PHILLIPS v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LYNN ANN PHILLIPS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-16

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY )

)

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845

F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because

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it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff raises several arguments challenging the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”)’s determination of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc. No. 7).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the treating medical source

opinion of Sara Shellhammer, PA-C. (Id. at 14-16). Further, Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ’s mental RFC determination failed to incorporate all of her limitations. (Id. at 16-

19). Lastly, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective

testimony. (Id. at 19-21). Upon consideration of the record, the Court disagrees with

Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence.

After reviewing all of the evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

following RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except the claimant can only operate foot

controls with [the] right foot occasionally, she can operate foot controls with

[the] left foot occasionally, occasionally reaching overhead to the left, and

occasionally reaching overhead to the right. For all other reaching she can

reach frequently to the left, and can reach frequently to the right. The

claimant can climb ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, balance frequently, stoop occasionally, kneel

occasionally, crouch occasionally, and never crawl. The claimant can

work at unprotected heights occasionally, never moving mechanical parts,

and can operate a motor vehicle occasionally. She can work in humidity

and wetness occasionally, in extreme cold occasionally, in extreme heat

occasionally, [and] in vibration occasionally. In addition to normal

breaks, the claimant will be off task 10% of the time in an 8 hour work day

due to the side effects of claimant’s medication and the pain from her

impairments.

(R. 23-24). Plaintiff contends this RFC is the result of legal error because the ALJ

improperly rejected Ms. Shellhammer’s opinion, failed to incorporate all of her mental

limitations, and improperly rejected her subjective testimony based on the fact that she was

“stable.” (Doc. No. 7). The Court finds no merit in any of these arguments for the

following reasons.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “singularly focused” on her spinal disorders in

rejecting Ms. Shellhammer’s opinion without explaining how her fibromyalgia or narcotic

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dependence factored into the analysis of this opinion. (Doc. No. 7 at 14-16). The Court

disagrees. Ms. Shellhammer opined that Plaintiff was limited to less than sedentary work

with additional postural, manipulative, environmental, off-task, and absenteeism

limitations. (R. 27; Ex. 9F). The ALJ explained that he found this opinion not

persuasive because while it was supported by citations to her examination of Plaintiff, the

more severe limitations in her opinion were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s mild spinal

impairments and mostly normal examinations. (R. 27). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

overlooked Ms. Shellhammer’s statements that Plaintiff’s use of narcotics and muscle

relaxers “can cause drowsiness.” (Doc. No. 7 at 15). However, Ms. Shellhammer never

indicated that Plaintiff actually experienced such side effects. Indeed, as Defendant

correctly points out, the record shows that Plaintiff reported no side effects from her

medications on multiple occasions. (See, e.g., R. 628, 653, 776, 906, 988, 1105, 1118).

The record did, however, evidence side effects causing 10% off-task time in addition to

normal breaks, which the ALJ incorporated into Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 23, 27).

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in his

evaluation of Ms. Shellhammer’s opinion because he failed to consider her use of narcotics

to treat fibromyalgia. (Doc. No. 7 at 15-16 (citing Payne v. Berryhill, No. 18-76, 2019

WL 1082488 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2019)). However, as Defendant point out, unlike in

Payne, the ALJ here did not rest his analysis on a statement that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia

treatment was “limited and conservative.” Id. at *2. Rather, here, the ALJ noted

Plaintiff’s use of narcotics to treat her fibromyalgia and chronic narcotic dependence

throughout his decision. (R. 21, 24). Accordingly, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s

arguments regarding the analysis of Ms. Shellhammer’s opinion.

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why he declined

to adopt Ms. Shellhammer’s opined absenteeism limitations and failed to add limitations

to account for her concentration and attention. (Doc. No. 7 at 16). Additionally, she

argues that the ALJ should have found her to be disabled because she would be off-task

25% of the workday and absent two to four days per month. (Id.). The Court rejects

both of these arguments because the record did not support adoption of these limitations in

the RFC. As explained above, the ALJ properly rejected Ms. Shellhammer’s opinion and

was under no obligation to adopt her opined limitations. Further, the ALJ declined to

adopt these more limiting off-task and absenteeism limitations based on the record

evidence. Instead, the ALJ explained that he adopted certain off-task limitations into the

RFC based on Plaintiff’s pain. (R. 23-24). In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments on these points

are without merit.

Moreover, the ALJ accounted for all of Plaintiff’s mental limitations in her RFC.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored her non-severe mental impairments and the opinion

of the psychological consultative examiner, Dr. Adrienne Gallo, Psy.D., when crafting the

RFC. (Doc. No. 7 at 16-19). For the following reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s

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determination that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in the four broad areas of mental

functioning and his analysis of Dr. Gallo’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s RFC adequately reflected the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments were non-severe at Step Two and his conclusion that Dr. Gallo’s opinion was

persuasive. After considering the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had only mild

limitations in each of the four broad functional areas known as the “Paragraph B Criteria.”

(R. 21-22). These findings were consistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Gallo’s

opinion was persuasive as Dr. Gallo opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in almost all

areas of mental functioning and only mild limitations in her ability to make judgments on

complex work-related decisions, and interact appropriately with the public. (R. 27, 871-

72). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately explain why he accepted Dr.

Gallo’s opinion and then did not incorporate his opined mental limitations. (Doc. No. 7

at 18). The Court notes that the ALJ is under no obligation to incorporate certain

limitations just because he or she finds an opinion persuasive. See Wilkinson v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014). Moreover, the ALJ’s finding of

non-severe mental impairments and mild limitations in the Paragraph B Criteria is

consistent with no resultant RFC limitations. See D.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-

2484, 2021 WL 1851830, at *5 (D.N.J. May 10, 2021) (quoting Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372

F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2004)) (stating “[w]here the ALJ concludes that a claimant’s

deficiency is ‘so minimal or negligible that . . . it would not limit her ability’ to perform

required work tasks, the ALJ may exclude that deficiency or limitation from the RFC

without error.”) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC

finding.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly rejected her

subjective testimony based on her “stability.” (Doc. No. 7 at 20-21 (citing Morales v.

Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2000)). However, unlike in Morales, the ALJ here did

not discount a treating physician’s opinion because Plaintiff was “stable.” Id. at 317-19.

Rather, here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s treatment notes, which documented that

Plaintiff had stable pain, her spine fusion was stable, and her migraines were stable, and

used this in combination with other evidence to reject Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

(R. 26). The ALJ explained that the record was not entirely consistent with Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints as the record showed that Plaintiff reported many daily activities,

denied needing reminders or having difficulty bending, reaching, following instructions,

or completing tasks, and many examinations revealed that Plaintiff often walked with a

normal gait, had a full range of motion, had no tenderness, and had intact strength and

sensation. (Id.). All together, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis of

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See Jones o/b/o E.D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-2133,

2022 WL 17660974, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2022), report and recommendation adopted

sub nom., Jones on behalf of E.D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-02133, 2022 WL 17627776

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2022) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ relied solely on

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

statements that plaintiff’s condition was “stable” in finding that she was not disabled as the

ALJ fairly and carefully assessed evidence of plaintiff’s improvement on medication in

light of other factual, medical, and opinion evidence).

In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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