Mayfield v. City of Mesa

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALISON MAYFIELD, No. 23-3222

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-

02205-JAT

v.

CITY OF MESA, OPINION

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 10, 2024

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed March 24, 2025

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and Daniel P. Collins,

Circuit Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Collins



The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

2 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act / Rehabilitation Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action brought by Alison Mayfield, who is deaf and

communicates primarily through American Sign Language

(“ASL”), alleging that she was denied a “reasonable

accommodation” in violation of Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”) when officers from the City of Mesa’s Police

Department (“MPD”) failed to provide her with an ASL

interpreter during a traffic stop and subsequent blood-

drawing procedure at a DUI facility.

The panel held that plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims were

not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

because a ruling in plaintiff’s favor would not necessarily

negate an element of the offense of which she was

convicted—reckless driving—and would not otherwise

imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence. The

district court erred in two respects in its application of the

Heck bar. First, the district court erroneously considered

whether plaintiff’s claims, if successful, would undermine

her original charges for DUI and not merely her ultimate

conviction for reckless driving. Second, the district court

erred in concluding that the City of Mesa had carried its

burden to establish the applicability of the Heck bar in this

case.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 3

Turning to the merits, the panel held that the relevant

question here was whether, in light of the exigent

circumstances applicable in the context of the stop and arrest

of a deaf motorist, the means of communication used were

sufficient to allow the detained motorist to effectively

exchange information with the officer so as to accomplish

the various tasks entailed in the stop and arrest. Applying

that standard, the panel held that plaintiff failed to plead

sufficient facts to establish that MPD discriminated against

her by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation during

her arrest and blood testing. Because plaintiff would be

unable to amend her complaint to overcome the indisputable

evidence in the incorporated body camera footage, the

district court properly dismissed her complaint without leave

to amend.

COUNSEL

David J. Hommel Jr. (argued) and Andrew Rozynski,

Eisenberg & Baum LLP, New York, New York; William A.

Richards, Richards & Moskowitz PLC, Phoenix, Arizona;

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christina G. Retts (argued), Kathleen L. Wieneke, and Laura

A. Van Buren, Wieneke Law Group, Tempe, Arizona, for

Defendant-Appellee.

4 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

This action under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794,

arises from the traffic stop and DUI arrest of Plaintiff Alison

Mayfield on the late evening of January 1, 2022. Mayfield,

who is deaf and communicates primarily through American

Sign Language (“ASL”), asserts that she was denied a

“reasonable accommodation” in violation of the ADA and

the RA when officers from the Defendant City of Mesa’s

Police Department (“MPD”) failed to provide her with an

ASL interpreter during the traffic stop and a subsequent

blood-drawing procedure at a DUI processing facility. The

district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Mayfield’s

ADA and RA claims, and she appeals. We affirm.

I

A

“Because the district court resolved this case on a motion

to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

we must take as true the operative complaint’s well-pleaded

allegations, including any such allegations that rely on the

incorporation of documents attached to the complaint, and

we draw all reasonable inferences in favor” of Mayfield.

Shields v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1220 (9th

Cir. 2022). Because Mayfield’s complaint refers to, and

quotes from, the footage from the body cameras worn by the

MPD officers who stopped and arrested Mayfield, the

district court correctly held that the body camera footage was

incorporated by reference into the complaint. See Orellana

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 5

v. Mayorkas, 6 F.4th 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2021). And

because Mayfield has never contended that the video footage

is inaccurate or unreliable, we “view[ ] the facts in the light

depicted by the videotape,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380–81 (2007), although we construe any ambiguities in the

video footage in “the light most favorable” to Mayfield, see

Orellana, 6 F.4th at 1043. See also Harmon v. City of

Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (stating that,

“where video recordings are included in the pleadings, as is

the case here, the video depictions of events, viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be adopted over

the factual allegations in the complaint if the video ‘blatantly

contradict[s]’ those allegations” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at

380) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)). With these

principles in mind, we take the following facts as true for

purposes of this appeal.

On January 1, 2022, Alison Mayfield was driving home

at around 9:45 PM, when MPD Officer M. Hall pulled

Mayfield over after assertedly observing her “weaving” in

traffic.1 Mayfield is deaf and primarily communicates

through ASL, and this fact shaped her ensuing contacts with

Officer Hall and other officers. Although Mayfield is able

to communicate verbally with a “quality assistive hearing

device,” the particular device Mayfield was wearing in her

left ear at the time of the traffic stop was of poor quality.

Due to that circumstance and to “the wind and other outside

noises” during the stop, Mayfield was unable to hear any

human speech during her interaction with the police.

1

The footage does not clearly show Mayfield weaving, but Mayfield

does not dispute “that she was driving recklessly.” After she was

stopped, Mayfield told Officer Hall that her car has “mechanical issues”

that cause it to “pull[] to the left.”

6 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

Mayfield, however, also has a “limited ability to read lips”

and is able to read and write in English.

Given these circumstances, Mayfield and Officer Hall

used a variety of different means to communicate throughout

the traffic stop. At some points, they each typed out

messages on their cell phones and then showed those

messages to one another. On other occasions, Officer Hall

spoke facing Mayfield, so that Mayfield could read her lips.

Officer Hall also later retrieved a notepad from her vehicle,

and she wrote out messages for Mayfield on the notepad.

Although Mayfield alleges that she had trouble reading the

various messages because she had been pulled over on a

street with no nearby streetlights, Officer Hall repeatedly

used her flashlight to help Mayfield read her typed and

handwritten questions and instructions, and Mayfield also

turned on the lights in her car on one occasion so that Officer

Hall could read the response that Mayfield had typed on her

phone. At another point, Officer Hall tried to shape letters

with her fingers, but without much apparent success, and she

and Mayfield instead communicated by typing on their

phones. To more clearly set forth Officer Hall’s and

Mayfield’s specific use of these various methods over the

course of their interaction during the traffic stop, we will

recount their encounter in more detail, proceeding

chronologically.

When Officer Hall first came up to Mayfield’s driver’s

side window, Mayfield “immediately began

communicating” in ASL, including “request[ing] an ASL

interpreter.” Mayfield also immediately made a gesture of

writing on a surface, thereby signaling to Officer Hall that

the officer could write out any communications. Officer

Hall did not know ASL, and upon realizing that Mayfield is

deaf, she promptly walked back to her vehicle to retrieve her

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 7

phone. She then began typing out messages to Mayfield on

her phone, albeit with some “typos,” and she showed them

to Mayfield, using her flashlight to help illuminate the area.

In response to Officer Hall’s messages, Mayfield was able

to communicate to Officer Hall that she had used marijuana

at around 8:00 AM that day.2

Officer Hall was able to communicate to Mayfield that

she wanted her driver’s license, and while Mayfield was

looking for it, Officer Hall radioed for backup, specifically

asking whether there was someone available who knew sign

language. Officer Hall then returned to her patrol vehicle,

where she checked Mayfield’s driver’s license and obtained

a notepad, a pen, and a clipboard with forms. Before

returning to Mayfield’s car, Officer Hall wrote out certain

instructions on the notepad, including “Can you exit the

vehicle please?”; “We will stand on the sidewalk.”; and “Can

I pat you down for weapons?” When Officer Hall showed

these instructions to Mayfield, she promptly got out of her

car and moved to the sidewalk.

At around that time, MPD Officer Van Hilsen, who does

not know ASL, arrived as backup. Mayfield was able to

consent to a pat down search for weapons, and Officer Hall

performed the search. Officer Hall then wrote out the

following on a notepad: “I would like to do some testing to

make sure you are safe to drive. Is that OK[?]” She showed

Mayfield that note, illuminating it with her flashlight.

Mayfield wrote a message on the note and handed it back to

Officer Hall, who read it and said, “Okay.” Although

Officer Van Hilsen did not read Mayfield’s note, he

2

According to Mayfield, she legally uses marijuana “[t]o alleviate the

symptoms associated with vertigo and debilitating migraines.”

8 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

observed Mayfield’s gestures and body language, and he

said, “Bathroom.”

Officer Hall proceeded to administer several different

sobriety tests. The first test required Mayfield to follow a

moving pen with her eyes, and Mayfield was able to follow

Officer Hall’s instructions, which were given orally and

through gestures.

For the next test, which is sometimes referred to as a

“Romberg” test,3 Officer Hall showed Mayfield a set of pre-

printed instructions on a form, pointing to the relevant

language with her pen and underlining portions of it. Officer

Van Hilsen used his flashlight to illuminate the instructions

as Officer Hall went over them with Mayfield. Mayfield

nodded after looking at the relevant text, although she

alleges in her complaint that she understood the instructions

“only partially.” Officer Hall supplemented the written form

with oral instructions, asking Mayfield to keep her feet

together and her arms at her sides and to put her head back

with her eyes closed. Mayfield followed those instructions

and stayed in that position while Officer Hall timed her.

Before administering the third test, Officer Hall wrote a

message on her notepad, and then Mayfield wrote her

response on the same notepad. Officer Hall then explained

the test, alternating between spoken explanations and

pointing to pre-printed instructions. At one point, Mayfield

held on with her left hand to the clipboard that contained the

written instructions, and her right-hand finger traced along

the relevant instructions as she read them. The test was a

3

See Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir.

2007) (stating that, in the “Romberg” test, “the individual must keep his

feet together, hold his arms by his side, tilt his head back, close his eyes,

and count silently for thirty seconds”).

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 9

walk-and-turn test, requiring Mayfield to take nine steps in

a line, turn, and then take nine steps back in a line. Officer

Hall also demonstrated the test by performing three steps

herself. After she did so, she asked Mayfield if she had any

questions, and Mayfield shook her head no. Mayfield then

performed the test.

The fourth and final test required Mayfield to stand on

one leg. Officer Hall explained this test orally while

pointing to the written instructions on the clipboard, which

were illuminated by her flashlight. Officer Hall also

demonstrated what she wanted Mayfield to do. After

explaining this test, Officer Hall asked Mayfield if she

understood, and Mayfield slightly nodded her head and

gestured with her hand. Officer Hall then asked Mayfield if

she had any questions, and Mayfield shook her head no.

Mayfield then proceeded to perform this test.

Although Mayfield was able to complete the tests, she

apparently did not pass them. According to Mayfield, her

failed tests were not due to intoxication. Rather, as a result

of her deafness, Mayfield suffers from vertigo, which she

asserts makes it difficult for her to complete balancing tests.

Further, she alleges, it was below 50 degrees outside, and

she had a “dire need to use the restroom.”

After the testing was completed, Mayfield was placed in

handcuffs, with her hands in front of her rather than behind

her. Officer Hall stated that she would get Mayfield to a

restroom. Officer Hall told Mayfield that she would not be

going to jail, that she would just be completing “paperwork”

and would then go home. Mayfield was “transported . . . in

the back of a patrol car to MPD’s DUI processing facility.”

She was administered a written Miranda warning. At the

DUI processing facility, Mayfield was able to use the

10 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

restroom. She “once again requested an [ASL] interpreter”

but was “told that none was available.” Another officer at

the facility, MPD Officer Voeltz, attempted to have

Mayfield communicate with him through a video call with

his mother, who he said was a certified ASL translator, but

the call was unsuccessful. Mayfield received a consent form

for blood drawing, which she read and signed. Mayfield

then cooperated with the person who drew her blood sample.

Mayfield was given a second form to review, and after

reading it, she signed the form.

Mayfield was subsequently charged with (1) “driving

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs,

vapor[-]releasing substance[s,] or any combination thereof,”

in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1381(A)(1);

and (2) “driving while there [wa]s any drug defined in

[Arizona Revised Statutes] § 13-3401 or its metabolite in

[her] body,” in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-

1381(A)(3). These charges were ultimately dropped when

Mayfield instead pleaded guilty to a single count of reckless

driving in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-

693(A), which provides that “[a] person who drives a vehicle

in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property is

guilty of reckless driving.”

B

Mayfield sued the City of Mesa under Title II of the

ADA and § 504 of the RA, alleging that the City’s MPD

officers had discriminated against her by failing to provide a

reasonable accommodation for her disability—namely,

either an in-person ASL interpreter or a Video Remote

Interpreting service—after she was pulled over. The district

court dismissed Mayfield’s complaint with prejudice,

holding alternatively that (1) Mayfield’s claims were barred

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 11

pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (2) in any event,

Mayfield had not plausibly alleged claims under the ADA or

RA. This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

We first address the district court’s holding that

Mayfield’s ADA and RA claims are barred by Heck.

Under Heck, a plaintiff’s civil claims challenging

government conduct in connection with her arrest and

prosecution may not proceed if a judgment in her favor

“would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction

or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487; see Nelson v. Campbell, 541

U.S. 637, 647 (2004) (noting that Heck was “careful . . . to

stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily’”). Although

Heck itself concerned claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we

have held that Heck’s reasoning applies equally to claims

under Title II of the ADA. See Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189

F.3d 999, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There is no reason to

believe that ADA claims should be treated any differently

than § 1983 claims when examining whether a prisoner’s

case should have been brought under habeas corpus.”).

Mayfield contends that Heck is inapplicable to her particular

claims, because a ruling in her favor here would not

necessarily negate an element of the offense of which she

was convicted and would not otherwise imply the invalidity

of her conviction or sentence. Reviewing the district court’s

application of Heck de novo, see Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90

F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024), we agree.

To evaluate “whether success on” an ADA claim “would

necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, we must

determine which acts formed the basis for the conviction.”

12 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

Lemos v. County of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.

2022) (en banc). When, as here, “the conviction is based on

a guilty plea, we look at the record to see which acts formed

the basis for the plea.” Id. If the plaintiff’s success on her

claim would “‘negat[e] an element of the offense’ of which

she was convicted,” id. at 1007 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at

486 n.6), then Heck bars that claim. Under our precedent,

however, Heck does not apply when (1) the plaintiff

committed multiple distinct acts that were each “sufficient to

warrant the filing of a criminal charge”; (2) the plaintiff is

challenging police conduct with respect to only one or some

of those acts; and (3) “the record does not reflect which acts

underlay [the plaintiff’s] plea.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394

F.3d 689, 696–97 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), disapproved on

other grounds by Lemos, 40 F.4th at 1008–09; see also Byrd

v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 644–45 (9th Cir.

2018). Put differently, when the plaintiff’s conviction could

be based on activity or evidence untainted by purportedly

unlawful police conduct, then her claims are not “necessarily

inconsistent with [her] conviction,” and the Heck bar does

not apply. Smith, 394 F.3d at 696.

Applying these principles, we conclude that the district

court erred in two respects in its application of the Heck bar

here. First, the district court erroneously considered whether

Mayfield’s claims, if successful, would undermine her

original charges for DUI and not merely her ultimate

conviction for reckless driving. But as we reiterated in

Lemos, Heck only bars claims that “would necessarily imply

the invalidity of a conviction,” 40 F.4th at 1006 (emphasis

added) (original emphasis omitted), and here, Mayfield

pleaded guilty to, and was only convicted of, reckless

driving in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-

693(A). Indeed, once Mayfield accepted her plea agreement

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 13

and entered her guilty plea, there were no longer any pending

DUI charges against her, because the plea agreement

explicitly “amend[ed] the [criminal] complaint to charge the

offense to which [Mayfield] plead[ed].” The Heck inquiry

in this case must therefore be focused only on the specific

offense of which Mayfield was ultimately convicted. A civil

claim that would only undermine a charged offense that was

later dropped is not sufficient to trigger the Heck bar.

Second, the district court erred in concluding that the

City had carried its burden to establish the applicability of

the Heck bar in this case. See Washington v. Los Angeles

Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 n.5 (9th Cir.

2016) (holding that the defendant asserting the Heck bar has

the burden to “show that the plaintiff’s success in the action

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal

conviction”). The judicially noticed records from

Mayfield’s criminal case that were submitted in support of

the City’s motion to dismiss do not contain any recitation of

the factual basis for Mayfield’s plea, but instead merely state

that “[a] basis in fact exists for believing the defendant guilty

of the offense[] charged.” As a result, the district court erred

in concluding that the City had shown that Mayfield’s

conviction necessarily rested on the evidence obtained

during and after the traffic stop, such that success in

Mayfield’s suit would call into question the legality of the

collection of that evidence and her ensuing conviction.

Nothing in the factual record or in the relevant Arizona law

precludes the equally plausible view that Mayfield’s plea

and conviction could have sufficiently rested solely on

Officer Hall’s observation of Mayfield’s vehicle weaving on

the road prior to the challenged traffic stop. Visibly weaving

in traffic may qualify as driving “in reckless disregard for

the safety of persons or property,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-

14 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

693(A), and testimony from Officer Hall concerning

Mayfield’s weaving would be amply sufficient to establish

that offense in a way that is completely independent of the

merits of this civil suit. Because the record thus does not

suffice to establish which of Mayfield’s “temporally [and]

spatially” “distinct” acts—viz., her weaving while driving or

her asserted intoxication—underlies her plea and conviction,

a ruling in her favor would not necessarily “demonstrate the

invalidity of” her conviction. Beets v. County of Los

Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Heck,

512 U.S. at 486–87), disapproved on other grounds by

Lemos, 40 F.4th at 1009. Heck therefore does not bar

Mayfield’s ADA and RA claims.

III

We proceed to consider the merits of Mayfield’s claims,

reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo. See Martell

v. Cole, 115 F.4th 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2024).

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with

a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded

from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132. Section 504 of the RA similarly provides that “[n]o

otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United

States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 794(a). Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA are

“interpreted coextensively because there is no significant

difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created

by” each provision. Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 15

11 F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (simplified). Accordingly,

we will limit our discussion to the ADA claim, but with the

understanding that the following analysis will equally apply

to the RA claim.

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a Title II claim may arise

where police “fail to reasonably accommodate the

[plaintiff’s] disability in the course of investigation or arrest,

causing the [plaintiff] to suffer greater injury or indignity in

that process than other arrestees.” Sheehan v. City & County

of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d

in part on other grounds, 575 U.S. 600 (2015).4 “To prove

that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA,

[a plaintiff] must show that: (1) [she] is a qualified individual

with a disability; (2) [she] was either excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by

reason of [her] disability.” Updike v. Multnomah County,

870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified).

There is no dispute that Title II applies to the City of

Mesa. Likewise, the parties do not dispute that Mayfield has

sufficiently alleged that, under Title II, she is a qualified

individual with a disability and that, if she establishes

actionable discrimination under prong (2), such

4

In Sheehan, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in part to

determine whether Title II of the ADA applies to arrests, but it ultimately

determined that the writ had been improvidently granted as to that

question, and so it did not decide that issue one way or the other.

575 U.S. at 610. Consequently, this court’s holding that “Title II applies

to arrests,” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232, remains the binding law of this

circuit. See Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1036–37 (9th

Cir. 2018).

16 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

discrimination would be “by reason” of her disability. The

key issue, then, is whether Mayfield has sufficiently alleged

that MPD discriminated against her in violation of Title II.

Here, Mayfield’s theory is that MPD officers

discriminated against her by failing to communicate with her

in a manner that reasonably accommodated her deafness,

thereby depriving her of the ability to fully participate in the

officers’ questioning and testing. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at

1233 (holding that “failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation” in the course of an investigation or arrest

may constitute unlawful discrimination under Title II); see

also Updike, 870 F.3d at 951 (“The failure to provide

reasonable accommodation can constitute discrimination.”

(simplified)). A plaintiff asserting a reasonable-

accommodation claim under Title II “bears the initial burden

of producing evidence of the existence of a reasonable

accommodation,” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233, that was

“denied or . . . not provided,” Updike, 870 F.3d at 951. If

the plaintiff carries this burden, the defendant may

nonetheless defeat the claim by showing that the plaintiff’s

proposed accommodation would cause an “undue burden.”

Id. at 950.

“[T]he reasonableness of an accommodation is

ordinarily a question of fact.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233.

In assessing whether there has been a violation of the

obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to a deaf

individual, we have held that there is no per se obligation to

provide “an on-site interpreter every time” one is requested;

“[r]ather, the test is whether an individual has received an

auxiliary aid sufficient to prevent any ‘real hindrance’ in her

ability to exchange information.” Bax v. Doctors Med. Ctr.

of Modesto, Inc., 52 F.4th 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). “Assessing whether an entity provided appropriate

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 17

auxiliary aids where necessary to afford effective

communication is a fact-intensive exercise. The trier of fact

must weigh several factors, including the method of

communication used by the individual; the nature, length,

and complexity of the communication involved; and the

context in which the communication is taking place.” Id.

(simplified).

Moreover, in the specific context of arrests, the court

must also consider whether any “exigent circumstances”

surrounding the plaintiff’s encounter with law enforcement

would render a proposed reasonable accommodation

impracticable. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (“[E]xigent

circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the

ADA, just as they inform the distinct reasonableness

analysis under the Fourth Amendment.”). As the Sheehan

Court explained, “[e]xigent circumstances include those

circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to

believe that [police conduct] was necessary to prevent

physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction

of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other

consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law

enforcement efforts.” Id. at 1221 (simplified).

Taking these various propositions together, we conclude

that the relevant question here is whether, in light of the

exigent circumstances applicable in the context of the stop

and arrest of a deaf motorist, the means of communication

used were sufficient to allow the detained motorist to

effectively exchange information with the officer so as to

accomplish the various tasks entailed in the stop and arrest.

Applying that standard, we hold that Mayfield has failed to

plead sufficient facts to establish that MPD “discriminated

against [her] by failing to provide a reasonable

accommodation during” her arrest and blood testing.

18 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009).

With respect to the questioning and sobriety testing

preceding Mayfield’s arrest, the body camera footage

establishes that, even if Mayfield’s understanding of Officer

Hall’s instructions was only partial, it was nonetheless

sufficient to enable her to provide the information being

requested and then to complete the various field sobriety

tests she was asked to perform. As our above summary

makes clear, Officer Hall’s body camera footage shows that

Mayfield and Officer Hall were able to effectively

communicate with one another in all material respects

throughout the encounter, thereby confirming that there was

no “‘real hindrance’ in [Mayfield’s] ability to exchange

information.” Bax, 52 F.4th at 867. Officer Hall was able

to communicate the purpose of the stop, and Mayfield

responded by informing Officer Hall that she had consumed

marijuana more than 12 hours before driving. Mayfield was

able to produce her license upon request, and she was able

to read and follow Officer Hall’s handwritten instructions

asking her to exit her vehicle and stand on the sidewalk. She

was then able to read handwritten notes advising her that she

would be subjected to a pat down and to sobriety tests, and

she was able to communicate to the two officers then on the

scene that she needed to use the bathroom. The video

footage further confirms that, thereafter, by the use of a

combination of written instructions, lip-reading, and/or

visual demonstration by Officer Hall, Mayfield was able to

understand the instructions for each of the four sobriety tests

and that Mayfield did in fact attempt to perform the specific

tasks required in each of those four tests.

Likewise, at the DUI processing facility, Mayfield was

able to effectively communicate in all respects that were

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 19

material to the accomplishment of the relevant tasks. In

particular, Mayfield was presented with physical copies of

the pertinent consent documents, and she attested, with her

signature, that she had read and understood them. Although

Officer Voeltz’s attempts to communicate with her were less

successful, there are no allegations sufficient to support a

plausible inference that any material aspect of the DUI

processing was ultimately hindered.

Moreover, as other courts have recognized, traffic

stops—particularly for suspected DUI offenses—present

“exigent circumstances” that limit the range of what would

constitute a “reasonable modification of police procedures.”

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1086 (11th

Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Bahl v. County of

Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 785–86 (8th Cir. 2012) (expressly

agreeing with Bircoll on this point). In particular, the safety

concerns presented by a roadside traffic stop, the need to

make a prompt judgment as to a motorist’s ability to drive,

and the interest in potentially collecting accurate test results

measuring intoxication before such evidence dissipates all

warrant acting without unnecessary delay. As the Eleventh

Circuit explained in rejecting a comparable claim for a

roadside interpreter during a 3:00 AM DUI traffic stop of a

deaf motorist:

[W]e conclude that waiting for an oral

interpreter before taking field sobriety tests is

not a reasonable modification of police

procedures given the exigent circumstances

of a DUI stop on the side of a highway, the

on-the-spot judgment required of police, and

the serious public safety concerns in DUI

criminal activity. In DUI stops, as opposed

20 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

to minor traffic offenses, the danger to human

life is high. To protect public safety, [the

officer] had to determine quickly, on the

roadside at 3:00 a.m., whether [the motorist]

was sober enough to drive his car further or

whether to impound his car and arrest him.

DUI stops involve a situation where time is

of the essence. Forestalling all police activity

at a roadside DUI stop until an oral interpreter

arrives is not only impractical but also would

jeopardize the police’s ability to act in time

to obtain an accurate measure of the driver’s

inebriation. Moreover, field sobriety

exercises are short tests that can be physically

and visually demonstrated. DUI stops do not

involve lengthy communications and the

suspect is not asked to give a written

statement. In sum, field sobriety tests in DUI

arrests involve exigencies that necessitate

prompt action for the protection of the public

and make the provision of an oral interpreter

to a driver who speaks English and can read

lips per se not reasonable.

Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086; see also Rosen v. Montgomery

County, 121 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The police do

not have to get an interpreter before they can stop and

shackle a fleeing bank robber, and they do not have to do so

to stop a suspected drunk driver, conduct a field sobriety test,

and make an arrest.”).

Although the traffic stop here did not occur quite as late

as the one in Bircoll, that is not a meaningful distinction in

the context of this case. Officer Hall’s stop of Mayfield

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 21

occurred on the side of the road late in the evening on a

holiday, after Officer Hall had assertedly observed Mayfield

“weaving” as she drove. Officer Hall thus reasonably

suspected that Mayfield might be under the influence of an

intoxicant, and delay in conducting sobriety tests could have

“jeopardize[d]” Officer Hall’s “ability to act in time to

obtain an accurate measure of” Mayfield’s potential

inebriation and to protect the public. Bircoll, 480 F.3d at

1086. Moreover, Officer Hall explicitly did request a “‘sign

language’ officer” very early in the encounter with Mayfield,

but no such officer was available at the time of the DUI stop,

nor was one available later when Hall was booked at the DUI

processing facility. And even though “the exigencies of the

situation were greatly reduced” by the time Mayfield was at

the DUI processing facility, they were not eliminated, and

the video footage of the events at that facility, as well as the

consent forms—all of which are properly deemed to be

incorporated into Mayfield’s complaint—confirm that

“effective communication” was achieved for purposes of the

relevant task to be accomplished, which was drawing a

sample of Mayfield’s blood for testing. See Bircoll, 480

F.3d at 1087; see also id. at 1086–87 (stating that the key

question is “[w]hat steps are reasonably necessary to

establish effective communication with a hearing-impaired

person after a DUI arrest and at a police station” and that

effective communication was established where the officer

“gave physical demonstrations” of the field sobriety

exercises “[i]n addition to verbal instructions,” and the

motorist admitted that he “understood that he was being

asked to perform field sobriety tests” and that “he actually

tried to perform at least three of those tests”).

Given the exigent circumstances inherent in the traffic

stop and subsequent drawing of blood, and the overall

22 MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA

adequacy of the communications between the officers and

Mayfield with respect to the relevant tasks, Mayfield is

wrong in contending that the obligation to provide

reasonable accommodations required Officer Hall to obtain

an interpreter, either “on-site or through video remote

interpreting . . . services.” The MPD therefore did not

violate Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the RA, and

Mayfield’s complaint was properly dismissed for failure to

state a claim. See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086–87 (rejecting

Title II claim where “the actual communication between [the

highway officer] and [the motorist] was not so ineffective

that an oral interpreter was necessary to guarantee that [the

motorist] was on equal footing with hearing individuals”);

see also Rosen, 121 F.3d at 158 (holding that, because the

deaf motorist “adequately participated in the various tests for

intoxication, and the officers obtained the information they

needed to complete the booking process,” the motorist “was

simply not ‘discriminated against’ just because he could not

follow everything the officers were telling him”).5 And

5

Mayfield cites a “Best Practices Toolkit” that was issued by the U.S.

Department of Justice in 2007, and she contends that (1) this document

has the force of a binding regulation; and (2) this document “require[s]”

the use of “advanced aids,” such as an interpreter, for any

communications with a deaf person beyond “brief or simple face-to-face

exchanges.” See ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local

Governments (“Toolkit”) § 3(B)(1),

https://archive.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/ch3_toolkit.pdf. Mayfield is wrong

on both counts. The regulations authorized by Title II of the ADA, see

42 U.S.C. § 12134, are contained in Part 35 of Chapter I of Title 28 of

the Code of Federal Regulations, and not in this Toolkit document.

Indeed, the governmental website that Mayfield cites and that contains

the Toolkit explicitly states that it is merely a “guidance document,” that

it “has no legally binding effect,” and that “state and local governments

are not required to use” it. See Toolkit,

MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA 23

because, as the district court correctly observed, Mayfield

would be “unable to amend her complaint to overcome the

indisputable evidence in the incorporated body camera

footage,” the court properly dismissed the complaint without

leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that leave to amend is

properly denied when amendment would be futile). We

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing this

action with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

https://archive.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/toolkitmain.htm. In any event, as we

expressly recognized in Bax, neither the applicable regulations nor the

Toolkit establish the sort of inflexible rule Mayfield advocates. See Bax,

52 F.4th at 870 (“We do not apply categorical rules to determine which

auxiliary aids are required to achieve effective communication.”); see

also id. at 869–70 n.7 (holding that the Toolkit “contains no categorical

prescription as to the appropriate ‘aids and services’ that are required for

any particular context” (citation omitted)).