SEALS v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL SEALS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-442

)

LELAND DUDEK,1 )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

1 Leland Dudek is substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend

the docket to reflect this change.

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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff raises several arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision. First, he

contends that the ALJ ignored medical evidence showing that he is disabled, specifically

three medical statements opining that Plaintiff was incapable of work. (Doc. No. 16 at 8-

9). Second, he argues the ALJ erred in stating that he never saw a headache specialist as

he saw a neurologist. (Id. at 9). Third, he posits that the ALJ failed to account for his

light sensitivity in his residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Id. at 10). Lastly, Plaintiff

argues the ALJ should have given his testimony greater weight because of his long work

history. (Id. at 10-11). Upon careful consideration of the record, the Court disagrees

and will affirm the ALJ’s decision for the following reasons.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ ignored medical evidence that

“overwhelmingly” supported a disability finding. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff points to the

statements contained in Meniere’s Disease Medical Source Statements from Drs. Mihaela

Nowak, M.D. and Douglas Chen, M.D., and Nurse Nicholas Sandulli, C.R.N.P., who all

opined that he was disabled. (Id.). These statements noted that Plaintiff was incapable

of even “low stress” work and basic work activities and would, therefore, be disabled. (R.

25; Exs. B9F/3-4, B12F/3-4, B13F/4). However, such statements did not purport to opine

as to Plaintiff’s specific functional limitations, and the ALJ, therefore, correctly declined

to provide written analyses about these statements because they opined on questions of

disability, which are reserved solely for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ should have provided more weight to the

remaining opinions of Drs. Nowak, Chen, and Mr. Sandulli because they are “longtime

providers” that have “laid hands” on him. (Doc. No. 16 at 9). However, the ALJ

properly analyzed the Meniere’s Disease Source Statements that these sources provided

and, moreover, the rationale to give more credence to providers that have “laid hands” on

a claimant is no longer in use under the applicable regulations. The regulations applicable

to Plaintiff’s claim no longer make medical opinions from treating source eligible for

controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); (R. 17) (noting Plaintiff filed his

application on October 28, 2021). The ALJ is not bound by the findings of a treating

physician if they are not well supported or are inconsistent with other substantial evidence

of record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).

Here, the ALJ applied the correct regulations to the analysis of Drs. Nowak, Chen,

and Mr. Sandulli’s Meniere’s Disease Source Statements. Dr. Nowak submitted two

different statements opining different levels of limitation. In January 2022, Dr. Nowak

opined that she “did not believe that [Plaintiff] should be on disability for his conditions[.]”

(Ex. B6F/6). However, 11 months later, Dr. Nowak opined that Plaintiff was incapable

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of even low stress work, would be off task 25% or more of the time, should not work at

heights, should not work with power machines, and should not operate a motor vehicle for

work purposes. (R. 25, Ex. B9F/1-4). The ALJ found this opinion partially persuasive,

as the latter limitations were supported by the medical record, but also as it was inconsistent

with Dr. Nowak’s prior opinion opining that Plaintiff should not be on disability. (R. 25-

26). This analysis comported with the applicable regulations. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01,

2017 WL 168819, at *5853 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c).

Additionally, the ALJ properly analyzed the Meniere’s Disease Medical Source

Statements of Dr. Chen and Mr. Sandulli. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Chen’s functional

limitations were consistent with those of Dr. Nowak except Dr. Chen opined that Plaintiff’s

typical Meniere’s disease attack lasts 10-20 minutes with no precipitating factors, nothing

makes his attacks worse, and lying down makes his attacks better. (R. 26; Ex. B13F).

The ALJ found this opinion partially persuasive because it was partially supported by the

medical record and was consistent with parts of Dr. Nowak’s opinion. (R. 26).

Similarly, the ALJ found Mr. Sandulli’s statement partially persuasive. (Id.). Mr.

Sandulli opined many of the same limitations as Drs. Nowak and Chen except for a few

differences, including that Plaintiff’s attacks are constant with precipitating factors and

strong odors. (B12F). The ALJ found this opinion partially persuasive because it was

consistent with evidence within the record, including Drs. Nowak and Chen’s statements,

and was partially supported by the record. (R. 26). These analyses comported with the

relevant regulations because the ALJ analyzed the consistency and supportability of these

opinions. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819, at *5853 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(b) and (c). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments as to the ALJ’s opinions of

Drs. Nowak, Chen, and Mr. Sandulli are without merit.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in stating he never

saw a headache specialist. (Doc. No. 16 at 9). The record shows that Plaintiff was

referred to “Dr. Bennett, [a] headache specialist . . . while [he] awaits” a neurology

appointment. (Ex. B2F/37). The ALJ accurately stated that there was no evidence that

Plaintiff saw Dr. Bennett, the headache specialist. (R. 23). However, the ALJ

accurately recognized that Plaintiff saw a neurologist. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ did

not err in stating that Plaintiff did not see a headache specialist.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to account for his light sensitivity in the

RFC and ignored medical records and source statements showing that he has such

sensitivity. (Doc. No. 16 at 10). While Plaintiff is correct that there is no specific

limitation accounting for his light sensitivity in his RFC, he overlooks that the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s testimony and medical source statements regarding his light

sensitivity and crafted his RFC based on all the evidence. Specifically, the ALJ heard

Plaintiff’s testimony that he has extreme sensitivity to light and acknowledged that Dr.

Nowak opined that Plaintiff was incapable of even low stress work due to extreme light

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

sensitivity. (R. 25, 56). However, as noted above, the ALJ found Dr. Nowak’s opinion

on this issue only partially persuasive and declined to adopt this specific limitation. (R.

25; Ex. B9F/2). Moreover, the ALJ found partially persuasive Dr. Chen’s medical

statement opining that Plaintiff had no precipitating factors for his Meniere’s disease

attacks. (R. 26; Ex. B13F/2). Based on all of the evidence, the ALJ incorporated only

“credibly established” limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 25); Rutherford v. Barnhart,

399 F.3d 546, 665 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting only “credibly established limitations” need

be included in the RFC and communicated to the vocational expert). Accordingly, the

RFC finding containing no limitation accommodating sensitivity to bright lights is

supported by substantial evidence.

Lastly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that his complaints should have been

given greater weight due to his long work history. (Doc. No. 16 at 10-11). Plaintiff

overlooks that a claimant is not entitled to heightened credibility based solely on his work

history. See Corley v. Barnhart, 102 Fed. Appx. 752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004); Thompson v.

Astrue, No. 09-519, 2010 WL 3661530, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010) (stating “a

claimant’s work history alone is not dispositive of the question of his credibility, and an

ALJ is not required to equate a long work history with enhanced credibility.”). Here, the

ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s prior work history as a rug cleaner, discussed Plaintiff’s

history of employment at the hearing, and recognized Plaintiff’s insured status through

December 31, 2026. (R. 19, 27-28, 45-51). Moreover, the ALJ properly evaluated

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and explained why she found these to be inconsistent with

the record. (R. 22-24). Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument on this point.

In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence

and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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