BROWN v. KEMP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

COLUMBUS DIVISION

JESSIE L. BROWN, :

:

Plaintiff, : NO. 4:25-CV-00037-CDL-AGH

VS. :

:

Governor B. KEMP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

__________________________________

DISMISSAL ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Jessie L. Brown, an inmate incarcerated at the Muscogee County

Jail in Columbus, Georgia, has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. However, Plaintiff has

three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, so he may not proceed in forma

pauperis. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is therefore DENIED and this complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice for the reasons set forth below.

ANALYSIS

Federal law bars a prisoner from bringing a civil action in federal court in forma

pauperis:

if [he] has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in

any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that

was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This is known as the “three strikes provision.” Under § 1915(g), a

prisoner incurs a “strike” any time he has a federal lawsuit or appeal dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim. See Medberry v. Butler,

185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999). Once a prisoner incurs three strikes, his ability to

proceed in forma pauperis in federal court is greatly limited: leave to proceed in forma

pauperis may not be granted unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of § 1915(g)

because it does not violate an inmate’s right to access the courts, the doctrine of

separation of powers, an inmate’s right to due process of law, or an inmate’s right to

equal protection. Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

A review of court records on the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court

Electronic Records (“PACER”) database reveals that Plaintiff has filed numerous prior

federal lawsuits and at least three of his complaints have been dismissed as frivolous or

malicious or for failure to state a claim.1 See, e.g., Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v.

Abbot, ECF No. 22 in Case No. 4:03-cv-00108-BAE (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2004) (dismissing

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. McLane, ECF

1 The Georgia Department of Corrections online offender query system shows that

Plaintiff spells his first name both as “Jessie” and as “Jesse” and that he has other aliases

as well. https://services.gdc.ga.gov/GDC/OffenderQuery/jsp/OffQryRedirector.jsp

(searched “Brown, Jessie”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2025) (showing known aliases include

“Brown, Jesse Lee,” Brown, Jessie Lee,” and “Brown, Jessie A.”). The Court has

confirmed that Plaintiff has filed more than two dozen other cases under the first names

“Jesse” and “Jessie” by cross-referencing PACER records with Plaintiff’s Georgia

Department of Corrections identification numbers, Georgia Department of Corrections

case numbers, and Muscogee County Sheriff’s Office online jail records. See id.;

https://portal-gamuscogee.tylertech.cloud/app/JailSearch/#/search (searched “Jessie

Brown”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2025).

No. 4 in Case No. 7:03-cv-00101-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2004) (dismissing as

frivolous); Order on Mot. Recons., Brown v. Nix, ECF No. 12 in Case No. 7:03-cv-

00098-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2004) (dismissing as frivolous and pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Nance, ECF No. 6 in Case No.

4:01-cv-00127-HL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2001) (adopting recommendation to dismiss for

failure to state claim). Additionally, Plaintiff has been identified as having three strikes

in multiple other federal lawsuits where he was denied leave to proceed in forma

pauperis under § 1915(g) and the cases were dismissed. See, e.g., Brown v. Ezell, Case

No. 4:06-cv-00121-CDL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2006); Brown v. Stracker, Case No. 4:12-cv-

00260 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2012); Brown v. Owens, Case No. 1:14-cv-00177 (S.D. Ga.

Nov. 10, 2014); Brown v. Owens, Case No. 7:14-cv-00170 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2014);

Brown v. Lynch, Case No. 4:20-cv-00053 (M.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2020); Brown v. Thomas,

Case No. 4:20-cv-00098 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2021).

Plaintiff is accordingly barred from prosecuting this action in forma pauperis

unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). To

qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts that describe an “ongoing

serious physical injury,” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of

imminent serious physical injury.” Sutton v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 334 Fed. App’x 278,

279 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Complaints of past

injuries are not sufficient. See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193. Vague and unsupported

claims of possible dangers likewise do not suffice. See White v. State of Colo., 157 F.3d

1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998). The exception to § 1915(g) is to be applied only in

“genuine emergencies,” when (1) “time is pressing,” (2) the “threat or prison condition is

real and proximate,” and (3) the “potential consequence is serious physical injury.” Lewis

v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).

This is Plaintiff’s third attempt since October 2024 to complain about his

incarceration at the Muscogee County Jail. See Brown v. Lynch, Case No. 4:24-cv-

158-CDL-AGH (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2025) (dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g) for

having three strikes and under 42 U.S.C. § 1915A as malicious for failure to truthfully

disclose his litigation history); Brown v. Mitchell, Case No. 4:24-cv-144-CDL-AGH

(M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2025) (dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1915A as malicious for failure

to truthfully disclose his litigation history). Just like these previous complaints,

Plaintiff again vaguely and generally contends that he is being denied a nutritious diet

which is “a health risk for [him] do (sic) to other medical issues.” Compare id. with

ECF No. 1 at 5-7. Plaintiff also now alleges that his “life and health [is] at risk do (sic)

to all the shower[s] are molded on every floor of the jail” and that “the sealing licks

(sic) when it rains leaving pool of water in the hallways in parts of the jail.” ECF No. 1

at 5-6. He claims that due “to these conditions of the sealing [he is] not ensured that

there is not a danger to [his] wellbeing.” Id. at 7.

Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint does he provide any specific or nonfrivolous

facts suggesting that he is in imminent danger of suffering any serious physical injury.

“[T]the issue is whether [Plaintiff’s] complaint, as a whole, alleges imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). To

qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts, as opposed to “‘general

assertion[s],’” that describe an “‘ongoing serious physical injury or [] a pattern of

misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.’” Id.

(citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of danger and risks to his health remain

vague, conclusory and unsupported by facts and thus he fails to show an imminent

danger of serious physical injury.2 See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193 (holding plaintiff

failed to qualify under imminent danger exception because complaint could not be

construed as “constituting an allegation that he was in imminent danger of serious

physical injury at the time he filed his [c]omplaint or that he was in jeopardy of any

ongoing danger”); Rodriguez v. Am. Civil Liberty Union, No. 3:23-cv-16482-LC-HTC,

at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023) (“[G]eneralized references to being in danger or being

subject to abuse, . . . [which] are conclusory, vague, and unsupported by any well-

pleaded factual allegations . . . [do not] support a claim of imminent danger.”). As

such, Plaintiff does not qualify for the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g) that

2 Additional review of Plaintiff’s complaint further finds that he is bringing his claims

against the Defendants based solely upon their supervisory positions as Governor,

Sheriff, and Health Department Director. However, it is well-settled in the Eleventh

Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts on

the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598

F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2010). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint is there any allegation

that would plausibly support an inference that any of his Defendants had any direct or

indirect involvement in any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and therefore

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Hernandez v.

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (rejecting

claim where the plaintiff failed to allege decision making officials took specific actions

amounting to a constitutional violation); Asad v. Crosby, 158 F. App’x 166, 170-72 (11th

Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s dismissal of supervisory liability claims against two

defendants because the record failed to show that they “personally participated in the

alleged constitutional violations, or that there was a causal connection between the

supervisory defendants’ actions and an alleged constitutional violation”).

would permit him to proceed in forma pauperis despite having three strikes and this

complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.3

SO ORDERED, this 25th day of March, 2025.

S//Clay D. Land

CLAY D. LAND

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

3 In Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that a

prisoner cannot simply pay the filing fee after being denied in forma pauperis status and

that the filing fee must be paid at the time the suit is initiated. Thus, the proper procedure

when denying in forma pauperis status is to dismiss the complaint without prejudice,

allowing the Plaintiff to refile upon payment of the full filing fee. See also Simmons v.

Zloch, 148 F. App’x 921, 922 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing to Dupree in affirming denial of in

forma pauperis motion and dismissing complaint under § 1915(g)).