Thomas, III v. C/O Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

TEDDY G. THOMAS, III., : Case No. 1:25-cv-14

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

:

C/O J. LEWIS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

By separate Order plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This

matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the

complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(1) as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on March 17, 2024 he was stopped at a metal detector on the way to

eat dinner. (Doc. 1-7, Complaint at PageID 91). According to plaintiff, he was using crutches at

the time due to having a broken foot and torn Achilles tendon. Plaintiff alleges that he placed his

crutches down on a table and showed his inmate ID to the correctional officers present—including

defendants J. Lewis and Murray—before hopping through the metal detector. Plaintiff claims that

Lewis laughed at him and again asked plaintiff for his ID. After showing Lewis the ID, plaintiff

claims he placed it back in his shirt pocket and retrieved his crutches. Plaintiff alleges that Lewis

smirked and stated “all inmates are to have their IDs out at all times.” Plaintiff retrieved his ID

and carried it while using the crutches, which allegedly prompted Lewis to state “see, the gimp

can carry his ID and use his crutches at the same time.” (Id. at PageID 93). According to

plaintiff, he requested Lewis’s name before Lewis stated “I don’t care that you write me up – make

sure you spell my name right” and “hobble your ass to the chow hall, you cocksucker.” (Id.).

After a brief argument, plaintiff claims that Lewis cut him off, forced him against the wall,

and placed his left wrist into handcuffs. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Lewis that he could not

walk without his crutches, to which Lewis stated “Don’t worry, I’ll help you walk.” (Id. at PageID

94). According to plaintiff, after being handcuffed by Lewis and Murray, Lewis “aggressively

yank[ed] him away from his crutches” and forced plaintiff to hop while kneeing plaintiff’s injured

leg. (Id.). When plaintiff protested, Lewis allegedly began to twist plaintiff’s left wrist to the point

that plaintiff claims “felt like Lewis was trying to break plaintiff’s wrist.” (Id.). Plaintiff further

alleges that Lewis continued to knee his left leg, causing his injured foot to twist at the ankle and

resulting in great pain. Plaintiff claims that Murray observed the incident and ignored his cries for

help. (Id. at PageID 95).

Plaintiff claims that an “SRT Member” eventually observed them and ordered Lewis to

place plaintiff in a wheelchair. Plaintiff further claims that Murray retrieved a wheelchair, but that

he purposefully rammed it into plaintiff’s legs, resulting in the leg rest striking his broken foot and

causing intense pain. According to plaintiff, Lewis wheeled plaintiff to a strip-out cage and he

was strip searched for no legitimate reason. (Id. at PageID 96). In an attached grievance

concerning the search, plaintiff alleges that Lewis’s goal in conducting the search was to humiliate,

harass, and retaliate against him. (See Doc. 1-3 at PageID 51).

Upon being released, plaintiff claims that defendant Captain Haywood accused plaintiff of

running his mouth. (Doc. 1-7 at PageID 96). Plaintiff claims he explained what happened, but

that Haywood placed him into restrictive housing, purportedly for a pending a use-of-force

investigation. However, plaintiff claims that no use of force investigation took place, and that he

remained in a filthy cell, was deprived dinner, and did not receive pain medication or medical

attention for three days. Plaintiff claims Lewis wrote a false conduct report against him in

connection with the incident and that he was improperly found guilty of a rule infraction violation.

He seeks to hold defendants Warden Cynthia Davis, Sgt. A. Cooper, Lt. B. Barney, and V. Brown

liable based on the false conduct report, guilty finding and/or appeal. (Id. at PageID 98).

Based on the above factual allegations, plaintiff asserts various state and federal claims

against defendants. (See id. at PageID 91, 97-98). As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages

and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID 92).

C. Analysis.

At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this action,

the undersigned concludes that plaintiff may proceed with his First, Fourth, and Eighth

Amendment claims against defendants Lewis and Murray in their individual capacities, based on

his allegations that these defendants retaliated against him, subjected him to a strip search for no

penological purpose, and used excessive force against him. Plaintiff may also proceed at this

juncture with his Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Haywood, based on his allegation

that Haywood deprived him of pain medication and medical attention for three days following the

incident. Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are deserving of further development and may

proceed at this juncture.

The Court has not yet determined whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

any state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Out of an abundance of caution, and in light

of plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will not sua sponte dismiss plaintiff’s state-law claims against

defendants Lewis, Murray, and Haywood at this juncture.2 The Court will determine at a later

stage in the proceedings whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims

is appropriate.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b).

As an initial matter, plaintiff fails to state a viable due process claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment in connection with the RIB hearing, because the challenged disciplinary actions did

not amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment confers on

prisoners only a “limited” liberty interest “to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” or

which “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487; see

also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Wilkinson, 51 F. App’x 553,

556 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit has held that confinement in segregation generally does

not rise to the level of an “atypical and significant” hardship implicating a liberty interest except

in “extreme circumstances, such as when the prisoner’s complaint alleged that he is subject to

2 Plaintiff asserts state-law claims of civil assault, battery, negligence, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and defamation, amongst other claims, against defendants Lewis, Murray, and

Haywood in the complaint. (See Doc. 1-7, Complaint at PageID 91).

an indefinite administrative segregation” or that such confinement was excessively long in

duration. Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Harden-Bey v. Rutter,

524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original); see also Harris v. Caruso, 465 F.

App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the prisoner’s 8-year confinement in segregation

was of “atypical duration” and thus “created a liberty interest that triggered his right to due

process”). Cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223-24 (2005) (ruling that an inmate’s transfer

to Ohio’s “supermax” prison “imposes an atypical and significant hardship” given the

combination of extreme isolation of inmates, prohibition of almost all human contact, indefinite

duration of assignment, and disqualification for parole consideration of otherwise eligible

inmates).

Here, plaintiff has not alleged that the challenged disciplinary proceedings resulted in the

lengthening of his prison sentence, the withdrawal of good-time credits, or the deprivation of any

necessities of life. Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that he was subjected

to a lengthy disciplinary placement amounting to an atypical or significant hardship that would

trigger constitutional concerns. Accordingly, because plaintiff does not have a protected liberty

interest under the circumstances alleged herein, any claim against defendants Warden Cynthia

Davis, Sgt. A. Cooper, Lt. B. Barney, and V. Brown for their conduct in the disciplinary

proceedings fails to state a cognizable federal claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause.3

3 The complaint should also be dismissed to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant

liable in connection with the grievance process or investigation of his claims. (See Doc. 1-1,

Complaint at PageID 98). “There is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional

right, to an investigation.” Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Daniels

v. Lisath, No. 2:10-cv-968, 2011 WL 2710786, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2011). Furthermore, to

the extent that plaintiff claims that the grievance procedure failed to produce the correct outcome,

this cannot give rise to a § 1983 claim because “[p]rison inmates do not have a constitutionally

Plaintiff has also not stated a constitutional claim to the extent he has alleged that Haywood

falsely accused plaintiff of “running his mouth” or that Lewis wrote the false conduct report which

resulted in disciplinary sanctions imposed by the RIB. Erroneous or even fabricated allegations

of misconduct by an inmate, standing alone, do not constitute a deprivation of a constitutional

right. See, e.g., Reeves v. Mohr, No. 4:11cv2062, 2012 WL 275166, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31,

2012) (and cases cited therein) (holding that the prisoner failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted to the extent that he claimed he had “a constitutional right to be free from false

accusations”). “A constitutional violation may occur, if as a result of an accusation, the Plaintiff

was deprived of a liberty interest without due process.” Reeves, supra, 2012 WL 275166, at *2

(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995)). However, as noted above, plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to trigger constitutional concerns because he has not alleged any facts

even remotely suggesting that the challenged disciplinary action deprived him of a protected

liberty interest.

Plaintiff’s equal protection claims should also be dismissed. Plaintiff asserts that all

defendants deprived him of equal protection of the law. (See Doc. 1-7, Complaint at PageID 91,

97). However, plaintiff has failed to plausibly set forth an actionable equal protection claim. “The

Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a

fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others

similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of

protected right to a grievance procedure.” Miller v. Haines, No. 97–3416, 1998 WL 476247, at *1

(6th Cir. Aug.03, 1998) (citations omitted). Prison officials whose only roles “involve their denial

of administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged [unconstitutional] behavior’”

cannot be liable under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Nor does a

prison official’s alleged failure to adequately investigate claims of misconduct rise to the level of

“encouragement” that would make the official liable for such misconduct. Knop v. Johnson, 977

F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395

F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005)). To state a claim for discrimination under the equal protection

clause, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that a state actor intentionally discriminated

against him because of his membership in a protected class. Simpson v. Ameji, 57 F. App’x 238,

239 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)).

In this case, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to plausibly suggest that defendants treated

plaintiff differently or denied him any rights because of his membership in a protected class.

Accordingly, in sum, plaintiff may proceed with his First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment

claims against defendants Lewis and Murray, as well as his Eighth Amendment claim against

defendant Haywood. At this juncture in the proceedings, the Court will not sua sponte dismiss

plaintiff’s state-law claims against defendants Lewis, Murray, and Haywood. Having found that

the remaining claims alleged in the complaint—including those against the remaining defendants,

Lt. B Barney, Sgt. A. Cooper, Warden Cynthia Davis, and V. Brown—fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, plaintiff’s remaining claims should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B), with the exception of plaintiff’s First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment claims

against defendants Lewis and Murray and his Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference claim

against defendant Haywood. At this juncture in the proceedings, plaintiff may also proceed with

his state law claims against defendants Lewis, Murray, and Haywood.

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith,

and therefore, deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, summons,

the Order granting plaintiff in forma pauperis status, and this Order and Report and

Recommendation upon defendants Lewis, Murray, and Haywood, with costs of service to be

advanced by the United States.

2. Plaintiff shall serve upon defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel,

upon defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the

Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed

to defendants or defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge

which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be

disregarded by the Court.

3. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may

occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.

Date: March 20, 2025 s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers__

Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy

of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947

(6th Cir. 1981).