Robins v. Wetzel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JONATHAN ROBINS, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-1474

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL, :

et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the court are the following motions: (1) the defendants’

motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second amended complaint (Doc. 34); (2) the

plaintiffs motion to compel discovery (Doc. 41); (3) the defendants’ motion

for an extension of time to respond to the plaintiffs motion to compel

discovery (Doc. 45); and (4) the plaintiffs motion to compel discovery “to

allow creation of proposed amendment” (Doc. 51).

By way of relevant background, on August 26, 2021, the plaintiff, an

inmate confined at the Rockview State Correctional Institution, (SCI-

Rockview), Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, filed the above-captioned civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). In his original complaint, the

plaintiff alleged violations of his rights to due process, equal protection and

the free exercise of his religion. These alleged violations related to the

plaintiffs participation in a sex offender program at SCl-Rockview. The

plaintiff alleged that the sex offender program, the completion of which is

necessary to be considered eligible for parole, required him to falsely admit

that he was guilty of a crime. While the plaintiff alleged that he was willing to

admit that he engaged in the claimed sexual acts, he stated that he was

unwilling to admit that he engaged in any illegal conduct because the acts

occurred with his wife. The plaintiff's wife was a minor child at the time of the

charged offenses. The plaintiff argued that any requirement that he admit

guilt under the sex offender program violated his constitutional and statutory

rights.

By memorandum and order dated December 9, 2021, the undersigned

gave the plaintiffs complaint preliminary consideration under 28 U.S.C.

§§1915A and 1915(c) and dismissed the action as legally frivolous. (Doc.

12). The plaintiff appealed that decision, and by an opinion filed September

28, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed

this court’s decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further

proceedings. (Doc. 23). Specifically, the Third Circuit agreed that the

plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims, as well as any claims

under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were all properly dismissed.' The

Third Circuit indicated, however, that the plaintiff also alleged that the

admission-of-guilt requirement of the sex offender program violated his

constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of religion. In this

regard, the Third Circuit pointed out that the plaintiff alleged that marriage

was a sacred tenant of his religion and that he could not admit the illegality

of his sexual conduct, which he construed as denouncing his religious marital

vows, without violating his religious beliefs. Although such allegations would

be meritless under the First Amendment, the Third Circuit found that it had

not had occasion to consider an acceptance-of-responsibility component of

a sex offender treatment program in the context of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-

1, et seq., or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C.

§2000bb-1, et seq. Given the lack of controlling precedent and this court’s

failure to consider the claim, the Third Circuit vacated the sua sponte

dismissal and remanded the case for this court to consider the acceptance-

4 The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff also raised a claim of age

discrimination which was not considered by this court, but that any age

discrimination claim was also facially meritless.

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of-responsibility component of the sex offender treatment program in the

context of RLUIPA and RFRA, allowing for amendment of the complaint as

deemed appropriate. (Doc. 23).

On October 21, 2022, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc.

19) which the court ordered stricken from the record (Doc. 22). The plaintiff

was directed to file a second amended complaint limited to the impact of the

plaintiff's acceptance of responsibility in the sex offender treatment program

on his constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of religion. On

February 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed his second amended complaint raising

claims under RLUIPA, RFRA and the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 24).

In response, on April 28, 2023, the defendants filed the pending motion to

dismiss the plaintiffs second amended complaint (Doc. 34) along with a brief

in support thereof (Doc. 35). The plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the

defendants’ motion to dismiss on May 30, 2023. (Doc. 38).

On June 20, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery (Doc.

41) along with a supporting brief (Doc. 42). The defendants then requested

? The plaintiff also argues that he has a right to be seen by the parole

board. This issue was previously ruled upon by the court and found properly

dismissed by the Third Circuit. Therefore, the matter will not be addressed

again herein. du

an extension of time to respond to the motion to compel until after the court

rules on their motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. (Doc. 45).

On December 23, 2023, the plaintiff filed another motion to compel discovery

“to allow creation of proposed accommodation” (Doc. 51) with a supporting

brief (Doc. 52).

In his second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was

convicted in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas of various

sexual offenses, including unlawful contact with a minor, statutory sexual

assault, interference with the custody of a child, and corruption of a minor.*

The plaintiff alleges that his wife was listed as the complainant in his criminal

case.

After his conviction, while incarcerated at SCl-Rockview, the plaintiff

was enrolled in the sex offender program. In fact, the plaintiff alleges that he

was enrolled and released from the sex offender program on five (5)

3 Although the plaintiff contends that he was not convicted on one

charged count, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible

compulsion, the plaintiff's state court docket reflects otherwise. In fact, the

docket reflects that the plaintiff was sentenced to ten (10) to twenty (20)

years of incarceration on this charge. See Commonwealth v. Robins, CP-51-

CR-0003430-2009. This court may take judicial notice of the contents of

another court's docket. See Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535,

537 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

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separate occasions. Each time, the plaintiff alleges that he admitted to the

sexual acts testified to at trial, but claimed they were not crimes because

they were acts with his wife. The plaintiff alleges that marriage is a part of his

recognition of his religion and has spiritual significance, and that to admit to

the illegality of his conduct would be to disavow and slander a religious tenet

of his marriage. The plaintiff states he “believe[s] in his [innocence] because

of [the] religious tenets on his marriage and [he] refuse[s] to lie, make false

statements’, slander, demonize, or disavow the sanctity of his marriage.”

The plaintiff alleges that the Department of Corrections’ application of the

acceptance-of-responsibility component of the sex offender program

infringes on his religious practices as it pertains to his marital religious tenets.

Based on these allegations, the plaintiff generally alleges claims under

RLUIPA, RFRA and the Pennsylvania Constitution.

* The plaintiff alleges that the law states that his actions were legal and,

as a result, any statement by him to complete the program that they were

illegal would be false and a lie. The plaintiff's claim that his actions were legal

is belied by the state court record which demonstrates that he was convicted

by a jury of numerous sexual offenses against a minor and that conviction

was upheld on appeal and after post-conviction challenges. Whether the

plaintiff is under some belief that his actions were legal does not equate to

them having been legal under the law.

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Initially, although the argument is not raised by the defendants, to the

extent that the plaintiff alleges a claim pursuant to RFRA in his second

amended complaint, RFRA was found to be unconstitutional as applied to

the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In response to that

finding, Congress passed RLUIPA, which applies to states only in the areas

of land use and incarceration. Thus, RFRA applies to the federal

government, and RLUIPA applies to the states. Because the plaintiff is a

state inmate bringing his claims against state officials, RFRA is inapplicable

in this case and any claim under RFRA will be dismissed.

In considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second

amended complaint, the defendants argue that, to the extent that the plaintiff

asserts claims against them in their official capacities, his complaint should

be dismissed as being barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Upon review, the

plaintiff names the defendants only in their official capacities and seeks only

prospective injunctive relief.

RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages asserted

against defendants in either their individual or official capacities, but does

allow for injunctive relief against defendants acting in their official capacities.

See Banks v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 601 F. App’x 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2015)

(nonprecedential). Eleventh Amendment immunity shields state actors

acting in their official capacity from an award of damages under RLUIPA.

See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011). Since the plaintiff is

requesting only prospective injunctive relief, which is available to a

successful RLUIPA plaintiff, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied

on this basis.

Moreover, although monetary relief is barred for claims under the

Pennsylvania Constitution, equitable remedies are available. Pocono

Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 688

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F.Supp.2d 316, 320-

21 (M.D.Pa. 2006) (“[l]t is well settled that individual plaintiffs may bring suit

for injunctive relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution’); Jones v. City of

Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1216 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (“[O]ther remedies, such

as declaratory or injunctive relief ... are ... remedies under the Pennsylvania

Constitution.”)). As such, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied on

this basis as well.

The defendants next argue that the plaintiff has substantively failed to

establish a violation of RLUIPA. “Congress passed RLUIPA to grant

heightened protection to prisoners from burdens imposed by the

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government.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2007); see

also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA

“protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their

religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's

permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion’). To

accomplish this protection, Section 3 of RLUIPA provides in pertinent part

that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability, unless the government demonstrates _ that

imposition of the burden on that person —

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—1(a). RLUIPA also has an “expansive[ ]” definition of

“religious exercise,” which includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Nunez v. Wolf, 117

F.4th 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).

In addition, “Congress mandated that [RLUIPA] ‘shall be construed in

favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent

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permitted by ... the Constitution.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c)). Overall,

RLUIPA ... affords inmates even “greater protection” than

that provided by the First Amendment. Holt, 574 U.S. at 357].

Under the latter, a prison regulation that substantially burdens

religious exercise is subject to intermediate scrutiny and thus

must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64

(1987); under RLUIPA, however, that regulation is subject to

strict scrutiny, requiring the government to prove that it “is the

least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental

interest,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2).... [T]hat burden is a heavy

one and carries unique implications in the prison context for both

the interests recognized as compelling and the acceptable

means to accomplish them.

Nunez, 117 F.4th at 146 (first and second alterations added).

“To state a plausible claim under RLUIPA, a [prisoner-]plaintiff must

allege that the prison placed a ‘substantial burden’ on the plaintiff's sincerely

held religious belief.” Lapp v. Nye, 2024 WL 53017, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4,

2024) (citing Washington, 497 F.3d at 277-78). A plaintiff can demonstrate

that a substantial burden exists if:

1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts

of [their] religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally

available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the

precepts of [their] religion in order to receive a benefit; OR (2)

the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to

substantially modify [their] behavior to violate [their] beliefs.

Washington, 497 F.3d at 280 (capitalization of “OR” in original) (footnote

omitted). “If a prisoner-plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on a

sincerely held religious belief, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that

the policy or practice furthers a compelling government interest and is the

least restrictive means of doing so.” Lapp, 2024 WL 53017, at *7 (citing Holt,

574 U.S. at 361-62); see also Holt, 574 U.S. at 355 (explaining that RLUIPA

“prohibits a state or local government from taking any action that

substantially burdens the religious exercise of an institutionalized person

unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes the least

restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”).

Without addressing whether the plaintiff's religious rights were

substantially burdened by the prison’s acceptance-of-responsibility policy in

relation to the sex offender program, the defendants immediately dive into

whether there is a compelling governmental interest in requiring inmates to

accept responsibility for their actions and admit to the illegality of those

actions.® In doing so, the defendants rely heavily on McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S.

° Given the sparsity of facts before the court relating to the plaintiff's

religion, the circumstances surrounding his relationship with the minor victim,

and his arrest and conviction, there is some question as to whether the

plaintiff can establish a substantial burden on his religious rights in this

ai (footnote continued on next page)

24 (2002). McKune, however, was a case addressing whether a sex offender

program which required the offender to accept responsibility for the crime for

which he was convicted violated the offender’s Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination. The standard applicable in McKune is different

than the one applicable to the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim. While the defendants

argue that the McKune Court ruled that requiring inmates to accept

responsibility and admit to the illegality of their actions furthers a “compelling”

governmental interest, the standard applicable here, the Court did no such

thing. Instead, the Court found that the decision not to offer immunity to every

participant in the sexual offender program served two “legitimate” state

interests, a standard which is not applicable in this case. Thus, McKune is

inapposite.

Relatedly, the defendants turn to the Third Circuit’s decision in

Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775 (3d Cir. 2010), which cited to McKune in

particular case. Importantly, there is a question as to whether the plaintiff

was, in fact, married to the minor at the time of the offenses and whether any

marriage was valid given the plaintiffs own statements that the minor lied to

him about her age when they met and got married. (Doc. 1). There’s also a

question as to whether there are any religious implications if the plaintiffs

actions took place outside of the marriage or if the marriage is somehow

invalid. Some of these facts are alluded to in the state court’s decisions

addressing the plaintiff's post-conviction challenge. However, the court is not

entitled to consider those facts in relation to the pending motion to dismiss.

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finding that “States ... have a vital interest in rehabilitating convicted sex

offenders” and “acceptance of responsibility for past offenses” is a “critical

first step” in a prison’s rehabilitation program for such offenders. Newman,

617 F. 3d at 779-80 (citing McKune, 536 U.S. at 33). Defendants argue that

this demonstrates that Pennsylvania has a “vital interest” in rehabilitating

convicted sex offenders.

In considering the above, the defendants do nothing to address the

standard applicable in this case. To this extent, the defendants do not

address whether the acceptance-of-responsibility component of the sex

offender treatment program furthers a compelling government interest and

whether it is the least restrictive means of doing so. Given this, the court will

deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs second amended

complaint on this basis.

Finally, as to the plaintiffs second amended complaint, although the

plaintiff alleges a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the defendants

do nothing to address this claim in their motion to dismiss. As such, that claim

will be allowed to proceed as well.

Given the court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court

turns then to the remaining motions. The plaintiff has filed a motion to compel

discovery. (Doc. 41). In his motion, the plaintiff indicates that he served

discovery requests upon defendants seeking, among things, his pre-

sentence report and psychological assessments, which the defendants have

refused to provide. (Doc. 41). In response, the defendants filed a motion for

an extension of time to respond to the plaintiff's motion to compel pending

the court’s ruling on their motion to dismiss (Doc. 45). The defendants

request that they be given twenty-one (21) days from the date of the court's

ruling on the motion to dismiss to file a response. The plaintiff then filed

another motion to compel “to allow creation of proposed accommodation” in

which he is continuing to seek his pre-sentence report and psychological

assessments. (Doc. 51).

In light of the court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the

second amended complaint, the defendants’ motion for an extension of time

will be granted. Any decision on the plaintiff's motions to compel will be held

in abeyance pending the filing of a brief in opposition to the motions by

defendants.

sigs

The Court will enter an appropriate Order.

E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Date: Jal aS

21-1474-02

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