Salahuddin v. Lynch

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Ameena Salahuddin,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-93

v. Chief District Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

Honorable Judge Julie Lynch,

Defendant.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant Ameena Salahuddin, an Ohio resident proceeding pro se, brings this action

against the Honorable Judge Julie Lynch of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc.

1). This matter is before the Undersigned on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 1) and for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2).

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1).

The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights. (Doc. 2).

But the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED.

I. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent

standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).

But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure

up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). Nor

is it the Court’s role to “ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants” or

advise “litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.” Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F.

App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the sua sponte dismissal of an amended complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). At bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless

of whether an individual proceeds pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor, accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although this standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,

. . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (internal

quotation and quotation marks removed). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation and

quotation marks omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Judge Lynch violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 1-1). Though her Complaint does not provide much context, it seems that Plaintiff was a

defendant in a foreclosure and eviction proceeding before Judge Lynch. (Id.).1 In defending

herself, Plaintiff says she claimed a “federal land patent defense” that Judge Lynch

“dismissed . . . without substantive review.” (Id. at 2). Further, Plaintiff claims that the

subsequent foreclosure and eviction violated several federal laws and regulations including 24

C.F.R. § 203.501, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f). (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges Judge Lynch ignored certain laws and “evidence of racial and disability

discrimination, due process violations, and the [Franklin County Sheriff’s office’s] improper

execution of the Writ of Possession.” (Id. at 2–3). Finally, she says Judge Lynch allowed the

unlawful eviction of her “adult daughter” and “two minor children” who were not named in the

eviction order. (Id. at 3).

On these facts, Plaintiff claims that Judge Lynch violated her due process rights, engaged

in judicial bias, failed to address civil rights violations by the Franklin County Sheriff’s deputies,

and improperly enforced an unlawful eviction “resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.” (Id. at 1). As relief, she requests a declaratory judgment that Judge Lynch

violated her constitutional rights, an injunction preventing enforcement of an eviction, and

compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 4). In the end, though, Plaintiff’s claims are barred

by judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity shields judges, and other public officers, “from undue interference with

their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 806 (1982). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from

suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages . . . . Accordingly, judicial immunity is not

1 See Case Nos. 17-CV-011307 and 23-AP-000035, viewed at

https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/. This Court may take judicial notice of court records that

are available online to members of the public. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons

v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)).

overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be

resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)

(internal citation omitted); see also Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tennessee, 63

F.4th 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[Judicial] immunity is absolute: all of a judge’s actions taken in

an official judicial capacity are immune from suit.”). Judicial immunity is overcome only if the

actions taken were not in the judge’s judicial capacity or if the actions taken were in absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.

Here, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Lynch clearly relate to actions she took while

functioning in her judicial capacity: her evaluation of evidence, consideration of arguments, and

rendering of the ultimate decision. (Doc. 1-1); see Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 465 (6th

Cir. 1989) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227(1988)) (“Clearly, the paradigmatic judicial

act is the resolution of a dispute between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court.”).

Plaintiff’s claims are, at best, classified as allegations of bad faith, malice, or bias. But even this

is not enough to overcome judicial immunity. Mireles, 505 U.S. at 11; see Buckner v. Powers,

No. 1:19-cv-92, 2019 WL 482022, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2019) (“Allegations of bias do not

impact judicial immunity.”). And Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Undersigned could

infer that Judge Lynch took action outside of her judicial capacity or in absence of jurisdiction.

What’s more, this is the second time Plaintiff has attempted to attack her eviction in this

Court. See Atlantica LLC v. Salahuddin, No. 2:24-CV-4098, 2024 WL 4893505 (S.D. Ohio Nov.

26, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-CV-4098, 2025 WL 27386 (S.D. Ohio

Jan. 3, 2025). As this Court previously explained, “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine instructs that

because the United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from state

court judgments, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases that in effect seek appellate

review of state court judgments.” ADSA, Inc. v. Ohio, 176 F. App’x 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). The

Sixth Circuit has summarized the doctrine “as being designed to prevent ‘a party losing in state

court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment [in the

lower federal courts] based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the

loser’s federal rights.’” Pieper v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). Though she styles this lawsuit as a

federal civil rights action, it is clear Plaintiff wants this Court to review a state court decision. (See

Doc. 1-1 at 4 (seeking an injunction “preventing the enforcement of the eviction”)). Just like last

time, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any such review.

For these reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Complaint be

DISMISSED.

Finally, this Court can, in its inherent power, revoke or deny a plaintiff’s privilege of

proceeding in forma pauperis or impose other restrictions if she files “frivolous, harassing or

duplicative lawsuits.” Levy v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-148, 2014 WL 49188, at *4–5 (S.D.

Ohio Jan. 7, 2014); see also In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184-85 (1989) (per curiam); Maxberry

v. S.E.C., 879 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Hopson v. Secret Service, No. 3:12-CV-

770-H, 2013 WL 1092915, at *1–3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2013); Marshall v. Beshear, No. 3:10-CV-

663-R, 2010 WL 5092713, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2010); Haddad v. Michigan Nat. Bank, No.

1:09-CV-1023, 2010 WL 2384535, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. June 10, 2010). The Undersigned

WARNS Plaintiff that should she continue to file repetitive or frivolous lawsuits, the Court may

place additional filing restrictions on her or even declare her a vexatious litigator.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) and

her Motion to Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights (Doc. 2) are GRANTED. However, the

Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED. The

Undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons, an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in

forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 27, 2025 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).