Sims v. BMW of North America LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

WILLIAM HARRISON SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:22-cv-1685-PGB-UAM

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA

LLC and BAYERISCHE

MOTOREN WERKE AG,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 211). Defendants BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW NA”) and

Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Response in

Opposition (Doc. 233), and Plaintiff submitted a Reply (Doc. 239). Upon

consideration, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is due to be

granted in part and denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment

must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” to support

its position that it is entitled to summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

“The court need consider only the cited materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). On

summary judgment, the court “do[es] not weigh conflicting evidence or make

credibility determinations.” Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).

Instead, “the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,

651 (2014) (per curiam)).

A genuine dispute of material fact is one from which “a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the

non-movant is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger

ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings, and present affirmative

evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461

F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). The non-movant must support its position by

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatories, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c)(1)(A). If the non-moving party fails to do so, the court must enter summary

judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Fabre Defense

Defendants assert the affirmative defense of apportionment of fault due to

the purported negligence of other potential tortfeasors, commonly called the Fabre

defense.1 (Doc. 136, pp. 20–21; Doc. 137, pp. 19–20). Plaintiff moves for partial

summary judgment as to the following Fabre defendants: (1) Tameca Nicole

Harris-Jackson, (2) Rachel Mettre, (3) Gloria Sims, (4) Darron Sims, (5) Patterson

Auto Sales, (6) Charlotte Patterson, (7) Jay Patterson, and (8) “other person(s) or

entity(ies), known or unknown, and for whose conduct [Defendants] bear[] no

responsibility.” (Doc. 211, p. 9 (alterations in original) (quoting Doc. 136, pp. 20–

21; Doc. 137, pp. 19–20)). Plaintiff advances two arguments: first, the defective

airbag is an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation with respect to

any negligent conduct by Ms. Harris-Jackson, Ms. Gloria Sims, and Mr. Darron

Sims (Doc. 211, pp. 13–16), and second, there is no record evidence suggesting any

conduct by Ms. Mettre, Mr. Patterson, Ms. Patterson, Patterson Auto Sales, or the

unidentified person(s) or entity(ies) contributed to causing Plaintiff’s injuries (Id.

at pp. 17–19).

1 In Fabre v. Martin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court held that an

injured Plaintiff’s damages must be apportioned among all responsible parties who contribute

to a tort even though not all of them have been joined as defendants. See Nash v. Wells Fargo

Guard Servs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263–64 (Fla. 1996). Defendants have the burden of

pleading the negligence of the nonparty, specifically identifying the nonparty, and proving

“that the nonparty’s fault contributed to the accident in order to include the nonparty’s name

on the jury verdict.” Id. at 1264.

Defendants only address record evidence regarding Ms. Harris-Jackson, Ms.

Sims, and Mr. Sims. (Doc. 233, pp. 3, 8, 10–16). Accordingly, summary judgment

is unopposed and is granted in favor of Plaintiff as to the following nonparties: Ms.

Mettre, Mr. Patterson, Ms Patterson, Patterson Auto Sales, and the unidentified

person(s) or entity(ies) that allegedly contributed to causing Plaintiff’s injuries. As

for Ms. Harris-Jackson, Ms. Gloria Sims, and Mr. Darron Sims, Plaintiff contends

the law of intervening cause precludes their inclusion on the verdict form. (Doc.

211, pp. 11–13). That is, even assuming that Ms. Harris-Jackson or Mr. and Mrs.

Sims were negligent, the defective airbag inflator in the subject BMW breaks the

causative chain of their alleged negligence. (Id. at pp. 13–15). Plaintiff’s argument

is predicted on his injuries having been caused by the airbag inflator rupturing and

not the original collision. (Id. at pp. 14, 16).

1. Intervening Cause

Plaintiff frames the issue as whether the explosion of the airbag inflator in

the subject BMW, which caused his injuries, is an intervening cause because the

original negligence does not directly contribute to the force or effectiveness of the

intervening cause. (Id. at p. 11); see St. Fort ex rel. St. Fort v. Post, Buckley, Schuh

& Jernigan, 902 So. 2d 244, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The court in St. Fort

succinctly summarized the law on intervening cause and it is worth repeating here:

Under the doctrine of intervening negligence, the original

negligence is not regarded as the “proximate cause” of the

injury, even though the injury might not have occurred but for

the original negligence, if an independent efficient cause

intervenes between the negligence and the injury and the

original negligence does not directly contribute to the force or

effectiveness of the intervening cause. Tampa Elec. Co. v.

Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939); see, e.g., Brady v.

State Paving Corp., 693 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA

1997) (owner’s intervening negligence in not correcting

known defect was proximate cause of injury, relieving

contractor of liability for installing defective product).

Moreover, “[i]t is only when an intervening cause is

completely independent of, and not in any way set in motion

by, the tortfeasor’s negligence that the intervening cause

relieves a tortfeasor from liability.” Deese v. McKinnonville

Hunting Club, Inc., 874 So.2d 1282, 1287–88 (Fla. 1st DCA

2004). If the alleged intervening cause is foreseeable, the

original negligent actor may still be liable. Id. at 1288; Gibson

v. Avis Rent–A–Car Sys., Inc., 386 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1980)[,

abrogated on other grounds by Askew v. Fla. Dep’t of Children &

Families, 385 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 2024)].

Id. at 249.

As Plaintiff notes, Florida’s courts have developed two approaches, or tests,

for determining whether an intervening cause breaks the chain of causation and

shields the original tortfeasor from liability. (Doc. 211, pp. 11–12). The first test

asks whether the harm that occurred [here the exploding inflator] was within the

scope of the danger attributable to the original tortfeasor’s negligent conduct. St.

Fort, 902 So. 2d at 249 (quoting Gibson, 386 So. 2d at 522). The second approach

asks whether the original tortfeasor’s negligence set in motion a chain of events

that caused the plaintiff’s injuries or “simply provided the occasion for the

negligence of another.” Id. at 250 (quoting Gibson, 386 So. 2d at 520).2

2 In St. Fort, the plaintiff sued the defendants and the Department of Transportation over the

design of a roadway and failure to warn, which resulted in another vehicle colliding with the

back of the plaintiff’s vehicle. 902 So. 2d at 246–47. The defendants moved for summary

judgment, claiming negligence by the car that struck the plaintiff was an intervening cause.

Id. at 248.

The Florida Supreme Court announced the crashworthiness doctrine in

D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2002). Even though the Florida

Legislature overruled D’Amario in 2011 by passing Florida Statute § 768.81(3)(b),

the reasoning that gave rise to D’Amario is instructive here.3 The court reasoned

that “unlike automobile accidents involving damages solely arising from the

collision itself, a defendant’s liability in a crashworthiness case is predicated upon

the existence of a distinct and second injury caused by a defective product.” Id. at

436–37. “The initial accident merely furnished the occasion for the manufacturer’s

fault to be tested.” Id. For all practical purposes, the Florida Supreme Court

recognized in D’Amario that a design is “an intervening cause [and] is completely

independent of, and not in any way set in motion by, the tortfeasor’s negligence

[such] that the intervening cause relieves a tortfeasor from liability.” St. Fort, 902

So. 2d at 249 (quotation omitted). Of course, if a tortfeasor knew of the design

defect and its potential to cause or enhance a plaintiff’s injuries, the foreseeability

of that harm negates intervening cause from operating.

3 Florida Statute § 768.81(3)(b) states:

In a products liability action alleging that injuries received by a

claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product, the

trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed

to the accident when apportioning fault between or among them.

The jury shall be appropriately instructed by the trial judge on the

apportionment of fault in products liability actions where there are

allegations that the injuries received by the claimant in an accident

were enhanced by a defective product. The rules of evidence apply

to these actions.

However, the intervening cause doctrine must be considered when applying

§ 768.81(3)(b). When the party causing the initial accident cannot be said to have

caused or been aware of the risks inherent in the design defect, and where the

design defect is the sole cause of the enhanced injuries, the design defect is an

intervening cause. Defendants fail to point to evidence in this record to suggest

that it was foreseeable to Ms. Harris-Jackson that the subject BMW contained a

defective inflator that would explode and injure Plaintiff. Even Defendants

continue to deny that all Takata airbag inflators are defective. (Doc. 287, p. 5).

Defendants’ lawyers attempt to create a proximate cause by arguing that Ms.

Harris-Jackson was generally aware that airbags could explode. (Doc. 233, p. 13).

What is missing is Ms. Harris-Jackson’s knowledge that the subject BMW was sold

with a defectively designed airbag inflator that would explode in this accident.

Foreseeability requires more than speculation and generalizations. This leaves the

Court to determine whether—to quote Defendants—the “Takata Corporation’s

PSDI-4 driver-side airbag inflator that utilized PSAN-based gas generant [and]

had the potential to manifest a defect after many years (typically at least a decade)

and that the Subject BMW had such an inflator” was foreseeable to Ms. Harris-

Jackson. (Doc. 287, p. 7). Stated differently, was the “Takata Corporation’s PSDI-

4 driver-side airbag inflator that utilized PSAN-based gas generant [and which]

had the potential to manifest a defect after many years (typically at least a decade)

and that the Subject BMW had such an inflator” an intervening cause completely

independent of, and not in any way set in motion by, the tortfeasor’s negligence?

(See id.). The answer to the first question is no, and the answer to the second

question is yes. As such, the Court finds that the defective airbag inflator is an

independent cause and breaks the causal connection between Ms. Harris-

Jackson’s alleged negligence in causing the initial accident and the injuries

allegedly sustained by Plaintiff when the Takata airbag inflator ruptured and

spewed shrapnel into his head and face.

Defendants raise an alternative theory for keeping Ms. Harris-Jackson on

the verdict form as a Fabre defendant. They contend that Ms. Harris-Jackson

should remain on the jury verdict because Plaintiff cannot prove his injuries were

caused by the airbag inflator rupturing and injuring him. (Doc. 233, p. 13). There

is no doubt that Plaintiff is looking to recover for his enhanced injuries. That is, the

injuries caused by the defective airbag inflator. This is evident from Defendants’

challenge to Plaintiff’s board-certified neurologist, Dr. Buechel. Defendants sought

to exclude Dr. Buechel’s opinion that the defective inflator and the shrapnel caused

Plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury. (Doc. 198, p. 4). Dr. Buechel opines that

“[r]egarding causality, in the greatest medical probability, it is [his] opinion that

each of these listed diagnoses and symptoms are indeed directly related to the

injuries he sustained in the vehicle airbag explosion which occurred on 10/24/19.”

(Doc. 198-1, p. 11; Doc. 198-2, 71:10–25).

Dr. Bonin, Plaintiff’s biomechanical engineer, is also offered to establish that

Plaintiff’s injuries are consistent with airbag inflator shrapnel striking his face.

(Doc. 200-1, pp. 7–11). Dr. Bonin’s testimony that Plaintiff was wearing his seatbelt

and his opinion that the risk of facial fractures for a belted driver with a non-

defective airbag in a frontal collision with a delta-V of 23 is about 0.18% supports

Dr. Buechel’s injury-causation opinions. (Id. at p. 10). Dr. Bonin will testify the risk

of Diffuse Brain Injury and intracranial injury is 5.96% and 0.54%, respectively,

when the airbag is functioning correctly. (Id. at p. 11). His testimony, thus,

addresses injuries caused by the defective inflator, not the original collision. Or, as

the court stated in D’Amario, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries arise from “a distinct and

second injury caused by a defective product.” 806 So. 2d at 437.

The point is that the alleged damages sustained by Plaintiff fall within the

category of enhanced injuries. If Plaintiff cannot carry the burden of proving that

the defective airbag inflator caused his damages, Defendants will prevail on the

lack of causation. A carefully crafted jury instruction can dispel any concern

Defendants may have that the jury could mistakenly award damages for injuries

caused by the original collision as opposed to his enhanced injuries resulting from

the exploding inflator.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Ms. Harris-

Jackson as a Fabre defendant is granted. Applying intervening cause to Plaintiff’s

parents, Ms. Gloria Sims and Mr. Darron Sims, presents questions of material fact

for the jury to resolve. Ms. Gloria Sims and Mr. Darron Sims received notice of the

recall and failed to warn Plaintiff of the risk of driving the Subject BMW. The jury

must determine whether Plaintiff’s injuries were foreseeable and whether

Plaintiff’s parents share responsibility for his injuries. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Ms. Sims and Mr. Sims is denied.

B. State-of-the-Art

Plaintiff contends he is entitled to summary judgment on paragraphs 8 and

9 of Defendants’ affirmative defenses wherein they allege that they are entitled to

have the jury instructed on the state-of-the-art defense codified in Florida Statute

§ 768.1257.4 Plaintiff argues that Defendants “vaguely allude to compliance with

all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards [(“FMVSS”)] as support for their

defenses,” but they have not identified the state-of-the-art they claim applies to the

subject BMW. (Doc. 211, p. 19). Defendants assert in their answers to Plaintiff’s

interrogatories that the front driver-side airbag inflator in the subject BMW was

state-of-the-art at the time it was designed and manufactured because it complied

with FMVSS 208, 209, and 210. (Doc. 211-1, pp. 6–7; Doc. 211-2, pp. 8–9).

BMW NA admits that “[t]he front driver-side airbag inflator was not

designed, tested, or manufactured by [them]. However, BMW NA understands

that the Subject Vehicle and its occupant protection system were ‘state-of-the-art’

at the time of distribution and initial sale in that the Subject Vehicle complied with

or exceeded all applicable FMVSS.” (Doc. 211-2, pp. 8–9). BMW NA does not

elaborate on the basis for this “understanding.” (See id.). And, as Plaintiff notes,

4 Florida Statute § 768.1257 provides: “In an action based upon defective design, brought

against the manufacturer of a product, the finder of fact shall consider the state of the art of

scientific and technical knowledge and other circumstances that existed at the time of

manufacture, not at the time of loss or injury.”

Defendants’ expert on automotive product development and safety, Mr. Robert

Lange, does not opine that the front driver-side airbag was state-of-the-art when

manufactured. (Doc. 211, p. 20 (citing Doc. 211-7)). Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Robert

Renz, however, does opine that when the subject BMW was manufactured feasible

and safer alternative airbag propellants existed and should have been used instead

of PSAN. (Doc. 211-5, pp. 9–17).

Section 768.1257 operates as a defense—it allows a manufacturer “to show

that its design of the product was state-of-the-art and, therefore, not defective

since it complied with the best known and available technology.” Eghnayem v.

Boston Sci. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-024061, 2016 WL 4051311, at *5 (S.D. Fla. March

17, 2016) (quoting Kaufman v. Wyeth, LLC, No. 1:02–CV–22692, 2011 WL

10483576, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2011)). As with any affirmative defense, the

defendant bears the burden of proof. Id. (citing Ellingham v. Fla. Dep’t of Children

& Family Servs., 896 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)). Defendants’ contention

that § 768.1257 “does not operate as an affirmative defense” is incorrect. (Doc. 233,

p. 17).5

Defendants contend they are entitled to present the state-of-the-art defense

because the subject BMW complied with all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards, including FMVSS 208, 209, and 210. (Id.). However, the Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standards do not establish the state-of-the-art for an airbag inflator

5 Defendants direct the Court to Florida Standard Jury Instruction 403.7(b). (Doc. 233, p. 17).

Note 5 of the “Notes on Use” for Florida Standard Jury Instruction 403.7, however, states:

“For the state-of-the-art defense see, F.S. 768.1257.”

at the time of manufacture. In Griffith v. General Motors, Corp., 303 F.3d 1276,

1281 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added), the Eleventh Circuit, in addressing the

preemptive effect of FMVSS 208, held that “the rule-making history of FMVSS 208

makes clear that [the Department of Transportation] saw it not merely as a

minimum standard, but as a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration thus “leaves a

manufacturer with a choice of safety device options” in complying with the

minimum standard announced in an FMVSS. Id. at 1282. For example, the 1984

version of FMVSS 208 is the product of competing considerations having nothing

to do with the state-of-the-art at the time, including public dislike for

nondetachable automatic seatbelts, the cost of requiring airbags in new vehicles

and concern that this cost will deter consumers from replacing an airbag after it

deploys. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 878 (2000). The

Department of Transportation is making a cost-benefit analysis designed to reduce

traffic-related injuries and fatalities by considering public policy considerations

like public sentiment and cost impact. It does not dictate the state-of-the-art when

a component part is manufactured.

Accordingly, Defendants do not carry the burden of showing that a material

issue of fact exists simply by claiming to satisfy Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards. Defendants point to no additional evidence showing or tending to show

the Takata front driver-side airbag in the subject BMW was state-of-the-art when

manufactured, and summary judgment on this defense is granted in favor of

Plaintiff.

C. Government Rules Defense

Defendants also allege they are entitled to the government rules defense

codified in Florida Statute § 768.1256.6 (Doc. 136, pp. 21–22; Doc. 137, pp. 20–21).

Plaintiff submits that Defendants failed to point out the record evidence to support

this defense. (Doc. 211, p. 22). Plaintiff argues that to be entitled to a rebuttable

6 Florida Statute § 768.1256 provides:

Government rules defense.—

(1) In a product liability action brought against a manufacturer or

seller for harm allegedly caused by a product, there is a rebuttable

presumption that the product is not defective or unreasonably

dangerous and the manufacturer or seller is not liable if, at the time

the specific unit of the product was sold or delivered to the initial

purchaser or user, the aspect of the product that allegedly caused

the harm:

(a) Complied with federal or state codes, statutes, rules,

regulations, or standards relevant to the event causing the death or

injury;

(b) The codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or standards are

designed to prevent the type of harm that allegedly occurred; and

(c) Compliance with the codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or

standards is required as a condition for selling or distributing the

product.

(2) In a product liability action as described in subsection (1),

there is a rebuttable presumption that the product is defective or

unreasonably dangerous and the manufacturer or seller is liable if

the manufacturer or seller did not comply with the federal or state

codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or standards which:

(a) Were relevant to the event causing the death or injury;

(b) Are designed to prevent the type of harm that allegedly

occurred; and

(c) Require compliance as a condition for selling or distributing

the product.

(3) This section does not apply to an action brought for harm

allegedly caused by a drug that is ordered off the market or seized

by the Federal Food and Drug Administration.

presumption of no defect, Defendants must prove three elements: (1) the subject

BMW vehicle and its front driver-side airbag inflator complied with federal or state

codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or standards relevant to the event causing

Plaintiff’s injury, (2) these codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or standards are

designed to prevent the type of harm that occurred, and (3) compliance with the

codes, statutes, rules, regulations, or standards is required as a condition for selling

or distributing the subject BMW vehicle and its front driver-side airbag inflator.

See FLA. STAT. § 768.1256(1); (Doc. 211, pp. 22–23).

Plaintiff argues that FMVSS 209 and 210 have nothing to do with vehicle

airbags, propellants, or airbag deployment. (Doc. 211, pp. 23–24). Therefore,

Defendants may not rely on these standards to advance their government rules

defense, and Defendants do not challenge this proposition. (Doc. 233, pp. 19–20).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to the government rules

defense regarding FMVSS 209 and 210. Defendants submit that FMVSS 208

presents a viable government rules defense because it provides “comprehensive

standards governing deployment of airbags in numerous scenarios.” (Id. at p. 19).

Defendants argue that “all vehicles manufactured or imported for sale in the

United States must comply with all applicable FMVSS.” (Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. §

30112(a)(2))). Section 30112(a)(1) provides the following:

[A] person may not manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale,

introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce,

or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or motor

vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date an

applicable motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under

this chapter takes effect unless the vehicle or equipment

complies with the standard and is covered by a certification

issued under section 30115 of this title.

49 U.S.C. § 30112.

Defendants assert that because § 30112 prohibits the sale of a motor vehicle

that does not comply with applicable motor vehicle safety standards, the subject

BMW must have complied with FMVSS 208 when it was sold in the United States.

(Doc. 233, p. 19). Section 30115 requires that the “manufacturer or distributor of a

motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall certify to the distributor or dealer

at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies with applicable motor vehicle

safety standards prescribed under this chapter.” 49 U.S.C. § 30115. Defendants are

correct that all vehicles manufactured or imported for sale in the United States

must comply with all applicable FMVSS, but they omit the fact that proof of such

compliance comes in the form of the certification required by § 30115. That is, the

mere fact that a vehicle has been imported does not prove the vehicle complies with

the applicable FMVSS. Plaintiff is correct that Defendants fail to point to record

evidence, i.e., the § 30115 certification, that the subject BMW complied with

FMVSS 208 when it was sold.

In Tillman v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1343 n.28 (M.D. Fla.

2015), the court highlighted that simply stating in a conclusory fashion that one is

entitled to the presumption under § 768.1256(1) without record evidence is not

enough. Plaintiff is correct that Defendants fail to produce any record evidence or

witness testimony to support their government rules defense. Therefore, summary

judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff on the government rules defense.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 211) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART as follows:

1. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Fabre

defendants is GRANTED as to Ms. Harris-Jackson, Ms. Rachel

Mettre, Patterson Auto Sales, Charlotte Patterson, Jay Patterson, and

“other person(s) or entity(ies), known or unknown, and for whose

conduct [Defendants] bear[] no responsibility” and DENIED as to

Ms. Gloria Sims and Mr. Darron Sims.

2. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’

state-of-the-art defense is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’

government rules defense is GRANTED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 21, 2025.

/ □□ / s

PAUL G.

UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties