Jones v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TROY JONES,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 3:22-cv-609-BJD-SJH

3:17-cr-243-BJD-SJH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_________________________________

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Troy Jones, a federal inmate, is proceeding pro se on a Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. Doc. 1,

Crim. Doc. 108; Pet. Mot.).1 The Government opposes the Motion (Civ. Doc. 7;

Gov’t Resp.). Petitioner filed a Reply (Civ. Doc. 10; Pet. Reply).

Under § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings,2

1 Citations to the record in the civil case will be denoted, “Civ. Doc.,” and citations to

the record in the criminal case will be denoted, “Crim. Doc.” Page numbers are those assigned

by the Court’s electronic case management system.

2 Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings expressly requires the Court to

review the record, including any transcripts and submitted materials to determine whether

an evidentiary hearing is warranted before resolving a § 2255 motion.

and in accordance with Petitioner’s request, see Pet. Mot. at 12, the Court has

considered the need for an evidentiary hearing and determines that a hearing

is unnecessary. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“The district court is not required to grant a petitioner an evidentiary hearing

if the § 2255 motion ‘and the files and records of the case conclusively show

that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’”). See also Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d

1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a § 2255 movant is not entitled to a

hearing “when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by

specifics or contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible”).

Thus, the Motion is ripe for review.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2017, a grand jury returned a six-count Indictment

charging Petitioner with, among other crimes, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 by aiding and abetting the distribution of

fentanyl, which caused the death of the person who purchased the drugs from

an intermediary “drug dealer” whom Petitioner supplied. See Crim. Doc. 1 at

2, 7; Gov’t Resp. at 1. With the assistance of retained counsel and pursuant to

a written plea agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea on October 1, 2019,

before the assigned Magistrate Judge. See Crim. Docs. 63–65.3

3 Petitioner consented to the Magistrate Judge’s authority to conduct the

proceedings required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

2

Following the plea hearing, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation, noting Petitioner was cautioned and examined under oath

“concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11” and finding Petitioner’s

guilty plea “was knowledgeable and voluntary, and that the offense charged

[was] supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the

essential elements of [the] offense.” See Crim. Doc. 66. As such, the Magistrate

Judge recommended that Petitioner’s “plea of guilty be accepted and that [he]

be adjudged guilty.” Id.

The undersigned adopted the Report and Recommendation and accepted

Petitioner’s guilty plea. See Crim. Doc. 68. The Court sentenced Petitioner to

serve a statutory minimum mandatory prison term of 240 months. See Crim.

Doc. 103 at 2; Crim. Doc. 110 at 6. When Petitioner did not seek an appeal

within the time prescribed, the Court sua sponte ordered Petitioner to file a

“written declaration that the decision not to file a notice of appeal was his

informed and voluntary choice,” or, if not, to so advise the Court in a written

statement. See Crim. Doc. 105. Petitioner did not respond to the Order.4

Petitioner’s failure to respond was “deemed by the Court to be an

Crim. Doc. 64. The Government dismissed the other counts charged in the Indictment

in accordance with the plea agreement. See Crim. Doc. 65 at 3; Crim. Doc. 103 at 1.

4 It is unclear whether Petitioner received a copy of the Order. A Deputy United

States Marshal was to personally deliver it to him and execute a return

demonstrating as much. See Crim. Doc. 105 at 3. No executed return was docketed.

3

acknowledgment by [him] that the decision not to pursue an appeal was his

informed and voluntary choice.” Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Title 28, United States Code, § 2255, a person in federal custody

may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on one of four grounds:

(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the

imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the imposed

sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only

jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims of error that are so

fundamentally defective as to cause a complete miscarriage of justice will

warrant relief through collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.

178, 184–86 (1979). The movant “bears the burden to prove the claims in his §

2255 motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).

See also Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017).

“It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by

an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be

collaterally attacked.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)

(quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984)). A petitioner may

collaterally challenge “the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea” but

4

only if he first advanced such an argument on direct appeal. Id. “Habeas review

is an extraordinary remedy and ‘will not be allowed to do service for an

appeal.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994)).

“[A] defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a

criminal conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred

from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” Lynn v. United States, 365

F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004). “This rule generally applies to all claims,

including constitutional claims.” Id. However, the Supreme Court has held

that the procedural default rule does not apply to ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“[A]n

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral

proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the

claim on direct appeal.”).

To avoid a procedural bar, a petitioner “must show cause for not raising

the claim of error on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the alleged error,”

or he must demonstrate he “is actually innocent.” Id. (citing Bousley, 523 U.S.

at 622). The ineffective assistance of counsel may satisfy the “cause” prong of

the first exception, but the claim must be a valid one. Fortenberry v. Haley, 297

F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A petitioner can establish cause by showing

that a procedural default was caused by constitutionally ineffective assistance

5

of counsel . . . .”). Under the second exception—actual innocence—a petitioner

must demonstrate his factual innocence and “show that it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Id. (quoting Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

The United States Constitution provides criminal defendants the right

to the effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. As such, a

claim that a criminal defendant has received the ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment may properly be brought in a

collateral proceeding under § 2255. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504. To establish the

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy two prongs: (1) that

his counsel’s conduct amounted to constitutionally deficient performance; and

(2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662,

667 (11th Cir. 2020).

In assessing the “performance” prong, courts adhere to the standard of

reasonably effective assistance. Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.

1994) (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 688). Under this standard, a review of

counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Chandler v. United States, 218

F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000).

The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have

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done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial

could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at

trial…. We are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances;

we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in

fact, worked adequately.

Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v.

Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992)). To establish his attorney

was deficient under the highly deferential Strickland standard, a petitioner

must show that, given all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Scott v. United

States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1258 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d

1297, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)).

To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a petitioner must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Martin, 949 F.3d at 667 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

356, 366 (2010)). A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough for

the [petitioner] to show that the error had some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding.” United States v. Phillips, 853 F. App’x 623, 626

(11th Cir. 2021) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

7

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to

show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland, “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground

of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course

should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to the validity of guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). The petitioner must still show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See id. at 56–59; Lynch v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209,

1218 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish prejudice, however, the petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill,

474 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted); Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts his retained counsel was ineffective for not fully or

properly advising him about the Government’s burden to obtain a conviction

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) or the maximum sentence he could receive if

8

convicted.5 See Pet. Mot. at 4. In a supporting affidavit (Civ. Doc. 1-1; Crim.

Doc. 108-1; Pet. Aff.), Petitioner avers that his attorney, who spoke with him

“only three times,” did not discuss with him (1) his “exposure to a harsher

sentencing penalty enhancement [under] 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)”; (2) the

Government’s burden to establish a penalty enhancement under the “but-for

causation” analysis set forth in the Burrage case; or (3) the factual basis of the

plea agreement. See Pet. Aff. ¶¶ 10, 14–18. Due to these alleged failures,

Petitioner concludes, his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Id.

¶¶ 13, 19.

The Government does not dispute that Petitioner exhausted his claim

but argues the claim is meritless. See Gov’t Resp. at 7. Liberally construing

Petitioner’s pro se Motion, he appears to raise two claims: one that he received

the ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his decision to enter a plea;

and one stand-alone claim that his plea was involuntary. The first claim is not

procedurally barred for Petitioner’s failure to appeal, see Massaro, 538 U.S. at

504, but the second is, unless Petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice

5 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), when “death . . . results from the use of [a

schedule I or II] substance,” which includes fentanyl, the person convicted of

distributing or dispensing the controlled substance “shall be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of not less than twenty years . . . .” The “death results” element must

be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because it increases the minimum mandatory

sentence. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014). The phrase “results

from” has been defined as requiring “but-for causality.” Id. at 212, 218–19.

9

or that he is actually innocent, see Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise

him of the law, including the Government’s burden of proof to obtain a

sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). See Pet. Mot. at 4;

Pet. Reply at 1–2, 4. According to Petitioner, his attorney “verbally coerced and

misguided [him] into pleading guilty” by telling him that “if he did not plead

guilty[,] he would receive a life sentence.” See Pet. Reply at 1. Petitioner claims,

“had he known that he could not receive a mandatory life term, he would never

have pled guilty, but would have proceeded to trial and been acquitted because

he did not cause the death [of the victim]” on the theory that the drug dealer

he supplied could have “tampered with [the substance].” Id. at 2.

Finding Petitioner waived the attorney-client privilege related to the

claims raised in his Motion, the Court granted the Government leave to file

with its Response relevant communications between Petitioner and his

attorney. See Civ. Doc. 4. As such, with its Response, the Government offers

an affidavit and supporting documentation from one of Petitioner’s two trial

attorneys (Doc. 7-1; Gov’t Ex.). Counsel avers that Petitioner indeed “faced a

possible mandatory life sentence,” and counsel explained to Petitioner both

orally and in writing the nature of the charges, the facts the Government was

10

prepared to prove in support of the charges, and the maximum sentence

Petitioner could have received if convicted as charged. See Gov’t Ex. at 4–5.

Counsel avers that he “strongly advise[d] [Petitioner] to accept the plea

agreement.” Id. at 6. In a letter counsel sent to Petitioner on October 15, 2018,

he explained:

Your current indictment carries only a minimum mandatory

twenty year sentence, but [the Assistant United States Attorney]

told me today that if you do not plead guilty to that charge – the

20 year minimum mandatory charge – that she would file an

information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, based on one or both of

your two prior drug convictions, and once she does that, then any

conviction under the death resulting count would then result in a

mandatory life sentence. This is what she intends to do unless

you agree to plead guilty to the minimum mandatory twenty year

count.

. . . .

I will do a more thorough analysis of the indictment and the law

relating to the death resulting charges [sic], but as of now, it is

my best judgment that you should plead guilty to the death

resulting charge which will mean your minimum sentence

will be twenty years in prison. [The Assistant United States

Attorney] advised that she would not argue for any sentence in

excess of the twenty years. If you do not do this, she will file the §

851 information which will trigger a mandatory life sentence if

convicted of the death resulting charge.

Id. at 8, 9.

Counsel followed through on his promise to do more research on the

death resulting charge and sent a copy of the Burrage case to Petitioner on

January 16, 2019. Id. at 11. In light of the Burrage decision, which counsel

11

explained to Petitioner “set the standard of proof for death resulting in a drug

prosecution,” counsel recommended to Petitioner that he “retain a medical

expert/pharmacologist to look at . . . whether the evidence meets the standard

set by the [C]ourt . . . .” Id. Counsel wrote to Petitioner again on August 22,

2019, updating him on the status of plea negotiations with the Government, as

follows:

[The Government’s] position is to either plead guilty to . . . the

death resulting count which carries a 20 year minimum mandatory

up to life imprisonment . . . or go to trial, and if we go to trial [the

Government’s attorney] will file a notice of your prior qualifying

drug conviction which would result in mandatory life if convicted.

Id. at 57 (emphasis added). Counsel further explained that, even without the

filing of an information charging him under 21 U.S.C. § 851, Petitioner could

be facing a “sentencing range of 30 years to life” under the sentencing

guidelines given his “prior felony drug conviction” was a “scoreable” offense.

Id. Counsel reminded Petitioner that he “ha[d] a right to trial” if that was what

he wanted. Id. at 58.

Counsel avers that he does not independently recall going over the plea

agreement with Petitioner but says that doing so has been his standard

practice with the hundreds of clients he has represented in federal court since

1989. Id. at 2, 5. Counsel explains that he mailed a copy of the plea agreement

to Petitioner on June 8, 2018, and Petitioner did not enter his plea until

12

October 1, 2019, which meant there would have been “plenty of time [for him

and Petitioner] to go over the plea agreement[,] including the factual basis.”

Id.

Petitioner offers no evidence contradicting the Government’s. See

generally Pet. Reply. Additionally, Petitioner’s initials and signature on the

written plea agreement and his sworn statements made at his plea hearing

contradict the assertions he now makes—that his attorney coerced him into

entering a guilty plea by improperly advising him on the law. See Crim. Docs.

65, 109. At the plea hearing, the Magistrate Judge asked Petitioner if he had

read the plea agreement before signing it, and he said he had. See Crim. Doc.

109 at 21. Petitioner acknowledged having initialed and signed the plea

agreement. Id. at 20–21. He also said his attorneys “discuss[ed] it with [him]”

and “answer[ed] all of [his] questions” about it. Id.

Before accepting Petitioner’s plea, the Magistrate Judge reviewed with

Petitioner the sentencing guidelines, the “essential elements” the Government

would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge to which

Petitioner was pleading guilty, and specific provisions in the written plea

agreement. Id. at 13–18, 22–26. Petitioner said that he understood

“everything” the Magistrate Judge had said and reviewed with him pertaining

to the plea, including the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. Id. at 26.

13

Following the Government’s factual proffer, the Court asked Petitioner

whether he committed the acts supporting the charge to which he was pleading

guilty:

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you these questions, and I’ll be

reading from the personalization of elements attached to your plea

agreement, page 20. Mr. Jones, between on or about June 20th,

2017, and on or about June 21st, 2017, in the Middle District of

Florida, did you distribute, cause to be distributed, and aid and

abet the distribution of a controlled substance, which violation

involved a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount

of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, as charged in the

indictment?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you do so knowingly and intentionally?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: On or about June 21st, 2017, did C.A. die as a result

of the use of the mixture and substance containing a detectable

amount of fentanyl?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. I do find a factual basis for Mr. Jones’s

plea of guilty and that all of the essential elements thereof have

been met.

Id. at 31–32. Petitioner further agreed that no one had coerced him into

entering a guilty plea, and his decision to enter the plea was voluntary. Id. at

32. Finally, Petitioner said he was satisfied with the representation of his two

attorneys, who had explained everything to him to his satisfaction:

THE COURT: . . . . Mr. Jones, you are represented, of course, here

today by Mr. McFarland, and I know that you are also represented

14

by Mr. Kent. Have you discussed your case fully with your

attorneys and explained everything you know about your case to

them?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorneys

or anyone else you care to about your case?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the way Mr. Kent and Mr.

McFarland have represented you in this case?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any complaints about their

representation?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

Id. at 33–34.

As demonstrated through the Government’s uncontroverted evidence,

Petitioner’s counsel advised him about sentencing exposure and the

Government’s burden of proof should he have chosen to proceed to trial.

Petitioner’s sworn statements at the plea hearing demonstrate the same. A

defendant’s “representations [at a plea hearing,]. . . as well as any findings

made by the judge accepting [a guilty] plea, constitute a formidable barrier in

any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry

a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

See also United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is

a strong presumption that the statements made during [a plea] colloquy are

15

true.”).

According to Petitioner, he would have insisted on going to trial had he

“known that he could not receive a mandatory life term.” See Pet. Reply at 1–

2. This “contention[] in the face of the record [is] wholly incredible.” See

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. Petitioner’s attorney explained to him that he could

have been sentenced to life on Count II had he not pled guilty because of his

prior drug convictions. That advice was not wrong. The relevant subsection of

the statute under which Petitioner was convicted provides as follows:

If any person commits . . . a violation [of subsection (a)] after a

prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such

person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more

than 30 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from the

use of such substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). As detailed in Petitioner’s final Pre-

Sentence Investigation Report, he had an extensive criminal history, including

a conviction for a felony drug offense for which he served eight years in prison.

See Crim. Doc. 73 at 8–14; see also State v. Jones, No. 16-CF-13646 (Fla. 4th

Cir. Ct.). While serving his eight-year prison term, Petitioner was adjudicated

guilty for introducing contraband into prison and was sentenced to a

concurrent term of sixteen months. See Crim. Doc. 73 at 14; see also State v.

Jones, No. 13-CF-140 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.). To the extent Petitioner feels wronged

because his counsel—based on the evidence and the law—gave him candid

16

“advice that [he likely did not] want to hear,” see Gov’t Ex. at 9, such a

complaint cannot sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For the

reasons stated, Petitioner fails to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective in

connection with advising him to accept the plea agreement, and his claim is

denied.

B. Voluntariness of Plea & Procedural Default

To the extent Petitioner raises a stand-alone claim that his guilty plea

was unknowing and involuntary, he did not raise such a claim on direct appeal.

As such, the claim is procedurally defaulted unless he can demonstrate cause

and prejudice for the procedural default or his actual innocence. Petitioner does

not argue actual innocence. See Pet. Reply at 3. And Petitioner’s statements

made under oath at the plea hearing demonstrate he was not wrongly accused

of the crime to which he pled guilty. See Sawyer v. Whitely, 505 U.S. 333, 340

(1992) (“A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the

case where the [government] has convicted the wrong person of the crime.”).

At the plea hearing, Petitioner testified that he was “pleading guilty because

[he was] guilty,” and he “admit[ted] that [he] committed the acts set forth in

[Count II of the Indictment].” See Crim. Doc. 109 at 26–27. Petitioner does not

offer or point to any “new reliable evidence” showing it “is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable

17

doubt.” See Schlup, 513 U.S at 324, 327, 329.

Petitioner appears to invoke the “cause and prejudice” exception to the

procedural default rule by claiming that his counsel was “ineffective for not

pursuing [his] claim through the appeal stages upon [his] request.” See Pet.

Reply at 3. Petitioner says counsel refused to file a notice of appeal on his

behalf because he waived his right to appeal by virtue of pleading guilty. Id. A

petitioner may demonstrate “cause” under the procedural default rule if he

demonstrates his failure was attributable to the ineffective assistance of

counsel, but the ineffective assistance claim “must have merit.” United States

v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).

Assuming Petitioner’s counsel did not file a notice of appeal in

accordance with Petitioner’s request, such a failure is per se ineffective under

the Sixth Amendment. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (“We

have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the

defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally

unreasonable.”). See also Thompson v. United States, 504 F.3d 1203, 1206

(11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]dequate consultation requires informing a client about his

right to appeal, advising the client about the advantages and disadvantages of

taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to determine whether the

client wishes to pursue an appeal, regardless of the merits of such an appeal.”).

18

Although the Court explicitly advised Petitioner of his right to appeal,

both at the sentencing hearing and through a written Order, see Crim. Doc.

110 at 23; Crim. Doc. 105 at 1–2, liberally construing the facts in Petitioner’s

favor, the Court accepts that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim has

some merit such that he overcomes the procedural default on his claim that his

guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. However, for the reasons already

explained and those that follow, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim lacks merit.

As demonstrated by the written plea agreement and exhaustive plea

colloquy the Magistrate Judge undertook in accordance with Rule 11,

Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary plea. See Crim. Docs. 65, 109. The

plea agreement, which Petitioner signed and reviewed with his counsel,

included the following paragraph, titled “Voluntariness”:

[Petitioner] acknowledges that [he] is entering into this

agreement and is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily without

reliance upon any discussions between the attorney for the

government and [Petitioner] and [Petitioner’s] attorney and

without promise of benefit of any kind (other than the concessions

contained herein), and without threats, force, intimidation, or

coercion of any kind. [Petitioner] further acknowledges [his]

understanding of the nature of the offense or offenses to which [he]

is pleading guilty and the elements thereof, including the penalties

provided by law, and [Petitioner’s] complete satisfaction with the

representation and advice received from [his] undersigned counsel

(if any). [Petitioner] also understands that [he] has the right to

plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been

made, and that [Petitioner] has the right to be tried by a jury with

the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine

the witnesses against [him] the right against compulsory self-

19

incrimination, and the right to compulsory process for the

attendance of witnesses to testify in [his] defense; but, by pleading

guilty, [Petitioner] waives or gives up those rights and there will

be no trial. [Petitioner] further understands that if [he] pleads

guilty, the Court may ask [him] questions about the offense or

offenses to which [he] pleaded, and if [he] answers those questions

under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel (if any),

[his] answers may later be used against [him] in a prosecution for

perjury or false statement. [Petitioner] also understands that [he]

will be adjudicated guilty of the offenses to which [he] has pleaded

and, if any of such offenses are felonies, may thereby be deprived

of certain rights, such as the right to vote, to hold public office, to

serve on a jury, or to have possession of firearms.

Crim. Doc. 65 at 16–18.

At the plea hearing, the Magistrate Judge reviewed specific provisions

of the written plea agreement with Petitioner. See Crim. Doc. 109 at 18, 22.

Petitioner said under oath that he had read the plea agreement before he

signed it, discussed it with his counsel who “answer[ed] all of [his] questions,

and understood it. Id. at 20–21. When entering his plea, Petitioner was

represented by counsel and demonstrated he was educated; could read, write,

and understand English; was not under the influence of intoxicants or

medications that would have impacted his ability to “think clearly”; did not

suffer from mental illness; and understood the proceeding and the nature of

the charge to which he was pleading. Id. at 5–7, 9–11. Petitioner’s attorney

informed the Magistrate Judge that he did not “have any doubt whatsoever

about [Petitioner’s] competency to proceed.” Id. at 7.

20

The Magistrate Judge explicitly advised Petitioner of the rights he was

waiving by entering a guilty plea, including the right to a jury trial at which

he would be “presumed innocent, and before [he] could be found guilty, the

burden of proof [was] on the United States to prove [his] guilt by competent

and sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 9–10. He was

informed that he was waiving his right to confront witnesses against him and

to “offer evidence on [his] own behalf.” Id. at 10. Petitioner told the Magistrate

Judge his attorneys had “explained” to him all of the rights he was waiving by

entering a guilty plea:

THE COURT: . . . . If you plead guilty there will be no trial of any

kind, and on your plea the Court will find you guilty and convict

you. A plea of guilty admits the truth of the charge, but a plea of

not guilty denies the charge.

Has this been explained to you by your lawyers?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

Id. at 11. The Magistrate Judge also asked Petitioner if his attorneys had

“explained the defenses that [may] be available to [him],” and he responded,

“Yes, sir.” Id. at 12. Petitioner told the Magistrate Judge that he understood

the provisions of the plea agreement reviewed during the plea hearing,

including the elements of the offense and the waiver of his right to appeal the

sentence imposed with enumerated exceptions. Id. at 23–26.

After hearing the factual basis for the guilty plea, the Magistrate Judge

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engaged in the following colloquy with Petitioner:

THE COURT: All right. I do find a factual basis for Mr. Jones’s

plea of guilty and that all of the essential elements thereof have

been met. Mr. Jones, is your guilty plea entered here today freely

and voluntarily?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is your plea of guilty your own independent

decision?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you, forced you, coerced you,

or intimidated you in any way regarding your decision to plead

guilty?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises or assurances to you

of any kind to induce you to plead guilty, other than those stated

in your plea agreement?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

Id. at 32.

Petitioner agreed that he “understood everything that [was] covered” at

the plea hearing. Id. at 34–35. The Magistrate Judge made the following

findings with respect to Petitioner’s guilty plea:

I do find that you, Troy Jones, are now alert and intelligent, that

you understand the nature of the charge against you and the

possible penalties, and you appreciate the consequences of

pleading guilty. I also find the facts that the Government is

prepared to prove and that by your plea of guilty you admit state

all of the essential elements of the offense to which you have

pleaded guilty. I further find that your decision to plead guilty is

freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made and that you

22

have had the advice and counsel of a competent lawyer, or

competent lawyers, with whom you say you are satisfied.

Id. at 35–36. The Magistrate Judge asked Petitioner if he “agree[d] with these

findings,” and Petitioner responded, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 36.

Petitioner’s plea colloquy satisfied the requirements of Rule 11, and upon

a thorough review of the record, including the written plea agreement, the plea

transcript, and the Government’s evidence, the Court finds that Petitioner’s

guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Petitioner’s sworn

statements that he entered his plea freely and voluntarily are presumed to be

true, and his conclusory assertions to the contrary do not entitle him to relief.

See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74; Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. Thus, his claim is

denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Finding Petitioner advances no argument warranting relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Petitioner’s Motion (Civ. Doc. 1, Crim. Doc. 108) is DENIED, and

this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment denying the Motion and

dismissing the action with prejudice, terminate any pending motions as moot,

and close the file.

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3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate

of appealability. Because this Court has determined that a certificate of

appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending

motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed

in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 25th day of

March 2025.

fy YQ:

fo (Yon ( | Le C74

BRIAN/J . DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Troy Jones

Counsel of Record

6 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were

‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

24