Opinion

Kim Hartigan v. Hernando County

Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 26, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.6%

The opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-13166 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13166

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KIM HARTIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HERNANDO COUNTY,

a political subdivision of the State of Florida,

HERNANDO COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER OFFICE,

a municipal corporation, an agency of Hernando County,

HERNANDO COUNTY TAX COLLECTOR OFFICE,

a municipal corporation, an agency of Hernando County,

JOHN C. EMERSON,

In his Official and Individual capacity,

SALLY L. DANIEL,

USCA11 Case: 24-13166 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 24-13166

In her Official and Individual capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-01780-SDM-UAM

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kim Hartigan, proceeding pro se, filed suit in federal district

court against Hernando County, Florida; the County Property Ap-

praiser and Tax Collector Offices; John Emerson, the County’s

Property Appraiser; and Sally Daniel, the Tax Collector. Hartigan’s

operative complaint—her second amended complaint—alleged vi-

olations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1982, and cited criminal

statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. She claimed the County lacked

authority to assess property taxes on her residence, which she con-

tended was not “real property” under Florida law and not subject

to ad valorem taxation. The District Court dismissed the complaint

with prejudice. Hartigan now appeals. And in response to the ap-

peal, Hernando County, the Tax Collector Office, and Daniel

move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

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24-13166 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Background

Hartigan owns a home in Spring Hill, Florida. She alleges

that Emerson and Daniel—acting individually and in their official

capacities—unlawfully assessed and collected ad valorem taxes on

her property. She claims the property was immune from taxation

because she had not filed a return, did not use the property com-

mercially, and did not qualify as a “taxpayer” under Florida law.

She further alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive her of

her constitutional rights by enforcing Florida’s property tax re-

gime, and she demands injunctive relief and empanelment of a

grand jury.

After dismissing an earlier version of the complaint as a shot-

gun pleading, the District Court dismissed the operative complaint

for failure to state a claim. The Court concluded that Hartigan, as

a private citizen, could not bring claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or

242; that she had no plausible claim under §§ 1982 or 1985; and that

the tax assessments were lawful under the Florida Constitution.

The Court remarked that Hartigan’s filings resembled those of self-

styled “sovereign citizens,” citing the “out-of-context passages

from court decisions, inapplicable and misapplied statutes and reg-

ulations, and other superfluous recitations.” In a footnote, the

Court also acknowledged that the suit was barred by the Tax In-

junction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and dismissed the action with prej-

udice. Hartigan’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was de-

nied. She timely appeals.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13166

II. Discussion

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the

“first and fundamental question” on appeal is whether jurisdiction

exists. United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 970–71 (11th Cir. 2019)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Tax Injunc-

tion Act provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin, sus-

pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under

State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in

the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The bar applies if (1) the

plaintiff’s requested relief would interfere with a state tax, and (2)

the state provides an adequate forum to litigate constitutional ob-

jections. Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir.

1984).

Hartigan’s claims satisfy both conditions. The complaint

seeks to invalidate the County’s tax assessments and prevent future

collections. Her assertion that she is not a “taxpayer” under Florida

law is immaterial—Florida courts are fully competent to adjudicate

her arguments. See Fla. Stat. §§ 192.0105, 194.171(1); Turner v. Jor-

dan, 117 F.4th 1289, 1305 (11th Cir. 2024). She has not shown—and

does not seriously argue—that Florida lacks a plain, speedy, and

efficient remedy.

The District Court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdic-

tion under the Tax Injunction Act. And because “[d]ismissals for a

lack of jurisdiction are not judgments on the merits,” the dismissal

should have been without prejudice. Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999,

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24-13166 Opinion of the Court 5

1007 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 225 (2024) (citation

omitted).

III. Sanctions

Rule 38 authorizes us to impose sanctions if an appeal is friv-

olous. See Fed. R. App. P. 38. A claim is frivolous if it is “utterly

devoid of merit.” Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391, 1393–94 (11th

Cir. 1993). Although we have imposed sanctions against pro se liti-

gants in extreme cases, see United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130,

1132–33 (11th Cir. 2008), we generally decline to do so absent a his-

tory of frivolous litigation or an explicit warning, see, e.g., Woods v.

I.R.S., 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993).

Hartigan has no history of similar litigation, and the District

Court did not clearly warn her that her claims were sanctionable.

Though her arguments border on frivolity and rely on discredited

legal theories, we exercise our discretion to deny the motion for

sanctions.

IV. Conclusion

The District Court’s order is VACATED and REMANDED

with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The

motion to impose sanctions against Hartigan is DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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