The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JONATHAN LUKE TERRICK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 24-431
)
LELAND DUDEK,1 )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 27th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and his claim for
supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence
and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d
114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)).
See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by
substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may
1 Leland Dudek is substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend
the docket to reflect this change.
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neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim
differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2
2 Plaintiff raises several arguments pertaining to his residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) finding and the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the Vocational Expert (“VE”).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because
the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff’s inability to adapt and manage himself within the RFC
and VE hypothetical. (Doc. No. 9 at 3-6). Next, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing
to consider that Plaintiff would be off-task more than 15% of the workday and would miss
more than one workday per-month. (Id. at 6-8). Lastly, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ
overlooked his memory and concentration issues. (Id.). Upon careful consideration of
the record, the Court disagrees and will affirm the ALJ’s decision for the following reasons.
As noted, Plaintiff first contends that his RFC and corresponding VE hypothetical
failed to include his mild limitation in his ability to adapt and manage himself. (Doc. No.
9 at 3-6). Plaintiff argues his case is similar to Gibson v. Comm’r, No. 17-6507, 2018
WL 6897648, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2018) and Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 554
(3d Cir. 2004), among other similar cases, where the Court held it was error for the ALJ to
have failed to include the claimant’s mental limitations in the VE hypothetical. Plaintiff
overlooks that his case is distinguishable from Gibson and Ramirez. Gibson involved an
RFC and VE hypothetical with no mental limitations despite the existence of mild mental
limitations found at Steps Two and Three. Gibson, 2018 WL 6897648, at *3. Similarly,
Ramirez involved remand for reconsideration of an RFC in light of the ALJ’s finding of
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 554.
In contrast to these cases, the facts here involve only mild limitations in adapting and
managing oneself and Plaintiff’s RFC and VE hypothetical included mental limitations,
such as simple instructions and simple work-related decisions. (R. 22, 53).
Additionally, “Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004), does not stand
for the proposition that a mild impairment in adapting or managing oneself demands a
specific corresponding functional limitation in the RFC, but that the ALJ must provide a
‘valid explanation’ for how he or she formulated the RFC.” Blakeman v. O’Malley, No.
23-760, 2024 WL 1833913, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2024). Here, the ALJ adequately
explained that his finding of a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself was
reflected in the RFC assessment. (R. 22-23). Specifically, the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s statements that he experienced dysphoric moods, diminished sense of pleasure,
fatigue, feelings of hopelessness, and panic episodes, among other allegations. (R. 23).
The ALJ further acknowledged that Plaintiff’s mental status exams were generally
unremarkable and that the examinations of Plaintiff’s memory showed his recent and
remote memory to be intact. (R. 24). The ALJ also found several medical opinions
persuasive where the doctors opined that Plaintiff had no adaptive limitations. (R. 25-
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26). All together, the ALJ’s decision shows there is substantial evidence to support
Plaintiff’s RFC and corresponding VE hypothetical.
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to consider
that Plaintiff would be off task more than 15% of the workday and would miss more than
one workday per-month. (Doc. No. 9 at 6-8). Plaintiff relies on the VE’s testimony that
an employee could be off-task no more than 15% of the workday and could not miss more
than one day of work per month in order to sustain employment. (Id.). Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ failed to discuss or consider whether these limitations were
applicable to preclude her from performing work. (Id.). The Court notes that the ALJ
must only include “credibly established” limitations into the claimant’s RFC and
corresponding VE hypothetical. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir.
2005). Here, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that he had trouble completing
tasks, but found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not supported by the objective
evidence. (R. 23-24). Moreover, as Defendant points out, no medical source offered an
opinion that Plaintiff would be off-task or routinely absent from work. (Doc. No. 13 at
24). The ALJ was under no obligation to accept the VE’s testimony that an employee
could be off task no more than 15% of the workday and could not miss more than one day
of work per-month to sustain employment where such a restriction was properly not
included in Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 54-55). In sum, the Court finds no error on this point.
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ overlooked his memory and concentration
issues when crafting the RFC. (Doc. No. 9 at 6-8). Plaintiff argues that the record shows
he missed appointments because of his memory problems and that he had trouble
concentrating, which was supported by a consultative examination. (Id.). To the extent
these appointments occurred after Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, the ALJ heard Plaintiff’s
testimony about missing appointments and acknowledged that Plaintiff reported needing
reminders to attend appointments. (R. 23, 39). Further, Plaintiff points to a consultative
examination performed by Dr. Haneen Efein, Psy.D., who found that Plaintiff had mild
concentration and attention impairments. (Ex. C9F/5). The ALJ found this opinion
persuasive, but also noted that the evidence showed that Plaintiff had intact memory and
attention. (R. 24-25 (citing Ex. C1F)). Additionally, the ALJ explained that Dr. Efein
noted discussion with Plaintiff regarding his diminished memory and his inability to
complete a serial 7 exercise, but that Plaintiff could discuss his medical history and details
about schooling and work, was fully oriented, and had coherent and goal-directed thought
processes, among other normal findings. (R. 25). Accounting for all of this evidence,
the ALJ assessed that Plaintiff could perform simple work, carry out simple instructions,
and make simple work-related decisions. (R. 22).
In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence
and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.
s/Mark R. Hornak
Chief United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
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