although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief
How later courts described this case
- although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief
- setting forth standard of review and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules”
- “A case might become moot if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
- “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHILLIP LEE CARSON, No. 23-15410
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00196-ROS-CDB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN, ADOC Director
(Retired); et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 17, 2025**
Before: CANBY, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Phillip Lee Carson appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment and dismissal orders in his action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Furnace v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (summary judgment and qualified
immunity determination); Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 970 n.8 (9th Cir.
2014) (mootness determination); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.
2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm in part, reverse in part,
vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Babeu,
Rice, and Willis on Carson’s deliberate indifference claims (Claim 5) because it
would not have been clear to every reasonable prison official that requiring Carson
to move his boxes and personal property out of his cell was unlawful under the
circumstances, and Carson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Willis was deliberately indifferent after Carson fell out of his bunk. See
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under § 1983
are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was clearly
established, meaning that “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (to establish deliberate
indifference, a prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also
draw the inference”).
The district court properly dismissed as moot Carson’s Free Exercise Clause
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and RLUIPA claims regarding the all-vegan kosher diet (Claim 9) because the
prison amended its food services contract to restore meat and dairy to the kosher
diet. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 170 (2000) (“A case might become moot if subsequent events make it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.”).
The district court properly dismissed Carson’s failure-to-protect; due
process; and deliberate indifference claims (Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7) because Carson
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim, and the district court
properly dismissed Carson’s access-to-courts claim (Claim 3) because Carson
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining
that an access-to-courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct
caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim).
However, dismissal without leave to amend of Claims 1, 4, 6, and 7 was
premature because it is not “absolutely clear” that any deficiencies could not be
cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court should
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grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d
245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure
the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies
and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Because the
deficiencies in these claims may be cured by amendment, we vacate the judgment
and remand for the district court to provide Carson with an opportunity to file a
third amended complaint.
The district court erred in dismissing Carson’s Free Exercise Clause and
RLUIPA claims (Claims 8 and 10) because Carson alleged facts supporting the
reasonable inference that Defendants impinged his sincerely held religious beliefs
and substantially burdened his practice of religion when they “ruined” his Torah,
prohibited him from sounding the shofar, denied his request to grow a five-inch
beard, and denied his request to use a bowl of water and a washcloth when praying
over meals. See Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346 (9th Cir. 2024) (“An inmate
asserting a Free Exercise claim must . . . show that he or she has a sincerely held
religious belief that was impinged by government action.”); Walker v. Beard, 789
F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[t]o state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner
must show that (1) he takes part in a ‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions
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have substantially burdened that exercise”). We reverse the district court’s
judgment as to these claims and remand for further proceedings.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Carson’s original
complaint and first amended complaint for failure to comply with local rules. See
Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of
review and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a district court’s
interpretation of its local rules”).
In sum, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment with respect to
Claim 5 and affirm the judgment dismissing Claim 9 as moot. As to the district
court’s screening dismissal, we affirm dismissal of Claims 2 and 3; vacate
dismissal of Claims 1, 4, 6, and 7; reverse dismissal of Claims 8 and 10; and
remand for further proceedings.
All pending motions are denied.
The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED.
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