The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ELIJAH CORBIN : No. 799 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered March 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007836-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2025
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”) appeals from
the order dismissing the charges against Elijah Corbin (“Corbin”) pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.1 We reverse and remand.
On August 20, 2019, Corbin stabbed the victim in the chest, side, back,
and left arm in downtown Philadelphia. The victim underwent emergency
surgery and survived. Corbin’s ex-girlfriend witnessed the assault and
identified him to the police. Video surveillance footage from a parking lot
caught a portion of the assault. On August 29, 2019, the Commonwealth
charged Corbin with attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple assault,
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1 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a) (providing generally that trial in a criminal
case shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint
is filed).
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possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another
person.
As the sole issue on appeal concerns whether the Commonwealth acted
with due diligence, under Rule 600, in providing discovery, we review only the
relevant, disputed dates of the procedural history.
During the case proceedings in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas,
the trial court listed the case for pre-trial status on March 26, 2020. However,
on March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order,
declaring a statewide judicial emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
suspending Rule 600. See In re Gen. Statewide Jud. Emergency, 228
A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2020). Subsequently, the President Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas extended the suspension of Rule 600 through October 1, 2021.
At issue here, the docket entry for a listing on March 9, 2021, stated
that “medical records and video[2] are outstanding[,] otherwise discovery
complete . . . .” Docket, 10/6/23, at 14 (unpaginated) (unnecessary
capitalization omitted). Furthermore, the September 23, 2021 docket entry
indicated: “Court request — case continued due to [COVID-]19 pandemic
protocols. Time ruled extendable[.] Both sides otherwise ready[. V]ideo
is passed at bar of court — medical records still outstanding. . . . List for
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2 Neither the docket entry, nor the Rule 600 notes of testimony, provides
further identifying information for this video.
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status of jury trial date: 11/19/2021.” Id. at 16 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted and emphasis added).
As stated above, on October 1, 2021, the Rule 600-suspension in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas concluded. However, subsequently,
“court calendars were clogged . . ..” N.T., 3/3/23, at 31. On October 25,
2021, there are multiple docket entries, the first of which stated: “Court
request — case continued due to [COVID-]19 pandemic protocols. Time ruled
extendable[.] Both sides otherwise ready[. V]ideo is passed at bar of court
— medical records still outstanding. List for status of jury trial date:
11/19/2021.” Id. Another docket entry dated October 25, 2021, stated,
“Status listing cancelled.” Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted). As a
result of the status listing cancellation, the court rescheduled the case to
November 5, 2021.
On November 5, 2021, Corbin demanded a jury trial and, according to
the docket entry of that date, the case was listed as a “Defense request —
jury demand.” Id. at 17. Docket entries for March 1, 2022 and November 2,
2022 stated the same.3 Id. at 17-18 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
On March 2, 2022, the trial court issued an order scheduling Corbin’s case for
a jury trial on March 6, 2023 — a full year later. The court also ordered the
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3 The trial court stated that “discovery was addressed as indicated on the
secure docket entries of November 5, 2021 and March 1, 2022.” Trial Court
Opinion, 10/6/23, at 17. However, our review of the November 5, 2021 and
March 1, 2022 docket entries did not reveal any notations regarding discovery.
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parties to complete discovery by February 6, 2023. Saliently, the
Commonwealth provided Corbin with the victim’s medical records on
September 7, 2022.
On March 1, 2023 — five days before the scheduled trial date —Corbin
filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to Rule 600. On March 3, 2023,
the trial court held a hearing. The parties stipulated to exclude the period
when Rule 600 was suspended due to COVID-19. See N.T., 3/3/23, at 8-9,
13. We emphasize the parties disputed only the following two periods of time.
The parties first argued whether the court should attribute the delay,
caused by Corbin’s demand for a jury trial, against Corbin. The
Commonwealth argued the delay would have been shorter had Corbin
proceeded with a non-jury trial. See id. at 12. The trial court held this time
“[does not] get ruled against [the] Commonwealth.” Id. at 29.
Next, Corbin’s sole Rule 600 argument focused upon the period between
March 9, 2021 — when the trial docket first made mention of discovery of the
victim’s medical records — and September 7, 2022, when the Commonwealth
provided this discovery. Corbin acknowledged that he did not request the
victim’s medical records at any time, but insisted the Commonwealth failed to
act with due diligence because it did not provide the records until September
7, 2022, where more than 365 days of includable time passed after it filed the
criminal complaint. See id. at 18, 26. Corbin claimed that without the
medical records, the Commonwealth would not have been ready for trial,
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because the victim was not available to testify at trial, and thus it would have
had to rely on the medical records to prove the element of serious bodily injury
for the charge of aggravated assault. See id. at 24.
The Commonwealth first responded that: (1) Corbin’s motion was
premature; (2) less than 365 days of includable time had passed between the
filing of the criminal complaint and the Rule 600 hearing; and (3) as a result,
the trial court did not need to consider whether the Commonwealth exercised
due diligence. See N.T., 3/3/23, at 5, 10-11. Second, with respect to due
diligence, the Commonwealth argued that: (1) the victim was initially
cooperative and testified at the preliminary hearing, but after the pandemic
commenced and this matter “went into limbo, [it] lost contact with the” victim;
(2) the Commonwealth sent subpoenas for the medical records in February
and April 2022, but it did not receive them until the first week of September
2022; and (3) the medical records were not necessary for the Commonwealth
to prove its case, as it could rely on circumstantial evidence and testimony
from medical personnel. Id. at 15-16, 20-21. Finally, the Commonwealth
averred: (1) Corbin could have but never filed a request for the records; and
(2) the records were not mandatory discovery because they were not
originally in its possession. See id. at 15, 23, 26.
The trial court found that based on its review of the docket entry from
March 9, 2021, Corbin requested the medical records on that date, they were
“material to the defense’s case,” and therefore, the Commonwealth was not
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ready for trial until September 7, 2022, when it provided the victim’s medical
records to him. N.T., 3/3/23, at 36; see also Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/24,
at 14, 19. The trial court thus found that the Commonwealth failed to act with
due diligence over the 341-day period — from the October 1, 2021
reinstatement of Rule 6004 to September 7, 2022, when it provided the
medical records. The trial court then added this 341 day-period to the total
of “143 days” attributable to the Commonwealth for other delays, to conclude
that “it took 484 days of Commonwealth delay to bring [Corbin] to trial.” 5
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 17. Accordingly, the trial court granted
Corbin’s Rule 600 motion and discharged him.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, and both the
Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following question for our
review: “Did the [trial] court err by dismissing the charges filed against
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4 We observe that the Rule 600 suspension lasted through October 1, 2021,
and thus was lifted on October 2, 2021. The resulting number of days through
September 7, 2022, was thus 340 days. Nevertheless, this one-day difference
does not affect our disposition, and for consistency, we refer to this period as
341 days.
5 Based upon the periods of delay the trial court attributed to the
Commonwealth, our calculations show that the correct number of days should
total 448, instead of 484 days. This difference does not affect our disposition.
Furthermore, on appeal, the Commonwealth avers the total days attributable
to it should be 107 days, instead of 143 days. See Commonwealth’s Brief at
13. However, as previously stated, this discrepancy does not affect our
disposition.
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[Corbin] on the grounds of an alleged violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
The Commonwealth’s sole issue is that the trial court abused its
discretion when it found it had not acted with due diligence in prosecuting the
case against Corbin. In reviewing a trial court’s decision in a Rule 600 case,
an appellate court will reverse only if the trial court abused its
discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or
misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable,
or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will[,] discretion is
abused. Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence
from the Rule 600 hearing and the findings of the [trial] court,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A) states that “[t]rial in a
court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall
commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Under Rule 600(C): “[P]eriods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the
computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods
of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). A
defendant not brought to trial within the time specified in Rule 600(A) may,
at any time prior to trial, “file a written motion requesting that the charges be
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dismissed with prejudice on the ground that [the] rule has been violated.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).
To decide whether the Commonwealth violated the rule, “a court must
first calculate the ‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days after the filing of a
complaint. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 981 (Pa. 2023)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Once the calculation of “excludable
time” is complete, a court adds this time to the “mechanical run date” to
produce the “adjusted run date,” which is the deadline for the Commonwealth
to bring the defendant to trial under Rule 600. Id. at 982. “If the trial court
determines that the Commonwealth violated Rule 600, it shall dismiss the
charges and discharge the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d
600, 615 (Pa. 2021).
The Supreme Court recently clarified:
Rule 600 establishes two requirements that must be met for delay
to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay must be
caused by the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth must
have failed to exercise due diligence. Otherwise, the delay is
excluded from the calculation of the run date. Put differently,
where delay is not caused by the Commonwealth or delay caused
by the Commonwealth is not the result of lack of diligence, it must
be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline. Due
diligence is fact specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does
not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a
showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort. . .
.
Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted).
It is the Commonwealth’s burden to show due diligence by a preponderance
of the evidence. See Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701.
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Meanwhile, “time attributable to the normal progression of a case simply
is not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600.” Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d
323, 325 (Pa. 2017). “[J]udicial delay is delay caused by the court, rather
than the Commonwealth, and is likewise excludable if the Commonwealth
exercised diligence during that time.” Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 (citing
Harth, 252 A.3d at 603); see also Harth, 252 A.3d at 621-22 (concluding
that Commonwealth’s failure to fulfill its discovery obligations constituted lack
of due diligence and that trial court’s unavailability for trial was irrelevant).
“[W]here a trial-ready prosecutor must wait several months due to a court
calendar, the time should be treated as ‘delay’ for which the Commonwealth
is not accountable.” Mills, 162 A.3d at 325. In other words, where the
Commonwealth is trial ready, it has exercised due diligence, a delay arising
from the court’s own scheduling concerns does not count against the
Commonwealth in the Rule 600 calculation. See id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 governs pre-trial discovery
in criminal cases. The rule lists certain evidence that is subject to mandatory
disclosure by the Commonwealth when they are: (1) requested by the
defendant, (2) material to the case, and (3) within the possession or control
of the prosecutor. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a)-(g). Otherwise, to obtain
discretionary discovery from the Commonwealth, the defendant must file a
motion for discovery, and the court may issue an order granting the request.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(a). This Court has recently recognized that a
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delay caused by a defense request for non-mandatory discovery is not
includable against the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213
A.3d 1004, 1013-14 (Pa. Super. 2019). In the context of discovery, where
evidence is equally accessible to both parties, the Commonwealth should not
be penalized for the defendant’s failure to avail himself of the evidence. See
Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 883 (Pa. Super. 2017).
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting Corbin’s Rule 600 motion. Preliminarily, we note the underlying 341
day-period is the only delay at issue, as: (1) Corbin did not raise any other
challenges in his Rule 600 motion or at the hearing; 6 and (2) the total included
delay found by the trial court was 484 days. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23,
at 17.
On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that it in fact completed
discovery on September 23, 2021 and was ready for trial, well within the 365
days of includable time permitted by Rule 600. The Commonwealth claims
that the trial court erred in finding that it was not diligent, and thus including
the 341 days, from the October 1, 2021 end of the Rule 600 suspension, to
September 7, 2022, when it provided the victim’s medical records to Corbin.
Finally, the Commonwealth contends that it did not have the victim’s medical
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6 We reiterate the Commonwealth did raise the delay caused by Corbin’s
demand for a jury trial, but the trial court ruled in its favor. See N.T., 3/3/23,
at 29.
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records in its original possession, and thus it was not mandatory discovery, it
did not need the records to proceed to trial, Corbin never filed a request for
the records, and the trial court never ordered the Commonwealth to obtain
them.
The trial court found that it properly granted Corbin’s Rule 600 motion
because the Commonwealth was not duly diligent in obtaining the victim’s
medical records during the 341-day period between October 1, 2021, and
September 7, 2022. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 7-19. The trial
court determined that “[t]he Commonwealth was not prepared for trial until
September 7, 2022, because discovery was not complete due to the
[outstanding] medical records.” Id. at 14. Furthermore, the trial court found
“very relevant the particularly material nature of the discovery at issue.” Id.
at 19.
The trial court explained that “Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly held
that delay is not attributable to the Commonwealth when discovery is
complete and the Commonwealth is ready for trial.” Trial Court Opinion,
10/6/23, at 4 (emphasis in original). The trial court then found that the
“standard” in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 599 A.2d 214 (Pa. Super. 1991)
required the Commonwealth “to explain why they were unable to furnish the
medical records to the defense prior to September 7, 2022.” Id. at 16. The
trial court reasoned:
[A] review of the entirety of the case history becomes critical to
this court’s analysis. It was determined on March 9, 2021, that
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the medical records and video were still outstanding and that
discovery was otherwise complete, and despite producing the
video to the defense, the Commonwealth did not provide the
medical records to defense at either the November 5, 2021 [or]
March 1, 2022 listings. By [the Commonwealth’s] own admission,
the medical records were not passed to [Corbin] until on or about
September 7, 2022.
****
Had [the Commonwealth] provided any documentation that
the medical records were unobtainable for legitimate reasons, for
example if hospitals were not honoring medical record requests
during a period of time during the COVID-19 Pandemic, then this
court would have likely denied [Corbin’s] Rule 600 Motion. . . .
Id. at 7, 9.
Critical to its analysis, the trial court noted that in Commonwealth v.
Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004 (Pa. Super. 2019), defense counsel requested
additional discovery — which caused a continuance in the proceedings — but
failed to specify what particular evidence it was seeking. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/6/23, at 6. In Andrews, this Court held the delay was
“excludable as [Andrews’] motion placed an obligation on the prosecution that
required the delay of the trial’s commencement to obtain discovery, which the
defense had not requested until this point.” Andrews, 213 A.3d at 1013.
The trial court found Andrews was distinguishable from this case, where
here:
[Corbin] specifically requested the victim’s medical records
on March 9, 2021 because the Commonwealth [was] proceeding
without a complaining witness and the defense was obliged to
review the complaining witness’s medical records and address the
legal inquiry of the degree of serious bodily injury in the charge it
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was faced to defend aggravated assault — attempted serious
bodily injury . . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 7 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that the victim’s medical
records were not mandatory discovery: “It is clear that based on Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 that the medical records would be discovery
that would be passed based on the discretion of the court.” Trial Court
Opinion, 10/6/23, at 8 n.9. Rule 573 provides:
(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.
****
(2) Discretionary With the Court.
(a) In all court cases . . . if the defendant files
a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order
the Commonwealth to allow the defendant’s attorney to
inspect and copy or photograph any of the following
requested items, upon a showing that they are material
to the preparation of the defense, and that the request
is reasonable:
****
(iv) any other evidence specifically identified by
the defendant, provided the defendant can
additionally establish that its disclosure would be in
the interests of justice.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the trial court reasoned:
[T]he Commonwealth was proceeding on a charge of aggravated
assault-— causing serious bodily injury without a complaining
witness. Even if . . . the medical records could be considered
discretionary discovery and not mandatory, it is clear that such
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records would be critical to the defense due to [its] not being able
to cross-examine the complainant in this matter. The records
would be critical to proving or disproving serious bodily injury[.]
. . . Consequently, this court determined that although applicable
case law has held medical records to qualify as discretionary
discovery as opposed to mandatory discovery, this court was
unconvinced by the Commonwealth’s argument which
mischaracterized the issue. The mere fact that the
Commonwealth “could have proceeded without the medical
records” is of no moment. The fact that the Commonwealth did
not need the medical records did not discount the fact that the
defense needed the medical records to defend against charges
that would not be supported by testimony from the complainant.
Id. at 8-9 n.9 (citations omitted).
Finally, regarding the Commonwealth’s due diligence, the trial court
stated:
[A] major factor of this court’s analysis is [that] it is clear that
from March 9, 2021, the Commonwealth was on notice that the
medical records were outstanding. Consequently, when the
moratorium on Rule 600 ended on October 1, 2021, there should
have been no delay in the Commonwealth working to produce the
medical records as the Commonwealth had been notified that the
medical records were outstanding seven months prior, as well as
at the additional hearings wherein discovery was addressed as
indicated on the secure docket entries of November 5, 2021 and
March 1, 2022. . . .
Id. at 17.7
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in
determining that the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence and in
granting Corbin’s Rule 600 motion. The crux of this case comes down to the
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7 As noted previously, our review of the record shows no notations in the
docket entries of November 5, 2021 and March 1, 2022 regarding discovery.
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trial court’s inference — from a March 9, 2021 docket entry by another judge,
which marked the medical records as “outstanding” — that Corbin requested
the records from the Commonwealth. In doing so, the trial court determined
that the Commonwealth did not act diligently, from the October 1, 2021 end
of the Rule 600 suspension until it provided the records to Corbin on
September 7, 2022. First, we determine that the trial court improperly held
the Commonwealth to a standard that required it to “explain how or why the
records were not obtained until nearly eleven months after the Rule 600
moratorium was lifted.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 13. Our Rule 600
jurisprudence includes no such requirement of the Commonwealth.
Second, the trial court granted Corbin’s Rule 600 motion because it
found that the victim’s medical records were material to his defense. The trial
court conceded — and we agree — that the records did not fall within one of
the enumerated categories of mandatory discovery, and instead, its
discovery was subject to the trial court’s discretion. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
573(B)(1)(a)-(g), (2)(a)(iv). The trial court’s finding, that Corbin needed this
discovery for his defense, is not dispositive for Rule 600 purposes. Instead,
the relevant query is whether the Commonwealth’s alleged failure to provide
this discretionary discovery could be construed against it. Under our
jurisprudence, we hold it could not. See Andrews, 213 A.3d at 1014.
Relatedly, although the trial court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument
that Corbin could have also requested the medical records, the court provided
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no supporting rationale; the court did not find, for example, that Corbin could
not, in fact, have obtained the records. Meanwhile, our decisional authority
has held that “[w]here the evidence is equally accessible or inaccessible to
both the Commonwealth and the defense, the defense cannot use the
discovery rules against the Commonwealth for its failure to produce the
evidence.” Santos, 176 A.3d at 883. Furthermore, the trial court erroneously
relied on Robinson, which involved the Commonwealth’s failure to timely
obtain mandatory discovery and is inapplicable to the instant case. See
Robinson 599 A.2d at 216.
Third, the trial court found the Commonwealth was not ready for trial
until September 7, 2022. However, the docket entry for September 23, 2021,
clearly stated that “both sides were ready for trial.” Docket, 10/6/23, at 16.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the 341-day period between
October 1, 2021 and September 7, 2022 must be excluded from the
computation of the Rule 600 deadline. See Johnson, 289 A.3d at 981-83.
As Corbin did not present any other arguments before the trial court, claiming
that other periods of delay should be attributable to the Commonwealth, we
do not review them. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude the trial
court abused its discretion in granting Corbin’s Rule 600 motion. We thus
reverse the order granting the Rule 600 motion and discharging Corbin.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Date: 3/26/2025
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