d 44, 71 (Ala. Crim.

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App. 2021). The death penalty was not imposed in this case, and Webster

did not object or otherwise present his confrontation claim to the trial

court. Thus, Webster failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.

Even if Webster had preserved this issue, which he did not, he

would still not be entitled to relief. This Court has previously held that

" 'it [is] not a violation of the Confrontation Clause to admit an autopsy

report without the medical examiner's testimony' because 'autopsy

reports are nontestimonial in nature.' " Henderson v. State, [Ms. CR-21-

0044, May 3, 2024] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024). Moreover,

violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless-error

analysis. Id.

Here, Dr. Reedy testified that he did not personally conduct

Pughsley's autopsy. (R. 672.) But Dr. Reedy did "conduct[] a second peer

review" of the original autopsy, which required "a review of the

investigative information and the autopsy photographs." (R. 674.) After

conducting the peer review, Dr. Reedy "generate[d] [his] own opinions as

to where the bullet entered, where the bullet exited, the wound path, and

injuries that may have occurred between the entrance and exit" wounds.

(R. 674.) When Dr. Reedy compared his own opinions to the original

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autopsy report, Dr. Reedy found that his own opinions were the same as

Dr. Geffre's opinions contained in the autopsy report. (R. 674-75.) Thus,

Dr. Reedy was subject to cross-examination and did not simply recite

conclusions from the autopsy report but provided his own opinions that

happened to be cumulative to those in the autopsy report. See, e.g.,

Henderson, __ So. 3d at __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (finding that the

doctor's own opinions were cumulative to those in the autopsy report,

making any error in admission of evidence harmless because the evidence

was cumulative). Additionally, it was undisputed that Pughsley's death

was caused by a gunshot wound; the dispute was whether the gunshot

was intentional or accidental. This evidence, thus, was not critical to the

State's case. For all these reasons, Webster is not entitled to relief.

III. Competency

Webster next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to

order that he undergo a mental evaluation to determine whether he was

competent to stand trial. Specifically, relying on Rule 11, Ala. R. Crim.

P., and § 15-16-22, Ala. Code 1975, Webster argues that the trial court

should have ordered that he undergo a mental evaluation to determine

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his competency to stand trial based on his pleas of not guilty and not

guilty by reason of mental disease or defect made at his arraignment.

Rule 11.2(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P., states that "[w]hen a person

charged with a crime is before a circuit court, the defendant, the

defendant's attorney, or the district attorney may petition for, or the

court on its own motion may order, an examination to assist in the

determination of the defendant's present mental condition and

competency to stand trial." Section 15-16-22(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides

in pertinent part:

"Whenever it shall be made known to the presiding judge of a

court by which an indictment has been returned against a

defendant for a capital offense, that there is reasonable

grounds to believe that such defendant may presently lack the

capacity to proceed or continue to trial, as defined in Section

22-52-30[, Ala. Code 1975], or whenever said judge receives

notice that the defense of said defendant may proceed on the

basis of mental disease or defect as a defense to criminal

responsibility; it shall be the duty of the presiding judge to

forthwith order that such defendant be committed to the

Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation for

examination by one or more mental health professionals

appointed by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental

Health and Mental Retardation …."

The Alabama Supreme Court has found that, "[w]hen read together, Rule

11.2(a) and § 15-16-22 stand for the proposition that a judge presiding

over a capital case has a duty to order the defendant to submit to an

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examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial

when the judge has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may

lack the competency to stand trial." Ex parte Cate, 134 So. 3d 870, 875

(Ala. 2013). Additionally,

"[a] defendant's ' "competency to stand trial refers to a

defendant's current mental state and functional capacities as

they relate to a pending trial process." ' Committee Comments

on Rule 11.1, quoting T. Grisso, Evaluating Competencies.

" ' "Ala. Code 1975, § 15-16-21, provides in

pertinent part:

" ' " 'If any person

charged with any felony is

held in confinement under

indictment and the trial

court shall have reasonable

grounds to doubt his sanity,

the trial of such person for

such offense shall be

suspended until the jury

shall inquire into the fact of

such sanity….'

" ' "This section authorizes the trial

court to make a preliminary

determination (without the aid of a

jury) as to whether there are

reasonable grounds to doubt the

defendant's competency to stand trial.

Ex parte LaFlore, 445 So. 2d 932, 934

(Ala. 1983); Richardson v. State, 354

So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Ala. Crim. App.

1978). The trial court is, thus, the

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'screening agent' for mental

examination requests. Livingston v.

State, 419 So. 2d 270, 274 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1982)."

" 'Reese v. State, 549 So. 2d 148, 150 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Huntley v.

State, 627 So. 2d 1013 (Ala. 1992). "It is left to the

discretion of the trial court as to whether there is

a reasonable doubt or bona fide doubt as to sanity

and, thus, whether a further examination is

required." Waldrop v. State, 459 So. 2d 953, 955

(Ala. Crim. App. 1983), aff'd, 459 So. 2d 959 (Ala.

1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S. Ct. 2050,

85 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1985). The standard of review is

whether the trial court abused its discretion by not

requiring an evaluation of [a defendant]'s

competency to stand trial. See Baker v. State, 599

So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).

" 'A trial of an accused who is incompetent

violates due process. Wagner v. State, 489 So. 2d

623, 628 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Bishop v. United

States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S. Ct. 440, 100 L. Ed. 835

(1956). Rule 11.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., states:

" ' "A defendant is mentally

incompetent to stand trial or to be

sentenced for an offense if that

defendant lacks sufficient present

ability to assist in his or her defense by

consulting with counsel with a

reasonable degree of rational

understanding of the facts and the

legal proceedings against the

defendant."

23

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" 'The trial court makes the ultimate

determination of a defendant's competency

pursuant to the following standard:

" ' "The test for determining competency

to stand trial is whether the defendant

'has sufficient present ability to consult

with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding -- and

whether he has a rational as well as

factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.' Dusky v.

United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct.

788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960); Drope v.

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896,

43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975)."

" 'Anderson v. State, 510 So. 2d 578, 579 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1987). "This determination [of

competency to stand trial] should be left to the

discretion of the trial court." Baker v. City of

Huntsville, 516 So. 2d 927, 931 (Ala. Crim. App.

1987).'

"Russell v. State, 715 So. 2d 866, 868-69 (Ala. Crim. App.

1997). (Emphasis added.)"

Frazier v. State, 758 So. 2d 577, 585-86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (footnote

omitted).

Here, an order entered by the trial court indicates that Webster

pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect at

his arraignment, but a transcript of the arraignment is not included in

the record on appeal. After his plea, Webster never moved for any mental

24

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evaluation, never requested funds for an expert, and never pursued a

defense that he was incompetent to stand trial. In fact, the only evidence

that Webster points this Court to regarding evidence of mental

incompetency is that, during the trial testimony of his sister, Tatyana

Webster ("Tatyana"), Tatyana testified that she overheard Webster say

-- after learning of Pughsley's death -- that "he was going to kill his self."

(R. 563.) Webster's statement was made on July 6, 2020; however,

Webster's trial did not occur until August 15, 2023. There is no indication

that Webster was still suffering from suicidal ideations at the time of

trial. See Cook v. State, 64 So. 3d 672, 674-75 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

(noting that there must be some evidence before the trial court to call into

doubt an accused's sanity before a mental evaluation is warranted).

Moreover, suicidal ideations alone are not "conclusive evidence of a

defendant's inability to understand the nature of the proceedings against

him and to aid in his own defense." Reese v. State, 549 So. 2d 148, 150

(Ala. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds in Huntley v. State,

627 So. 2d 1013 (Ala. 1992). There is no indication from the record that

Webster was suffering from any mental deficiencies at the time of trial.

The fact that Webster may have had suicidal ideations three years before

25

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his trial does not show that Webster was mentally incompetent at the

time of trial. Webster's failure to raise this issue before the trial court,

other than by his initial pleas, also militates against finding that Webster

was suffering any mental deficiency at the time of trial. Given these

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not ordering

a mental evaluation to determine Webster's competency to stand trial.

Webster is, thus, due no relief.

IV. Body-Camera Footage

Webster next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his

motion to exclude the audio of the body-camera footage depicting

Pughsley's death. Specifically, Webster argues that the audio of the

body-camera footage, which was admitted into evidence as State's

Exhibit 16, "served no purpose other than to inflame the jury and was

particularly gruesome" such that it should have been excluded.

(Webster's brief, p. 16.)

Prior to the trial, Webster filed a motion in limine seeking to redact

the body-camera footage he believed the State intended to introduce at

the trial. Specifically, Webster argued that the body-camera footage

contained "hearsay and other inadmissible statements" made by law-

26

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enforcement officers and other third parties. (C. 322-24.) Webster also

argued that the body-camera footage depicted Pughsley "still 'twitching'

and 'moaning' prior to her death," which he argued was cumulative to

other evidence -- photographs -- the State intended to introduce at trial.

(C. 322-24.) The trial court denied Webster's motion.

During the trial, Webster argued that the body-camera footage

showed Pughsley being found alive, that Pughsley made no statements,

and that she only moaned. Specifically, Webster argued that the

prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value of the footage

because Pughsley does not say who shot her. Webster argued that the

State could prove where Pughsley was found with photographs from the

body-camera footage but that Webster's "problem [with the footage] is

with the audio portion." (R. 371.) The State argued that it had "the

burden of proving that [Pughsley] was alive and that [Pughsley] died"

and that the footage depicting her death was "an essential element" of

the proof needed to convict Webster. (R. 372-73.) The State also argued

that the body-camera footage, including its audio, was relevant for other

purposes as well. Specifically, the State argued that the purpose of the

footage was to counter Webster's theory that the shooting was an

27

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accident or that law-enforcement officers manipulated evidence. Thus,

the State argued that admitting the footage without the audio would

allow Webster to continue to advance his theory without contradiction.

In response, Webster argued he was "not asking [that] the entire audio

… be redacted" but only that the audio of Pughsley dying be redacted.

(R. 374-77.) After hearing the arguments, the trial court overruled

Webster's objection.

This Court has repeatedly said:

" 'Generally, photographs are admissible into evidence

in a criminal prosecution "if they tend to prove or disprove

some disputed or material issue, to illustrate or elucidate

some other relevant fact or evidence, or to corroborate or

disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered, and

their admission is within the sound discretion of the trial

judge." ' Bankhead v. State, 585 So. 2d 97, 109 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1989), remanded on other grounds, 585 So. 2d 112 (Ala.

1991), aff'd on return to remand, 625 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1992), rev'd, 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1993), quoting

Magwood v. State, 494 So. 2d 124, 141 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985),

aff'd, 494 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1986). 'Photographic exhibits are

admissible even though they may be cumulative,

demonstrative of undisputed facts, or gruesome.' Williams v.

State, 506 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (citations

omitted). In addition, 'photographic evidence, if relevant, is

admissible even if it has a tendency to inflame the minds of

the jurors.' Ex parte Siebert, 555 So. 2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1989).

'This court has held that autopsy photographs, although

gruesome, are admissible to show the extent of a victim's

injuries.' Ferguson v. State, 814 So. 2d 925, 944 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2000), aff'd, 814 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 2001). ' "[A]utopsy

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photographs depicting the character and location of wounds

on a victim's body are admissible even if they are gruesome,

cumulative, or relate to an undisputed matter." ' Jackson v.

State, 791 So. 2d 979, 1016 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), quoting

Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041, 1108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999),

aff' 'd, 808 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2001), judgment vacated on other

grounds, 536 U.S. 953, 122 S. Ct. 2653, 153 L. Ed. 2d 830

(2002), on remand to, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002). 'The same

rule applies for videotapes as for photographs: "The fact that

a photograph is gruesome and ghastly is no reason for

excluding it, if relevant, even if the photograph may tend to

inflame the jury." ' Siebert v. State, 562 So. 2d 586, 599 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1989), aff'd, 562 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1990), quoting

Walker v. State, 416 So. 2d 1083, 1090 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

See also Ward v. State, 814 So. 2d 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).

Generally, '[a] properly authenticated video tape recording of

the scene of the crime constitutes competent evidence' and 'is

admissible over the defendant's objections that the tape was

inflammatory, prejudicial, and cumulative.' Kuenzel v. State,

577 So. 2d 474, 512-13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), aff'd, 577 So.

2d 531 (Ala. 1991). 'Provided that a proper foundation is laid,

the admissibility of videotape evidence in a criminal trial is a

matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.'

Donahoo v. State, 505 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (Ala. Crim. App.

1986)."

Brooks v. State, 973 So. 2d 380, 393 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, this

Court has upheld video evidence, that included audio, depicting the scene

of a crime that "show[ed] [a] massive amount of blood present" on a victim

who had been cut in the neck and depicting the finding of another victim

(a 12-year-old child) that had been shot multiple times in the head. Id.

at 386-87, 393-94. The evidence in Brooks was admissible because it

29

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depicted the crime scene, showed the condition of the victims when they

were found, and duplicated the remoteness of the location, which showed

the effort put in to cover up the crime. Id. at 394.

In Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 173, 183 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), Luong

"was convicted of five counts of murder made capital because he killed

his four children, all under the age of 14 years, by one act or pursuant to

one scheme or course of conduct." Luong confessed to killing his children

by throwing them off a bridge, and the children died due to "blunt-force

trauma and asphyxia due to drowning." Id. Regardless, this Court found

that the State had the burden of proving that its victims were deceased,

and photographs or video evidence were direct proof on that point. Id. at

211.

In Riley v. State, 166 So. 3d 705 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013), Riley was

convicted of capital murder during a first-degree robbery and sentenced

to death. At issue were "three surveillance videos" that "clearly

depict[ed] Riley robbing" a store and leading a victim into a back room.

Id. at 754. The actual murder was not captured on the videos, but "the

audio portion of the videos recorded the sound of each gunshot, as well as

the 'clearly audible, drawn out, agonizing "scream" of the victim….' " Id.

30

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While this Court applied plain-error review, this Court noted that " 'the

balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is a matter which

is within the discretion of the trial court.' " Id. at 756 (quoting United

States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981), citing in turn

United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1979)). However,

after reviewing the video evidence, this Court held that the probative

value of the videos outweighed any prejudice. Id.

Finally, in State v. Abu-Fakher, 274 Kan. 584, 594, 56 P.3d 166,

175 (2002), the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether it was error

to admit, over Abu-Fakher's objection, an audiotape recording that

contained "the dying sounds" of the victim, which Abu-Fakher argued

could have been easily redacted and only served to inflame the passions

of the jury. In finding the admission of the recording appropriate, the

Kansas Supreme Court found it offered "proof of the elements of the crime

charged, including the fact and manner of [the victim]'s death." Id. at

176-77. More specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court found the

recording "captured the demeanor of the parties involved," corroborated

other evidence, and was the "most probative and comprehensive evidence

of the actual commission of the crime, the sequence in which events

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occurred, and their duration; it [also] provide[d] considerable context for

the manner of death and time span in which the events took place." Id.

at 177.

It is well established that

" ' "Alabama recognizes a liberal test of relevancy," ' Gavin v.

State, 891 So. 2d 907, 963 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting

Hayes v. State, 717 So. 2d 30, 36 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)),

which provides that evidence is relevant if it has 'any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' Rule

401, Ala. R. Evid. Under that liberal standard, evidence is

' "admissible against a relevancy challenge if it has any

probative value, however[] slight, upon a matter in the case." '

Gavin, 891 So. 2d at 964 (quoting Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d

431, 468 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (emphasis added))."

Harrison v. State, 398 So.3d 955, 969 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023). Moreover,

" ' "[p]hotographs [or videos] that tend to shed light on, to strengthen, or

to illustrate other testimony presented may be admitted into evidence." '

Lindsay v. State, 326 So. 3d 1, 34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Ex

parte Siebert, 555 So. 2d 780, 783 (Ala. 1989) (emphasis added))."

Harrison, 398 So. 3d at 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023).

Here, the body-camera footage, along with its audio, was relevant

and probative for several reasons. The body-camera footage and its audio

depicted how the crime scene appeared upon law enforcement's arrival

32

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at the scene. The body-camera footage's audio showed that officers were

not able to hear the burglar alarm until they proceeded to Pughsley's

open back door. Once inside, the footage showed how the inside of

Pughsley's home appeared upon their arrival. It also captured exactly

where in the master bedroom and in what position Pughsley was found.

The footage also showed where Pughsley was wounded. The audio

depicted that Pughsley was still alive at the time law-enforcement

officers arrived because she was moaning and could follow directions,

such as breathing onto an officer's hand. However, the audio also

depicted the moment that Pughsley stopped breathing and the

subsequent life-saving efforts by law-enforcement officers. The entire

body-camera footage is 1 hour and 19 minutes long; however, the footage

depicting Pughsley is approximately 10 minutes long. Thus, this

evidence was relevant and probative to show that Pughsley was alive and

died due to being shot. Additionally, this evidence tended to rebut

Webster's insinuation at trial that law-enforcement officers were playing

some nefarious game to blame him and protect their own police members

or friends.

33

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However, our inquiry does not end with a finding that the body-

camera footage was relevant. Relevant evidence may still be excluded "if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice." Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. Thus,

"[t]he question under Rule 403[, Ala. R. Evid.,] is not simply

whether [Webster] was prejudiced by the admission of [the]

video; indeed 'all evidence against a defendant … [is]

prejudicial.' Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 812 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2010). Rather, the question is whether there was a

danger that unfair prejudice could result from the admission

of the video and whether that danger was substantially

outweighed by the video's probative value. See Ex parte

Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 95 (Ala. 1999) ('Mere prejudice is not

a basis for exclusion under Rule 403[, Ala. R. Evid.], because

evidence can be harmful, yet not unfairly prejudicial.') As to

what constitutes unfair prejudice, the Alabama Supreme

Court has explained:

" ' "Unfair prejudice" under Rule 403 has been

defined as something more than simple damage to

an opponent's case. Dealto v. State, 677 So. 2d

1236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). A litigant's case is

always damaged by evidence that is contrary to his

or her contention, but damage caused in that

manner does not rise to the level of "unfair

prejudice" and cannot alone be cause for exclusion.

Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Crim. App.

1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 674 So.

2d 1365 (Ala. 1994). "Prejudice is 'unfair' if [it] has

'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an

improper basis.' " Gipson v. Younes, 724 So. 2d

530, 532 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting Fed. R.

Evid. 403 (Advisory Committee Notes 1972). See,

also, Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.'

34

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"Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d at 96."

Harrison v. State, 398 So.3d at 970-71.

Here, the body-camera footage's probative value is not outweighed

by any prejudice. The body-camera footage depicted both Pughsley being

found alive suffering from a gunshot wound and her death from that

same wound. Although the footage and its accompanying audio was

certainly prejudicial, as is the nature of such violent crimes, that alone

does not make the evidence inadmissible. While Pughsley's gasps for

breath would certainly arouse some passion, it does not rise to the level

of suggesting the jury would make its decision on an improper basis.

Additionally, the body-camera footage also refuted Webster's insinuation

throughout the trial that law-enforcement officers were attempting to

protect their own members and friends during this investigation. Given

these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the body-

camera footage into evidence, and Webster is due no relief.

V. Webster's Prior Statements

Webster next argues that the trial court erred when it admitted his

"alleged statements … that he would shoot Pughsley in the face if he saw

her" because, he says, the probative value of this evidence was

35

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substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. (Webster's brief, pp. 17-

20.) This issue is both unpreserved and without merit.

Before the trial, the State provided notice that it intended to offer

evidence at Webster's trial, pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., "to

prove [Webster]'s intent to kill and motive to kill" Pughsley. (C. 311-12.)

Specifically, the State provided notice that it intended to show that

between May and June of 2020 Webster "made statements that he

wanted to shoot [Pughsley] in the face and that if he saw [Pughsley]

downtown he would shoot her in the face." (C. 311.) At a hearing before

the trial began, Webster objected to the admission of this evidence,

arguing that its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair

prejudice. Webster argued that the alleged threatening statements were

conveyed to a third party, Ashley Hartley, and not to Pughsley. Finally,

Webster also argued that the threats were irrelevant because Pughsley

was neither shot in the face nor was she downtown when she was shot.

The trial court classified Webster's pretrial objection as a motion in

limine and denied his motion.

Hartley, in July 2020, was a patrol officer with the Montgomery

Police Department; however, at the time of Webster's trial, she was no

36

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longer with the Montgomery Police Department. Hartley knew Pughsley

was also with the Montgomery Police Department and knew Pughsley

was dating Webster because she is friends with Webster's sister,

Tatyana. When asked whether Webster had stated that he wanted to

shoot Pughsley in the face, as was written in Hartley's statement,

Hartley stated: "I didn't put that in my statement." (R. 598.) Hartley

also denied putting in her statement that Webster had stated that he

hated Pughsley or that Webster said he would shoot Pughsley in the face

if he saw her downtown. On cross-examination, Webster's counsel

inquired into Hartley testifying that she did not write in her statement -

- even though it appears in the statement -- that Webster had threatened

to shoot Pughsley in the face or that Webster hated Pughsley. Hartley

denied having ever heard Webster say that he wanted to shoot Pughsley

in the face. On redirect examination, Hartley twice denied putting in her

statement that Webster had threatened to shoot Pughsley in the face.

This issue was not preserved for appellate review. Regarding

preservation of an issue raised in a motion in limine, this Court has

stated:

" ' "The general rule is that an adverse ruling on a

motion in limine does not preserve the issue for

37

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appellate review unless an objection is made at the

time the evidence is introduced." Moody v. State,

888 So. 2d 532, 582 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).

"[U]nless the trial court's ruling on the motion in

limine is absolute or unconditional, the ruling does

not preserve the issue for appeal." Perry v.

Brakefield, 534 So. 2d 602, 606 (Ala. 1988).'

"Saunders v. State, 10 So. 3d 53, 87 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).

See also Parks v. State, 587 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Ala. 1991)

(holding where a party seeking the exclusion of the evidence

suffers an adverse ruling on its motion in limine, that party

can preserve the ruling for appellate review 'only by objecting

to the introduction of the proffered evidence and assigning

specific grounds at the time of trial, unless he or she obtains

the express acquiescence of the trial judge that a subsequent

objection and assignment of grounds are not necessary')."

Lucas v. State, 204 So. 3d 929, 941-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). Here,

Webster argued to the trial court, before opening statements, that

Hartley's alleged Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., evidence should be excluded

from the trial. After hearing the arguments, the trial court denied

Webster's motion, but there is no indication that this ruling was absolute

or unconditional. In fact, the trial court indicated that it was open to

changing its ruling when it denied the motion "at th[at] time." (R. 197.)

During the trial, Webster did not object when Hartley was called, nor did

Webster interpose any objection when Hartley was asked about the

38

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proffered Rule 404(b) evidence. Thus, Webster failed to preserve this

issue for appellate review.

Even if Webster had preserved the issue, Webster would not be

entitled to relief. During the State's questioning of Hartley, Hartley

adamantly denied that she ever wrote that Webster had threatened to

shoot Pughsley in the face. While the State insinuated that Hartley's

statement contained this claim, Hartley denied writing it, and the State

did not put Hartley's statement into evidence. Thus, there was no

evidence introduced at Webster's trial that Webster had previously said

that he wanted to shoot Pughsley in the face. See Bates v. State, 669 So.

2d 232, 235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that statements of attorneys

in a trial are not evidence); see also Armstrong v. State, 516 So. 2d 806,

809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("The prosecutor's statements are not

evidence."). The fact that the evidence at issue was not introduced into

evidence at Webster's trial makes this issue moot. See Irwin v. Jefferson

Cnty. Pers. Bd., 263 So. 3d 698, 703 (Ala. 2018) (finding that a moot

question is one as to which no real controversy exists, such as a question

that seeks to answer an abstract question based on nonexistent facts or

rights). Webster is, thus, due no relief.

39

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VI. Jury Instruction on Intent

Webster finally argues that the trial court erred when it improperly

instructed the jury that it could "presume" intent. (Webster's brief, p. 20-

22.) Relying in part upon Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979),

Webster argues that the trial court's instruction on intent improperly

shifted the burden to him. Webster concedes in his brief that no objection

was made to this instruction in the trial court, but he again requests

plain-error review.

This issue was not preserved for appellate review, and, as already

noted, the plain-error doctrine does not apply because the death penalty

was not imposed. This Court has repeatedly held that "[p]lain error

review does not apply to convictions in which the death penalty has not

been imposed." Hicks, 378 So. 3d at 1130. Moreover,

" ' "[r]eview on appeal is restricted to questions and

issues properly and timely raised at trial." ' Ex parte

Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003) (citing Newsome v.

State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). … '[T]o

preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented

to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out

the specific grounds in support thereof.' McKinney v. State,

654 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (citation omitted).

"Rule 21.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides, in pertinent part:

40

CR-2023-0721

" 'No party may assign as error the court's

giving or failing to give a written instruction, or

the giving of an erroneous, misleading, incomplete,

or otherwise improper oral charge, unless the

party objects thereto before the jury retires to

consider its verdict, stating the matter to which he

or she objects and the grounds of the objection.' "

Jones v. State, 217 So. 3d 947, 960-61 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016).

Here, as Webster concedes, he did not object to the trial court's jury

instruction on the ground he advances on appeal. Because Webster failed

to object to the trial court's instruction, this issue is not preserved for

appellate review. Webster is, thus, due no relief.

VII. Illegal Sentence

Webster's three convictions and his sentences for capital murder

while a valid protective order was in place and capital murder during a

first-degree burglary are proper. However, even though neither Webster

nor the State challenges Webster's 10-year "straight" sentence for

attempted first-degree assault, we must take notice that Webster's 10-

year sentence is illegal. "It is well settled that '[m]atters concerning

unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional.' Hunt v. State, 659 So. 2d 998,

999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore, this Court may take notice of an

illegal sentence 'at any time and may do so even ex mero motu.' Moore

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v. State, 40 So. 3d 750, 753 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)." Towns v. State, 293

So. 3d 975, 985 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).

First-degree assault, § 13A-6-20, Ala. Code 1975, is classified as a

Class B felony. However, an attempt to commit a first-degree assault is

classified as Class C felony. § 13A-4-2(d)(3), Ala. Code 1975. A Class C

felony is punishable by imprisonment for "not more than 10 years or less

than one year and one day." § 13A-5-6(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. However,

" ' "[a] defendant's sentence is determined by the law in effect

at the time of the commission of the offense." ' Moore [v.

State], 40 So. 3d [750,] 753 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2009)] (quoting

Davis v. State, 571 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)).

See also Minnifield v. State, 941 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2005) ('It is well settled that the law in effect at the time

of the commission of the offense controls the prosecution.')."

Towns, 293 So. 3d at 986. At the time of Webster's offenses, on July 6,

2020, § 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code 1975, stated, in pertinent part:

"[W]hen a defendant is convicted of an offense that constitutes

a Class C or D felony offense and receives a sentence of not

more than 15 years, the judge presiding over the case shall

order that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison,

jail-type institution, treatment institution, or community

corrections program for a Class C felony offense … for a period

not exceeding two years in cases where the imposed sentence

is not more than 15 years, and that the execution of the

remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any

provision of the law to the contrary and that the defendant be

placed on probation for a period not exceeding three years and

upon such terms as the court deems best."

42

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Webster was not sentenced pursuant to the Habitual Felony

Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975. Thus, Alabama law required

that Webster's 10-year "straight" sentence for a Class C felony conviction

be split for him to serve a period of no more than 2 years' imprisonment

followed by a period of probation for no more than 3 years. Although the

Alabama Legislature has amended § 15-18-8(b) since the commission of

Webster's crimes, Webster's sentence must comply with the law in effect

at the time of the offense or it is an illegal sentence. Because the

execution of Webster's 10-year sentence is illegal, we must remand this

case to the trial court for it to impose a sentence on Webster for his

conviction for attempted first-degree assault that complies with the

version of § 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code 1975, in effect at the time of the offense.

Because Webster's 10-year sentence is valid, the trial court cannot

change the base sentence. See Born v. State, 331 So. 3d 626, 638 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2020).

Conclusion

For these reasons, Webster's convictions for capital murder while a

protective order was in place and for capital murder during a first-degree

burglary and the resulting concurrent sentences of life imprisonment

43

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without the possibility of parole are affirmed. Webster's conviction for

attempted first-degree assault is also affirmed. However, this case is

remanded to the trial court for that court to resentence Webster in

accordance with this opinion for his attempted-first-degree-assault

conviction. Due return shall be made to this Court within 42 days of the

date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Minor and Anderson, JJ., concur. Kellum, J.,

concurs in the result.

44