The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
DECEMB ER SESSION, 1997 January 26, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
RANDY BLAINE KNIGHT, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9705-CR-00162
)
Appe llant, )
) JOHNSON COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON. LYNN BROWN, JUDGE
HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, )
)
Appellee. ) (HABEAS C ORPU S)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RAND Y KN IGHT , pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
N.E.C.C. #101642 Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683 TIMOTHY F. BEHAN
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
DAVID CROCKETT
District Attorney General
Route 19, Box 99
Johnson City, TN 37601
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Appe llant, Ra ndy B laine K night, a ppea ls as of right from the trial
court’s dismissal of his Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief. We affirm the
judgm ent of the tria l court.
The record shows that on December 1 2, 1983, Appellant was
convicted of two counts of second degree burglary, one count of grand larceny,
one count o f aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. He
received an effective sentence of seventy (70) years in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On September 11, 1996, he filed the petition for writ
of habeas corpus relief wh ich is the subject of this appeal. In essence, Appellant
argues that the indictment charging all of the offenses is void because the
culpab le men tal state for e ach offen se was not allege d in the ind ictmen t.
The first count of the indictment, charging Appellant with second
degree burglary, alleged that he did “break and enter a dwelling house during the
daytime . . . with the felonio us intent to c omm it a felony there in, to-wit:
larceny . . . .” The second count of the indictment charged Appellant with the
crime of grand larceny and alleged that the property was taken “with the felonious
intent to perm anently d eprive the said true o wner the reof.” The third count of the
indictment charged second degree bu rglary b y allegin g that th e App ellant d id
“felonio usly break and enter a dwelling house by daytime . . . with the felonious
intent to com mit a felon y therein, to-w it: an aggra vated rap e . . . .” The fou rth
count of the indictment charged that the Appellant committed aggravated rape
and tha t he did “felo niously, se xually pen etrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that
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force or coercion was used to accomplish the act . . . .” The indictment further
alleged that he was armed with a .25 c aliber pisto l, caused person al injury to the
victim, and pe netrated her gen ital area with his finger. The fifth count of the
indictment alleged that Appellant committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping
and included allegations that he did “seize, confine, inveigled, enticed, decoyed,
abducted, concealed, kidnapped or carried away, [victim] with the felonious intent
to cause the said [vic tim] to b e con fined s ecretly , again st her w ill or to de tain the
said [victim] against her will . . . .” The indictm ent furth er alleg ed se rious b odily
injury to the victim and that a deadly weapon was used during the commission
of the crim inal act.
Coun ts 1, 2, 3, and 5 plainly and clearly alleged the Appellant’s
felonious intent to sa tisfy any req uireme nts of allegations of the appropriate mens
rea.
Appellant places the most emphasis in his argum ent on the fourth
count of the indictment, which alleges in full as follows:
The Gran d Juro rs for the State a nd Co unty afo resaid , upon their
oath present and say that Rand y Blaine Knigh t on or about the 24
day of July, 1983, in the State and C ounty afores aid did unlaw fully
and feloniously, sexually pen etrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that
force or coercion was used to accomplish the act and that the
defendant was armed with a weapon, to-wit: a .25 caliber autom atic
pistol. The defenda nt cause d perso nal injury to th e said [victim ].
The defend ant’s penis touch ed he r genita l area a nd he did
penetra te her genital area with his finger se veral tim es, an d did
injure her by striking h er with his g un, and biting her, co ntrary to the
Statute, [a]gainst the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
In support of his argument, Appellant relies upon the decision of this
Court in State v. Rog er Da le Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne
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Coun ty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Nas hville, June 20, 199 6). However, our supreme
court reversed this Court’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725
(Tenn . 1997).
Furthermore, a panel of this Co urt has previously h eld in a similar
case that the ruling of this Court in State v. Rog er Da le Hill, was based upon an
interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c), which was
enacted in 1989. See Gregory L. Hatton v. State of Tennessee, C.C.A . No.
02C01-9611-CC-00407, slip op. at 2, Lake County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson,
Feb. 19 , 1997).
As in Hatton, Appellant was convicted of an offense which occurred
prior to enactm ent of the 1 989 revis ions to the Crimina l Code. We conclude that
the langu age in the ind ictment charging appellant with various offenses was
sufficient under the law as it existed at the time of the offenses.
Appe llant’s petition may be dismissed sum marily if the pe tition fails
to state a co gnizab le claim. See Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 280, 283
(Tenn. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed
Appellant’s petition.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
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CONCUR:
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES , Judge
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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