The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: DENNIS A. PERRY CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-1123
SECTION: “G”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Bankruptcy Appellants Dr. William Alden, Perry Associates, LLC,
Crescent City Property Redevelopment Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc.,
Private Connection Auto, LLC, 4330 State Street Drive, LLC, and 1100 South Jefferson Davis
Parkway, LLC’s (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court’s
April 18, 2024 Order approving a Plan of Reorganization in Debtor Dennis A. Perry’s (“Perry”)
bankruptcy case.1 Also pending before the Court is Perry’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.2
Considering the briefs filed by the parties, the record and the applicable law, for the reasons that
follow, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the instant appeal as moot.
I. Background
On November 30, 2020, Perry filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.3 In response to the filing, Appellants filed seven Proofs of Claim related to the
multiple business and personal ventures between Perry and Appellants.4 A state court case
Appellants filed against Perry was also removed to the Bankruptcy Court (the “Adversary
1 Rec. Doc. 1; Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 515.
2 Rec. Doc. 16.
3 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 1.
4 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Claim Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32.
Proceeding”).5 Perry filed affirmative defenses to the Adversary Proceeding,6 objections to the
seven proofs of claim,7 and a motion to terminate the joint venture agreements and trigger the sale
provisions therein.8 These disputes concern numerous loans and joint venture agreements between
Perry and Dr. Alden. Perry and Dr. Alden started their relationship as friends, transitioned into a
lender/borrower relationship, and ultimately entered into several joint venture agreements together.
From March 28, 2022 through April 5, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court held a trial on liability
in Perry’s main bankruptcy case and the claims alleged in two adversary proceedings.9 Prior to
trial, all parties agreed that the issue of damages would be bifurcated and determined at a second
trial after the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of liability.10 The Bankruptcy Court issued an
Original Memorandum Opinion and Order on September 1, 2023.11
Dr. Alden claimed the joint venture agreements gave him ownership interests in several
pieces of property that Perry claimed to be part of his bankruptcy estate: (1) a rental home located
at 4021 9th Street in Marrero, Louisiana; (2) an empty lot located at 4025 Westbank Expressway
in Marrero, Louisiana; (3) a rental home located at 3065 South Palm Drive in Slidell, Louisiana;
(4) a rental home located at 3303 Bonfouca Drive in Slidell, Louisiana; and (5) 27420 Sampson
Drive in Lacombe.12 The Bankruptcy Court found that Appellants had no ownership interest in the
5 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 1.
6 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 20.
7 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Docs. 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 81, 83, 156.
8 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 79.
9 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 460.
10 Id.
11 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 400.
12 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433.
two properties located in Marrero.13 With respect to the Palm Drive, Bonfouca, and Sampson
properties, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the properties be sold, pursuant to the terms of the
joint venture agreements, with the proceeds from the sale of each property to be divided equally
between Perry and Perry Associates.14
On September 12, 2023, Appellants filed notices of appeal, which were allotted to this
Court.15 Perry then filed a motion to amend the judgment, and the Bankruptcy Court issued an
amended ruling on November 21, 2023.16 The trial on damages was held before the Bankruptcy
Court in April 2024.17 This Court administratively closed the original appeals pending ruling by
the Bankruptcy Court on the outstanding damages issues.18
On April 18, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court approved a Plan of Reorganization in Perry’s
bankruptcy case.19 The Confirmed Plan provides that the creditors shall be entitled to receive
excess proceeds from the sale of certain properties and that “the Subchapter V Trustee shall remain
in place to complete the sale of the three joint venture properties as previously ordered by the
13 Id. at 55–57.
14 Id. at 54–55.
15 Case No. 23-5265 (filed by appellants Perry Associates, LLC, Crescent City Property Redevelopment
Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc., Private Connection Auto, LLC, and William W. Alden on
September 12, 2023); Case No. 23-5266 (filed by appellants Perry Associates, LLC, Crescent City Property
Redevelopment Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc., Private Connection Auto, LLC, and William
W. Alden on September 12, 2023); Case No. 23-5341 (filed by appellant Darryl Fish on September 15, 2023); Case
No. 23-5343 (filed by appellant David Edward Cook on September 15, 2023, and voluntarily dismissed on April 15,
2024).
16 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433.
17 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 510.
18 Case No. 23-5265, Rec. Doc. 12; Case No. 23-5266, Rec. Doc. 12.
19 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 515.
Bankruptcy Court.”20 Appellants then filed the instant appeal, Civil Action No. 24-1123, related
to the Bankruptcy Court’s order confirming the Plan of Reorganization (the “Confirmation
Order”).
On September 23, 2024, Appellants filed their brief in the instant appeal related to the
Confirmation Order.21 On October 23, 2024, Perry filed his brief.22 On October 23, 2024, Perry
also filed the Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.23 Appellants did not respond to that motion.
On January 28, 2025, after the briefs were filed, the Bankruptcy Court issued a ruling on
the outstanding damages issues.24 Thereafter, Appellants filed two new appeals, both related to the
Bankruptcy Court’s January 28, 2025 Order.25
II. Issues Raised on Appeal
A. Appellants’ Arguments
Appellants raise two issues in this appeal regarding the Confirmation Order.26 First,
Appellants argue the confirmation of Perry’s Plan of Reorganization was premature given the
pendency of the other appeals.27 Appellants point out that the Bankruptcy Court reduced their
claims from over $900,000 to $18,700.28 Appellants contend that the Bankruptcy Court disallowed
20 Id.
21 Rec. Doc. 12.
22 Rec. Doc. 17.
23 Id.
24 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616.
25 Case Nos. 25-304, 25-305.
26 Rec. Doc. 12.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id.
recovery of the payoffs for delinquent mortgages in the amount of $317,774.54 and disallowed
$350,143.05 in funds spent to maintain and improve the properties.29 Appellants argue the
Bankruptcy Court erred in disallowing these amounts because they were not disputed by Perry.30
Appellants cite In re Spiegel, Inc.31 and In re Adelphia Communications Corp.32 for the proposition
that a confirmation plan should reserve disputed funds to be distributed if the creditor is successful
on appeal.33 Appellants contend the Confirmation Order includes no such provision and instead
allows Perry to maintain possession of substantial moveable and immovable assets.34 According
to Appellants, Perry’s proposal of a plan that ignores undisputed debts was not made in good faith
as required by 11 USC § 1129(a)(3).35
Second, Appellants argue the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to order the liquidation of
the Star Motel and other properties owned by Perry.36 Appellants assert Perry tried to place the
Star Motel beyond the reach of creditors before he filed for bankruptcy, by transferring the property
to his girlfriend for $10 who then executed a $500,000 mortgage on the property.37 Although these
transactions were reversed on advice of counsel, Appellants argue these actions show an obvious
29 Id.
30 Id. at 13–14.
31 385 B.R. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
32 361 B.R. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
33 Rec. Doc. 12 at 14–15.
34 Id. at 15.
35 Id. at 15–16.
36 Id. at 16.
37 Id.
willingness by Perry to perpetrate fraud.38 According to Appellants, the Plan is neither fair nor
equitable, and it discriminates unfairly against them.39 Appellants contend the Bankruptcy Court
should have stayed the Confirmation Order pending appeal to prevent unfairness to them.40 By
confirming the Plan and denying the motion to stay pending appeal, Appellants contend the
Bankruptcy Court has effectively prevented an appeal of the original liability determination.41
Therefore, Appellants assert the Confirmation Order should be reversed as it was premature to
approve the Plan before resolution of the original appeals.42
B. Perry’s Arguments
Perry raises two arguments in the appellee brief.43 First, Perry argues the appeal should be
dismissed and/or denied as equitably moot.44 Perry points out that Appellants failed to obtain a
stay of the Confirmation Order, and the Plan has been substantially consummated.45 Perry also
argues that third parties have relied on the finality of the Plan.46 Therefore, Perry argues that all of
the factors weigh in favor of finding this appeal moot.47
38 Id. at 17.
39 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)).
40 Id. at 18.
41 Id. at 19.
42 Id.
43 Rec. Doc. 17.
44 Id. at 13.
45 Id. at 14–15.
46 Id. at 17.
47 Id.
Second, Perry asserts the Confirmation Order was not premature.48 Perry points out that
Appellants cite no legal authority for their argument that the Confirmation Order was premature.49
Perry contends that Appellants’ claims are unsecured.50 If on appeal of the Adversary Proceeding
this Court determines that Appellants’ claims are for a different dollar amount, Perry argues he can
modify the Plan to increase the percentage payout received by Appellants on the unsecured
claims.51 “If, on appeal of the Adversary Proceeding, this Court reverses the bankruptcy court’s
factual findings as to the fraud committed by Alden, the forgery committed by Alden and the
fraudulent accounting kept by Alden, resulting in Alden holding a higher unsecured claim,” Perry
asserts “this could always be rectified by Perry, if necessary, through a plan modification
permitting an increase in the percentage of the $6,868.00 allocated to Appellant.”52
In the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Perry reiterates his argument that this appeal is moot.53
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which
authorizes appellate review of final orders, judgments and decrees of a United States Bankruptcy
Court entered consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 157.54 In appeals from bankruptcy courts, district courts
sit as an appellate court.55 A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo,
48 Id. at 18.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 19.
52 Id. at 21.
53 Rec. Doc. 16.
54 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
55 Id.
findings of fact for clear error, and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.56
IV.Analysis
This appeal relates only to the Confirmation Order. Appellants argue the Bankruptcy Court
erred by confirming the Plan before Appellants’ other appeals were resolved.57 Perry argues this
appeal is moot because the Plan has been substantially consummated.58 Appellants have not
responded to Perry’s mootness argument. Appellants were given a deadline to file a reply brief,59
but they failed to file one. Appellants also failed to oppose Perry’s Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal, which was set for submission on November 13, 2024.60
In bankruptcy appeal proceedings, “equitable mootness” is a “recognition by the appellate
courts that there is a point beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization
actions.”61 As a general rule, “[t]he doctrine of equitable mootness is designed to protect concerns
unique to bankruptcy proceedings.”62
“Consequently, a reviewing court may decline to consider the merits of a confirmation
order when there has been substantial consummation of the plan such that effective judicial relief
is no longer available—even though there may still be a viable dispute between the parties on
56 In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 208 F.3d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 2000).
57 Rec. Doc. 12.
58 Rec. Docs. 16, 17.
59 Rec. Doc. 8.
60 Rec. Doc. 17-2.
61 In re Efficient Solutions, Inc., 2001 WL 1636843 (E.D. La. 2001); In re GWI PCS I, Inc., 230 F.2d 788,
800 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152 (1995).
62 In re Scopac, 624 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1038); see also In re
Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009).
appeal.”63 To determine whether this appeal is moot, the Court must examine the following three
factors: (1) whether a stay has been obtained, (2) whether the plan has been “substantially
consummated,” and (3) whether the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not
before the court or the success of the plan.64
1. Failure to Obtain a Stay
“The requirement of a stay encapsulates the fundamental bankruptcy policy of reliance on
the finality of confirmation orders by the bankruptcy court.”65 Here, Appellants’ motion to stay
was denied by the Bankruptcy Court and this Court because they did not meet the requirements
for a stay. “A stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the implementation of
the plan . . .”66 Appellants did not respond to Perry’s argument regarding equitable mootness, and
they offer no argument as to why this factor would not weigh in favor of finding this appeal moot.
Therefore, this factor favors dismissal for mootness.
2. Substantial Consummation
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a plan has been substantially consummated when: (1)
substantially all property the plan proposes to transfer is transferred; (2) the debtor assumes the
business or management of substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (3)
distribution under the plan commences.67 The “substantial consummation” test informs a court’s
“judgment as to when finality concerns and the reliance interests of third parties upon the plan as
63 In re GWI, 230 F.2d at 800.
64 Id.
65 In re Berryman, 159 F.3d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1998).
66 See In re GWI, 230 F.3d at 800, n. 25 (quoting In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1994)).
67 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2); In re GWI, 230 F.3d at 801; In re Berryman, 159 F.3d at 945.
effectuated have become paramount to a resolution of the dispute between the parties on appeal.”68
In this case, properties have been surrendered to secured lenders. The sale of one of the
joint venture properties has occurred, and the other two joint venture properties have been
auctioned. Perry continues to manage his businesses and rental properties in order to generate
income to make the plan payments. Disbursements have been made to all classes of claimants. The
Plan Effective Date was several months ago, and all creditors have relied upon the finality of the
Plan. Appellants did not respond to Perry’s argument regarding equitable mootness, and they offer
no argument as to why this factor would not weigh in favor of finding this appeal moot. Therefore,
this factor favors dismissal for mootness.
3. Impact on Third Parties
“The final question in the mootness inquiry is whether the requested relief would affect the
rights of parties not before the court or the success of the Plan.”69 “Substantial consummation of a
reorganization plan is a momentous event, but it does not necessarily make it impossible or
inequitable for an appellate court to grant effective relief.”70 The Court must determine whether it
could place the debtor’s estate or third parties back into the status quo as it existed before
confirmation of the Plan.71
In this case, multiple plan payments have already been made. Creditors are relying on Perry
to continue to make those payments in order to protect secured collateral. Additionally, under the
Bankruptcy Code, taxing entities must be paid on priority claims within 60 months of the Petition
68 In re GWI, 230 F.3d at 801 (quoting In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1041)).
69 In re Berryman, 159 F.3d at 945–46.
70 In re U.S. Brass, 169 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1042–43).
71 In re Berryman, 159 F.3d at 946.
Date. Perry now has only 15 months left to satisfy the priority tax claims. To reverse the Plan at
this point would adversely impact the tax claimants and jeopardize the future success of the Plan.
Moreover, the sales of the joint venture properties to third parties cannot be undone. Appellants
did not respond to Perry’s argument regarding equitable mootness, and they offer no argument as
to why this factor would not weigh in favor of finding this appeal moot. Therefore, this factor
favors dismissal for mootness.
V. Conclusion
Appellants have not responded to Perry’s argument that this appeal is equitably moot.
Appellants failed to obtain a stay of the Confirmation Order, and the Plan has been substantially
consummated. Reversing the Confirmation Order at this point would affect the rights of parties not
before this Court. Therefore, all three factors weigh in favor of finding this appeal moot.
Additionally, since the filing of this appeal, the Bankruptcy Court has ruled on outstanding
damages issues, and Appellants have filed two new notices of appeal related to that ruling. This
development further demonstrates the mootness of the instant appeal, which relates only to the
Confirmation Order. The issues are more properly addressed in the substantive appeals. If the
Bankruptcy Court’s rulings are later reversed, the Plan can be modified to increase the percentage
payout received by Appellants. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Perry’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal” is GRANTED.
The instant appeal is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 299 day of March, 2025.
NANNETTE J Vel BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Rec. Doc. 16.
12