Felder v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN FELDER ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 00123

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

)

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF )

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION ) M EMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendant. )

I. Introduction

Pro se plaintiff Kevin Felder filed this in forma pauperis action, presumably under 42

U.S.C. §1983, against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). (Doc.

No. 1). In the Civil Cover Sheet attached to his complaint, Plaintiff alleges “errors in

administration” as his cause of action. (Doc. No. 1-1). In his brief complaint, Plaintiff appears to

allege that Defendant made an error on his release date. He claims that he prepared to leave

confinement by giving away his property and informing his family, but when “APA arrived, they

[canceled] my release because of legislature the prison was not aware of due to an error [in]

misreading memos.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3). He claims this error caused him embarrassment and

emotional pain and anguish. And for relief, he requests “$500.000.”

II. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants

that application.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,

109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading

must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all

the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required

to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.

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1998).

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, the complaint consists only of bare, conclusory assertions, providing

no facts upon which a court could find Defendant engaged in any wrongdoing.

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).

However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not

“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The

Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf

of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)

(District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to

construct full claims from sentence fragments. To do so would “require ... [the courts] to explore

exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff ... [and] would ... transform the district court

from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest

arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although specific facts

are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of

what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v.

Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer

Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain either direct

or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy

federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading

standard, as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing

that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint is almost

completely devoid of facts. Additionally, the complaint fails to assert a cognizable claim within

the jurisdiction of this Court based on recognized legal authority, and the Court finds there is no

cause of action readily identifiable in the complaint. Plaintiff’s pleading, rather, is nothing more

than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. The complaint therefore fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8 and

must be dismissed on this basis.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff satisfied Rule 8 pleading requirements, to the extent Plaintiff

is asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff’s claims fail. The ODRC is an agency

of the State of Ohio and is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, unless the

State of Ohio has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued in federal court. See

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989).

Congress did not intend that Section 1983 abrogate the State of Ohio’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity, and the State of Ohio has not waived that immunity to suit in federal court. See id. at

66-67; Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the ODRC is

immune from suit. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a plausible civil rights claim against the

ODRC upon which relief may be granted.

Furthermore, although Plaintiff lists “Lorain Correctional staff, Warden, ... correctional

officers and supervisors” as additional defendants in the “Parties” section of the complaint, he

fails to state a claim for relief regarding these purported defendants. A plaintiff cannot establish

the liability of any defendant absent a clear showing that the defendant was personally involved

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in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186,

1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36082, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). “Because vicarious

liability is inapplicable to. . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676. And where individuals are merely named as defendants in a civil rights action

without supporting allegations of specific conduct in the body of the complaint, the complaint is

subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se plaintiffs. See Gilmore

v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Merely listing names in the

caption of the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not

enough to sustain recovery under §1983"); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.

2002) (affirming dismissal of complaint that did not allege with any degree of specificity which

of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of

federal rights). Here, Plaintiff does not set forth any allegations specifically connecting any of

the remaining defendants to the purported constitutional violations. Plaintiff therefore fails to

state a plausible civil rights claim against these individuals.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. No. 2) and DISMISSES the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the Court

certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be made

in good faith.

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IT ISSO ORDERED.

□□□ Denakd C. Mugent

DONALD C. NUGENT

United States District Judge

DATED: March 20, 2025

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