K.A. v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Russell Juvenile Court: JU-23-748.03)

Rel: March 28, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

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K.A.

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Russell Juvenile Court

(JU-23-748.03)

KELLUM, Judge.

K.A. was adjudicated delinquent on the underlying charge of

murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a

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robbery in the first degree. 1 See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The

juvenile court found K.A. to be a serious juvenile offender and committed

him to the custody of the Department of Youth Services ("DYS") until his

21st birthday.

At the delinquency hearing, the State presented evidence

indicating that, on December 12, 2023, K.A. and J.S. robbed at gunpoint

Douglas Rutledge as he was walking down the street by Synovus Bank

in Phenix City. One pointed the gun at Rutledge while the other checked

Rutledge's pockets. K.A. and J.S. then ran away, and Rutledge continued

walking. A short time later, a little after 7:00 p.m., just after Ryan Boles

got into his vehicle parked behind Synovus Bank, K.A. ran up, opened

the driver's door, and shot Boles. The autopsy revealed that the bullet

1In the same proceeding, in case no. JU-23-748.04, K.A. was tried

for a robbery that occurred only a few minutes before the murder, and

the juvenile court purported to adjudicate him delinquent of attempted

robbery as a lesser-included offense of the robbery charge. See, e.g.,

Pilgrim v. State, 963 So. 2d 697, 700 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) ("[A]fter the

effective date of the Criminal Code [January 1, 1980,] attempted robbery

[i]s no longer a criminal offense in Alabama."). K.A. listed on his notice

of appeal, however, only case no. JU-23-748.03, the case number

associated with his adjudication for capital murder. Therefore, this

appeal is solely from his adjudication for capital murder.

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passed through Boles's left arm and entered his chest, where it punctured

his heart, lung, diaphragm, and liver.

Surveillance cameras from the bank and another nearby business

captured both the robbery of Rutledge and the murder of Boles. K.A. was

identified from that surveillance footage as one of the participants in the

crimes based on the distinctive clothing that he was wearing at the time 2

and based on Robert Isabel, a lieutenant with the Phenix City Police

Department, recognizing K.A., whom he knew personally. Specifically,

testimony indicated that K.A. had received the Reebok brand black and

gray jacket and the joggers with writing down the side that he was

wearing the night of the shooting only a few days earlier as Christmas

presents from a youth camp that he regularly attended and where Lt.

Isabel volunteered. K.A. later gave a statement to investigators, in which

he confessed to shooting Boles, claiming that the gun belonged to J.S. and

that, "if he didn't do what he did, then [J.S.] was going to kill him that

night." (R. 387.)

I.

2J.S. was also identified based on his clothing as seen in the

surveillance footage.

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K.A. contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion

to suppress the statement he made to investigators because, he says, he

did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights. He argues that he

was only 13 years old, had completed only the 6th grade, and had not

taken any classes in school about his constitutional rights. He also

argues that he did not verbally acknowledge that he understood his

rights during the interview and that his aunt testified that she did not

believe he understood his rights. Thus, he concludes, he was too young

and lacking in knowledge to knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights.

At the suppression hearing and at the delinquency hearing, the

State presented evidence indicating that Lt. Isabel and Deon San

Nicolas, an investigator with the Phenix City Police Department,

interviewed K.A. Inv. San Nicolas advised K.A. of his juvenile Miranda

rights. 3 Inv. San Nicolas said that, when asked if he understood his

rights, K.A. nodded his head and then signed a waiver-of-rights form.4

3See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and § 12-15-202, Ala.

Code 1975.

4After watching the video of the interview, the juvenile court agreed

that K.A. had nodded his head, albeit slightly, after being asked if he

understood his rights. This Court has also watched the video, and we

agree with the juvenile court.

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According to Inv. San Nicolas, K.A. appeared to understand his rights

and never indicated otherwise and at no point during the interview did

K.A. refuse to answer questions or request to speak to a lawyer or a

parent. In addition, Inv. San Nicolas stated that no promises or threats

were made to induce K.A. to give a statement.

Rayshawnda Hicks, K.A.'s aunt, testified at the suppression

hearing that K.A. had lived with her from the fourth grade to the sixth

grade, which concluded in May before the murder in December 2023.

Hicks testified that she did not remember K.A.'s having taken any classes

in which he learned about government or the United States Constitution.

She also testified that she had had no discussions with K.A. about his

constitutional rights, and, because of that, she did not "think he would

understand or he understood" his constitutional rights. (R. 45.) Hicks

admitted, however, that K.A. understood the English language and that

he had no trouble understanding her when she spoke to him.

"To establish a proper Miranda predicate, the State

must prove that 'the accused was informed of his Miranda

rights before he made the statement' and that 'the accused

voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before

making his statement.' Jones v. State, 987 So. 2d 1156, 1164

(Ala. Crim. App. 2006). 'Whether a waiver of Miranda rights

is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made depends on

the facts of each case, considering the totality of the

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circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the

characteristics of the accused, the conditions of the

interrogation, and the conduct of the law-enforcement officials

in conducting the interrogation.' Foldi v. State, 861 So. 2d

414, 421 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)."

Wilkerson v. State, 70 So. 3d 442, 460 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

The evidence established that K.A. was properly advised of his

juvenile Miranda rights, that he nodded his head when asked if he

understood those rights, that he signed a waiver-of-rights form, and that

no threats or promises were made to get K.A. to waive his rights or to

give his statement. At no time did K.A. indicate that he did not

understand his rights as read to him, and, after a time, he answered the

questions posed to him.5 In State v. R.C., 195 So. 3d 317, 323-24 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015), this Court held that a juvenile's "affirmative nodding

of his head [when asked if he understood his rights] as well as his

signature at the bottom of the waiver form ... indicate that [the juvenile]

was aware of his rights but chose to waive them." Although K.A.'s aunt

testified that she did not believe K.A. was able to understand his rights,

her opinion in that regard was based on her not having any conversations

5K.A. did not respond to the questions posed to him during the first

few minutes of the interview.

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with K.A. about his rights, and she admitted that K.A. understood

English and had no trouble understanding her when she spoke with him

about other things. Neither K.A.'s age nor the fact that he had not been

schooled in his constitutional rights by someone other than law-

enforcement officers indicates that K.A. was unable to, or did not,

understand his rights. Under the circumstances in this case, we have no

trouble concluding that K.A. knowingly and voluntarily waived his

juvenile Miranda rights. Therefore, the juvenile court properly denied

K.A.'s motion to suppress.

II.

K.A. also contends that the juvenile court erred in ordering that he

be committed to DYS until his 21st birthday, because, he says,

subsections (b), (c), and (d) of § 12-15-219, Ala. Code 1975, part of the

Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et. seq., Ala. Code 1975, when strictly

construed and read in pari materia, prohibit a juvenile court from

committing a serious juvenile offender to the custody of DYS for more

than one year. Whether the juvenile remains in the custody of DYS for

more than one year, he maintains, is to be determined by DYS, not the

juvenile court. Relying on Ex parte S.F.R., 598 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1992),

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he argues that, to hold otherwise would allow the juvenile court to dictate

the "amount of time that a juvenile must remain in the custody of DYS"

and would, therefore, "undermine[] the express authority of DYS to

determine when a juvenile has achieved rehabilitation." (K.A.'s brief, p.

21.)

The State argues, on the other hand, that in Ex parte R.E.C., 678

So. 2d 1041, 1045 (Ala. 1995), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a

determinate commitment was permissible under the Juvenile Justice Act

even for a nonserious juvenile offender as long as the juvenile court made

certain findings. According to the State:

"[I]f the less serious offenders can be subject to determinate

periods of commitment, serious juvenile offenders can as well.

A conclusion otherwise would result in absurd results,

wherein a juvenile charged with second-degree assault could

be committed for a determinate period of time, while a

juvenile that commits capital murder cannot."

(State's brief, pp. 28-29.) The State suggests that this Court apply the

rationale and holding of Ex parte R.E.C. to serious juvenile offenders and

that we remand this case for the juvenile court to make the findings

required by Ex parte R.E.C. We agree with the State.

Initially, we decline K.A.'s request to strictly construe the

provisions of § 12-15-219. This Court is required to liberally, not strictly,

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construe the Juvenile Justice Act. See § 12-15-101(d), Ala. Code 1975

("This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child

coming under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive the care,

guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, necessary for

the welfare of the child and the best interests of the state."). See also Ex

parte R.E.C., 678 So. 2d at 1044 (noting that a "narrow construction" of

the Juvenile Justice Act "is inconsistent with [the] legislative directive").

That being said, we reject K.A.'s argument that the provisions of § 12-15-

219 prohibit a juvenile court from committing a serious juvenile offender

to the custody of DYS for more than one year.

Section 12-15-219(b) provides that "[a] child found to be a serious

juvenile offender shall be committed to the custody of the Department of

Youth Services, where he or she shall remain for a minimum of one year."

(Emphasis added.) The plain language of this subsection establishes a

minimum term of commitment, not a maximum. Sections 12-15-219(c)

and (d) then provide:

"(c) A serious juvenile offender review panel shall be

created by the Board of the Department of Youth Services.

The serious juvenile offender review panel shall review

quarterly the progress of each serious juvenile offender and

determine at the end of the one-year term served by each

child, a further treatment plan for that child. The panel may

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extend the commitment, order alternative treatment, or

release the child. The serious juvenile offender review panel

shall provide the juvenile court with all reports and

recommendations, and notify the judge in writing of the

decision to release the child at least 30 days in advance of the

release.

"(d) The Department of Youth Services shall maintain

and staff a separate, secure facility and implement programs

for serious juvenile offenders. The minimum one-year term

required by this section shall be served at the facility and the

review panel may extend the period of confinement in the

facility as determined necessary."

In Ex parte S.F.R., on which K.A. relies, the Alabama Supreme

Court held that a serious juvenile offender is not entitled to credit for

time served in detention pending his or her delinquency hearing. The

Court noted three reasons for its holding, only the first of which is

relevant here:

"First, for this Court to hold that serious juvenile offenders

must receive credit for time served would undercut the very

purposes and stated goals of the Juvenile Justice Act. The

purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act are 'to facilitate the care,

protection and discipline of children who come within the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court, while acknowledging the

responsibility of the juvenile court to preserve the public

peace and security.' Section 12-15-1.1, Ala. Code 1975 [now §

12-15-101(a), Ala. Code 1975]. Additionally, a stated goal of

the Juvenile Justice Act is:

" 'To hold a child found to be delinquent

accountable for his or her actions to the extent of

the child's age, education, mental and physical

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condition, background and all other relevant

factors and to provide a program of supervision,

care, and rehabilitation, including rehabilitative

restitution by the child to the victim of his

delinquent acts to the extent that the child is

reasonably able to do so.'

"§ 12-15-1.1(7), Ala. Code 1975 [now § 12-15-101(b)(7), Ala.

Code 1975].

"Clearly, the intent of the Juvenile Justice Act is not punitive

but rehabilitative. For this Court to hold that a serious

juvenile offender must receive credit for time spent in pre-

adjudication detention would be to dictate to the Department

of Youth Services when rehabilitation is achieved. Also, such

a holding would undermine the juvenile court's ability 'to

preserve the public peace and security' by forcing a release of

a youth who, in the professional opinion of DYS officials,

might not be fully rehabilitated."

598 So. 2d at 1008.

K.A.'s argument focuses on the Court's reasoning that allowing

credit for preadjudication detention would improperly dictate to DYS

when rehabilitation has been achieved, without acknowledging the

additional reason the Court provided for not allowing credit for

preadjudication detention -- that it would undermine the juvenile court's

ability to preserve the public peace and security. In other words, K.A.'s

argument focuses entirely on the rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile

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Justice Act. But as the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently recognized

in Ex parte R.E.C., the purpose of the Act is, in fact, two-fold:

"We agree that the Act aims to rehabilitate, but we

assign particular significance to its two-fold statement of

purpose, one of which 'is to facilitate the care, protection and

discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court.' Section 12-15-1.1 [now § 12-15-101(a), Ala.

Code 1975] (emphasis added). ' " Discipline" (as a noun)

signifies "punishment; ... retribution for an offense, especially

in a subordinate; ... control gained by enforcing obedience or

order." As a verb, it means "to chastise, to impose a penalty

upon." ' Federal Labor Union 23393, American Federation of

Labor v. American Can Co., 28 N.J. Super. 306, 100 A.2d 693,

695 (1953) (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary

(2d ed.)). Moreover, rehabilitation is one of the goals of

punishment. Williams v. State, 420 So. 2d 91 (Ala. Crim. App.

1982) (quoting Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642, 652 (5th

Cir. 1968)). To effectuate this goal, the legislature expressly

authorized the juvenile court '[t]o hold a child found to be

delinquent accountable for his or her actions to the extent of

the child's age, ... background and all other relevant factors

and to provide a program of supervision, care, and

rehabilitation, including rehabilitative restitution by the

child to the victim of [the child's] delinquent acts.' Section 12-

15-1.1(7) [now § 12-15-101(b)(7), Ala. Code 1975] (emphasis

added). Indeed, the Act uses such 'rehabilitative' terms

virtually interchangeably with 'punitive' or 'disciplinary'

terms. We conclude, therefore, that the legislature did not

intend to restrict the juvenile court exclusively to courses of

action devoid of an arguably punitive flavor."

678 So. 2d at 1043.

In Ex parte R.E.C., the Alabama Supreme Court addressed an

argument similar to the argument K.A. makes here. The juvenile court

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there had committed the juvenile, who was not found to be a serious

juvenile offender, to the custody of DYS for a determinate period. The

juvenile argued that such a "determinate commitment impinges upon the

prerogative of DYS to decide when rehabilitation has been achieved." 678

So. 2d at 1043. In support of his argument, the juvenile relied in large

part on § 44-1-36(c), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that "[a] committed

youth shall be discharged who, in the judgment of the director [of DYS],

has gained optimal rehabilitation from the programs of the department

and will not be received again by the department under the original

commitment order." Section § 12-15-219 is similar to § 44-1-36 in that

both statutes appear to place the determination of when a juvenile has

been rehabilitated and is entitled to be released in the hands of DYS.

The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the juvenile's argument,

holding that a determinate commitment was permissible under the

Juvenile Justice Act. The Court reasoned:

"We agree that the Juvenile Justice Act cannot be construed

without reference to § 44-1-36(c) and the rest of Title 44,

Chapter One. See Locke v. Wheat, 350 So. 2d 451, 453 (Ala.

1977) ('Sections of the Code dealing with the same subject

matter are in pari materia'). However, even a cursory reading

of Title 44, Chapter One, compels the conclusion that the

legislature intended DYS and the juvenile court to operate in

coordination and concert.

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"For example, the purpose of Title 44, Chapter One --

the chapter creating DYS -- is 'to promote and safeguard the

social well-being and general welfare of the youth of the state

through a comprehensive and coordinated program of public

services for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the

rehabilitation of delinquent youth.' Section 44-1-1 (emphasis

added). One of the means by which the legislature sought to

achieve its declared purpose was the development of '[s]ocial

and educational services and facilities for any youth whom a

juvenile judge deems in need of such state services.' Section

44-1-1(1) (emphasis added). See, e.g., § 44-1-1(5) (a goal of

Chapter One is '[t]he promotion of improved communications

between the ... agencies and bodies of this state responsible

for said youth and the juvenile courts'); § 44-1-30 (requiring

DYS to investigate and evaluate each youth committed by the

juvenile court to its custody and 'make available its findings

... to any juvenile court in the state'); § 44-1-32 (requiring DYS

to apprise the 'committing court ... of the physical location of

the youth at all times'); § 44-1-33(a) (requiring DYS to obtain

approval for 'major surgery or medical treatment' from the

youth's parent or guardian or, if such approval cannot be

acquired, from the juvenile court); § 44-1-34 (requiring DYS

to submit 'at least every nine months' to the committing court

a 'written report,' based on a review of 'all pertinent

circumstances of [the] personal and family situation [of each

committed youth],' such review to 'be for the purpose of

determining whether existing decisions, orders and

dispositions in his case should be modified or continued in

force').

"Particularly pertinent in this regard are various

provisions in § 44-1-36. Pursuant to § 44-1-36(d), for example,

'[a] committed youth shall be released into aftercare when

[DYS] determines that said youth is no longer in need of the

services of the state training schools and can function ... under

the supervision of a probation officer in accordance with terms

and conditions as established by the committing court.'

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Pursuant to § 44-1-36(g) -- subject to specific procedural

restrictions -- the juvenile court has 'jurisdiction until the

youth reaches his twenty-first birthday to issue an extension

of its original commitment order.' (Emphasis added.)

"We cite these provisions, of course, primarily as

illustrating a principle, namely, that the juvenile court's

direct, ongoing participation in the rehabilitation of a

delinquent juvenile does not necessarily conflict with the

statutory scheme or infringe upon the prerogative of DYS. In

fact, the State and both amici agree with this principle.

"Significant also in this connection is the second prong

of the stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act, which

recognizes that it is 'the responsibility of the juvenile court to

preserve the public peace and security.' Section 12-15-1.1

[now § 12-15-101(a), Ala. Code 1975] (emphasis added). No

one in this case contends that the juvenile court's authority to

order a determinate commitment would not facilitate this

goal. Logic and experience suggest that such authority would,

indeed, promote public safety.[ 6]

"Finally, the Act contains other intrinsic evidence that

is, perhaps, most important to the proper construction of the

scope of the juvenile court's discretion. Section 12-15-1.1 [now

§ 12-15-101(d), Ala. Code 1975] provides: 'This chapter shall

be liberally construed to the end that each child coming within

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive such care,

guidance and control ... necessary for the child's welfare and

the best interest of the state.' R.E.C.'s restrictive view of the

juvenile court's role vis-à-vis that of DYS is a result of his

narrow construction of the Act, and that view is inconsistent

with this legislative directive.

6This is especially true in cases involving serious juvenile offenders.

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"Consistent with this directive, however, is a

construction of the Act -- and § 12-15-71(c) [now § 12-15-

215(a), Ala. Code 1975] in particular -- that vests the juvenile

court with broad discretion in the exercise of its continuing

jurisdiction of juveniles adjudicated delinquent.[7] Thus, we

conclude that, provided certain criteria are met, a

determinate commitment is appropriately rehabilitative

within the context of the Juvenile Justice Act, even if the

juvenile has not been adjudicated a 'serious juvenile offender.'

For the following reasons, however, we conclude that those

criteria were not met in this case.

"During oral argument, R.E.C. and amicus A.W.

explained that upon commitment to DYS every juvenile is

assigned an 'individual service plan' (the 'Plan'). The Plan is

based on a study and evaluation of 'all pertinent

circumstances of [the juvenile's] behavior and life.' Section

44-1-30[, Ala. Code 1975]. A.W. contends that a determinate

commitment would involve no statutory difficulty if the

commitment is based on specific findings of fact and orders

that are intended to, and that do, become integrated into the

Plan itself. As he phrases it: 'That statement of

determination of time [would] then become[] part of the child's

... Plan.' Similarly, amicus DYS orally argued: 'It could help

DYS for the juvenile judge to share in the responsibility to

determine the method and length of treatment that the child

should have.'

"We agree with these propositions. Indeed, as a logical

matter, few, if any, of the 'circumstances of [the juvenile's]

behavior' are more 'pertinent' to the formulation of the Plan

7See § 12-15-117(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("Once a child has been

adjudicated delinquent, ... jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall

terminate when the child becomes 21 years of age unless, prior thereto,

the judge of the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction by explicitly

stating in a written order that it is terminating jurisdiction over the case

involving the child.").

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than the circumstances out of which the delinquency

adjudication arose. Few, if any, of the state officials

responsible for the juvenile's rehabilitation are better situated

to make findings of fact regarding those circumstances than

the juvenile court judge. We conclude, therefore, that an order

of commitment for a definite period does not offend the Act,

even though the juvenile has not been adjudicated a serious

juvenile offender, provided that the order is accompanied by

specific findings of fact and a reasoned analysis as to how the

determinate period is calculated to benefit the juvenile or to

further his or her rehabilitation; and provided, further, that

the court's intent to incorporate its order into the Plan plainly

appears in the order."

678 So. 2d at 1043-45.

We see no reason not to apply Ex parte R.E.C. to serious juvenile

offenders. Whether a juvenile court finds a juvenile to be a serious

offender or not, the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act and the duty of

DYS and juvenile courts to work in concert and coordination to achieve

those purposes are the same. Of import, we think, is the fact that the

Court in Ex parte R.E.C. placed no limit on the length of the determinate

commitment that a juvenile court may order for a nonserious juvenile

offender. In B.W. v. State, 834 So. 2d 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), this

Court noted that an order committing a nonserious juvenile offender to

the custody of DYS until his 21st birthday complied with the

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requirements in Ex parte R.E.C.8 As the State points out, if a nonserious

juvenile offender can receive such a commitment, it would be absurd to

hold that a serious juvenile offender could not. Therefore, we agree with

the State that Ex parte R.E.C. should apply to serious juvenile offenders.

Having determined that Ex parte R.E.C. applies here, we conclude

that the juvenile court's order does not comply with the requirements in

Ex parte R.E.C. The juvenile court did make extensive findings of fact

regarding the crimes as required by Ex parte R.E.C., but it did not

provide a reasoned analysis as to how committing K.A. to DYS until his

21st birthday was calculated to benefit K.A. or to further his

rehabilitation; nor does the court's intent to incorporate its order into

DYS's individual service plan for K.A. plainly appear in the order. After

setting out its findings of fact regarding the crimes, the juvenile court

stated in its order:

"For purposes of Disposition, it is hereby ORDERED,

ADJUDGED and DECREED:

"1. That the Juvenile is hereby adjudicated a Serious

Juvenile Offender (SJO) and shall be committed to the

8The juvenile in B.W. had been adjudicated delinquent on the

underlying charge of murder. Although the juvenile court could have

found the juvenile to be a serious juvenile offender, see § 12-15-219(a),

Ala. Code 1975, it did not do so.

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Alabama Department of Youth Services until he reaches the

age of 21 years old and shall not be released before that time

for any reason.

"2. That the Juvenile and his mother [are] ordered to

pay restitution to the victims and the State shall have 30 days

to file a restitution affidavit for consideration by the Court

after a hearing on the same unless the amount of restitution

is stipulated to by the parties in writing.

"3. Court costs in this matter are hereby assessed

against the Juvenile and his mother, [E.A.]

"4. That the Juvenile is hereby informed of his right

to appeal this decision within 14 days and should he be unable

to afford an attorney, one shall be appointed for him for the

purposes of appeal.

"5. That custody of the Juvenile is removed from the

mother and placed with the Alabama Department of Youth

Services (DYS) until he reaches the age of 21 years old.

"6. That DYS is authorized to exercise the powers

listed in Section 44-1-33, Code of Alabama, 1975, as amended.

"7. That DYS is authorized to place the Juvenile in

greater or lesser restrictive environment according to its

rehabilitation program.

"8. That DYS is authorized and directed to obtain

such physical testing and to obtain the results thereof as it

deems necessary.

"9. That DYS is authorized and directed to implement

procedures of identifying, evaluating and determining the

eligibility of students in need of special education and related

services as specified in Administrative Code Chapter 290-080-

090, Special Programs.

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"10. That pending transfer to DYS, the Juvenile is

directed to remain detained in the Lee County Youth

Detention Center until transported to DYS for placement.

"11. That the mother, [E.A.,] is hereby made a party to

these proceedings."

(C. 63-64.)

The juvenile court's order is similar to the orders in T.D.B. v. State,

195 So. 3d 314 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), Q.S. v. State, 188 So. 3d 710 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015), and T.L.S. v. State, 153 So. 3d 829 (Ala. Crim. App.

2013), all of which this Court found did not comply with the requirements

in Ex parte R.E.C. Therefore, in accordance with Ex parte R.E.C. and its

progeny, we remand this case for the juvenile court to set aside its order

of commitment and to resentence K.A. and issue a commitment order

that complies with Ex parte R.E.C. Due return shall be filed within 56

days of the date of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

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